

THE POLITICS OF SURVIVAL: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF THE CHINESE IN NEW ZEALAND

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A B S T R A C T

This work is first and foremost intended to be a reasonably comprehensive social history of the Chinese community which attempts to treat the subject from the perspective of the Chinese community. This has been, at least in part, accomplished by extensive attention to the development of organisational structures within the community.

A considerable body of literature on overseas Chinese communities has focused on the matrix of associational activity which is an aspect of the overseas community. This was important, as Willmott noted in 1969 for it facilitated the beginning of attempts through sociological analysis to produce generalisations about overseas Chinese communities which could form the basis of future comparative work (Willmott, 1969: 282). This present study is intended to be complementary to and an extension of that work building specifically on the analyses provided by Freedman (1967), Crissman (1967), Willmott (1969) and Wickberg (1979). The particular aim is to trace the changes and persistence in the associational structure of the New Zealand Chinese community by locating its history within the complex milieu which persistently confronted its development. Through this it is possible to indicate how the organisational structure of the community, acting as a variable, is capable of innovation, fragmentation and collective action depending on the particular situations that influence its existence.

This analysis takes Crissman's model of the segmentary structure which he derives from synchronic analysis and applies it in a diachronic fashion. The results of this confirm that while the derivation of the segmentary structure may be traced to historic urban adaptations in China, its development through time in the overseas community is a reflection of changing contexts. It is argued here that not only does interaction within and external to the Chinese, create the necessity for persistence and change in the segmentary structure, but that the structure itself provides the most efficacious means through which the Chinese community governs itself as well as articulating its needs and mediating external demands. Consequently, the segmentary structure constitutes, as part of the culture of an overseas Chinese community, what Cohen refers to as a 'universe(s) of...formally non-political formations and activities that are politicized in the course of social action' (Cohen, 1974:xvi), - in brief a case of political ethnicity. This social history maintains that the New Zealand Chinese community through the emergence of political ethnicity exemplified by the change and persistence in the segmentary structure of the community has ensured its survival and integrity.

FRONTISPIECE

成語：「瓜田李下」(之嫌)

辭意解釋被猜疑之感覺：在李樹下勿整理帽冠，在瓜田裡勿整理鞋帶。免受偷盜瓜李之嫌疑。

注釋：右列之辭語是由亞歷山大頓牧師

從在一八九四年壹位華僑來紐移民聽聞后記錄下來的。詞意有忠告的意念。頓牧師附注了他自己的辭語，描述當時的華僑怎樣适应紐西蘭環境——「華人猜疑一切也意料到被人(洋人)猜疑」。

Translation: 'Under the plum tree do not put your cap straight; nor in a melon patch lace your shoes'

Note: The above proverb was recorded by Reverend Alexander Don who had heard it given as advice to a recent Chinese immigrant to New Zealand in 1894. Don added his own proverb which according to him described how the Chinese coped with New Zealand:

'The Chinese suspects and expects to be suspected',

(see Annual Up-Country Tour Among Otago Chinese, 1894-95:18.

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PART I

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: THE FRAMEWORK, METHOD AND THE FOCUS

The subject of this thesis is the Chinese community in New Zealand, a topic with a rather too well trodden path before it, including three books, thirty-one theses and, at last count, twenty-five assorted articles. It is therefore with some humility, and fear that I add yet another work to this plethora of material which from all accounts, especially the Chinese themselves, has explored the topic to its full. However with a persistence characteristic of the people of whom I write I have tried to add some sociological insight to the history of the Chinese community. It is a social history which if it is doing its job properly should, as regards overseas Chinese communities, satisfy three requirements defined by Wickberg (1965) when he describes the challenge overseas Chinese communities in Asia present to the historian:

The existence of these communities presents the historian with the important task of identifying periods of significant change in their institutional lives and in their relations with both their host societies and their "mother country", China.

(Wickberg, 1965:viii)

The task I have set myself is to identify (using the key points Wickberg highlights) what I consider the development of political ethnicity in a Chinese community. In order to do this it is necessary to discuss the development of organisations within this community and to trace the history of these organisations as they respond and change according to the influence of more complex changes in New Zealand society and China. Unlike other writers however, I have not been able to discuss this process as one that conforms to the gradual and inexorable assimilation of a minority into the 'greater New Zealand culture' (Greif 1974:xiii) nor am I happy to try and evaluate the history of the New Zealand Chinese using Park's stages of contact, competition, accommodation and assimilation (Ng 1959:7-10). This theoretical position, while ideologically embedded in New Zealand's past, invariably evaluates an ethnic minority from the perspective of how it should develop and not as a historic community which has developed through time. Granted, Park's stages allow for some historic development and change but these are deemed to be 'progressive and irreversible' rather than having their own dynamic. If anything it is the concepts of Park's stages which are useful but they hardly conform to a neat developmental pattern.

The assumptions this study is based on essentially come from three sets of ideas which encompass, as much as possible, the kinds of questions I have asked about the New Zealand Chinese and the changes that have occurred in their community.

The three sets of ideas are covered under the terms framework, method and focus. The first, framework, deals with the way one conceptualizes the milieu in which the Chinese community has developed through time. This study operates under the assumption that the development of the Chinese community can be viewed from the perspective of various relationships the community encounters as part of its

total social relations. Largely these are sets of relationships originating from three interrelated spheres of activity. The more obvious spheres would include New Zealand society in the midst of which the Chinese community lives and China, the homeland or place of national origin from which they came or to which they trace their origin. The former provides a context of hostility mellowed by later tolerance while the other in the midst of its own political turmoils goes from total neglect to close scrutiny of its overseas population. Both of these contexts supply sets of relationships and problems for the developing Chinese community which force the community to organize, in order to maintain its integrity and survival. Since both contexts constantly change the Chinese community is also forced to periodically re-articulate its position through mobilizing sets of social relationships to face the threats and pressures it confronts.

While these are the two obvious spheres of activity, the reaction to them gives rise to a third context which suffers the unintended consequences of action taken in regard to the other spheres of activity. The third area of concern is the social relations of the Chinese community itself which in the course of organising and reorganising creates the basis for internal cohesion and fragmentation. The very nature of collective effort to confront pressures from the other contexts leads invariably to new alignments and these in turn result in dissension within the community, arguments over authority, and organisational fragmentation, a unique quality of overseas Chinese communities which will be discussed later. Alternatively the tendency of units in the Chinese community to value their autonomy leads to new difficulties in the functional organisation of collective activity.

The three contexts provide a basic framework in which to place the history of the Chinese community and adequately isolate the influence of three interrelated sets of social relations which together provide a way of analysing the development of the Chinese community.

Two sets of arguments, however, emerge from the framework, one having to do with content or the history of the Chinese in New Zealand and the other with the way one analyses the history from the perspective of social relations within the Chinese community. The organisation of the thesis attempts to encompass both sets of arguments by providing sufficient historic data to answer questions about content and probe the analytical points which have to do with the nature and extent of political ethnicity in the Chinese community.

The analytical problem is to uncover the kinds of external and internal relationships of the Chinese community that lead to ethnic loyalties and customs being organised and articulated for specific purposes. The specific purposes and organisation have to do with the distribution of power and authority in the Chinese community and the way it is brought to bear on making decisions about political action.

The second set of ideas has to do with the matching of the historical and analytical problems with a method of doing research. Essentially there were two methods, one having to do with documentary evidence which could be brought to bear on problems of historic content and the other having to do with the exploration of the kinds of interconnections discussed previously. The documentary evidence to elucidate the relationship between the Chinese community and New Zealand society was a matter of collecting and reading a mass of data,

but the evidence to enable an understanding of the social organisation of the Chinese community required field work which used individual biographies as the key to the kinds of relationships that existed.

In approaching the problem from this perspective the study relies heavily on Mill's (1970) important statements about the nature of the sociological imagination. The data, therefore, was collected through the recording of individual biography but the questions that informed the structure of this biography were designed to link the individual to the social organisation of which he or she was an integral part.

Finally, the focus of the study is simply the attempt to take a set of problems, the analytic questions that arise, the answers that are derived from them and develop an explanation of how and why a Chinese community was able to articulate its autonomy and survive in a context which at times would seem to deny this possibility. The explanation used two sets of ideas, one derived from the literature on the unique types of social organisation which are ubiquitous in overseas Chinese communities and provide a range of idioms under which the community may combine its resources to articulate its needs, and the other from the notion of political ethnicity. Since the Chinese community in its history has organised into interest groups and mobilised resources to confront various problems with which it is faced, and since this organisation regardless of its internal or external orientation to the Chinese community has to do with the struggle for power and the authority and the right to use that power, then it is maintained that political ethnicity is an accurate description of the process.

The framework was initially derived from an examination of available resources both popular and academic. In order to indicate the sets of problems and questions that emerge the existing studies on the New Zealand Chinese community or aspects relating to it have been divided into five categories largely on the basis of their approach, extent of coverage and focus.

The first category and earliest writing of the New Zealand Chinese dealt almost ostensibly with the gold fields activity of early Chinese immigrants to New Zealand which spanned a period from 1865 till the turn of the century. It was largely descriptive, relying almost entirely on information gleaned from the Presbyterian Church whose missionary activity at one time focused on Chinese gold miners in Otago.

One of the earliest and most important contributions on the Chinese in the goldfields was provided by Reverend Alexander Don who was missionary to the Chinese in Otago in 1886 till 1908 and made annual trips, by foot, around the various gold mining settlements of the Chinese (see Map IV). Don's annual reports were published in The New Zealand Presbyterian and the separate issues of Up-Country Tours, but are as meticulous in their detail as his diary in which he recorded the names, village and country of origin, years of schooling, number of visits home and place of residence in New Zealand of most of the Chinese he met. While Don's evangelical success was dubious amongst his mining friends, his feeling for their lives was immense, only wavering slightly when he found their ways wanting and their resistance to Christianity strong. Don's understanding of the community grew with time and he pieced together much information which allows the reader to understand that the mining groups, despite separation and isolation were not only tied together but also still

linked to their homeland. This latter point, while perhaps not foremost in Don's mind initially, definitely became significant as the Presbyterian Church decided to open the Canton Missions in the home countries of some of the New Zealand Chinese.

Don's major contribution, however, was in his description of the gold field's communities and groups of miners, their recreation, associational activity and their relationship individually to their families in China. Don's observations present a picture of Chinese settlement that is more than lonely groups of miners spread out all over the gold fields. Instead they are linked by various social relations, including their local Chinese merchant network, their attempts at organisation, the conflicts that arose between groups and the problems of confrontation with European society.

Of equal importance is the material that can be gleaned about the influence of such a person as himself working amongst the Chinese. The reaction to the Church and Don is manifest at both individual and group level as they either decide to accept or reject his teaching, encourage their own religious activity or attempt to enlist his help as a mediator between themselves and the European society. This latter role is one that developed during his career and persisted with the aid of like-minded people in the Presbyterian Church who had compassion for the Chinese. It was, perhaps, these people working with the Chinese who first realised the effect of constraints the Chinese faced. Because of this they fulfilled a unique role at periodic times assisting the Chinese to confront the stereotyped attitudes they faced and the government which took eighty three years to accept the idea of a Chinese community complete with families.¹

This contribution by the Presbyterian Church as both a spokesperson and historian of the Chinese community has continuously provided researchers with an initial introduction to the Chinese community, but unfortunately these same researchers did not exhaust the vast material produced nor attempt to go beyond the recorded events piecing them together into a complete picture.

One descendant of both the Presbyterian Church and those who used these materials was Jean McNeur. Miss McNeur wrote one of the earliest history theses on the Chinese community in 1930. She was born in Canton, the daughter of a Presbyterian missionary, Reverend McNeur, who, besides Don, probably knew more about the Chinese community in the period from the 1890's to the late 1904's than any other European. Miss McNeur's thesis presented a picture of Chinese peasant miners, who were superstitious, frugal, hardy and willing survivors in a none too pleasant environment. Her study is informed by the church's involvement with the Chinese and government immigration restrictions against them, but only sparingly with knowledge of the Chinese community which is defined largely in terms of the more renowned and professional Chinese people within it. McNeur also, however, alluded to a process:

..... the types of Chinese in New Zealand has changed from the gold digger of former days to the more assured and better educated young man who has entered the country under the Immigration Restriction Laws.

(McNeur 1930:92)

For McNeur, the Chinese population had changed from being almost an entirely superstitious group of peasants to a more sophisticated group of materialists but the dynamics of this process including reference to the internal structure of the Chinese community are absent.

The second category includes work on immigration restrictions, legislative activity and the results of these as it affected the population of Chinese in New Zealand. These through time have gone from a mere recounting of legislation to more sophisticated works which attempt to explain the context in which this legislation emerges but few have attempted a sociological explanation.

By far the most often quoted source for those who have dealt exclusively with legislation, outside direct reference to Hansard, are Dr Scholefield and T.D.H. Hall who wrote predominantly in the period from 1927 till 1936 as a contribution to the Wellington Group of Institute of Pacific Relations. Hall was Clerk of the Dominion Parliament and Dr Scholefield was Parliamentary Librarian so both had the benefit of being close to records and the people who had created them. Their first effort was a monograph in 1927 entitled Asiatic Immigration into New Zealand; Legislative Control and Historical Survey, a largely factual excursion through the myriad of restrictions from 1881 till 1923. The account they provide is objective, lacking any evaluation until the very end, when they provide two important insights. The first describes the history of Chinese in New Zealand according to the politicians:

There is recognition by the bulk of our leading men in political circles of the real nature of the problem, the necessity of maintaining racial purity and standards of living. Sweeping condemnations of the Chinese race on moral and other grounds, the attribution of inferiority, low civilization, and the denial of culture receive no support from competent judges, and thinkers. Nevertheless, in the formation of public opinion and in securing the driving power for new and more stringent legislation the commonest method has been that of abuse and the playing upon the fears and self interest of sections of the community. A fresh agitation is arising. It remains to be seen whether the sound and responsible views that have been expressed by leading men in all parties will receive sufficient support to enable the matter to be dealt with without offence to the rising nationalist consciousness of the East.

Four points emerge from the above which summarise the context of Asiatic immigration restrictions. Firstly there were fears by New Zealand labour that they would be swamped by the onrush of cheap Chinese labour from China. Secondly, that the 'condemnations' and 'agitation' were groundless, but nevertheless apparent if not purposefully created, evidenced by their monotonous sporadic appearances. Thirdly that racial purity became and continued to be a preoccupation in New Zealand. Fourthly that there had been no attempt to acknowledge the national feelings of those who faced exclusion.²

For later writers the above statements have become part of a general explanation for the existence of immigration restrictions:

First, and dominant, was working class fear of cheap labour depressing an already uncertain income level that reflected the instability of a primary producing economy dependent on world markets with fluctuating prices. Secondly there were middle class fears of similar competition in the sphere of retail business, reinforced by a belief that the presence of non-Europeans was in some way a threat to bourgeois respectability particularly in the area of sexual mores. Thirdly, politicians - some of whom appear to have had strong racist attitudes and expressed them with vigour of conviction - were quite prepared to make political capital of public fears, and even to reinforce those fears if they showed signs of waning. Fourthly, there was the ubiquitous existence of a hostile stereotype within the condemnatory blanket judgement of foreigners.

(Roy, 1970:16)

The predominant tendency is to rely on periods of racism which are explained by either the racist predisposition of politicians or middle class and working class fears of entrepreneurial skills and cheap labour (see also Ng in Otago Daily Times 22 and 29 July 1972).³ While one cannot deny that these were all influential the level of generality ignores the more important aspects of colonial

politics, namely dependency and internal conflict between economic groups represented in the New Zealand government. The point here was made clearly and concisely by Scholefield and Hall in 1927: although never laid out as the focus of their description:

From the New Zealand point of view, it is interesting to note the part played by the immigration question in settling one of the difficult problems of the relationship between New Zealand and the Home Country. On the one side, there has been the recognition of our right to decide our destinies and, on the other side, the greater recognition by the Dominion of its place and responsibility in a world system.

(Scholefield and Hall, 1927:16)⁴

In the same year the above authors rewrote their earlier piece, this time free from the constraints imposed by their writing for the Institute, adding 'inferences from the facts' which they considered worthy of 'attention and study' (Hall, 1927:228). The inferences were noteworthy, but generated a widespread outcry in New Zealand (see Ponton, 1946:73). The most important ones for the purposes of this work were as follows: (1) that periods of economic downturn seemed to heighten the intensity of the racial purity issue in New Zealand; (2) that the whole argument of Asiatic immigration restrictions was used as part of a struggle between a conservative Legislative Council and a more radical House of Representatives; (3) that the outcome of this struggle and its resultant agitation and legislation led to the creation of 'racial consciousness'; (4) that New Zealand dealt with the Asiatic immigration as a problem that concerned only herself without regard to China or Britain; (5) that if Chinese lived in particular areas together it was perhaps more the result of the 'public feeling of the white population (than) any desire on the part of Asiatics to herd together', and (6) that if the Chinese

were to remain in New Zealand they should receive 'sympathetic treatment' which could only come by 'the gradual elimination of racial consciousness' (Hall, 1927:234-236). The salient points Scholefield and Hall made in 1927 formed the basis for the way I have thought about the relationship between the Chinese community and New Zealand. Specifically, I borrowed their emphasis on economic context, intra-governmental conflict, and colonial-imperial relations as a context in which to place a description of immigration restriction which has, as they predicted, far more explanatory power than reliance on individual racism or class antagonism as the only contributing factors. Of perhaps more importance for an understanding of the Chinese community itself, however, is their analytic point which suggests that the surrounding structure in the dominant society, in fact, helped create the very phenomenon which allowed hostility to be perpetuated. The structure which created antagonism and restriction also unintentionally helped create a Chinese community and the unintended consequence of antagonism and restriction was reaction from the institutional framework within this Chinese community.

Three other works deserve mention not only because they contain considerable data but because they brought some rigorous analysis to aspects of immigration restrictions. F.A. Ponton wrote his thesis 'Immigration Restriction in New Zealand' in 1946 and this represented the first attempt to explore the relationship between the New Zealand government and the Colonial Office while at the same time examining the operation of the Customs Department through access to their files.⁵ Ponton carefully traced the changing nexus of power that was responsible for immigration matters and noted the appropriation of this right finally by Cabinet after 1920. While the

historic information and presentation is exact and objective there are slight hints that Ponton holds little sympathy for any party who had been the subject of immigration restriction.

On the opposite side at least in terms of sympathy, is O'Connor (1968), who has covered the legislative period reviewed by Ponton, but with a focus on racial prejudice in the period 1908 till 1920 when the smouldering 'white New Zealand' policy came to the fore and was expressed overtly as policy.⁶ As O'Connor notes, the major New Zealand history books exclude this aspect of New Zealand from their discussion and his work remedies this deficiency with a particularly detailed recounting of the wave of anti-Asiatic feeling that swept the country after World War 1 and the New Zealand government's ability to finally find a formula for restriction that would avoid confrontation at home, with England or with other powers. O'Connor's major point is that New Zealand history has effectively covered up this aspect or it has been overshadowed by the discussion of Pakeha-Maori relations which have not drawn heavy criticism historically and that it is time this incompleteness in New Zealand's self image was rectified (O'Connor 1968:65).⁷

The third work is a thesis by Rachagan (1971) which links the immigration restrictions to New Zealand society through the medium of local press. Rachagan examines the context of government activity as reflected in the press from 1865 to 1947. The significance of this work is that it firmly shows the excessive extent of anti-Chinese coverage in the press until at least 1946. Rachagan's careful scrutiny of the press goes a considerable way to supporting O'Connor's call for an uncovering of what has taken place in regard to anti-Asiatic feeling, but without providing any explanation or any more than a minimum description of its effects on the Chinese community.

The third category of work discusses aspects of the first two categories but more importantly proceeds to discuss specific aspects of the Chinese community in detail. The most elaborate example⁸ in this category, one that has remained largely the prerogative of Chinese writers, is an M.A. thesis by Lawrence Wong entitled 'Chinese Youth in Wellington'.

The focus of Wong's thesis is on young Chinese people, predominantly those from sixteen to nineteen, whom he notes, despite Westernisation from all outward appearances are actually an homogeneous group, who prefer Chinese company, although they are New Zealand citizens.⁹ They have, according to Wong, synthesised cultural patterns of both contexts. The central question in the thesis is to ask why this situation prevails and why they have resisted total assimilation. Wong isolates two important aspects as the contributing factors; racism on the parts of the dominant society (a point he shares with Ng, 1959:118) and the 'resilient and adaptive nature of the Chinese institutions, including family and social organizations in Wellington and the rest of New Zealand, with the Chinese family as the most powerful unifying factor' (Wong, 1973:2).¹⁰

The thesis then proceeds after an historic discussion to deal with the influence of restrictive immigration legislation as reflecting racism and the influence of the changing family and social structure on the Wellington community. The important observation Wong makes is that it is impossible to discuss youth without examining the 'context of the Chinese milieux' but immediately restricts the context by maintaining that:

No reliable research has been undertaken on the political attitude of the New Zealand Chinese and the writer believes that research in a field which is sensitive would be unprofitable.

(Wong, 1973:28)

Luckily, the author does not conform to his own assertion and does discuss the evolution of political organisation and demographic imbalance, both as an outcome of immigration restriction.

Unfortunately, the former relationship is couched in general terms and used mainly to contrast with the period post 1936 which he describes in terms of liberalized immigration policy and 'administrative discrimination' (Wong 1973:70). While the context has changed, Wong notes that the associations which existed in the Chinese community still remain and in fact became the basis for some complex developments in the 1960's and 70's. The real focus of the thesis becomes the nature of internal conflict over who has the right in the Chinese community to lead collective action, a situation reminiscent of the Chinese community during the war years. Wong recounts the chronology of the conflict but the use of context disappears in the explanation. The irony of the work is that conflict has to do with the competitive development of community halls to provide recreation, cultural and spiritual guidance and education for all the community but particularly the younger members. Yet, as Wong notes in the end, they are no part of the issue, being excluded from the area in which the conflict takes place (Wong 1973:47).

While the thesis returns to the issues of Chinese youth the fundamental contribution Wong makes is to show clearly that the historical aspects of social structure have influenced the shape of the Chinese community and the individuals within it.

However, it is also clear that in fact there are two contexts of social organisation; one which is part of European dominant society with its institutions and organisations and the other, an attribute of the Chinese community. The former, at least implicitly in Wong's analysis, has helped bring about the existence of the

organisation in the Chinese community (see Wong 1972:59) and these in turn have influenced the response of individuals, in this specific case, young people, to the dominant society.¹¹ This much is clear but the final explanation for the organisational conflict in the community and the re-emergence of associational activity in Wong's opinion hinges on the personalities of two men who seem to both want a community hall but have differing ideas about the organisations which will actually commence the activity (Wong 1972:146).¹² The only qualification of this view is his suggestion that the Ambassador, one of the personalities, used the hall issue as a means of stimulating a 'strong pro-Nationalist China backing in Wellington' (Wong 1972:144).

The Ambassador, as Wong notes, communicated news of a fund raising sponsored by one organisation to a Taiwan newspaper where the event was incorrectly reported and in fact credited to another organization - one supported by the Ambassador. The point is clear in this instance but this kind of connection is absent when Wong evaluates the historic development of social organisation in the Chinese community. It seems evident from research that external events affected both the social organisation in the Chinese community and the response of New Zealand to the Chinese presence. New Zealand's external relations with Britain seem to have influenced her immigration policy and political changes in China in conjunction with New Zealand's anti-Chinese fervour directly or indirectly produced the kinds of organisations that emerge within the Chinese community.

Wong's work is extremely important for he is the first researcher to go beyond the limitations imposed by the use of assimilation, acknowledging the presence of conflict, a social organisation which has existed through time and the importance of the context in which the Chinese community has survived.¹³

The fourth category includes a small number who have chosen a demographic view of the Chinese community. Again this approach has started with immigration restriction and has developed stages of the Chinese communities history which reflects the changes in population dynamics and residence patterns.

The best example of this approach is Taher (1970) who divided the history of Chinese immigration to New Zealand into phases: 1866-1920 the phase of legislative restrictions and increasing population; 1921-1945 a permit system phase with a decreasing Chinese population and finally a post 1945 phase marked by an increasing population and controlled immigration (Taher 1970:38-41). The demographic periods that corresponded to the above phases include 1866-1900, a period of 'concentration'; 1901-1920, a period of 'dispersion' and 1920-1961, a period of 'reconcentration' (Taher 1970:46-60). Again, while the information is useful at a general level, the phases and periods described are not. Legislative activity didn't begin till 1881 and certainly didn't end in 1920 and the period from 1866 till 1920 cannot aptly be described as either one of population concentration or dispersion but perhaps more correctly as characterized by both simultaneously. Taher does discuss some aspects of the Chinese community but there is no real attempt to relate legislative restriction and population dynamics other than through over-all population numbers, nor any attempt to explain why residence patterns changed other than to note the influence of community and prejudice which pulled people together and 'economic activities occupational status and efficient intra-urban transportation' which separate them. (Taher 1970:57).

The fifth category, and perhaps the most significant, includes those who, while acknowledging all the above approaches, have also attempted to discuss the history of the entire Chinese community.

The most significant work in the fifth category is The Chinese in New Zealand (1959), by Ng Bickleen Fong, an extension of her M.A. thesis written four years earlier. Primarily the book addressed itself to the problem of how 'fellow countrymen are fitting into New Zealand life' by using assimilation as a desired end and trying to evaluate the position and status of first and second generation Chinese in New Zealand (Ng 1959:1, 11-12 and 40-49). Ng used Park as her point of departure, but only cursorily discusses the history of contact and competition preferring to develop a typology of the generations in terms of their relative assimilation of acculturation.

Ng's view of the Chinese in New Zealand, of necessity, given her theoretical stance, is synchronic, lapsing only occasionally into a diachronic view in the discussion of immigration and early history. The result of this is a sketch of the extent of legislation and discrimination, but never a discussion of why they existed. Similarly one gets glimpses of historic changes in the structure of the community, for instance in the four paragraph discussion of political institutions, but it is only a brief incomplete framework without historic depth (see Ng 1959:50-51). Ng describes the state of 'social institutional life' as being in a 'state of disorganisation' without attempting to explain why this is the case (ibid:50) and further describes the community as politically inactive as far as both China and New Zealand are concerned, partially explained by exclusion and partially by cultural habits or remaining aloof from politics (ibid.). There is a sense in which the reader begins to feel that the author is ashamed of her own community for in several places mention is made of the point that the New Zealand Chinese, because of their lack of education and

background, are not able to transmit the 'best characteristics of Chinese civilization' an opinion that was very close to those expressed repeatedly in the endless debates over immigration restrictions (see Ng, 1959:8, 35 and 121).

Despite shortcomings, however, the book has some fundamental insights which echoed Hall (1927), although this work was apparently not used.¹⁴ Ng firmly maintains that the structural impositions placed on the Chinese in New Zealand in the areas of immigration restriction, naturalisation, voting and the contingent effect of this on employment, education and welfare has created the kind of community she described in 1959 (Ng, 1959:127). Ng maintains that:

The immigration restrictions against the Chinese have been one of the main factors hindering the acculturation and assimilation of the Chinese in this country.

(Ng, 1959:118)

Furthermore, Ng asserts that when second generation New Zealand-born Chinese face discrimination it tends to make them 'race conscious' and more Chinese than those born in China (*ibid.*:47). In the first instance if one removes the desired ideals of acculturation and assimilation from the equation then one is led to ask what effect discrimination had on the first generation Chinese in New Zealand and particularly on their political organisation.

Essentially Ng provided, from her synchronic view, a way of thinking about the history of the Chinese community which coincided with some of the suggestions that emerged from Hall. The questions that remained unanswered were those which would have asked about activity in the Chinese community which, from all accounts, merely endured without action or re-action.

The one work which has been done since Ng completed her book and which purported to include both a social history and a survey of the local Chinese is The Overseas Chinese in New Zealand by Greif.¹⁵ Greif completed his work in 1972 after four years research which would have enabled him to interview a number of older men who were still able to recall the politics of their own community from the turn of the century. The book, however, while setting out to reveal political opinions of the New Zealand Chinese ends up assessing attitudes, values and the degree of assimilation:

...one is struck by the degree to which the Chinese have been assimilated into New Zealand life and culture.

and

The public opinion poll reveals an overall desire and ability on the part of almost all Chinese under 40 to assimilate almost completely.

(Greif, 1974:161)

One is led to believe at the onset that Greif is concerned with the historic development of political life amongst the Chinese in New Zealand, but his conclusions deny that it existed:

If complete cultural assimilation is in the offering, how does this affect the political life of the New Zealand Chinese? The answer lies in the historical background of the Chinese in New Zealand. Having come from peasant stock in search of money to buy land, often fleeing the anarchy of China in the 1850's and 60's, the Chinese of New Zealand had little experience involvement... Only when their basic goals were challenged did they speak out, and almost always through friendly Europeans...

(Greif 1974:162)

The confusion that emerges from Greif's study is that it seems to start with a notion of Chinese politics and power within the community but ends up evaluating political activity as defined by participation in New Zealand politics. According to Greif both

forms of political participation are the prerogative of individuals and that group political activity is thwarted by conservatism. In the end the Chinese are described as:

...rapidly and usually happily becoming average or perhaps above-average New Zealanders whose race happens to be Chinese.

(Greif 1974:163)

which could be marred by 'an unsatisfactory solution to the immigration question and the recognition of Communist China'.¹⁶ In essence Greif uses a set of questions which are intended to isolate values and attitudes. Having done this the values and attitudes are then used as a basis for the description of the Chinese community which makes a discussion of social organisation or political activity irrelevant since attitudes and values form the basis of both content and analysis.

While the above discussion by no means exhausts all the sources noted at the beginning it does provide enough examples to clarify the contexts and analytic points upon which this study is based.

The starting point of this work then is to extrapolate from what has been written a number of contexts and analytic questions which would provide a framework to be used in thinking about the Chinese community. These contexts and questions, it seemed to me, had to satisfy a fundamental requirement of sociological research which I believe is consistent with the kinds of expectations Wickberg set out when he described the task before the researcher (op.cit:1). The questions and their answers then had to link biography with social structure and history. In this specific instance they must link individuals in the relevant communities discussed to the social structure and these in turn must be related

to the historic context in which they have existed. In drawing attention specifically to these aspects and the relationship between them I am doing little more than attempting to satisfy Mill's requirement for an adequate social study, in that it must deal with the 'problems of biography, of history and of their intersections within a society' (Mills 1970:12). Further to this, Mills maintained that to manifest some semblance of a sociological imagination which was apparent in the 'classic social analysis' one must ask three sorts of questions:

- 1) What is the structure of this particular society as a whole? What are the essential components, and how are they related to one another? How does it differ from other varieties of social order? Within it, what is the meaning of any particular feature for its continuance and for its change?
- 2) Where does this society stand in human history? What are the mechanics by which it is changing? What is its place within and its meaning for the development of humanity as a whole? How does any particular feature we are examining affect, and how is it affected by, the historical period in which it moves? And this period - what are its essential features? How does it differ from other periods? What are its characteristic ways of history making?
- 3) What varieties of men and women now prevail in this society and in this period? And what varieties are coming to prevail? In what ways are they selected and formed, liberated and repressed, made sensitive and blunted? What kinds of 'human nature' are revealed in the conduct and character we observe in this society in this period? And what is the meaning for 'human nature' of each and every feature of the society we are examining?

(Mills 1970:13)

While there is no argument with the extent of the questions posed, there is with Mill's notion of the relationship between the aspects of society upon which he bases his analysis. Contrary to Mill there is no substantiation of what I believe to be his determinant role of history and social structure. In order to argue that biography is an adequate source for uncovering the linkages between individuals,

social structure and history one has to view them as existing in some kind of dynamic relationship with each having the ability to assume at any one time a deterministic role. Of more immediate importance, however, are the particular questions which can be generated from Mill's more general ones which would be pertinent to this study.

For instance, which individuals, which social structure and which history or historic context was pertinent to the study. The answer was provided by previous researchers who have explicitly in some cases, implicitly in others, made assumptions, omissions or insights which provided the necessary clues.

To explain this more clearly it is necessary to take the three variables of biography, social structure and history and re-evaluate the five categories of works previously discussed.

If one proceeds with history it is clear that all five categories have covered various aspects of history but the history is particularistic. All works, in one form or another, acknowledge immigration restriction as important and invariably link them to the biography of particular politicians. However, it is only when one examines Scholefield and Hall (1927), Hall (1927), O'Connor (1968) and Rachagan (1971) together that one finds a much broader historic context in which to place immigration restriction and New Zealand history. Scholefield and Hall suggest a crucial link between economic context, intra-governmental tension and colonial dependency. They also suggest that if one wants to see a reflection of this in the public political sphere then one should examine the creation of 'racial consciousness' which in turn is harnessed to justify the institution of harsher immigrant restrictions. O'Connor, in addition argues that the racial consciousness created has an institutional component

based on national racial purity (excluding the issue of the Maori) and exclusion of those who would interfere with this ideal.

Rachagan (1971) examines the reflection of this activity in the media as it responds to the above. The important insight that Scholefield, Hall, O'Connor and Rachagan explicitly emphasize in regard to the issue of Chinese immigration is that the effort expended in New Zealand on anti-Asiatic activity far exceeds the demographic magnitude of the problem. In their opinion it is an aspect of New Zealand history which is not only problematic but also submerged in a pervasive assumption that New Zealand's concern with race relations have to do with the Maori only.

It is not enough, however, to see these sorts of questions as providing an adequate description of historic context, for while they admit a relationship to and influence on the Chinese community they omit the history of the local Chinese community and its relationship to Chinese history.¹⁷ Understandably, those who have dealt almost entirely with immigration restriction would find this beyond their interests. However, those who have written in part or whole about Chinese community have tended to discuss only these two areas and the relationship between them in terms of specific events. This leads to an interpretation of the Chinese community as a structure-less, inactive, apolitical group who manage to survive being totally passive to their environment. Having made this generalization, however, it is necessary to quickly qualify it with the observation that if one takes these researchers collectively the kind of view of the Chinese community is altered. For instance Ng (1959) while to some degree ignoring social structure in the Chinese community clearly sees the relationship between it and the kind of historic context the New Zealand Chinese have lived in. If

Scholefield and Hall could see how government had created 'racial consciousness' in European New Zealand, Ng could see how the government had inadvertently made the local Chinese 'race conscious'. Similarly, Wong (1974), while asking questions about assimilation of young Chinese, avoiding by choice a discussion of the politics of the community, presents something far more important than individual biography. His most important question is to ask why social organisation has survived in the Chinese community and in answering this he analyses the particular relationship between the New Zealand government, the Chinese associations and Taiwan through their diplomatic representative. The interplay of these variables, although finally reduced to the interplay of individual personalities gives a view of the Chinese community which is alive, active and responsive.

Given these sort of insights and relationships made by previous researchers I have come up with a set of assumptions which have provided not only a complementary set of questions, but also particular ways of looking at the Chinese community in New Zealand.

The assumptions are as follows:

1. That a social organisation has existed historically (in the gold fields) and has persisted in the Chinese community of New Zealand and that its configuration, activity and existence must be seen not purely as derivative of their culture but as the product of the historic context in which they lived and do live (China their overseas communities and New Zealand).
2. That the influence of these relationships (within their own communities and New Zealand) caused qualitatively different types of responses but involved the same collectivities.
3. That the response of China and of New Zealand to the local Chinese community must be seen in the light of international relations and that New Zealand's activity in particular must be evaluated in terms of initially its colonial status and later its role in an international setting.

The way of thinking about the Chinese community, therefore, has involved the consideration of all three of these assumptions and the structure of the discussion uses a diachronic perspective. The key focus of the work is to establish the existence, persistence and change of social organisation in the Chinese community and to explain this phenomenon as a manifestation of political ethnicity or the politics of survival.

In taking this position I am attempting to bring together the basic ideas present in Yancey et al. (1976) Cohen (1969, 1974) and Crissman (1967). The contribution of Yancey, Erickson and Julian (1976) is their reformulation of the notion of persistent ethnicity. Their position is succinctly summarized in the précis of the article:

In contrast to the traditional emphasis on the transplanted cultural heritage as the principle antecedent and defining characteristic of ethnic groups, we suggest that the development and persistence of ethnicity is dependent upon structural conditions characterizing American cities and position of groups in American social structure. Attention is focused on the question: under what conditions does ethnic culture emerge? Specifically, what social forces promote the crystalization and development of ethnic solidarity and identification?

(Yancey et al. 1976:391)

Yancey et al., using evidence of other studies make the following observations:

- a) each immigrant group and their descendants face differing structural conditions and will consequently respond differently despite the fact that they may come from the same cultural background (ibid: 391-932).
- b) Each immigrant group and their descendants enter the occupational structure at different points which reflect the types of opportunity available and the particular economy that is operating.
- c) Given(b) one would expect to find residence affected similarly.

- d) Given a particular residence pattern and economic structure one would expect to see varying types of ethnic solidarity and institutional response (395-396).

In brief:

We suggest that a more parsimonious explanation of ethnic and community behaviour (other than relying on portable heritage) will be found in the relationship of the ethnic community to the larger macroscopic structure of the society - particularly in the constraints of occupation, residence and institutional affiliation.

(Yancey et al. 1976:399)

While Yancey et al., clearly provided the kind of perspective which I would argue is appropriate for the subject of this work the substantive examples they use come from a different context, namely America, and deal with permanent settlement of immigrants whose presence is condoned if not welcomed and whose ties with their homeland are not mediated by obligations at both a personal and institutional level.

Also, there is a sense in which Yancey et al. present ethnicity as a phenomenon arising from the top-down imposition of social structure whereas this study argues that it is produced by interaction between the immigrant group and the particular context with which they are confronted. In this instance it is more of a process which views emergent ethnicity as the periodic result of vacillating pressures from interaction.

The emphasis or direction I wish to take in regard to the Chinese case, rather than concentrating on how the various contexts impose constraint on, for instance, employment and housing, is to examine in detail the kinds of more general organisational responses they have made through time to counteract the kind of impositions they have faced. Ethnicity in this case is a product of interaction not

constraint. In order to accomplish this, as already noted, it is necessary to historically link sets of relationships with spheres of activity which, interconnected, influenced individual biographies and social organisation in the Chinese community, and produced, contemporaneously, alternative responses. In simplistic terms the Chinese in New Zealand have responded historically to conditions in their local community, in New Zealand society and in China and similarly New Zealand has responded to the Chinese community in its midst in response to its relationship to Britain, its own socio-economic make-up and to China.

Turning now to the nature of the response, Yancey et al. suggests that it is in the form of 'ethnic culture' and 'ethnic solidarity' (institutional) (Yancey et al. 1976:391-396), which in turn produce what they call emergent ethnicity. Given the context and groups Yancey et al. use to illustrate this phenomenon it is easy to see the response as essentially cultural but in, what I would argue is a more complex situation with differing sets of structural conditions the response seems more aptly described as political.

Here I agree with Cohen when he maintains:

Ethnicity is...basically a political and not a cultural phenomenon, and it operates with contemporary political contexts and is not an archaic survival arrangement carried over into the present by conservative people.

(Cohen 1969:190)

Clearly there is no issue between Yancey et al. and the latter part of Cohen's statement for they too are unwilling to accept an explanation of ethnicity based purely on cultural heritage or conservatism.

Ethnicity in both cases is a variable (see Cohen 1974:xv).

Ethnicity as a political phenomenon, however, is a different matter and is used by Cohen in his Study Customs and Politics in Urban Africa

(1969) to describe the process whereby the Hausa have achieved monopoly over the cattle and Kola trade in Nigeria despite opposition from Yoruba groups and individuals. In this situation the Yoruba are the majority but the Hausa, a minority, are able to organise themselves effectively for political action. The Hausa through this organisation maintain the integrity of their community within an urban context by building effective means of 'communication, decision making, authority, administration and sanctions' (Cohen 1969:184). Prior to the appearance of party politics, a nationalist movement and finally independence in the 1950's the Hausa were able to maintain their control over trade and expand it since their organisation was not only effective but recognised by the indirect rule under British colonial administration. Once independence came, however, their official recognition was removed and their ethnic exclusiveness, political organisation and economic base were under threat. They tried to halt the process by involvement in national party politics, but found it unsuccessful and counter-productive which led to the search for new ways to articulate their interests.

The Hausa's final solution was to adopt the Tijaniyya religious order which as part of Hausa 'cultural baggage' was already available as a possible strategy or pattern of behaviour. In fact as Cohen points out Tijaniyya has appeared once before in Sabo but had not been able to get a foothold (Cohen 1969:152). However, within a milieu of unsatisfactory representation in volatile national politics, the possibility of increased collusion between Yoruba and Hausa and their joint effect in undermining Hausa exclusiveness in their trade, the context was ripe for its revival:

The adoption of the Tijaniyya by the Quarter brought about processes which halted the disintegration of the bases of the exclusiveness and identity of Sabo. The reorganization of the Quarter's religion was at the same time a reorganization of the Quarter's political organization.

(Cohen 1969:185)

As Cohen succinctly states in another place:

The cultures of ethnic groups are universes of such formally non-political formulations and activities that are politicized in the course of social action.

(Cohen 1974:xvi)

In the context of the Hausa living in Sabo it is not so much the existence of Tijaniyya itself which is political but the context of the struggle for their existence with the dominant Yoruba makes it so.

Following on from this Cohen argues that there are two ways in which groups can articulate its organisation, one formally and the other informally. The former according to Cohen is the most efficient and effective and the most evident in industrial society having clear cut aims, rationally planned functions and a bureaucratic organisation (Cohen 1974:xvii). However, given a particular context which makes this type of organisation impossible, a group will have to articulate its organisation along informal lines using kinship, friendship, ritual and 'other symbolic activities that are implicit in what is known as 'style of life' (ibid.).¹⁸ They will use 'whatever cultural mechanisms are available in order to articulate the organisation of their grouping' (ibid:xviii), and this, in Cohen's opinion, is when 'politicalethnicity comes into being' (ibid.).

In both the case of the Hausa of Sabo and the Chinese in New Zealand, the possibility of articulating an organisation, along formal

lines in the way Cohen defines it, is ineffective or unacceptable. In the Hausa example the means are available and tried by the Hausa but the cost is too high to them and in the Chinese case it is quite clearly opposed by the dominant society at the outset and even when possible is faced with extreme scepticism and never fully accepted.

As an alternative in both situations, informal means are adopted to articulate their organisation, in the Hausa case with the Tijaniya order and in the Chinese case with what Crissman (1967) has called a 'segmentary system'.

Crissman's basic assumption is that all overseas Chinese communities have a similar segmentary organisation which uses, as the basis of its divisions, certain ascribed criteria which have to do with the way overseas Chinese make distinctions among themselves (see Crissman, 1967:185-189). These distinctions constitute 'relevant ethnicity' and their use is defined by the situation in which the Chinese find themselves (*ibid.*:189). Crissman sees the segmentary structure in the overseas Chinese community, therefore as a set of alternative ways by which the community can divide and organise for particular interests but the pattern of segmentation, he maintains, is unique in each case.

The fundamental criteria by which Chinese make distinctions between themselves include speech group, surname and locality. While speech group is important amongst New Zealand Chinese it is not of the same order as the generally referred to five major speech groups of overseas Chinese, but more a variation within Cantonese which distinguishes two localities from which Chinese have emigrated to New Zealand. It is not, therefore, a criterion for division or organisation as such but a means of informal differentiation. A surname, likewise, is not used in New Zealand since with a relatively small population its most viable use would lead only to the

identification of the smallest unit of locality, the village, as the core of the organisation. While locality is the fundamental unit of organisation among New Zealand Chinese it is at the level of county and district that it becomes significant and it has been locality associations representing various counties, or districts that were the first to appear. More importantly, when the next higher level of the segmentary system - which will be discussed below - has potential conflicts or problems threatening its persistence there is an immediate resorting to the former level of organisation, namely the county or district association.

Above these organisations, as already mentioned, are what Crissman refers to as the 'community organisation' or voluntary organisations. Crissman's listing includes benevolent societies, funeral associations, surname temples, provincial clubs, merchant and craft guilds, chambers of commerce and secret societies (Crissman 1967:194). He maintains that they have a duality to them, their primary role is as 'administrative organs of the communities from which their membership is drawn' but their secondary role is reflected in the fact that they have 'names and stated purposes which are sometimes chosen more with an eye toward official government regulations' than their real interests (ibid:194).

To return to Cohen's distinction between 'formal' and 'informal' ways of articulating organisation and particularly his point about some organisations having aspects of both, one would seem to find an ideal case with the community organisation.¹⁹ The 'informal' aspect would include the fact that membership is largely based on ascribed characteristics which can often incorporate the next level down in the segmentary system. The organisation articulates by using aspects of ascribed status as its base, legitimizing its

existence to its community and its membership. However, the group also articulates the organisation in a 'formal' sense. The community organisation will have a formal constitution, with executive committees, secretaries, sub-committees and treasurers, and membership, while nominally including all people that fulfill the ascribed characteristics will also formally involve the payment of dues and registration. This formal process legitimises the organisation to the larger environment especially when this organisation acts as mediator between the Chinese community and the government and has control over it.²⁰ In addition, the community organisation will conduct the business of the community specifically coordinating efforts to collect money for local activities or support of China (Crissman, 1967:197) under the guidance of a 'small group that holds all the power' (Crissman, 1967:197). The executive of these organisations, according to Crissman '...are rather like the board of directors of a large stock company where the directors control and represent large blocks of shareholders (ibid.), and are usually wealthy and able to make substantial financial contributions themselves. Crissman emphasises wealth and bilingual capabilities as two main assets necessary for those who seek power and prestige through community organisations.

The segmentary structure, therefore, in the Chinese community provides through its organisations, according to Crissman, a means whereby it governs itself without having 'noticeable governmental institutions' (Crissman, 1967:200). The system achieves what he calls a 'presentative political system and a hierarchical administrative system' (ibid.). When it comes to explaining the existence of this system in the overseas context, however, Crissman maintains that it has direct parallels with the conditions that would have prevailed in

Chinese cities during the Ch'ing dynasty. The context they faced when migrating to an urban situation in China was mirrored in the overseas community and 'the organisational superstructure of their segmentary social structure' provided the same kinds of functions as Crissman maintains they performed in the overseas context (ibid.).

While it may be accurate to make this cultural linkage between the overseas community and urban China it does not solve the problem of change or persistence in a new context. It is useful to argue that the possible ways the Chinese community can articulate their organisations conform to Crissman's model especially since within the segmentary system change is an inbuilt quality and there are at least three levels in the hierarchy which can operate. Given this, however, and the history of a small Chinese community that has changed the modes of articulation several times it is necessary to suggest that other variables influence these modes of articulation. While one may explain the existence of the segmentary system as a remnant of experience in China, explanation of its continual reproduction in the overseas situation requires reference to other variables. For this reason it is argued that changes in the articulation of the segmentary system are not only the result of changes in China and the overseas milieux but also the internal dynamics of the Chinese community.

In brief this work is an application and extension of Crissman's model suggesting that given a set of vacillating contexts (similar to Cohen's Hausa situation) through time one can discover how the Chinese community is able to articulate the segmentary system, to meet their needs.

Before proceeding to the discussion on method, however, it would seem there is other literature on overseas Chinese which compliments and supports the focus adopted here.

One of the seminal articles that has dealt with, particularly, the development of Chinese associations in a colonial overseas context is one by Freedman (1967) when he describes the associational activity in nineteenth century Singapore. Freedman in his discussion develops a continuum along which he intends one to place various overseas communities in terms of their associational simplicity or complexity. At the simple end he uses the example of Tuin's work on the Chinese in Sarawak, 'a relatively small scale overseas settlement' with few associations, whereas he locates Singapore at the other extreme with its intricate network of association (Freedman, 1967:44). The continuum, while attractive as a model, has problems when one tries to apply it in other colonial contexts for the crucial variables of population size and heterogeneity can be shown to be eclipsed by others that become much more significant.

Willmott (1969) for instance has taken issue with Freedman's model using his own work from Cambodia. The case of Phnom Penh is problematic, for in terms of Freedman's variables it should appear at the complex end of the continuum but Willmott maintains that the contrary is true and he argues this is so because of the context in which the Chinese exist, that is, under a system of indirect rule. Under French rule the community organised into five speech groups, congregations, headed by a particular chef chosen by the Chinese who was in turn responsible to the French. This system, as Willmott explains, effectively restricted the development of other associations. The point is also made, however, that if one does not restrict the period of discussion but takes a more longitudinal view in a context free from external political interference then

segmentation will occur in the community. Increasing numbers of associations will develop and participate in the political structure of the Chinese community (Willmott 1969:290). This is the case for not only Phnom Penh but Singapore, Java and Thailand, but here again Willmott singles out an anomaly. Phnom Penh's development came considerably later than the others, in the 1950's, which is attributed to the fact that indirect rule had not fully eroded until this time. However, in the other cases the end of indirect rule is not a sufficient explanation and as Willmott points out, one must look to external influences outside the particular host countries. This leads to an evaluation of the influences of China and particularly the nationalist fervour which spread from the homeland after the turn of the century. Returning to Freedman, the continuum, therefore, has problems as a model since its application within a confined time period makes it a dubious tool given a longer view. However, it would be wrong to discard it entirely, for while the continuum may have no utility as a model it may have as a cyclical process. I would argue that there are degrees of simplicity and complexity within the associational complex of a Chinese community and that it is not an unidirectional movement but one that may go back and forth depending on the kinds of influence a Chinese community faces. This then may result in cycles of simplicity and complexity articulated informally or formally under the influence of the variables Willmott isolates in his critique of Freedman. Put another way, the organisational configuration, complex or simple, should be treated as a variable changing over time and/or by context.

In order to explain this further it is necessary to turn to a context which has closer affinities to the New Zealand situation, that is a place historically related to Britain as a colony and contemporaneously part of the Commonwealth with a Chinese population that is almost exclusively Cantonese and a historic depth that is similar. The most obvious example with the necessary data is Canada.

In 1974 Sedgwick and Willmott attempted to evaluate the evolution of community structure amongst Chinese Canadians. The assumptions are fundamentally the same as already emphasized from other studies, namely that changes in government policy towards the Chinese community and events in China produce structural changes in the overseas Chinese community (Sedgwick and Willmott 1974:8). The structural changes, in turn, are most accurately reflected in associational activity which provide the basis of 'fragmentation and consolidation and forms the venue for leadership within the community' (*ibid.*). The authors then isolate five periods that reflect associational development, although not in all communities in Canada, and trace the structural change using a dual typology of associations.²¹ The typology includes traditionist associations which are directed towards the 'preservation of traditional Chinese values within the community' and modernist associations which are 'more concerned with relations between the Chinese and the dominant host community' (*ibid.*).

Basically, the history of the various Chinese communities in Canada can be described as one that had mainly traditionist associations prior to 1950 with the emergence of modernist leaders if not associations post 1950. However, to state this is to immediately gloss the subtleties of the situation. Clearly as evidenced by the initial discussions of the early merchant elite in a situation without

associations there are elements of the traditionist and modernist in all periods. Furthermore, while not emphasised, the order of appearance of various types of associations differs for each locality. For instance, in Victoria the order moves from locality to clan, fraternal and then community organisation, whereas in Vancouver locality is preceeded by a community organisation with clan associations following this development. In addition it is also clear that political factions in the community not only change the structure but also tend to stimulate an appeal to the more fundamental collectivities of the segmentary system as noted in 1914 when the executive of the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association was reconstituted in Victoria and later Vancouver (CBA) to include representatives from locality associations. The community at the time was divided between support for the KMT and the CKT. During the war years, despite difficulties with the Canadian government, there is virtual unity within the community suspending antagonism between factions, but given the removal of this influence and even relaxed immigration laws the conflict and fragmentation re-emerges. In this situation with the emergence of a new modernist elite there is also the existence of an ageing elite and their traditionist allegiance.

The important points, it seems to me, that can be gleaned from this history which would be useful in a similar situation are that there is no identifiable clear move from simple to complex. Each situation can only be evaluated, as such, in terms of the issues and contexts that are pertinent at any one time and not entirely in terms of the absolute numbers of associations. This point was made clearly by Wickberg (1979) who argued that size and complexity were not adequate variables to explain the absence or presence of certain organisations in four Chinese communities in Canada. He maintains

that to explain the kinds of organisation he chooses to discuss, the external relations of the particular Chinese community, that is the cultural links with China, Canadian government policy and social discrimination are far more useful variables to consider than size and complexity of the Chinese community.²² He concludes:

In the Canadian case, as long as the majority of politically-minded Chinese were concerned with the politics of China and as long as Chinese and white attitudes encouraged continued Chinese preoccupation with Chinese culture, then political and cultural trends in China would have a major role in shaping Chinese organizational development in Canada.

(Wickberg 1979:97)

For Wickberg organisational complexity or simplicity are a function of a Chinese community's contextual needs and not merely a function of the size and composition of the community.

In this study it is the segmentary system which meets these contextual needs and articulates the interests of the Chinese community having the unique capability to move either towards increasing fragmentation (complexity?) or towards cohesion (simplicity?). Similarly, the dichotomy between traditional and modernist is equally hard to distinguish clearly but general trends seem to rely more heavily on one type in some periods than others. To explain further. The period from 1879 till 1937 is one where, in the traditionist idiom, there is increasing complexity in the social structure as the number of associations increases and the issues become more complicated. During the war, however, with an intense collection campaign, a simple configuration is apparent and conflict generated in the previous period is sublimated. However, once this collective effort is terminated the previously

existing complex situation re-emerges. More contemporaneously given a changed context and a new elite more united action is evident under the guidance of more modernist organisations but still elements of traditionist organisations influence policy.

It has been useful in the New Zealand context to be aware of the above changes for some have been duplicated as they were in many overseas communities; particularly the types of activity that coped with change in China and extensive immigration restriction. However, there are differences and perhaps these should be noted briefly. The Chinese population in New Zealand has always been relatively small when compared to Canada but the extent of immigration restriction has been similar with virtual exclusion legislated in the 1920s in both countries. However, in Canada, the government knew considerably more about the Chinese than it ever did in New Zealand. Government investigations to collect substantive data were fairly frequent and done in cooperation with representatives of the Chinese community which meant that the financial position was fairly well known. Of course the wealth, especially that of the merchants, was greater than in the New Zealand context so it was much more visible. As already noted associational activity and the organisation of the Chinese community took place in both contexts but the population in Canada and its significance as an overseas Chinese community led to more intense activity and a greater contact with China.²³ Consequently the conflicts have lasted longer and been more pronounced but like New Zealand largely contained within the Chinese community. One pronounced difference was the role of the church in New Zealand. Presbyterian especially, but also Anglican and Baptist churches have had a continuous interest in the community and have

maintained this interest in each large centre. More importantly the Presbyterians formed an important link for some Chinese between New Zealand and China through their overseas mission activity and also lobbied effectively on behalf of the Chinese after the war. This did not occur in Canada although various denominations did play significant roles within local communities.

Finally there is one important similarity and that concerns the direction of the community in the post war period. The emergence of a younger active elite in the Chinese communities of both countries has meant a changed profile for the Chinese community.

While there is considerable variation in the kinds of analytical points derived from a discussion of overseas Chinese organisational development there is no dispute over its significance as an indicator of change within the community. For this reason it is used here for the same purpose. But in addition it is also perceived as the medium through which political ethnicity manifests itself and is articulated to represent the interests of the community or segments within it.

Two things remain to be done in this chapter. One is to show precisely how the chapters reflect the ideas in the above, and secondly to briefly discuss the method of research.

The latter point has already been alluded to in discussing the relevance of Mills (1970) and his notion of the sociological imagination. The quotes already provided influenced this work not only in terms of the questions asked about the Chinese in New Zealand, but also concerning the method of doing research.

As already mentioned, the material, other than documentary evidence from government or other researchers, was provided solely by interviews. The interviews predominantly set out to trace individual and family life history, trying to tease out facts and explanations

for decisions that went beyond what has commonly been assumed as adequate. For example, there is a certain amount of frustration built into a situation when both Europeans and Chinese make the same response to a question. Questions about the occupations of Chinese invariably yielded statements from Europeans and Chinese alike that they/we worked in the gold fields then laundries and market gardening and fruit and vegetable shops. Endlessly, general questions led to simplicity as if there was no community, no structure, no change and in fact little to discuss. In fact histories written by local Chinese for their own consumption portray this simplicity as evidenced by the brief translated text below:

The History of the Auckland Chinese

Since the late Ch'ing dynasty there have been Chinese migrating to New Zealand in order that they make a living. At the very beginning most of them went to the South Island because it was the place where there were gold mines. That is the reason New Zealand was called 'New Gold Mountain'. In a later period the Chinese in New Zealand had moved north because the gold mines were taken over by the government. Because of the mild weather and good transportation Auckland gradually became the largest community of overseas Chinese in New Zealand.

The occupations of the overseas Chinese here are mostly fruit shops, market gardens, laundries and restaurants. There are some import and export businesses and also some which deal entirely in Chinese groceries.

Because of hard work the Chinese businesses increased. Moreover we have observed the local regulations and laws making us highly respected by local people. Even though there have been a lot of scientific changes in business including mechanization in some, the Chinese have faced little difficulty in adapting. During the First and Second World War the Chinese growers helped to provide food. This has been highly appreciated by the local government.

When the father of China (Sun Yat-sen) advocated revolution, our friends here donated a significant amount of money. After that droughts and floods in China also stimulated donations to help. When the time of the anti-Japanese war came, all overseas Chinese in New Zealand organized the New Zealand Overseas Chinese Association of which the headquarters are in Wellington, the capital of New Zealand. The purpose of the organization was to get together the will and means to help the government with money and manpower. The Chinese here were the first to respond to such ideas. Meanwhile an Auckland Branch was set up. During the eight years of the war of resistance the donations totalled more than \$100,000.

Before the anti-Japanese war, the Chinese usually came alone to New Zealand but after the war broke out a number of Chinese became refugees in Hong Kong. Since New Zealand was an ally of China during the war immigration restrictions were amended to allow Chinese to migrate here as refugees. Since then the number of Chinese here has been increasing. During the last twenty years the number of locally born Chinese children number half the adult population. Chinese education here is becoming an important problem that has caused some concern. These children were born and brought up here and educated in the local language. Their occupations have changed and improved compared to the last generation. In addition to market gardening and fruit shops there are Chinese who are doctors, architects, accountants, nurses, engineers and draftsmen. It is expected that the contribution of the Chinese here will be much greater in ten years to come.

(Auckland Chinese Hall 1961:69
translated from the Chinese)

Questions about associations, newspapers, conflict, the influence of China or their home country were met with vague almost disinterested replies. There were no newspapers, I was told, associations existed but didn't do anything; there had never been any conflict and they

did not have much contact with home. Clearly the problem was the wrong questions, for although they were informed by other overseas Chinese communities they were not specific enough to elicit specific responses relevant to New Zealand. The attempt to get at social structure and history directly failed and there was no material that actually spelled out the kind of detail one needed. The only option was to try and just record life histories and see if any organisational material emerged. It was only after two years of interviews that Chinese social relations could be sparingly sketched out, complete with organisations, newspapers, conflict and external influence. In every case where organisational information emerged it was because the person was actually directly involved. The simplicity expected from the description in the literature and the relatively small population was anything but an accurate assessment as the complexity of the situation in all respects increased. The complexity came when I would be asked to recount what I knew about the history of the Chinese and market gardening, about ripening bananas, about the Chong Wah Wui Koon or the Chee Kung Tong and having done this would be introduced to things I did not know. The point I learned with some difficulty was that it was only by making a connection between social structure, history and the individual life history that one learned about the former. It was as if one had to reconstruct the people and events for the people one talked to and in turn you would be led on to others. The key, therefore, was individuals, it was who you knew of, and about, that was important initially. While organisation either nationally or in localised communities is never denied, neither is it blatantly made apparent other than through those individuals who are significant within the organisation or who know about it. Unless one knew the important individuals by name, unless one could sit down

and identify forty delegates to the Fifth National All-Representatives Conference there was no point in asking what happened. There was no point in asking about fruit shops, restaurants, gardens, unless you knew the person involved.

The method, therefore, is one in which Chinese people whom I have met and talked with have taught me about the people who live and have lived in New Zealand and I in turn, have tried to take all those individuals and their interactions with social organisation and history and reconstruct the social organisation in the Chinese community. The result, therefore, is not isolated snippets from hundreds of interviews but a composite picture in which I try to account for the most general situation and the most unique. Looking back I can see no other way I could have learned enough to ask questions which made sense to the people who have lived through the answers, for it was only then we could argue about the nature of the answers and their interpretation. The lesson from Mills (1974) is that one has to be taught the context of the sociological imagination before the form can be provided by the researcher.

In this method there was no methodical set of interviews, no selected informants, no sample, just endless interviews, visits, re-visits, letters and more questions. There were no fixed hypotheses but only a set of hunches that had to do with the survival of a Chinese community. There was no one community of which one could write and generalise for the whole, but many Chinese communities all with their own histories, organisations and individuals.

The final task in this chapter is to try and show how the framework of the thesis reflects the kinds of questions and concerns previously discussed. In the review of the literature it was suggested that each particular category into which the writing had

been divided either suggested certain relationships or neglected others by omission. The organisation of chapters in this thesis is intended to expand or fill in these omissions, while at the same time tracing the survival of the Chinese community in New Zealand through the articulation of political ethnicity.

The narrative of the thesis starts at a time before the arrival of the Chinese in New Zealand and proceeds to discuss particular events which foreshadow types of social action which would follow. It was clear prior to the arrival of the Chinese that it was an issue over which sides would be taken. In the early years of Chinese settlement the respective positions were manifest in the Report of the Select Committee (1871) and again in the debacle over the employment of Chinese labour on Public Works (1872-73). The first event was decided in favour of those who would tolerate Chinese immigration and the latter terminated the use of Chinese labour in New Zealand. Of more importance in terms of the latter episode was, however, the first evidence of conflict, caused partially by Chinese middlemen and partially by European employers. The conflict itself was played out in a European Court as Chinese labourers laid their case against the Chinese labour contractor and his European employers.

A third event initiated the type of response the Chinese, once organised, would use till at least 1908 attempting through merchant leadership to manipulate or confront aspects of European social structure. The event was a set of accusations by Chinese in the gold fields laid against a European Judge for his supposed bias by using a petition against him.

Chapter 3 sees the initiation of three types of action, that of government; of the Chinese community when confronted with internal problems and that of the same community when confronted by external pressures which influence or restrict their disposition.

The following chapter pursues these same ideas, but in the context of the gold fields population. Out of the earlier period emerges a myriad of Chinese camps and communities apparently scattered and isolated but in reality connected. Rather than simple social organisation, the use of Alexander Don's records unfolds a complex network of relationships which bind men together in camps and in turn connect them not only to local communities but also to large centres and finally to their villages in China. Shared interests amongst this population require organisation and leadership but when gold mining, as the foundation of their presence, declined choices had to be made. Those who were committed to a longer period of residence overseas were forced to move and diversify their activity while others returned to China or retired in New Zealand to a life of solitude. Unfortunately the social context for those who moved but stayed in New Zealand was to become counter-productive to their continued existence. Party politics, a depression, organised labour and fabricated public opinion responded to the urban Chinese population which now, removed from the mining camps of Otago, was visible. The result was the development of racial consciousness amongst European New Zealanders agitated and promulgated by a refusal to understand the Chinese or gather information about the Chinese community. The Chinese for their part, in order to survive, responded through a merchant elite and various organisations. The former tried, through the medium of petitions, to manipulate the increasingly inflexible position of government over the Chinese presence and the latter articulated the interests of the Chinese within their own community with the exception of the Ch'eung Shin Tong which tried to do both.

The legacy of the last period forms the core of the next chapter which traces in necessary detail the context and substance of anti-Chinese immigration till 1920.

The justification for the detail in an area already well documented is to pursue a number of points mentioned in the review of the relevant literature. The primary aim was to provide enough evidence to show that the subject of continued Chinese immigration in a context which seemed to want absolute exclusion was being used as a variable to influence internal and external political relations of New Zealand. In internal politics it was used by political parties to manipulate its electorate and it was used in Parliament as ammunition by an Upper and Lower House against each other as they fought to maintain their vested interests. As regards external politics, it was used as a lever by a dependent colony to wrest autonomy from British imperial hegemony. Of concern is the parallel developments in the recurrent fervour for a white New Zealand matched with a public outcry which coincided with several waves of legislative activity and fluctuations in New Zealand's economic conditions.

While this whole episode is played out a Chinese community persists and reacts. The economic base is diversified and a leadership emerges, again merchants, using the petition to articulate their needs and with distaste for the increasing constraint of legislation. The unintended consequences of anti-Chinese legislation was organisation in the Chinese community which eventually coincided with China modifying its stand on their overseas population. Unrepresented by diplomatic representation for forty years the Chinese were vulnerable, but in 1909 the situation changed.

Finally, the issue of immigration was resolved in 1920 which satisfied or exhausted political interest within New Zealand and escaped the manipulation of Britain. It also removed, for all future time, the topic of immigration restriction from public and Parliamentary debate, delegating the matter almost entirely to government bureaucracy and Cabinet.

While the Chinese community had representation and New Zealand could determine who came to her shores, other external events were to introduce complexity to both situations. New Zealand with a changed political economy and emergent nationalism had to re-evaluate its attitude to the Chinese within its boundaries and the New Zealand Chinese re-evaluated their own existence as events changed rapidly in China.

The following five chapters trace the interaction of these variables as they begin to emerge from the period prior to diplomatic representation. The primary concern in these chapters is to explore the notion of political ethnicity by investigating the ways the Chinese community has articulated its various interests. Specifically, the interests referred to focus on immigration restrictions, the profile of its own community in the New Zealand context, changing events in China and handling of factions within the community. Three types of evidence are used here as a guide to the shifting interests. Initially petitions represent the various interests articulated and are promulgated by a merchant elite with support from various co-opted individuals within and outside the community, but these give way to diplomatic representation and a segmentary structure within the Chinese community.

In the period from the 1880s till 1907 the elite, with new communities and restructured economic activity after the decline of goldmining, attempts through petitions, to halt repressive immigration

legislation, gain diplomatic representation and at the very least adjust the public profile of the Chinese community. While its activity is largely directed towards residence in New Zealand, associational activity emerges again in the community after its demise in the gold fields. The appearance, however, is aimed largely at articulating the interests of a segment of the community towards events in China. In the period from 1909 till 1928 tension emerges as associational activity and segmentation increases. The pattern is cyclical initiated by groups representing factions which are purposefully overshadowed by the first community organisation (Chong Wah Wui Koon) which, in turn, becomes embroiled in the political factions giving rise to locality associations which avoid politics or public reaction to the context of New Zealand or China and concern themselves with the internal security of their respective collectivities. This situation prevails until a national community organisation is needed again as the community comes under threat in New Zealand. Another community-wide organisation is organised, representing all the separate interests that have emerged. The interests articulated by this group are both directed towards New Zealand and responsive to changes in China. By definition they attempt to maintain cohesion. In the years 1928 till 1944 this association matures into a national organisation which, rather than representing sectional interests, represents all Chinese and co-ordinates a national collection to help China in her war with Japan. It is not clear, however, that this collective action is united in support of one political leader in China, nor that the headquarters of this association is able to maintain power over co-operative effort. The result then is the re-emergence of factions but the factions are so diffuse that they cannot appeal to any previously

organised segments and there is a tendency for effort to be directed primarily towards family organisation and, secondly, towards one's local community, with the exception of youth organisations which continue.

The war, despite its devastation in China and the following civil war that re-emerged, brought an issue of morality and internationalism to New Zealand politics which in the final result allowed a Chinese community to be re-constituted in New Zealand during and after the war. Wives and children joined husbands and were eventually allowed to remain in New Zealand with additional provisions being allowed for others, who remained in China, to come. The result was local Chinese communities with families and with these communities came concern for local well being.

This post-war era is dealt with in the last substantive chapter, which follows the re-emergence of a more covert bureaucratic form of immigration restriction aimed at exclusion, a more alienated feeling of the Chinese to their homeland after 1949 manifested by the founding of the New Zealand Anti-Communist Union and arguments over which government the local community should recognise and consequently a diminished role for the Consulate.

The immigration restriction made access for spouses difficult for the community; the general feeling about Communism in the 1950s made the internal and external relations of the local community uneasy and the arguments over which government should be recognised by the New Zealand Chinese and the New Zealand government presented further dilemmas. The New Zealand Chinese Association, already in difficulties over remaining funds from the war collection and implications of other activity that surrounded the war executive, made it ineffectual as a national body. The locality associations and the Chinese church

however, remained intact, as did the Chinese market gardener's association which, with the advent of its own publication in 1949, gradually achieved the status of a national association with a journal which most Chinese read. Its special interest in market gardening was matched with detailed news of changes in China, Taiwan and New Zealand until such time as its overseas news was defined as unnecessary by the New Zealand government. While the association persists, its role during the 1950's and 1960's and its journal are no longer extant. The market gardening activity had declined, New Zealand recognized the People's Republic of China in 1972 and most Chinese communities had evolved to a situation where local interests took precedence over national or international relations. Again locality associations, church organisations and the newly re-organised local branches of the Chinese association and newly formed cultural associations are the segmentary system's response as the interests that need to be articulated reflect a new position of the Chinese community in New Zealand. The attempt to formulate collective activity out of this fragmentation, however, brought to the surface agenda inherited from the war years till the present. Conflict emerged on two fronts, but both had to do with the legitimate right to co-ordinate local community activity. The one front had to do with dynamics of the Chinese community and the allocation of power and authority internally to seek collective support and the other had to do with who had the right to procure resources from government and local bodies in New Zealand. The resolution of these conflicting interests was the cultural organisations and clubs that appeared representing both the interests of traditionalist and modernist within the community, although sometimes in an uneasy truce.

Organisations with the exception of a few, now accept young people as part of the organisation, unknown in previous years, but it is questionable as to whether or not they are actually privy to the politics of internal conflict that may exist.

This view briefly outlines the direction of the thesis, the way the data has been organised and presented and the focus of discussion. It will remain for the conclusion to draw out the salient features which in fact support the assertions made and the existence and use of political ethnicity. It is sufficient to add at this point that the Chinese community has persisted and survived in New Zealand and this thesis is about the politics of survival.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. This refers to the concerted effort by the Chinese community and the Presbyterian Church to allow the war refugees to remain in New Zealand after 1948 and to re-establish the right to naturalisation for the Chinese which had been removed in 1908 (see Chapter 6).
2. Dr. James Ng suggested in 1972 that the Chinese themselves felt they were being subjected to the discrimination because they lacked 'diplomatic protection'. (Ng, Otago Daily Times 22 and 29 July 1972). Clearly this facilitated the implementation of legislation but it does not explain why the arguments were made against the Chinese in the first place. Roy (1966) makes a similar point when he states that 'there is ample evidence that a restrictive immigration policy affects adversely the relations of the state practising it with states whose nationals are prospective immigrants', and then proceeds to examine the history of Asiatic legislation as an example (Roy 1966:35;40). His explanation blames the phenomenon partly on the White British New Zealand policy and partly on New Zealand's dependance on Britain which meant that she had not really developed independent foreign policy until after World War II (ibid: 35-36 and 38).
3. Bernardelli (1952) is a particularly strong advocate for the position that the Chinese presence constituted a real threat to the New Zealand labour force. His argument is based on the assumptions that the Chinese, unlike European immigrants did not have to sever their connections with their homeland, were unencumbered with dependants and could replenish their numbers at will despite immigration restrictions. The evidence would suggest that, to the contrary, the Chinese had no comparative advantage but rather suffered comparable disadvantages to those of their European counterparts.
4. The specific focus of their article was a historical discussion of Asiatic immigration and the relevant legislation in New Zealand. The quote formed the last paragraph of their 'General Conclusion'.
5. As far as I have been able to ascertain, Ponton was the last person to see the C33 series files of the Customs Department before they were destroyed in a fire. This is confirmed also by O'Connor (1968).
6. As O'Connor notes this policy has its origins well before 1908 which is discussed in careful detail by N. Harrison's very competent thesis 'The Formation of the White New Zealand Immigration Policy between 1890-1907'. Harrison's interpretation of the White New Zealand policy links the need to implement policy on the part of politicians to their use of this issue to create favourable public opinions. This is particularly the case, as Harrison's work shows, between Liberal members of Parliament and Trades and Labour Councils and unions.

- 7 O'Connor's fears are well founded, as exemplified by the absence of any discussion concerning this aspect of New Zealand history in the most recent work on New Zealand, Oliver and Williams (eds) (1981) The Oxford History of New Zealand.
- 8 Another important, brief, but succinct overview of the Chinese in New Zealand was provided by Dr. James Ng in 1972. The article he wrote was published in the Otago Daily Times in response to the first television programme in New Zealand on the Chinese community. The press reviews of the programme suggested that the media slant had indicated strong interest by the New Zealand Chinese in China (see Tablet 26 July 1972 and Otago Daily Times 15 July 1972). The innuendo was clear and Dr. Ng took issue with this interpretation and maintained that while local Chinese gave 'primary and national loyalties' to New Zealand, in order to be a complete person they 'must be aware and proud of their Chinese ancestral history and culture' (Ng 1972 in Otago Daily Times 29 July 1972).
- 9 Wong's fundamental observations here closely approximate those of Ng (1972) who maintained that the Chinese, while participating to a large extent in New Zealand society, also have a strong interest in their historical and cultural background. Ng, however, unlike Wong, sees no hindrance or reaction to complete assimilation, although there is still a 'spectrum of progress in assimilating' (Ng, 1972). It is interesting to note that non-Chinese writers have tended to maintain the reverse. For instance Fabia-Nair (1976) to confirm the extent of assimilation maintained that:

The Chinese do not even have a religious or ethical motivation to identify and conserve themselves as a separate community from the host society.

(Fabia-Nair, 1976:62)

Greif (1974) expresses very similar opinions to this (see following pages).
- 10 It is interesting to contrast this view of social structure with that expressed fourteen years earlier by Ng who maintained that:

Although these institutional organisations and other means of social control are in the process of collapsing, there are few evidences of the unfavourable symptoms which are often associated with cultural change and adjustment in a minority group.

(Ng 1959a:296)
- 11 Another more recent thesis which starts with the same assumptions as Wong is one by Lian (1980). While Wong's explanation of the organizational conflict rely on interpersonal politics Lian's explanation relies on interpretation of the same events as evidence of conflict resulting from competing strategies to raise ethnic consciousness and identity, one in a more traditional idiom (ACC) and the other within the framework of dual identity (WCS CC).

- 12 Ng also commented on conflict and competition in the community at the time of her writing in 1959. She maintained that:

...there is intragroup rivalry and competition between the members as well as between the groups stemming from the three districts of Kwang Tung province. Each group seeks to outdo the other in showing "progress" and adaptation to New Zealand culture through exhibiting material objects and the pursuit of such leisure time activities as horse racing, football, parties, movies and so on.

(Ng 1959a:297)

While she does not elaborate on this comment it seems implicit that the economic base of the community which had changed (quoted page 17) had affected the nature of Chinese organisations and she interpreted this as acculturation and integration into New Zealand society (ibid:298).

- 13 It is curious that Greif (1974) carried research out during the same period as Wong yet their conclusions and views of the Chinese community are so different.
- 14 Ng did not for some reason have access to Ponton (1946) either.
- 15 The survey consisted of 136 questions put to a 'random' sample of ninety Chinese, one percent of the Chinese population (12,818) over the age of sixteen. The fundamental problem is that there are far too few respondents to some questions to make predictions or offer explanations. For a complete critique of the methodology see Willmott, W.E. Review of The Overseas Chinese in New Zealand, 'Pacific Affairs', Vol. 49, No 2, 1976:382-385.
- 16 New Zealand recognized the People's Republic of China on December 22 1972, and Greif included an Epilogue in which he described his feelings about this act and its relationship to the previous Ambassador from Taiwan, but does not speculate on how he sees it affecting the local Chinese community.
- 17 Don and McNeur (previously mentioned) do bridge this gap in that they explicitly relate the situation in China to the status of the New Zealand Chinese but they wrote nothing of the organisational structure of the Chinese community, its response to restriction nor the effect of immigration restriction on their community. They did, however, act on behalf of the Chinese and in so doing altered the structure of the Chinese community.
- 18 Cohen admits that the term 'informal' is highly ambiguous and unfortunately linked to the meaning of 'formal structure' (Cohen 1974:xviii). He also notes the distinction between them is sometimes a 'matter of degree' some starting off as one type and gradually becoming the other or having characteristics of both at their inception.
- 19 Crissman maintains that community organisations can be formal or informal but the difference is unclear. The formal type however seems to conform to Cohen's description of a formal organisation (see page 27).

- 20 This is particularly the case for what Crissman calls the 'high level community organisation' which is the relevant example for the New Zealand context.
- 21 The typology was developed by Willmott in his work on Cambodia (see Willmott 1970:115-116).
- 22 Wickberg examines the significant organisational developments in Toronto, Vancouver and Calgary in a fifteen year period (1923-1937) when their respective populations remained stable. He asks '(1) Why, contrary to theory, were there Chinese Benevolent Associations in some of the smaller Chinese communities but not in some of the largest ones; (2) why did so many new Chinese schools appear in the interwar period, despite the absence of a large "second generation"; (3) why did theatrical groups proliferate during the same period, despite stability in community sizes and compositions; (4) why, under the same conditions, did so many new organisations of all types develop, contrary to theoretical expectations?
- 23 The Chinese population in Canada went from just over 9,000 in 1891 to 17,312 by 1901. By 1941 it was double the 1901 population and by 1961 had reached 58,197.

CHAPTER 2

CHINA, KWANGTUNG AND NEW ZEALAND: A
BRIEF VIEW OF LOCALITY


The area of China where the New Zealand Chinese came from is located in the districts surrounding the southeastern city of Kwangchou (Canton) which is the capital of Kwangtung province, one of twenty-two provinces in China. Kwangtung itself, during the late 1800s and early nineteen hundreds was divided into seventy-nine districts of which twelve were important as the homelands of early Chinese migrants to New Zealand. These districts included those listed in Table 1. While it is impossible to show with any accuracy the actual proportions from each district either in the 1800s or for that matter in the contemporary population, the proportions represented in Don's figures, according to informants is fairly accurate for much of the period with the exception that there are increased numbers of Seyip people in the current population as well as Malaysian and Singaporean Chinese. The six counties with the larger number of representatives overseas have tended to dominate the New Zealand population including people from Poon Yu (Sam Yap), Toy San and Sun Wui (Seyip) as well as the districts adjacent to Sam Yap including Tshang Sheng (Jung Sing), Tung Goon and Fa Yuen (see Map 1).¹

TABLE 1: County, Villages and Surnames of the New Zealand Chinese.¹

District	County	No. of Villages	Surnames	No. of people
Sam Yap	Sun Dak	17	12	31
	Pun Yu	165	46	2104
	Nam Hoy	17	14	19
	TOTAL	199	72	2154
Seyip	Toy San	241	47	345
	Yun Ping	2	2	
	Hoy Ping	29	16	33
	San Wui	13	11	23
	TOTAL	285	76	401
	Jung Sing	42		432
	Tung Goon	17	15	26
	Fa Yuen	17		50
	Hawk San			72
	Sun On	12	11	24
		88	26	604
	TOTAL	572	No Total Possible	3159

¹ Statistics include all people listed in Don's Diary from 1896 to 1919 and does not take into account departures during that period. Therefore, it is impossible to determine which areas had more sojourners returning to their native villages in the early years of migration.

MAP 1




Reproduced with kind permission of Lawrence Wong.

The two general areas where these districts are located according to informants are geographically different. The districts north of Kwangchou (Poon Yu, Jung Sing, Tung Goon and Fa Yuen) are surrounded, as one moves further north, with ranges of high hills, which give way on the Kwangchou side to the other areas where Toy San and Sun Wui are located in the broad river dissected plain of the delta region.

While both areas may differ geographically the village and market town configuration is much the same. The areas are literally studded with hundreds of villages some with populations of between 100 and one thousand while others may exceed 20,000 (see Map 2). The map (2) was sketched by Don in the early 1900s and shows, according to informants an accurate presentation of the districts included, predominantly that of Poon Yu.

It is significant that the features of the landscape singled out in this map by the Presbyterian missionaries who needed information about the area to enable an efficient missionary activity, coincided with features that would have been equally significant to the local Chinese albeit for other reasons. The waterways and market towns for instance, were important and of common interest to both missionaries and Chinese, but the former needed them particularly to follow their clientele in order to proseltize, while to the Chinese they were the fundamental mode of transport and the key to trade networks in the area.

The villages, in particular Poon Yu, were described by many of the missionaries including Mawson. Mawson described the houses in the nucleated villages as low, windowless, constructed of sun dried and fired bricks held together with a mixture of sand, lime and clay



(Mawson 1926:12). The floors were either of clay or large tiles while the roof was of light tiles laid on pine rafters. There was, according to Mawson, little wood used in construction due to the damage that could be caused to it by ants. Two-storied buildings were according to Mawson, forbidden by clan elders who would not tolerate roof levels violating custom by being higher than the ancestral hall. However according to informants, wealthier Chinese, who had made enough overseas to rebuild their homes often built two-storied buildings with balconies both as a display of wealth and status but also to act as watchtowers for their vulnerable villages.

The villages themselves were populated by lineages and clans; the lineage being made up of families who trace their descent through the male line back to a common ancestor; the clan on the other hand, is defined by surname. The lineage is related to other lineages and in this way draws people into a large kinship system while the clan is a unit of exogamy specifying who one may or may not marry. While both these aspects are crucial to social organisation in China because lineages rarely migrate overseas in total, the clan becomes the significant unifying and differentiating characteristic overseas, provided the population is large enough to merit its use. In New Zealand clan has never been the fundamental unit around which organisation takes place, whereas in Vancouver, Canada, Willmott recorded the existence of twenty-three clan organizations (Willmott, 1964:34).

In New Zealand the only exception would be the instances where single surnames dominate locality or community associations in particular communities, or instances where two families happen to be in conflict with each other. In these situations they will be described as clan factions but they are usually no larger than a single family.

The fundamental unit of identification in New Zealand is the county, or combination of counties from which one came originally. Therefore the locality associations which developed, represented these groupings including Poon Yu and Fa Yuen (Poon Fa Association) Jung Sing and Tung Goon (Tung Jung Association), Toy San and Sun Wui (Seyip Association). It is out of this matrix, once it appears, that fundamental bases for alignment and fragmentation occur but this is a far too simplistic view as later chapters will argue.

The villages, from which the New Zealand Chinese came from, populated by single or multiple lineages invariably had ancestral halls which would contain a history of the lineage in the form of tablets dedicated to the male ancestors who had died in China and overseas. Attached to this building was often the village school which, prior to 1911, specifically provided for male children who would receive a basic education, provided they were wealthy enough. Many of the early migrants, however, who would come overseas had to forfeit the opportunity but in later years, once families had become established and gold mining had given way to more settled pursuits, young were often repatriated to attend the local schools in order to receive a basic education particularly in their native language. This was very significant for the overseas population, for not only did it provide fundamental education, but also a cultural experience in an appropriate milieu with the benefit of older generations present who had time to inculcate appropriate values. Family overseas, particularly fathers and uncles who would be responsible for young members seldom had the time, patience, money or facilities in the early years to provide the same training. The consequence of this repatriation

being terminated by war, shipping interruptions and finally the change in government in 1949 meant that the overseas population had to take responsibility for this training which became the center of considerable concern in later years.

The focal point of business and trade activity in the local village areas of the districts was the market town which one can see clearly marked on Don's map (see Map 2). These market towns were a conglomeration of shops and places for traders where commodities were bought and sold. Each of the market towns had a regular number of market days which were alternated between market towns in such a way as to avoid clashes between adjacent towns. Markets were therefore run according to the lunar calendar and held on every fifth day so that one town for instance may have its market days in the 1st, 6th, 11th, 16th, 21st and 26th while another would have them on the 2nd, 7th, 12th, 17th, 22nd and 27th. Still another market town would have different days so that anyone living in the area would have the opportunity to go to a market every day of the month. Mawson noted that it was always possible to tell which town was having a market day for the people would all be going in one direction, which meant as Skinner was to note some years later, that information travels the route of the market cycle within what he called the 'standard market community' (Mawson 1926:11 and Skinner, 1964).

...first hand knowledge of the commercial relations
connecting his production to the world market and,
...a good measure of commercial knowledge.

(Willmott, 1970a:40)

Correspondingly, news from overseas, according to informants was usually gathered in the same venue and arrangements that were consequently made for travel overseas would invariably start at the

nearest market town. A network therefore could be traced from the village to the overseas destination very often through individuals who had originally come from the same district. For instance, contacts would be located in Canton, Hong Kong, Sydney and then Auckland or Wellington for the traveller and much of this information came via the market towns. Besides this however, the market town became the place where wealthy overseas Chinese who returned home to start their own business would locate, unless they were of course wealthy enough to locate in places as large as Canton, and also the place where the Presbyterian missionaries could find large segments of the population gathered in one place at one time.

While the discussion of the home districts has thus far been without a cause for migration there were in fact, significant problems in the area. In general the area both to the north and west of Canton and the Pearl River delta region was not a pleasant place to live for several reasons. In terms of external relations it has been one area that has been under constant incursion from outside for many years, and because of this the local population suffered and developed a particularly hostile attitude to foreigners which was justified according to those who understood what had happened. McNeur, an early Presbyterian missionary to the area described the situation in the following:

...Canton was for several centuries the point of contact between the Chinese Empire and the outside world. Thus Cantonese knew most regarding the insatiable hunger for territory and power that possessed European nations. They witnessed with alarm the absorption of the next door neighbour, India, and feared a like treatment for themselves. The Portuguese and Dutch ships came plundering and wrecking villages, and carrying away slaves to their colonies. The Spaniards followed, and massacred almost every Chinese in the Philippines. Then came the British with their opium and gunboats, and HongKong, guarding the entrance of the Canton River, became a British fortress. Even their beloved city was in the hands of foreigners

for some months. For such reasons it is difficult to persuade a Cantonese that the missionaries have a higher purpose than personal gain. This hatred of the foreigners is one of the most serious obstacles to missionary work. It is so deep rooted that it is hardly changed by a long residence in another country.

(McNeur 1902:14-15)

Internally the area had extreme problems in population density with an overall density of 600 persons per kilometre by the late nineteenth century (Johnson, 1980:8). According to Johnson the 'typical peasant' cultivated less than one-third of a hectare of land and the majority of the land cultivated had to be rented at usurious rates from landlords. Zo (1977) also confirms the situation maintaining that there was 1.6 mou per person in 1817 which amounted to .53 less than the national average (Zo, 1977:314).

Chen Han-seng has described the situation in the 1930s in the following:

Within the past five years the total tax burden has trebled and this burden is largely shifted upon the shoulders of peasants who have to pay rent. The rent, which is usually paid in grain, amounts to 50-57 per cent of the total harvest...Such a high rent, together with all its consequent burdens, crushes the peasant and sends him to the usurer. In any one district of the province, 60-90 per cent of all the families are in debt. Many peasants have to seek a loan in grain; others have to pawn their clothes, furniture and even hoes, harrows, rakes and ploughs. The usual interest charged on a loan in grain is 30 per cent for six months; the monthly interest at the pawn shop is 2 to 3 per cent for six months, sometimes as high as 6 per cent. The bankrupted peasants rapidly give up their land through the process of mortgage; as landless peasants not taken in or "absorbed" by industry they ever on the increase, wages in general are falling down and rents in all forms are rising. Thus bankruptcy repeats itself and accelerates ...the speed of pauperization, far exceeds that of peasant exodus and possible industrialization. The present system of land monopoly can only bestow perpetual ownership to a selected few, and simultaneously force perpetual indebtedness upon an ever growing mass.

(Chen, 1936:ix-x)

Kil Young Zo has suggested that Seyip area, which contributed many to the New Zealand Chinese population, faced even more severe problems. He described it as a 'mountainous and traditionally land hungry region...with no more reclaimable land available for the increasing population...having reached a saturation point by the third quarter of the eighteenth century' (Zo, 1977:313). Particularly badly off were Hsin-ning (Toy San) and K'ai-P'ing (Hoy Ping) districts, the former being able to only produce one quarter of its needed foodstuffs and the latter only one half (ibid:315).

To further illustrate the situation Choi (1975) presented statistics shown in Table II. While Jung Sing is missing from Choi's data the indications gleaned from the other relevant districts would show considerable population pressure especially in Poon Yu, Toy San and Sun Wui, especially since Choi estimates the provincial average as being 400 per sq. mi. (Choi,1975:6).

It was out of this situation that Chinese migrated, although officially forbidden by their government to do so until 1859, when voluntary migration from Kwangtung was allowed. Despite this however, the New Zealand Chinese, as did many others, came without protection from their government. The Ching government remained aloof from its overseas population although, as indicated in the New Zealand case there was ample evidence to support an argument of need. It was only in 1877 that the Ching government established a legation in Britain and it was not until 1908 that a Chinese Consulate was established in New Zealand. By this time the Ching officials had become well aware of the political anti-government activities in their overseas communities and while not wanting to allow emigration they seemed to

TABLE 2: Landuse and Population of Fourteen Districts in the Canton Delta

Canton Delta Districts	Total Area (sq.m.)	Cultivated Area (mows)	Per cent of total area cultivated	Population (1923)	Population per sq. m. of land	Cultivated land (mows) per person
Toishan	579	2,254,700	18.4	940,680	1,625	2.39
Sunwui	712	1,245,100	45.0	1,230,770	1,729	1.10
Hoiping	577	346,800	15.5	671,410	1,164	.52
Yanping	838	299,900	9.2	325,300	388	.92
Nanhai	15	43,600	72.0			
Punyu	817	1,516,300	47.7	1,367,680	1,674	.90
Shunte	331	1,087,100	84.4	1,039,740	3,141	1.04
Tungkuan	1,145	1,848,800	41.5	900,000	786	2.05


(Adapted from Choi, 1975:7, Table 1.1)

have gradually changed their minds at least in terms of watching the proceedings in these overseas communities. In the New Zealand case they responded to the protest by local Chinese about the discrimination they faced in New Zealand but their sympathies lay almost entirely with the educated and the wealthy.

The situation of Chinese migrants therefore was complex, coming from a set of social relations which depended on a full compliment of kin, an ethical basis that made it mandatory to ideally remain part of those social relations yet tremendous pressure to leave illegally in order to acquire sufficient money to return and upgrade one's family position. However, there were those that came to New Zealand and stayed, even in the early days, whose family had died or was limited to a few poor relatives. There were others whose family relationships were such that they used the overseas situation to rid themselves of familial pressures and still others who found life overseas sufficiently attractive despite hostility to envision permanent settlement. The variety of reasons therefore for migration are considerable and extend far beyond the economic pressures that were first described.

The islands to which the Chinese came, initially from Australia (approximately 1300 nautical miles from Sydney) and later direct from Hong Kong (6,000 nautical miles from New Zealand via Australia) lay in the South West Pacific. New Zealand is made up of two large islands and other adjacent smaller ones; the former together equal the size of Japan (see Map 3). The islands first settlers were Polynesians who arrived 1000 years ago, to be followed by European discovery in 1642 and British attempts at colonization after 1826.

MAP 3



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Partial colonization was apparent with the settlement of 1500 Europeans in the North and South Island combined. By the 1840s settlement began in earnest and by 1864 and the arrival of the first group of Chinese the population excluding indigenous peoples, numbered 172,158, 49,019 of whom lived in the South Island where the Chinese first disembarked. The province of Otago where the Chinese first resided was one of the six provinces into which the country had been divided in 1852 for administrative purposes. The province was initially settled in 1847 but by 1861 had undergone dramatic transformation with the discovery of gold which increased the population from 12,600 in 1861 to 60,000 in 1863. At the time the capital of New Zealand was in Auckland where the first general assembly gathered in 1854 and elected a House of Representatives which met the following year.

In these early years, life in the two main islands of New Zealand was quite distinctive. The South Island was characterised by predominantly European settlements involved in largely agricultural pursuits and gold mining whereas the North Island was embroiled in the 'land wars' of the 1860s, an often bitter and desperate struggle between a determined dominant European society and the indigenous Maori population. The wars lasted ostensibly from 1860-1864 but the effects lingered on in terms of the consequences which were largely to do with the alienation of Maori lands which included drastic socio-economic disruption to what remained of their traditional ways of life. The Chinese were largely absent from these affairs since their movement into local areas of the North Island post-dated the open conflict, taking place for the most part after 1871.

The Chinese movement throughout both islands occurred at a time when responsible government, dominated by the Provincial Councils, located after 1865 in Wellington, gave way in 1876 to central government. At that point the nine provinces were abolished as administrative units, and while the Chinese presence had been tolerated before 1876 it was clear that it would not be so after this period. Centralization of government in conjunction with the development of party politics and the migration of Chinese to other places in New Zealand left no room for the decentralized opinions of former years.

By 1881 the Chinese settlement of the North Island was well under way with two small concentrations in Wellington and Auckland and the gradual spread of small numbers of Chinese into other local communities already settled by Europeans. From this period on the mobility of Chinese, both around New Zealand and back and forth from China was considerable. In New Zealand, despite waves of hostility to their presence more and more local communities had small numbers of Chinese living in their midst and the larger urban centres had what some alarmists termed Chinatowns. At the turn of the century fifty-two boroughs and cities had Chinese living in them which had increased to sixty-nine in 1911, eighty in 1916, eighty-three in 1936 and by 1961 ninety. The substantial trend represented here was consistent with the more general movement of population in New Zealand for there had been a clear movement into new towns in the first two decades of the twentieth century as service centres developed to provide for rural areas. By the 1920s this trend had changed to a movement into larger towns and cities, some of which would continue to have a growing Chinese population after the depression and World War II. The depression in particular had forced,

in the absence of welfare provisions, rural Chinese to rely on their more urban countrymen for help which meant that larger towns had to absorb Chinese who found existence in more rural areas difficult. During the war there were quite substantial increases in the Chinese population as families were gradually reunited under various refugee provisions and later the extended permit provisions under existing legislation.

The post war years of the Chinese in New Zealand saw a dramatic increase in the population and especially children with a gradual move towards a more balanced sex structure. It was during these years that the Chinese community became even more concentrated in urban areas and that a number of the smaller market gardening centres adjacent to larger centres were consumed by urban sprawl. As the population increased however, it was clear that the North Island urban centres particularly Auckland and Wellington which included 55% of the total Chinese population, would grow disproportionately and that the entire South Island, while having growing Chinese communities, would only account for a small percentage of the total. Despite this unequal distribution between the two islands which represents a total reverse of the situation in the 1880s most Chinese communities which have grown in size, have organised sufficiently to provide for their needs.

The community now, unlike its predecessor in the gold fields, has the basis of a kinship network with which individuals readily associate located in New Zealand and although residential mobility of the young is considerable the re-affirmation of these ties seems, according to most informants and observation in the field, to be of primary importance. Gatherings for weddings and birthdays of older

kin can often bring people from all over New Zealand. Substantial families who have resided in New Zealand over several generations may also be found in a single community and in many of these families it is to the first pioneer of their family in New Zealand, that they trace their heritage. Since travel has been more easily arranged between New Zealand and China, others, including the above, have availed themselves of a visit to their home village and still others for the first time have undertaken extensive tours of China. It is possible that future generations of Chinese may find their cultural links with China much more substantial and important, given the diplomatic relationship between New Zealand and China.

FOOTNOTE FOR CHAPTER 1

- 1 This disagrees with Taher (1970) who maintains that Chinese in New Zealand came from nine counties including all of Sze Yap, one from Sam Yap, Poon Yu and Chung-shan, Jung Sing, Shiuning and Tung-Goon (Taher, 1970:41). He further states that 60% of the New Zealand Chinese are from Sze Yap and that Poon Yu and Jung Sing are represented by 20% to 15% respectively with 5% remaining for the three other counties. While I have heard this estimate, by far the most frequent generalisation acknowledges equal number of Jung Sing, Poon Yu, Toy San and Sun Wui with some Fa Yuen and Tung-Goon people.

PART II

CHAPTER III

INVITED GUESTS AND UNINVITED RESIDENTS 1868-1871

The earliest arrival of Chinese in New Zealand is now almost totally obscured by mythology but several authors allude to a migration, of a few Chinese, in the 1850s (Greif, 1975:4; Ng B.F., 1959:15). Even at this time they were the pioneers of the Asian migrants coming to New Zealand. Most evidence to indicate that Chinese had arrived prior to 1865 is circumstantial. There had been Chinese coolies brought into Australia as early as 1848 (Choi, 1975:18) and by 1854 there were an estimated 2,400 Chinese in New South Wales, so it is possible that some may have escaped their indentured existence and found passage to New Zealand. Also, there was a report from Victoria in 1862 of a group of Chinese trying to come to Otago by boat. According to the report the Chinese man in control spoke good English, was well dressed and was obviously educated, but nevertheless they were all thrown off the boat (Millar, 1972:23).

Other than this purely speculative possibility there are three pieces of more substantial evidence. One of these is a document of the New Zealand government which lists persons naturalised in New Zealand from the earliest years. According to this register there was a Chinese man naturalised in Nelson in 1852 at the age of 29. His name was, according to the register, Hopton Appo, and he was

engaged as a cattle breeder: (Names etc. of Alien Friends Who Have Been Naturalised in New Zealand, 1911:190). The second piece of evidence is an article in an Otago newspaper of 1862. It is entitled the 'Advent of the Chinese' and describes the arrival of the first Chinese in New Zealand:

Yesterday morning the first Chinaman that has ever paid Dunedin a visit landed at the Jetty from the Steamer, 'Golden Age'. His reception was noisy, and appeared rather to disconcert Johnny, who took to his heels and scudded up the street at a rapid pace. The ice having been broken, it is not unlikely that we may have the Celestials down here in great force next spring.

(The Daily Telegraph, June 2, 1862)

The third piece of evidence comes from Reverend McNeur, who worked for many years with the Chinese in New Zealand. McNeur mentioned, in his book, that there was an elder of the Chinese Church in Dunedin, by the name of Mr. Lo Keong, who had come to New Zealand from Australia in 1865 to start a business. Apparently Lo Keong was the first Chinese man to bring his wife to New Zealand from Melbourne after their marriage in 1873 (McNeur 1951:28).

According to local Chinese history, these early migrants were an exception to their followers in that they were not involved in gold-mining. They appeared to have come to settle, and it is unknown whether or not they ever returned to China. Despite their different occupation, however, it is unlikely that they escaped the hostility of European settlers. Even New Zealand in the 1850s, as yet devoid of any Asiatic mass migration, as it became known, was not free from racial discrimination. The precedent for this attitude which pervades much of the history of the Chinese in New Zealand, was established in Christchurch and Nelson. In 1853 a group of landowners and merchants had proposed the importation of Chinese labour to remedy a labour

shortage. The former group needed cheap agricultural labour to produce vegetables to meet an increasing demand in Australia but the opposition to both groups was strong and the workmen of Canterbury succeeded in getting Colonel Campbell elected as superintendent in the same year, a staunch supporter of the working man (Gardner, 1971:12 and 54-55). Four years later on August 15, a local meeting was held in Nelson to submit proposals to the Provincial governments on how to keep Chinese out of New Zealand. An earlier newspaper article, on August 12, approved force as an initial reaction, which was supported by the August 15 meeting with the further stipulation that anyone helping the Chinese would be considered an enemy (Nelson Examiner, 12 and 15 August, 1857). Whether this outburst was prompted by Mr. Hopton or by the Australian experience is unknown, but it did initiate anti-Chinese feeling in New Zealand, and by 1861 the first mention of anti-Chinese legislation appears in the Parliamentary Debates.¹

Chronologically, the Australian States had pioneered this anti-Chinese feeling and legislation in the areas where Chinese went. In 1853 South Australia established a £10 poll tax for Chinese immigrants, followed by Victoria in 1855 and New South Wales in 1861, and although this legislation was temporarily repealed in 1855, 1861 and 1867 respectively, there is no doubt that it provided the basis for the opinions which travelled across the Tasman (Choi, 1975:20-21).

Despite this feeling, however, there were people in New Zealand who thought otherwise. In 1865 the Dunedin Chamber of Commerce, mainly made up of local merchants and businessmen who were feeling the effects of the declining mining population in Otago, decided that they would favour Chinese migration. At their September meeting, their justification included the fact that the province needed population, that the Chinese were well-behaved, important consumers,

and that further, all the things that the Chinese had been accused of had not been proved.² The meeting stood behind these assumptions except for one dissenting vote (Millar, 1972:26).

The year prior to this, however, there had been an inquiry by the Chinese in Victoria, who had obviously suffered enough under both the legislative restrictions and open hostility in the Victorian gold fields. They wondered whether they would receive any protection in the New Zealand gold fields as they had supposedly received in Victoria (Choi, 1975:20-21), and asked also about regulations and privileges (Millar, 1972:25). The reply of the Chief Secretary of Otago had been that they would be in the same situation as the Europeans in the gold fields (*ibid.*).³

This suggested that at least their initial migration was going to be mutually desirable. For the Chinese in Victoria, the push factors were very evident in the increasingly bad relations with Europeans, and the pull factors included a less hostile environment in New Zealand that, as yet, had not attempted to pass any anti-Chinese immigration laws. Also, favourable news of the New Zealand gold fields must have spread, even though by 1865 the greatest part of the gold rush had subsided.⁴

In October the written statement conferring the right of protection on the Chinese from the Provincial Treasurer was conveyed by a Dunedin merchant to a Chinese merchant in Melbourne (ODT, 10 November 1865).⁵ There was further dissension as regards this decision, however, and it came from the gold fields. Neither the miners nor the gold fields' representatives in the Provincial Council were in favour of a Chinese migration. The miners, particularly

those in the Dunstan district, wasted no time in sending a petition to the Superintendent of Otago opposing the immigration of Chinese, and other local areas held meetings that generated the same sentiment (Millar, 1972:27-28). The Otago Witness⁶, the Dunedin paper, also entered the fray and initially opposed the Chamber of Commerce, then changed its mind and supported it towards the end of September (Rachagan, 1971:58).

On 23 December 1865 Mr. Ho Ah Mei arrived from Melbourne to inspect the gold fields and he was to be followed by several other Chinese who were to assist him in his task (OW, 23 December 1865). Mr. Ah Mei's likeness was captured by the Dunedin 'Punch' in a cartoon which depicted him as a Mandarin in fine clothes with an attendant; he was being welcomed at the docks by Mr. Punch, who was obviously intended to represent the Dunedin Chamber of Commerce. Altogether it seems to have been a cordial welcome; however, the departure was depicted by the same magazine as harried and antagonistic with a large miner trying to remove the Mandarin's queue. Although Otago seems to have forgotten the visit of Ho Ah Mei quite quickly, he had ~~not~~ forgotten them.

In 1871 Ho Ah Mei wrote to the Otago Daily Times and spelled out the details of the first visit. He explained his initial speculative voyage in 1865 stating that although he was not a miner his purpose "...was to first secure the introduction of labour; then with a hope to reap the benefit by having the full command provisioning business, should the scheme be proved successful" (ODT, 8 June 1871). In the course of his visit, Ho Ah Mei claims that he was able to secure a guarantee of protection for lives and property of the Chinese, should they arrive, and also much useful

information from a very helpful Inspector-General of Goldfields, Mr. Vincent Pyke (ibid.). He left, according to his version, without event, and immediately returned to Melbourne where he issued placards for various areas of the Australian goldfields. He met with little success, and was to later explain this in terms of his fellow countrymen's reluctance to risk what they already had and knew for the unknown especially on the word of one man.

Finally, Ah Mei convinced twelve penniless miners⁷ to leave Australia by advancing them £20 each for passage and supplies (ibid.). They embarked in Melbourne and arrived in Dunedin in February 1866 and then two days later moved on to Taupeka on the suggestion of Mr. Pyke. In Taupeka they were met by Mr. D. Campbell who seems, on the basis of Ah Mei's description to have taken it upon himself to usher the miners into Taupeka and ensure peaceful relations.⁸

In total Ah Mei spent £800, according to his accounts and by 1871 had only been able to recoup £340. His role as collector had in 1871 been assigned to another man in Dunedin it seems, who was also to look after two lodging houses owned by Ah Mei for the express purpose of housing newcomers. After an uncertain amount of time Ah Mei gave up his wait for news from the men and returned to Melbourne and from there went to a job as Interpreter in Ballarat, Victoria.⁹ Even when news did come to Victoria of lucrative returns from New Zealand Ah Mei chose to remain in Victoria. He stated with some confidence in 1871 that, 'As I anticipated (the) news was not a durable one, for very shortly afterwards unfavourable news again returned; and again the migration of our countrymen from Melbourne resumed its old state of dullness, but not before a thousand or so had already been added to your census' (ibid.). By 1868, Ah Mei, tired of

waiting for his returns from the miners in Otago, departed for China with his family after ten years away. He had the chance of staying in New Zealand with the promise of a job as Interpreter for the Police but turned it down since he saw no financial gain from a government job. In Canton, however, he took up a job with the Customs service for six months before he again decided to return to Dunedin via Melbourne and '...look after those pets of mine to whom I had lent my yellow boys, and from whom I might get back something with which I might be enabled to start life anew',¹⁰ (ODT, 8 June 1871). In actual fact, by 1871 Ah Mei had got no further than working as a clerk and Interpreter for the government in Hong Kong. Interestingly enough in this position he was actually involved in the chartering of the Whirlwind for the transport of 350 passengers straight to Dunedin rather than via Melbourne¹¹ in 1870. Ah Mei also reported that two more ships were bound for New Zealand, one having left in January 1871 and another due to leave later in April. The remainder of the letter included in the Otago Daily Times gently reminded the 'generous and open-handed' government that he would look favourably upon recognition of his 'scheme' and they could signify so with remuneration. By the end of June the Otago Witness picked up the story and added further input from Ah Mei. He now maintained that 400 were being sent and that he hoped they 'will prove themselves useful citizens, or generally termed useful miners and labourers in your country and that no cause for complaint will be made against them either by the government or the people in general. This forms the chief portion of (the) trading interest between this port and yours, at least for the present. I have in fact learned that there will be about 2,000 Chinese for your part this year' (OW, 24 June 1871).

In fact, Ho Ah Mei was not far off in his estimate, considering the 400 that were on their way. The statistics for 1871 show that 1,596 Chinese arrived in New Zealand (see Appendix II). The letter caused some consternation and the Otago Witness was even accused of manufacturing it, but the paper was quick to remind readers that Mr. Ah Mei had visited Dunedin in 1865 (OW 1 July 1871). The situation turned out to be quite serious. Ho Ah Mei had heard that his notice was advertised in the papers in New Zealand and he obviously felt that the deal had been accepted by the New Zealand Government. Naturally he wrote asking for his reward. It seems as though the New Zealand Government had no intention of taking Mr. Ho Ah Mei seriously, since nothing more was said of the issue.

The Chinese, according to one, John Ah Tong, liked Otago much better than Victoria (OW 8 December 1866).

From these early years of migration, there was fairly constant reporting¹² of the Chinese activity in the gold fields and of their arrivals, but some areas of Otago did not like the Chinese. In 1866 they were thrown out of Nevis and reported in Clyde, and in 1867 it was reported that they were earning 25/- to 40/- per week but were not buying miners' licences (OW 16 June, 8 December 1866, 17 January, 27 April 1867). In the middle of 1867 a Chinese was murdered, and the local Chinese organised their first petition for the murderer's apprehension. They offered a £200 reward, and the notice was signed by George Ah Kee, butcher of Gabriel's Gully, Tin Cheong, He Ti, Wong Wai, miner, storekeeper and dealer at Tuapeka Flat (OW 15 June 1867). The Colonial Secretary also offered £100 reward (ibid.). Perhaps more significant than the murder is the fact that within a year Chinese not only were mining but also had set themselves up in businesses to provide commodities for their own people, which of

course defeated the basis of the Chamber of Commerce's and Provincial Council's initial decision.

In the remainder of 1867 Chinese continued to arrive, and by September five Chinese men, obviously disenchanted with gold mining, had taken up gardening in Dunedin (OW, 7 September 1867). The three and one half acres they used were leased from the City Council. It was a swampy bit of land near the school house on Great King Street and was made available to them for three years at a rate of £30 per year.

The reception of the Chinese in Otago was not all peaceful, as has already been indicated, and besides the murder there were periodic reports of Chinese being forcibly removed from various areas. They were evicted from Mount Ida, Dunstan Creek and Naseby, and the evident hostility obviously moved the Dunedin Chamber of Commerce to take action. In 1868 both the Superintendent of the gold fields and the police were enjoined to 'keep protective watch over the Chinese' as had previously been promised to them (OW, 8 February 1868). In December of that same year the Otago Provincial Government Gazette made this protection official:

Proclamation of Police Protection
over Chinese Miners

Whereas several instances have occurred wherein the Chinese have been made the subject of persecution by the Europeans and other residents of the gold fields - in one case a gross outrage having been committed by a number of persons on a single Chinaman, and in another threats having been used to induce Chinese miners to remove from the locality they had selected in which to carry out their operation.

Notice is hereby given, that the Chinese having come to Otago under a promise made by successive Superintendants, that those who come will be fully protected, the Provincial Government is determined to fulfil that promise, and the police are strictly enjoined to keep protective watch over the Chinese population in their respective districts, and in case of their being made aware of any injury having being illegally inflicted on any of the Chinese population, to lose no time in bringing the perpetrators thereof to justice.

The Superintendent relies upon the assistance of all right thinking, well disposed people to aid in affording that protection to the Chinese, which persons residing with a British Settlement have the right to rely on.

Dunedin

29 January 1868

Signed by James MacAndrew
Superintendent
(Otago Provincial Government
Gazette 1868:39)

The one point that the above ignored was the fact that many of the Chinese legal problems would stem from their own complaints about each other. It seems that this was anticipated to some extent, for there was a Chinese Interpreter at least in the Tuapeka district, a Mr. H. Blewitt, who was required to send quarterly reports to the Colonial Secretary in Wellington; after 1868 this was to be done by the local police. Also, numerous disputes, largely pertaining to mining issues, between various claims were solved in the Warden's Court that sat periodically in various areas. These disputes were numerous and usually seemed to involve the scarce resource of water used for sluicing. Men on one claim, for instance, would divert water from another claim to use on their particular area. These were often resolved through a fine, which might be as high as £10.

Remarkably quickly after their arrival, and coincidental with their business activity the Chinese established their own communities in the gold fields. By 1868 and 1869 Chinese camps, and later communities, had been established in Lawrence, Moa Flat and Nevis. At Lawrence the Chinese camp was relegated to an area adjacent to the community by a local ordinance, and it appears that most other towns in the gold fields followed suit, or the Chinese voluntarily set up their camps on the periphery (ODT, 1 October 1869). In 1868 the Lawrence correspondent for the Otago Daily Times described the Chinese camp in the following:

It consists of a double row of houses built parallel to the government road and the Chinese there have subscribed, of themselves, £20 for the formation of the main street and two side tracks connecting it with that thoroughfare. Their dwellings are sufficiently comfortable, and are fitted up in a creditable manner.

(ODT, 8 July 1868)

At that time the camp contained a gaming house, cook shop, several stores, one of which was called He Tie and Company and the correspondent noted that many of the men spoke at least some English (ibid.).¹³

In 1869 the first recorded group of Chinese arrived from China via Melbourne (OW, 8 May 1869). They were noted to have a different appearance but immediately upon arrival made their way into the gold fields and particularly to the smaller communities. In September of the same year 228 arrived from China after a passage that had taken 100 days. The majority, it was stated, had come from the Five Districts, which presumably would include Sam Yap, and another group had come from Seyip (OW, 18 September 1869). It

is also noted that three Chinese women arrived in New Zealand in October. They had bound feet and went to join their husbands in Lawrence (OW, 2 October 1869). It seems almost certain that all women who came out during this period would have come to join merchant husbands. It is unlikely that miners and gardeners would have had enough capital to afford the trip for their families. Furthermore, the period of stay for miners was far more flexible depending on their earning power, diligence and desire to return home.


In the early part of 1870 the Chinese in Otago had expanded to 2,640 and were situated in the following areas:

Queenstown	350
Arrowtown	70
Nevis	300
Bendigo	40
Cromwell	60
Bannockburn	300
Dunstan Creek	30
Mount Ida	250
Blacks	50
Macreas	150
Waipoi	450
Waitahuna	150
Lawrence	300
Beaumont	40
Switzer	20
Dunedin and other	<u>80</u>
TOTAL	<u>2,640</u>

(OW, 15 January 1870; See also Map 4)

Although it is known that not all the above were engaged in mining the estimates of income for the time did not take this into account. It was estimated that the Chinese miners were making from 30/- to £2

Map 4



Source: New Zealand Presbyterian, Vol. II, No. 9, March 1888:170-171

per week and producing a total of 1,400 ounces of gold per week, which was equivalent to one-fifth of the total gold field's production (ibid.). If one can estimate, based on 1871 statistics, that approximately 3 per cent of the Chinese population in the gold fields was engaged in service-related activities for their own countrymen, then there are an estimated 2,560 directly involved in mining. The range of estimated income would have been between £3,840 and £5,120 per week for the whole Chinese community.

The service activities of local Chinese, at this time, were confined to a few gardens and a range of other businesses including two substantial merchant firms in Dunedin. In 1869 a 32 year old merchant arrived from Melbourne to establish one of the firms in Dunedin. He had also brought ten to twelve people from Melbourne with him, all of whom were from Sai Gong Village, Poon Yu County in China. A company was established, according to informants, employing some local people, and eventually it diversified into gold mining activity. It is interesting to note two things about this family. First, as is the case in numerous instances amongst the New Zealand Chinese, there is a tendency to drop the surname and to adopt the given names for both the name of the company and the family name. This means that the number of generations is impossible to ascertain without reference to their Chinese names. While the Chinese within their own community still use a full Chinese name there is still a sense in which a lineage, rather than being generations deep, now appears to have a starting point in the overseas community and traces its heritage and patronage to this founder. Second, it indicates a very clear pattern in male succession to the business, which is also evident in most Chinese businesses once they become

established in the overseas community. In this case there were two sons by a wife in China, who came out to New Zealand in 1884 to help run the business. However, after his wife died, the father remarried in New Zealand, which meant that the sojourn in New Zealand became permanent. One of the sons settled in New Zealand and the other returned home, but the company has persisted to this day, now operated by the third and fourth generation of males in the family.

Besides service activity and mining on their own account, some Chinese preferred to work for wages. There is evidence to show that they were employed by both Chinese and Europeans in the gold fields. Their wages appear to have been paid weekly, except in one instance (Tuapeka Times, 18 July 1868; OW, 18 April 1868, 12 June 1869).¹⁴ The exception, which involved indentured labour, occurred in Orepuki, where one Kee Chang had bought a claim for £125 and intended to contact a Dunedin merchant who got men for him (OW, 23 September 1871). Kee Chang estimated that the deal would involve him paying the merchant £20 to £30 to bring each man to New Zealand, and then he would pay them 15/- per week and give them food, and the men would pay him back a fixed amount for their passage (*ibid.*). When they had paid Kee Chang back, they would be free to go.

By 1871, according to the numerous reports in the gold fields' papers, the Chinese were well organised, but a little bit too much so, for the Europeans. They were providing their own supplies and their own doctor, Leang Chum Wah who had arrived from Hong Kong (TT, 28 April 1871). They had established their own meeting place, since a 'Joss House had already opened in the Tuapeka area' (TT, 25 September 1869), and the first Presbyterian Chinese missionary arrived in Lawrence¹⁵

(OW, 4 February 1871). By this time also one of the leading merchants of Lawrence's Chinese community had died. Onlookers witnessed the body being taken from the hospital in a carriage with the relatives riding behind, casting out little white squares of paper on the road. The large group of Chinese who followed all had white gauze strips in their hats, which were later taken off and burned at the graveside. Once at the grave, an offering was presented on a tray which consisted of an 80-lb. roast pig, boiled pork, cakes and apples. As each mourner left he was given 1/- in an envelope (West Coast Times, 12 July 1870).

Partially because of the self-sufficiency but largely because of an increasingly competitive gold mining situation, the hostility towards the Chinese increased. Incidents of deviance were reported, and the accusations of Chinese not paying their Miner's Rights were substantiated by an investigation resulting in numerous fines.¹⁶

The total cost of the fines to the Chinese were as follows:

Waipoi	£ 60
Cardrona	£ 120
Arrow District	£ 200
Mount Ida, Tuapeka	£ 600
Dunstan and Switzer	—
TOTAL	£ 980

(OW, 1 December 1871)

Furthermore, European storekeepers were seeing their Chinese counterparts doing a thriving business, and one such storekeeper was alleged to have separate accounts for as much as £40 and £120. A Chinese merchant in Dunedin responded to this accusation with the logic that although the Chinese patronised their own storekeepers, the storekeepers themselves were benefiting the province since they paid customs duty and harbour dues for boats coming in. He added that

he had paid £2000 in customs duty (OW, 8 July 1871). The particular merchant also mentioned that he had opened a branch of his store in the North Island and was collecting fungus for export to China (ibid.). Prior to this he had been collecting scrap iron in the gold fields to send to China (ibid.).¹⁷ It is interesting to note that this thread of the history ties up with a well known Chinese merchant who settled in New Plymouth in 1870. His name was Chew Chong, and he had left China in 1855 for Australia, where he worked in the Victoria fields as a storekeeper for eleven years (Encyclopaedia of New Zealand, Vol. I:340-341).¹⁸ He came to New Zealand in 1866 and settled in Dunedin, where he was engaged in collecting scrap iron to send back to China (ibid.).

According to the Encyclopaedia, it was Chew Chong's travels around New Zealand that eventually led him to the Taranaki area, where he discovered edible fungus 東姑 comparable to a type widely used in China as a delicacy and for medicinal purposes. Whether or not Chew Chong is in fact the merchant mentioned in the Dunedin papers or whether he merely worked for that merchant is unknown. It is known, however, that he did set up a business in New Plymouth and engage in the collection of the fungus from local cockies, who were at that time facing a depression. He paid 6/- for a sack and apparently one could collect two to five sacks per day of the wet fungus, which then had to be dried and sent to Dunedin for shipment to China (Encyclopaedia of New Zealand, Vol. I:340-341).¹⁹

The large part of the opposition to the Chinese seems to have centred in the Wakatipu District and especially in Arrowtown. In November 1870, one T.L. Shepherd gave a speech in which he proposed an immediate imposition of a £50 poll tax on the Chinese and a heavy duty

on rice (OW, 12 November 1870). In August of the following year, Mr. C.E. Haughton, M.H.R. for Wakatipu²⁰ asked the government whether they were going to take any action over the growing number of Chinese in the colony (Scholefield and Hall, 1937:262). Sir William Fox who had become Premier in 1869, said that:

...a number, not a very large number, of Chinese had arrived in the Province of Otago; but had not received any information of an official character from any person in that Province. Should the government receive any such information it would take care to at once inform the House.

(NZPD 1871, 10:47)

But two weeks later Haughton again raised the question, suggesting that the Goldfields Committee should take on the investigation of the Chinese (ibid:263). Since it was feared this committee would be biased, the government set up a Select Committee on 29 August 1871 (ibid.).

Initially the Committee was composed of nine members, only one of whom came from Otago. By September 1871 three more members had been added, MacAndrew (Otago), Thomson (Otago) and White (Westland) (AJHR, 1871, H-5:2).²¹ MacAndrew, it should be noted, was involved with the Public Works programme which was to begin railway construction in Otago in 1871. In the early part of 1871 he had written to the Dunedin paper suggesting the use of Chinese labour on the Clutha railway, who, according to him, would provide a reliable work force at a cheaper cost (OW, 15 April 1871).

The Report of the Select Committee takes up some forty-six pages and includes thirteen interviews with various people in New Zealand, most of whom had either been in China, Australia or some other country where Chinese resided. Their comments were generally made up of personal opinions which ranged from extremely negative to

ambivalent. Without exception they were willing to tolerate Chinese immigrants as long as they were useful and as long as they were a minority that could be kept a minority. The suggestions of polygamy, frugality, maltreatment of European women, avoidance of taxation, general dirtiness, in addition to gambling and opium and that they did not settle but took their wealth home, were presented totally without proof. The only statistical evidence presented included occupations, residence in New Zealand and offences committed by Chinese in 1871 in the gold fields' districts (see Appendix III). No attempt had been made to calculate earnings, customs duty, immigration rates, inter-marriage or length of stay in New Zealand, all of which would have been possible.

The only Chinese person interviewed was one John Ah Tong,²² at the time resident in Wellington and working as a cabinetmaker. There were only 17 Chinese people living in Wellington at the time. John Ah Tong, of his own admission, had spent little time in the gold fields although he had been in New South Wales before his arrival in New Zealand. The only facts that he could add to the investigation were that wages in China ranged from 8d. to 9d. for labourers per day and as much as half a dollar (2/2) for mechanics; that Chinese who came out were often indebted to masters for three years until they had paid off their passages; that Chinese coming here would be satisfied to leave with between £50 and £100 in their pockets; and, finally, that blowing out a match as an oath was as binding on a Chinese as swearing on a Bible was for Europeans (AJHR, 1971, H-4:5). Two other Chinese, Ah Gee and Ah Hing, the former married to a European like John Ah Tong, were in attendance, but John Ah Tong insisted that they would be able to add nothing to his testimony.

Perhaps the most insistent of those that advocated the anti-Chinese line was C.E. Haughton from Wakatipu, who went to great lengths to explain the devious activities of a group of Chinese who disputed ownership with a group of Europeans over a claim that had been found to have gold in it. The dispute went to Court and the Chinese lost the case. Haughton suggested that they often encroached upon European claims in the same gully, as they had done in this case, especially after waiting to see if it would be productive first. He added that the Chinese, although generally thought to be only re-working areas left by Europeans, were on the contrary staking out new areas and, what was worse, they were mining them in groups (AJHR, 1871,H-4:7).

Two other, more interesting facts came out of Haughton's testimony, which, although presented as negative opinion, tells us something about the relationship between the Chinese miners and the merchants that supplied them. It was shown in two separate cases that Chinese merchants were known to support their fellow countrymen should the necessity arise, especially in legal action, and also that Chinese miners had been known to help out a merchant in a similar situation.²³ If this was not an entirely altruistic situation, at least it was reciprocity based on mutual dependence, since the merchant needed his mining clientele and, conversely, the miners needed the merchant. This kind of relationship will be dealt with later in more detail.

It was generally conceded that the Chinese made good domestic servants, gardeners and laundrymen but also that their 'superior industry and plodding perseverance would, in the end, eat us out of house and home...' (AJHR, 1871,H-5:12). Those who were bitterly opposed to their presence went so far as to suggest that the Miners

Right fee be increased and also that either provisions should not be sold to them or otherwise they should be subject to heavy duties, specifically rice and dried fish.²⁴

Following the interviews in the Report are a series of replies to seven questions sent to each of the Wardens in the goldfields.

They were asked:

1. State your opinion of the effect on the gold fields of Chinese migration.
2. What is the influence of Chinese upon general conduct of mining population especially as to gambling and disturbance of peace.
3. Is there any danger to the morality of the community, especially young children and girls?
4. Are the Chinese useful in developing the gold fields, and for agricultural and domestic purposes?
5. Are you aware of intermarriages of Chinese with Europeans; if so, what class of women.
6. Is it desirable that Chinese immigration should be checked or promoted; if so will you suggest what legislation might prove effective?
7. What is the comparative cost of Chinese and European labour; also cost of living.

(AJHR, 1871, Ad Interim Report No. I, H-5:14).

The responses to these questions from nine areas indicate little more than a fairly negative attitude to the Chinese presence. It is interesting to note that the responses from the Wardens of Lawrence, Switzer and Naseby concerning the usefulness of the Chinese were all positive, and in each of these places there were enough Chinese people living for them to have established a viable community.²⁵ It seems that even in a situation of high visibility, albeit as a separate community, that Europeans were more favourably disposed towards the Chinese presence than in situations where they were more dispersed.

The wardens of all three places were also of the opinion that no immediate action should be taken about the immigration of Chinese into New Zealand but also that a poll tax should be imposed if the government felt it necessary at a later date. The other responses were far more negative in terms of restrictions and ranged from a mild form of non-encouragement to a poll tax, or even an annual tax plus a levy on their basic food commodities of rice and dried fish on top of the large duty already paid for luxury goods.

The information required by Question 7 indicated a considerable variation in wages and cost of living for Chinese as well as Europeans and can best be summarised as follows:

TABLE 3: Estimates on the Comparative Cost of Living and Labour for Chinese and Europeans in the Gold Fields.

	Chinese Wages	Chinese cost of living	European Wages	European cost of living
Roxburgh		9/-		16/-
Queenstown	£1.0.0	8/-	£2.8.0	
Clyde	£1.10.0	10/-	£2.10.0	£1.0.0
Lawrence	15/- to 25/-	5/-	£2.10.0	12/- to 15/-

Note: All estimates are based on a week, and five areas gave no response

(AJHR 1871, H-5:14-22)

Generally, it can be seen that the wages and cost of living for Europeans were twice as much as that for their Chinese counterparts in the gold fields.

Similar questions were asked of police officers in various areas, and in general the responses were similar. None of the officers in areas where there were Chinese found them any more of a burden than Europeans in the same areas. In short the consensus appears to have been that they required no extra police supervision and if there were problems there was more need for interpreters than police officers.

The more useful information from the replies indicated that already Chinese in small numbers had moved into towns elsewhere in New Zealand where they would have had to depend largely on a European population for their income. In Christchurch there were two gardens and two employed in storekeeping; in Nelson there were two fancy goods stores, one carter and an old settler; in Westland there were fourteen in gardens distributed around Woodstock and Ross, while there was one cook in Hokitika. In all these places a Chinese community was non-existent, so it is obvious that relations were amicable enough to support their presence.

The summation of the Select Committee was forwarded to the House on 27 October 1871, only two months after initiation, and its conclusions and recommendation were as follows:

1. That the Chinese are industrious and frugal.
2. That they are as orderly citizens as Europeans.
3. That there is no special risk to the morality or security of the community to be apprehended from their presence in the Colony.
4. That they are not likely to introduce any special infectious diseases.
5. That they are well adapted for menial and light mechanical and for agricultural occupations.
6. But that nearly all those who come to this Colony do so for the purpose of mining for gold.

7. That, as a rule, they occupy and turn to good account ground which at present would not pay the European miner.
8. That, as a rule, they return to China as soon as they have amassed a net sum of from £100 upwards.
9. That no considerable number of them are at any time likely to become permanent settlers in the country.
10. That they spend less per head than the European population.
11. That the presence of Chinese in the country has not hitherto entailed any additional police expenditure.

In view of the foregoing the Committee are of opinion that there have been no sufficient grounds shown for the exclusion of the Chinese; and that no sufficient case has up to the present time been made out to require the Committee to propose that legislative action should be taken having for effect the exclusion of the Chinese or the imposition of special burdens upon them.

Wm. J. Steward
Chairman, October 27, 1871

(AJHR, H-5B:4)

Nine members voted and there were 5 'ayes' and 4 'noes'. Those that voted against the conclusions included the representatives on the Committee from Wakatipu, Dunedin, Waimea and Otago, and Mr. Haughton of Wakatipu registered a final protest against the recommendations on the grounds that he believed they were inconsistent with the evidence. (AJHR, 1871 H-5B:8).

In the same year that the Select Committee met, the government had also been negotiating the beginning of its railroad contracts as part of the public works programme. One of the contractors who tendered for the building of the railroads was John Brogden and Sons of London, who had managed to procure a large number of the contracts in negotiation with Sir Julius Vogel. The government of the day,

according to the Honorable Mr. Ormond, then Minister of Works, found themselves obligated to accept an agreement worth three quarters of a million pounds (NZPD, 1896, 94:430). Apparently labour was short at this time, since it was prior to the assisted immigration programme, and Brogden, having trouble getting labour, proposed to bring in a couple of loads of Chinese labourers.²⁶ This very neatly fits with Ho Ah Mei's venture (see page 83) and also eventually leads to John Ah Tong (see page 97).

Ormond, facing this proposition from Brogden had found that there was no legal objection against Chinese men being used and also nothing to stop the contractors bringing them into the Colony (*ibid.*). The general principle of the government, however, was to use people on the public works scheme who would eventually settle in the country (NZPD, 1872, 12:92). Faced with having to stop this possible influx, Ormond wrote to the Superintendents of the various Provinces and the County Council of Westland asking for their opinion. He stated in the circular that there had been difficulty in inducing sufficient European migration to New Zealand in order to make up the labour deficiency, and it had been suggested by the railroad contractors that Chinese labour be used (AJHR, 1972, D-12). Ormond added in his last paragraph that '...unless every available means of obtaining labour be temporarily adopted, until a sufficient flow of European immigration shall have been established, great difficulty and vexatious delays will be experienced in the execution of railways and other important works' (*ibid.*).²⁷

In the following weeks the responses came in. Auckland was in favour, adding that the savings in labour costs would outweigh the fact that the Chinese would be taking their savings out of the country. The Select Committee Report was also used as a positive reason for

such action (ibid.). New Plymouth would accept the importation of only 100 or 150; Wellington was in favour to a 'limited extent', and Napier's response was that New Zealand's public works could wait until sufficient European immigrants had arrived (ibid:2). Canterbury was totally opposed, and so was the Superintendent of Nelson, who failed to return an answer but instead published a lengthy response in the Nelson Examiner (NZPD, 1872, 12:162). He insisted that the railway construction was awaited with optimism, as it was the only thing that would rescue the district from impoverishment; therefore, nothing should be done to hinder the expectations of those people in the area (NZPD, 1972, 12:163). Otago as might have been expected, was opposed to the idea because Chinese immigrants seemed to be arriving fast enough without encouraging immigration (ibid:164).

Very typically, this long debate in July was really uninformed. Otago public works schemes were already subcontracting to a party of Chinese labour as early as May 1872 on a portion of the Arthur's Point road from Queenstown to Arrowtown (OW, 4 May 1872). By November of 1872 it had become obvious also that Brogden had ignored the government and made arrangements with one John Ah Tong to go to Tuapeka from Wellington, where he lived, and procure Chinese labour for the Clutha railroad (OW, 23 November 1872:16). The reports in the paper about the employment of Chinese labour were however very sketchy for the remainder of 1872. In December it seemed that John Ah Tong had refused the offer to be Brogden's agent (OW, 7 December 1872:1), but by the middle of December there is mention of ninety-six Chinese resuming contract work on the railway near Adam's Flat and by the end of December they were employed on the Clutha railway (OW, 14 and 28 December 1872).²⁸

In the spring of 1873, however, something had gone drastically wrong, and John Ah Tong's involvement with Brogden became publicized in a dispute with some of his fellow countrymen over the payment of wages. Initially the Bruce Herald had found out about the story from the Chinese labourers who had gone on strike in the township because Ah Tong had not paid them. As far as the labourers were concerned, John Ah Tong was their employer (Bruce Herald, 7 January 1873). John Ah Tong wrote to the paper and insisted that he was engaged by Brogden and that it was Brogden who paid the wages (OW, 18 January 1873). Although this may have been the case the newspaper was also quick to report that John Ah Tong had organised a society whereby the Chinese labourers paid a fixed monthly sum out of their wages to him which was to help defray medical expenses. Apparently a Dr. Weber had been employed by Ah Tong to look after 180 men (OW, 18 January 1873), and he had also leased five acres of land in the township for ten years at an annual rate of £25 per year. This was to be used as a garden, presumably to supply the railway workers (Bruce Herald, 10 January 1873).

It transpired, as information about John Ah Tong leaked out, that he had initially come to the area as an agent for Brogden and that he procured a number of labourers for Mr. Smyth, Brogden's manager in Otago. This arrangement seems to have failed, and Smyth dismissed them all (see footnote 28). The first publicity about this arrangement had been posted in the area in November 1872 in the following notice:

Notice is hereby given that the Government being desirous of making a railway, therefore Brogden have employed Ah Tong to issue notices and employ Chinese at the rate of 5s.6d. a day.

It also included the class of men desired and information stating that if they could not provide their own provisions John Ah Tong would do so until they could provide their own. It was signed by Mr. Brodgen (Bruce Herald, 21 January 1873).

In the court case that took place in Tokomairiro before J.P. Maitland between John Ah Tong and Ah Foo, the plaintiff, Ah Tong was accused of not paying Ah Foo £5.11.0 in wages owing to him (Bruce Herald, 21 January 1873). During the giving of evidence, Mr. Smyth, Brodgen's manager, testified that as far as he was concerned Ah Tong had been offered a sub-contract for forty men and that Ah Tong would be paid 10d. per cubic yard for cuttings and excavation (ibid.). Ah Tong then went off and came back with eighty men who apparently went to work despite the requirement for only forty men. Ah Tong also went to some local storekeepers and bought £85 worth of provisions for the men and charged them to Mr. Smyth (ibid.).

In the second week of December 1872 another notice appeared in the area for the employment of Chinese labour:

...formerly the work had not been done properly, and therefore Ah Tong had been employed to employ more suitable parties. The Government have considered they would only employ suitable and steady parties. Those who wish to be employed can come, and will be paid up at the end of four weeks - on Saturday of the fourth week. Those who do not wish to work by the day can obtain contract work. Three feet European and two and a half Chinese measure shall be a yard. If wheel-barrows are requisite, 10d. a yard, if they are not, 9d. a yard. The money would be paid in 14 days, or so according to work done. If you wish employment, come with your friends, and find it with Ah Tong. (Dated the 8th day of Chinese 12 the month).

(Bruce Herald, 21 January 1873)

Whether or not the first notice had been translated into Chinese is unknown, although Ah Tong said that he had had it translated, but according to Ah Foo the second one was posted everywhere (ibid.). Unlike the first, it gave no details of wages or arrangements for provisions, and it certainly did not tell of Yett Chung and Chin Chuke, the clerk and timekeeper employed by Ah Tong, the latter at £15 a week (ibid.).

Ah Tong's story of the negotiations with Brogden also provide a startling contrast to that of Mr. Smyth. According to Ah Tong, Brogden had first asked him to go to China and get 1000 men, but Ah Tong told him that there were plenty in Melbourne, Sydney and Otago (cf. Ho Ah Mei). After this, Brogden had apparently received a telegram from Smyth stating that Ah Tong was to proceed to Otago to procure men at a salary of £2.2.0 a day when travelling and £1.1.0 a day when supervising the men.²⁹ Smyth maintained that he had no knowledge of this arrangement and knew nothing of the 12 weeks' salary at £1.1.0 and the £44 for 22 days travelling expenses that Ah Tong said Brogden owed to him. Smyth maintained that he had paid Ah Tong £343 for piece-work and day-work and a further £107.11.7, but according to Ah Tong this was still £80 short. Ah Tong had asked the paymaster not to tell the men that he received the second amount until such time as he could get it from a friend in Dunedin and then pay the men (Bruce Herald, 21 January 1873).

The summation of the case by the judge hardly resolved the matter. In his opinion, if the plaintiff had willingly entered into a contract with Ah Tong by agreeing to pay him 3d. a day for having procured him labour then there was no misunderstanding. Further, he suggested that it would have made more sense to pay them 5/9d. instead of 6/- (Bruce Herald, 28 January 1873).

In the interim another contract had been made for Chinese labour with the Chinese storekeeper at Milton. During the case numerous Chinese had been camped in the local area and had even attended the trial, but now that the 'unfortunate connection with Ah Tong' had been revealed they could go back to work.³⁰ The paper obviously sympathized with the Chinese labourers and, further, pleaded with parents to stop their children annoying and insulting orderly and peaceable Chinese on the streets (Bruce Herald, 24 January 1873).

The extent to which the employment of Chinese labour was perpetuated is unknown except for the following statistics which appeared in the Census:

TABLE 4: Chinese employed as Road, Railway, Labourer Navy 1874-76.

	Construction Labour ³¹	Undefined Labour
1874	159	99
1878	58	135
1881	77	56
1886	22	55

(Census, 1874-1886)

Generally it seems as though the opposition died down, perhaps due to economic prosperity plus the fact that large numbers of assisted immigrants were also entering the country at the same time. In the period 1870 till 1881, before the first restrictive Act was passed in an attempt to limit Chinese immigration, 6,077 Chinese entered New Zealand and 3,100 departed (Appendix II), and the overall Chinese population had increased from 2,641 in 1871 to 5,004 by 1881 (Appendix I). In Australia the Chinese population had increased in

the period from 1871 to 1881 from 28,351 to 38,533, and Queensland had passed the Chinese Immigration Restriction Act in 1877 which imposed a £10 poll tax (Choi 1975:22-25).

The period from 1873 to the late 1870s was fairly peaceful for the Chinese, and they seemed to have been able to persist with little opposition. There were two significant events which do merit mention. The first concerns the movement of Chinese to the West Coast, which seems to have started in 1868. In May of that year seven or eight Chinese were recorded as arriving in Hokitika overland from Otago (West Coast Times, 27 May 1868). The numbers were initially small, and there were only twenty-four Chinese reported in Westland in 1871 (see Appendix III). Even though the resident numbers remained small, there were large groups that disembarked in Hokitika. In 1874 two groups arrived numbering in total 350 persons, although their arrival was greeted with little more than curiosity at the time. By 1879, however, the area had become one of the centres for anti-Chinese agitation fostered by people like Seddon, who had come from England to Australia and then to Westland. More will be said about this in Chapter 4.

The second event concerns the attempt by the Chinese to have Warden Beetham of Queenstown removed from office. Beetham was well known in the gold fields, by both Chinese and Europeans, for his stern justice, and it appears that in 1872 the Chinese in the Wakatipu District actually organized to accomplish their task. In 1872 a petition was sent to the Provincial Council in Otago which went as follows:³²

CHINESE PETITION AGAINST MR. WARDEN BEETHAM

A book for the collection of money issued by many who deliberated.

We, the Flowery people have not counted it far to come a thousand ley (3000 miles), and having arrived in a strange country in search of wealth, expected that Chinese and foreigners would dwell together in harmony; but at Queenstown there is a great feeling of anger, indignation, and resentment against the magistrate of that place, who is wicked and vicious, a violator of decorum and moral propriety, and introducing confusion and anarchy into the relations of life.

If we go to law, this dog magistrate does not distinguish and separate clearly, but at once takes and inflicts fines on us, the Flowery people. Thus it may be seen that this dog magistrate appropriates the fines in the dark...

A great lawyer, who is just and upright, respects us, the Flowery people, as people of original ability and our bellies filled with talent... With him was spoken clearly about the payment of money. If the lawyer explains clearly and manages ably this business so that this magistrate shall not in Queenstown perform his functions, then he will receive the money. But if he explains clearly and the magistrate is not removed from office in Queenstown, he will not touch the smallest amount, but it will be returned to the subscribers. Certainly, if this dog magistrate is sent away, truly we shall rejoice...

Those who are the treasurers and will see that the money is disposed of as stated are

Ye Goon (Store name)
Kwan Hay
Oun Woa (Store name)
Wong Kang Moon

(Gilkison, 1930:155)

A list of names followed the petition, which indicated a list of donors to the cause, each having contributed between £5 and 3/6d. (Gilkison, 1930:156). The petition reached the Council, and it was referred to Select Committee. In the meantime the miners of the Arrow District, Shotover, Skippers, the Chinese and European miners of Moke Creek, residents of Franklin and the

settlers and miners of Queenstown all submitted petitions saying that the services of Warden Beetham be retained (Votes and Proceedings of the Provincial Council of Otago, 1872:xxvi and xxix). The Chinese at Wakitipu had managed to get 827 signatures (which in the course of the inquiry were supposedly proved to be false (Gilkison, 1930:156), and those on the other side managed to get 834.

The Select Committee reported back in seven days completely exonerating Warden Beetham (Votes and Proceedings of the Provincial Council of Otago, 1873:5). The proof used was an examination of cases in the Warden's Court from November 1870, where it was shown that of the 15 Chinese cases only 8 had resulted in judgement against the Chinese (OW, 5 July 1873). In the Resident Magistrate's Court for the same period, there were 43 cases between Chinese and Europeans of which 24 were decided against the Chinese (ibid.). In the area of costs, it was stated that they were high for Europeans and Chinese but that the Europeans actually paid more in fines (ibid.).

In looking at this situation, it seems very likely that the issue was the Wakitipu District, renowned as an area where the Chinese were not liked and where relations were strained. One only has to think of the case that Haughton went to great lengths to explain in the Chinese Immigration Committee Report of 1871 where the Chinese lost a claim in both the Warden's Court and the District Court (AJHR 1871, H-4:7). It does not appear that this problem occurred in any other place in the gold fields. On the contrary, in at least one case a warden was actually presented with a gift and a speech by the Chinese community upon his resignation (Mayhew, 1947:91).

These two events are significant in that they herald the beginning of a new era in New Zealand politics, the beginning of the long depression and the development of an increasingly hostile environment for the Chinese in New Zealand. Despite these changes, however, mining and other occupations persisted as viable occupations for the Chinese population in the gold fields. Chinese communities grew in various areas, and a whole network of trading relationships between groups of miners and shopkeepers developed to provide for the distribution of goods and services. Some of this has been implicit in the foregoing, but a more penetrating view has been made possible by an unusual set of documents produced by a European who lived and worked with the Chinese in the gold fields for several years during the late 1800s. Although chronologically out of context, the intimate view he provides is far more useful for analysing social structure even though it is mediated by Christian ideology. Besides the sociological import of the information that the Reverend Alexander Don and his followers provided, their presence also marks an unusual and continuous relationship between the church and the Chinese in New Zealand. The relationship is unique for three reasons. Perhaps the foremost is that, although various denominations of the church have been active with overseas communities of Chinese, the relationship has at best been intermittent, which is contrary to the case in New Zealand. Secondly, the relationship that developed in New Zealand was also reinforced by mission activity in the villages where the New Zealand Chinese had come from, and, thirdly, the church has been instrumental for many years as a mediator between the Chinese and the New Zealand government.

The relationship started with the great influx of people into Otago during the gold rush and the realisation that the Presbyterian Church had not only Europeans to minister to but also a growing Chinese population. In the Victoria gold fields of Australia, the Presbyterian Church already had a thriving mission and was also training Chinese missionaries for work elsewhere. A request for a missionary, sent to the Victoria Church, produced after two years a Chinese missionary by the name of Paul Ah Chin (Wan Ah Chin), who was assigned to Lawrence and remained there for four years, leaving because of unexplained friction in 1874 (McNeur, 1951:14). Paul Ah Chin came back for one more try in 1877, working with Reverend Hugh Cowie from Amoy who had returned to New Zealand. Unfortunately, Reverend Cowie spoke the wrong Chinese language and eventually resigned, and Paul Ah Ching again returned to Australia. The vacant position was to be filled eventually by Alexander Don, the son of a miner in Ballarat who at the age of 14 came under the influence of Reverend Fitchett, who encouraged both the Christian development and educational pursuits of the young boy (McNeur, 1951:17). Eventually Don came to New Zealand to pursue his missionary activity; thinking that he would be sent to the New Hebrides but finding that position filled, he volunteered for the job of missionary to the Chinese.

In 1879 Don was sent to China and spent 18 months in Canton learning Chinese. He returned to New Zealand with a Chinese teacher and, after some time at the Theological Hall in Dunedin, was sent to the biggest Chinese mining centre at the time, which was the Riverton-Round Hill area in Southland. It is during his time

in Southland, 1882 till 1889, that Don records his observations and dealings with the Chinese community in the New Zealand Presbyterian,³³ which was published monthly. The diary that is published there is very detailed, and, although heavily directed towards Don's particular purpose, it does allow one to extract other information which is not recorded elsewhere. There were, at least once, objections to this diary being published. It was felt that this information was trivial and monotonous, but Don persevered arguing that it is the details about life and people which are important (NZP, 1 June 1885:223).

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 3

- 1 In 1861 the Member for Otago in the House of Representatives became the first government member to bring the issue of Chinese to the attention of the government. Anticipating that numbers of Chinese would flock to Otago for the gold, he wanted to know whether the government would be willing to take steps to prevent such an influx. The response was negative, his attention being drawn to the treaty signed between Lord Elgin and the Chinese Government in 1859. A clause in this treaty prescribed that "...all Chinese shall be at liberty to take service in any British possession, and the Emperor binds himself to allow them to ship themselves and families from free ports of China, in British ships, without let or hindrance". Because of this, it was deemed impossible for the Colonial government to impose any tax or restrictive legislation on the Chinese.
(New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 1861:373, hereafter abbreviated to NZPD).

- 2 The meeting was made up of James MacAndrew, member for the House for Port Chalmers; E.P. Cargill, President of the Chamber of Commerce and shipping merchant agent and owner, first director of Union Steamship Company and the main owner of ships carrying Chinese to Otago; W.H. Reynolds, T. Dick, A.W. Morris and F.J. Moss all members of the Provincial Council and in shipping or merchant activity and W.A. Tolme also in shipping (see Buckingham, 1974:6).

- 3 The Chamber of Commerce prior to this presented two resolutions to the government, one dealt with protection of life and property and the other which said, 'That it is desirable that the immigration of Chinese into the province be encouraged', (Otago Daily Times, 28 September 1865). The Provincial Treasurer agreed to give verbal assurance for the first provided a written submission was received from the Chamber of Commerce outlining the grounds on which the request was made, but refused to give assent to the second resolution (Otago Daily Times, 28 September 1865).

- 4 In February 1864 there had been an estimated 22,000 to 24,000 European gold miners in the gold fields, but by 1866 the number had dropped to 6,000, by 1867 to 4,414 and it was only in 1871 that the number of European miners again increased to 5,000 with the advent of quartz-mining. In 1867 there were 1,213 Chinese males and six Chinese females in New Zealand (Forrest, 1961:67-69).

- 5 The Otago Daily Times is hereafter abbreviated to ODT.

- 6 The Otago Witness is hereafter abbreviated to OW.

- 7 According to the 1871 article another batch, (eighteen men) arrived some days later and was despatched to another area of the goldfields, again under Ho Ah Mei's guidance (ODT, 8 June 1871). The decision to send them to another area was to give them experience of another gold field area, according to Ho Ah Mei. The information about various areas, was no doubt, expected to filter back to him since they were still in his debt.

- 8 According to the Otago Witness, eight of the party hired a dray, loaded their provisions on it and left for Blackstone Hill to join three or four of their countrymen (OW, 25 January 1866).

- 9 In the time Ah Mei was in Dunedin he apparently endeared himself to the local police by helping in the prosecution of one of his fellow countrymen who had entered New Zealand with the express purpose of making counterfeit gold. Ah Mei seems to have known of the arrival and actually informed the police (ODT, 8 June 1871).

- 10 The nature of this arrangement is unclear and is never specified although it does appear that he had an agent in Dunedin who was supposed to take care of his interests.

- 11 This seems to have been the first direct passage from Hong Kong to New Zealand even though as noted on page there had been passengers from China as early as 1869 although they appeared to have gone via Melbourne.

- 12 The gold field's papers were according to Buckingham '...unusually anti-Chinese and employed a vicious polemic which added nothing to the literature of the time nor to historiographical sources of the period, beyond demonstrating a vehement dislike to the "heathen Chinese"' (Buckingham, 1974:5).

- 13 The Chinese communities usually contained several shops providing cooked and other food, a blacksmith and a butcher, gambling houses that seemed to have been ubiquitous in the goldfields with fifteen to twenty reportedly existing in 1870 by the newly arrived Chinese Interpreter, Mr. John Aloo (OW, 1 October 1870). John Aloo eventually settled in Clyde and married an Irish girl. They apparently had a family of boys and girls, and all could speak English well (Appendix to the Journal of the House of Representatives H-5:17, hereafter abbreviated to AJHR).

- 14 The Tuapeka Times is hereafter abbreviated to TT.

- 15 The missionary was Paul Ah Chin (Wan Ah Chin), who had been trained by Reverend Robert Hamilton of Fitzroy. Paul Ah Chin arrived in New Zealand in 1870 and was sent to the Synod of Lawrence. He remained there, according to McNeur, until 1874, when he returned to Australia. He had managed to convert eleven Chinese in his time at Lawrence (McNeur, 1951:14).

- 16 'Any person not being the holder of a miner's right, licence or lease duly empowering him in that behalf, who shall mine for gold, or occupy or carry on any business upon any Crown Lands, shall be liable to the penalties following - that is to say: for the first offence a sum not exceeding £5; for the second or any subsequent offence a sum not exceeding £10 nor less than £5, with imprisonment in some Goal, there to remain for any time not exceeding one calendar month for every £5 or fractional part of £5 so to be paid.'
(Extract from Section 172 of the Miner's Act - also translated into Chinese and posted in the gold fields).

- 17 According to McLean, MHR for Waikouati, the scrap iron had been sent to China in exchange for tea, which was brought back to New Zealand. McLean, who argued against the total restriction of Chinese immigration in 1880 used this evidence to show how the Chinese were saving New Zealand cash (NZPD, 1880, 38:101).

- 18 The entry for Chew Chong and Ventnor are the only two entries which deal with the New Zealand Chinese in the Encyclopaedia of New Zealand.

- 19 The Secretary and Inspector of Customs in Wellington became curious about this export activity in 1873 and wrote to a contact in New Plymouth to inquire as to the nature of the operation. William Seed, of the Customs Department feared that the Chinese had a monopoly of the market and were getting the fungus for less than its value (AJHR, H-39, 1873:1). The reply from the New Plymouth customs officer stated that since Chew Chong had started the operation other Chinese merchants had also appeared, buying the fungus from settlers and Maoris. Most of the fungus was sent by boat to Dunedin, and the price paid in his area was £20 per ton (ibid:1-2). Between 1872 and 1920 £433,623 worth was exported from New Zealand to Hong Kong, Australia and the west coast of the United States at an average price of £54 per ton (Statistics of New Zealand 1872-1920).

- 20 M.H.R. stands for Member of the House of Representatives.

- 21 All members of the committee were foreign born.

- 22 John Ah Tong's name was to become well known in the gold fields in 1872-73, since he was supposedly employed by Brogden, the contractor for railway construction in New Zealand, as a labour agent for the employment of Chinese.

- 23 Gilkison in recounting the story of a Chinese merchant in Queenstown who collected money from his fellow countrymen when they were engaged in litigation so that the judge could be paid - says that when the merchant went bankrupt his books were examined and payments of £30 were recorded. Gilkison adds that of course the payments went straight in the pocket of the merchant (Gilkison, 1930:157).
- 24 Opium, brandy and tobacco already had a heavy duty on them, and these, according to some, were consumed in large quantities by the Chinese, especially when they were well off.
- 25 Although the Warden's office at Switzer had replied in fairly favourable terms to the questions about the Chinese, the miners in the local area were not as charitably disposed. Wood sent in his reply in September 1871, and by the end of October in the same year a petition had been sent by 155 miners in the area to the Public Petitions Committee of the government. They wanted 'an effectual bar to the further influx of Chinese' and a discontinuance of issuing miners rights to the Chinese (AJHR, 1871, H-5B:1). It was reported in the Otago Witness on 14 October that some Chinese miners in the area were willing to support the petition since they too feared further competition from their own countrymen (OW, 14 October 1871).
- 26 This was not the first time that Chinese labour had been suggested as a remedy to labour shortages in New Zealand (see page 80).
- 27 When Ormond relates this story in Parliament in 1896 while debating the Asiatic Restriction Bill then before them, he says that the circular asked each Superintendent whether this proposal would be 'desirable or have a disastrous effect on the country'. As can be seen from the above, the approach was far less open ended, yet even in 1872 he said, 'the government of the Colony never had any intention of bringing Chinese into the Colony to be employed on railways and whatever the wishes of Superintendents might have been the Government would not have hesitated to refuse their consent to contractors employing Chinese labour on the railways' (NZPD, 1872, 12:163). Even more interesting is the fact that Brogden's employees were actively recruiting workers in some English counties (OW, 27 April 1872) but that it was readily known in Otago that the contractor needed workers and could not wait much longer for their arrival. By November 1872, negotiations for Chinese workers were well under way (see Bruce Herald, 20 November 1872).
- 28 According to the Otago Witness, sixty Chinese had been hired to begin work on 25th November. They were hired on a daily basis but objected to this after several days, insisting that they should be employed on a contract basis (see Baldwin, 1975:40-41 for a complete description of this situation).

- 29 Another version was reported in the Tuapeka Times in 1872. The article said that John Ah Tong and some 'Celestial friends' had gone by coach from Lawrence to Tokomairo to procure navvies for Brogden. It also added that Brogden wanted 500 Chinese and that he had wanted Ah Tong to go to China but Ah Tong had declined. Brogden had, however, found another agent, according to the article, and he would import large numbers of Chinese 'which he will have working at Manawatu' (West Coast Times, 12 February 1872).
- 30 The concern of local residents was evident. The Milton Sergeant of Police together with other residents, visited the Chinese camp, and noting the demoralized state and lack of food, were instrumental in getting the Recreation Ground Committee to employ the Chinese at 2/6d. each to tidy up the grounds (Baldwin, 1975:44).
- 31 The West Coast Times of 1874 estimated that there were 1,833 Chinese in Otago at the time, 533 miners and 350 employed on railway works between Tokomairo and Lawrence. It added that there were approximately 200 at Waitahuna, 18 at Glenmor 50 at Adams and Miller's Flat, 900 at Queenstown, Cromwell and above Teviot and 350 at Nokomai, Waikaka and Switzers (West Coast Times, 23 January 1874).
- 32 According to Gilkison this petition was found by a European in Otago and sent to Melbourne, where it was translated and published in the Daily Times, 16 June 1873. Further, the actual copy that went to the Council contained nothing about the lawyer and merely said that they wanted the Warden of the District removed and another placed in his position.
- 33 The New Zealand Presbyterian will hereafter be abbreviated to NZP.

CHAPTER 4

A CHINESE COMMUNITY IN THE GOLD FIELDS1870-1890

When Don arrived at Round Hill's Chinese settlement in 1881, he wrote the following description of what he saw:

The Chinese settlement of a hundred and twenty huts covers about five square miles of spur and gully; but, like a sort of nucleus near the centre, is a collection of 38 houses, by Europeans called 'Canton' - by Chinese called 'The Street of Chinese men' synonymous with Walker Street in Dunedin...of the 38 places five are business houses, 24 are gambling and opium smoking, while the use of most of the remainder is too easily guessed.

(Annual Inland Tour, 1893-94:2)¹

Don described this nucleus as supplying the needs of some 400 Chinese miners both as regards everyday needs and also for festival occasions held during the year. There was one double-storied building which was a tea shop owned by a Riverton firm and which Don was allowed to use as a meeting house for his gatherings with the local Chinese. When Don looked at the local gold fields, he was amazed at the destruction that was taking place as the result of sluicing.

The Chinese miners seemed unperturbed by this destruction and in fact rationalised it by insisting that New Zealand had no 'fung shui', since it was of an earthly nature and therefore one could dig gold here. This also explained why such action could not

be tolerated in China, since China was T'ien wan - of heavenly nature - but it could not explain why Chinese miners considered the Riverton area to have good 'fung shui' when it produced gold.

Most of the Chinese in Riverton had come from China and had paid from £8 to £13 (40 taels of silver) for the passage. This money, usually more than any individual would have, was borrowed from kin or fellow villagers at a considerable rate of interest, sometimes as much as 2% per month, which worked out to 25% per annum (NZP, 1 July 1884:3). Sometimes the ticket was paid through the 'credit ticket system', which meant that the individual had to work off his passage before he was free to do what he wanted. This system operated in New Zealand, but it is generally maintained that there was no coolie-labour system operating (Tour, 1905-06:16). The only other system that operated for bringing out relatives was sponsorship by a relative in New Zealand. This was possible only if the benefactor in New Zealand was sure of the relative (usually confined to brothers or sons) and was also wealthy enough to provide passage money. This limited the scheme to wealthy merchants until such time as Chinese in New Zealand were ensured of a regular wage through being employed as labour or self-employed in their own shops, which became much more prevalent after 1900.

Once the Chinese had arrived at their destination, of course, it was their express purpose to earn as much as possible so that they could return to China, discharge their debts, should they have any, either in China or New Zealand and perhaps even return again. This system has been made to sound simple and it was definitely believed to be a simple process by relatives in China, who thought that the gold merely had to be dug up and sold. As Mr. F.L. Law² remarked to Don in 1911:

I can see now that it is really hard. I used to think that it was only pretended; for we said in China that if their lot was really so grievous they would return home sooner and not remain so long away. The home folk rather think that digging for gold is like digging for peanuts - that the ground is shallow and the gold in lumps.

(Tour 1909-11:8)

Further if we look at some statistics recorded meticulously by Don in 1896 we can see that, not only were the miners of the time fairly old when they arrived in New Zealand, but also few had been able to afford a trip home and, in fact, had been away from home for a considerable number of years. It was estimated that at least seven out of ten of the Chinese at Round Hill had wives at home staying with their husbands' kin looking after children and other family members while their husbands sent, or were supposed to send, remittances home (NZP, 1 September 1884:43). Many of the men lost touch through time. If they were not married and never went home to get married, it was a sign of poverty, and often men were loath to go home with only £100, since they feared it would not clear their debts (Tour, 1909-11:10). Letters were never received from China unless remittances had arrived home or kin wanted more money, and so stories would be made up about bad seasons, the high cost of living and the money that had to be borrowed so that peace could be kept with home (ibid.). In one case Don recorded a man of 66 who had been in New Zealand for 27 years and had not heard from home in 18 years. Even though the man was a comparatively educated person with 12 years of schooling in China, he had not written home and since he had sent no money home, nobody wrote to him (Tour 1900-01:25). More responsible men sent money home regularly and did receive letters, but they often told of hardship and, as shown in the following letter,

the rather idealistic view held by those at home about one's earning power in the gold fields. This letter was written to two brothers in the gold fields by their mother, which Don suggested was unusual since women rarely wrote to their men overseas, it being always a man's responsibility:

These words are to let my sons Cassia-Forest and Cassia-Foundation know, that in the ninth moon of last year cousin Prosperity brought home two sovereigns; this year in the second moon Rising-Aim brought three; and in the fifth moon Shining brought six--all these were safely received, so you need not be anxious. In the fifth moon of this year your father left this world, and was buried in a lucky spot on Old Prince Hill. This year is very dry, the farmers have no harvest, and rice is extremely dear. Your two younger brothers at home are in great distress, in fact dying from poverty, suffering piercing hardships. Your mother is aged, and her body frail. I pray you two brothers a thousand times over, on receipt of this letter, to return home at once and see your mother's face. It is most urgent. If you continue longer in foreign lands your aged mother may be like a candle in the wind. Although you two men of wealth amass a myriad sovereigns, I fear you will drink bitter regret into your souls. This paper is short and words are many, so it is really difficult to say fully how important it is that you SOON RETURN HOME. It is impossible to over-state this command.

(Tour, 1905-06:22)

There was also evidence that letters which requested more money were sent despite the fact that the family in China was well off, which left the male overseas constantly insecure about his position if he returned home.

The outcome of all these factors was a growing reluctance to return home. In New Zealand they felt free to do with their money what they wanted, even if it meant spending their year's savings for a holiday in Dunedin or Alexandra. If they did this in China, they

had readily admitted they would face the vituperations of their fellow villagers and especially their wives. One old man who returned to China wrote back to New Zealand that he could not take the drudgery of working in the fields nor all the problems at home. If he loafed and gambled in his own market town, his family and neighbours reviled him, and all he wanted to do was to return to New Zealand, but he was too old and had no Exemption Certificate³ (Tour, 1909-11:17).

There are other reasons also which lead one to suspect that the ideal of the sojourner was just that - an ideal often disrupted by other problems. In one case Don recorded the unusual situation of a father who had sold his claim, sending his son home instead of going home himself, which was the usual custom. When Don inquired as to the reason for this behaviour, he was told that the father could not return home for fear that his older brother would return with him and kill him in China. It transpired that the younger brother had given 98 ounces of gold to the older brother to take home and divide equally between their two respective families. The older brother, however, gave his younger brother's wife only 36/-, spending the rest on his own buildings and land. The younger brother, hearing of this, held a feast for his friends in New Zealand and told them of the treachery. When the other brother returned to New Zealand to take up the claim, he was unable to get help and was forced to sell his claim to the younger brother (Tour 1892-93:13-14). The elder brother apparently was awaiting his chance for revenge should the younger brother return home.

In other cases families died leaving no living close relatives in China and, rather than returning home to an unpredictable retirement they were happy to eke out a life of bare subsistence in New Zealand.

Although there were windfalls and many cases of miners taking home considerable wealth, there were other cases which indicate a minimum being sent home. Table 5 gives a sample of a number of cases Don recorded over a period of seven years.

TABLE 5: Recorded amounts sent Home by Chinese Miners, Gamblers and Businessmen, 1882-1889.

<u>No. of Men</u>	<u>Total Amount in £</u>	<u>Years in New Zealand</u>
1	70 ^a	-
1	600 ^b	-
40	3000 ^c	-
5	300	6-8
5 ^d	300	6 -
1	200 ^e	-
1	900	-
1	170	10-20 yrs ^f
1	120	-
1	200	-
1	150	-
1	200	-
1	300 ^g	-
8	1080 ^h	4-14
1	184 ⁱ	-
1	160 ^j	5
1	159 ^k	27
2	40	18
1	17 ^l	16
6	2000 ^m	-
TOTAL	80	19,150ⁿ

Source: New Zealand Presbyterian 1882-1889.

Notes

- a Out of the £70, £20 would be required to pay passage home.
- b This was the largest amount recorded that was taken from Round Hill by a single man.
- c It was estimated that these 40 men also took about £3000 to give to relatives of friends in amounts ranging from £1 to £10 sums.

- d Four of these men were of the surname Chan and from the same village.
- e This man also carried £700 given to him by friends for delivery in China.
- f This group of men were all on S.S. Charlton which sank on its way from Newcastle, New South Wales to Hong Kong.
- g This man wanted to go home, buy land and build a house and then come back to New Zealand or go to America.
- h Three of these men were in business and the rest were miners. Two other men were sent with them with their passage paid by friends.
- i This money was made by running a lottery saloon in Round Hill.
- j This money was actually sent home in this period.
- k This money had been won in two lotteries and the man concerned actually paid the passage of a village mate.
- l The amount was sent home.
- m The six bodies were recovered after they had drowned when the steamer Changchow sank in 1885.
- n Don was told in 1883 that land cost 40 to 60 taels of silver per mau, or £100 per acre (NZP, 2 April 1883:184). This would mean that the total amount taken home by the 81 men in the above table would buy only approximately 102 acres of land (NZP, 2 April 1883:184).

It indicates that the range in amounts was considerable, and obviously good luck in either mining or the games of chance provided the difference between the large and small amounts. Often Don found that the older men, perhaps with less energy and fewer village mates or clansmen to call upon to mine larger areas, were forced to cradle alone. If one had partners, however, the situation could be much better. In good times, that is, in a good claim with plenty of

water for sluicing, a group of men could make as much as £4 to £6 each in a week, while a single old man working alone might get as little as 13/- in three weeks (NZP, 1 November 1882:87). While the former group might seem lucky, one has to acknowledge that it often took up to six months to open a claim. This would be a period where one had to live off what had already been saved and was described as a time when men became irritable and also poor (NZP, 1 March 1887:164).

The situation also varied seasonally. In May the rains came and provided plenty of water which was needed for sluicing, but it also proved to make mining very hazardous. Since many of the mines were actually holes dug into the sides of creeks or rivers, excess water made the likelihood of slips and cave-ins a constant possibility, often resulting in the death of an unsuspecting miner. In the dry weather, water became a scarce resource, and there is some hint that if it came from another claim it had to be paid for. Whether water was scarce or plentiful, when times were good miners worked endlessly, often all night. This for the Chinese miner was real work, but there was also trifling or leisure (Haan), which for them included chopping firewood, cutting mining timbers or bailing water, all of which, according to them, took little time (NZP, 2 October 1882:67).

While gold mining was intended to yield profits without much investment, a sojourn was not without a cost of living, despite the fact that the standard of living was kept to a minimum most of the time. To start mining the Chinese, like anyone else, were required to buy a Miner's Right for £2. If one did not pay it, which, as already mentioned, was a risk some Chinese miners took, then one always took the chance of being caught and subjected to a fine. After

establishing a claim, then the matter of obtaining supplies required attention. Initially in the gold fields, various merchant shops in Dunedin had been the sole source of supply, but as miners moved out into various districts a network of shops followed them, and each local community always had as many Chinese merchants as the market could bear.

Don recorded the presence of Chinese supply shops in Nokomai, Maori Point, Kyeburn, Waikia, Ophir, Roxburgh, Gore, Macreas, Clyde, Alexandra, Butcher's Gully and Arrowtown in the late 1800s (see Chapter 3, Map 4). These were all single shops, while in places like Naseby there were two shops, at least three in Round Hill (one of which was named 'Virtuous Store'), several in Lawrence, and at Riverton there were four.⁴ These were larger centres with a resident community all year round, more in the winter months when individuals with savings migrated into larger communities to wait till spring.

The merchant shop provided food stuffs like rice and pickles imported from China and rice from India and Java (NZP, 1 December 1882:104). According to Don, the average weekly cost of food for a Chinese miner was about 11/- to 12/-, much of this taken up with the price of pork and rice. Since the rewards of mining were intermittent, merchants had to extend credit, but in the early years to insulate themselves against bankruptcy they often added large mark-ups of 100 to 300% to their wares. In one case where a Queenstown merchant went bankrupt, his books showed total liabilities of over £5000, £3000 of which was owed to two other firms. The outstanding accounts amounted to £4000, but this had been over a period of eighteen years (Tour, 1894-95:14). According to Don the rates of mark-up and the amount of credit dwindled as the gold became less plentiful and the population more depleted. When businesses ceased,

they also terminated their credit, as one storekeeper in Nokomai indicated by a notice on his door that read:

As the business is being wound up, credit diminished and bank accounts reduced, our intimate friends should not show their suspicious countenances for loan(s) nor credit, as refusal is inelegant.

(Tour, 1893-94:8)

Debts then, were a perennial problem to both miner and merchant, and the merchant seems to have had two possible methods of keeping track of his clients. Sometimes merchants would employ collectors who would have to go around to the various areas and collect the debts. Don was once asked to collect several hundred pounds worth of debts for a storekeeper in Tapanui, but he declined (NZP, 1 February 1883:147). Otherwise the payment of debts depended on Chinese tradition, since at New Year, which fell usually in February, all were supposed to pay their debts. If one had outstanding debts, creditors pasted their accounts on their house doors or on the front of their shops for all to see. The only way to avoid the debt was to leave one's residence over New Year, returning afterwards, with the hope that one's credit would be extended for yet another year (NZP, 2 April 1883:184-85).

Shops also provided other services for their clientele, which included the writing of letters home for the illiterate miners at a cost of 2/- each (NZP, 1 September 1882:45). In at least one instance, a local store in Nokomai collected the county rates from local Chinese. All the notices would be sent to the store, and he would distribute them and collect the amount due. Obviously, this would give the local storekeeper considerable leverage, and in this particular case, two men, having in the previous year offended the shopkeeper, feared that he had destroyed their notices, thus placing

them in jeopardy (Tour, 1894-95:12). They solved their problem by giving the money to Don so that he could pay their rates.

Whether or not Chinese merchants acted as banks is debatable, and little evidence is apparent to support the contention. Judging by the attitude of the Chinese to banks, it seems unlikely that they would have entrusted their life savings to a storekeeper, yet they were willing to entrust it to friends and relatives to take home. The rationale expressed by at least one Chinese for not using the New Zealand banks, even though the banks went out of their way to advertise their services in Chinese, was not because of the institution but because of the mere activity of going to the bank. It was expressed to Don in the following way:

...if a man puts money in a bank it is soon found out, and then he is continually applied to for loans.

(Tour, 1893-94:9)

If one refused to give a loan to a clansman, it was considered a very grave insult, and no doubt social pressure through gossip would attempt to correct one's meanness.

Even more plentiful than the merchant shops in the gold fields but distributed in the same areas were the gambling and opium saloons. In some places they were part of the merchant's shop, but in many others they were separate, which meant that there had to be a viable local Chinese population sufficiently motivated to take time off work to come to the various gambling places. Opium smoking was less problematic for the supplier, since the addiction ensured a clientele. Most men seem to have used gambling as a means of recreation - a break from long, tedious hours of mining and something additional to do on festival days after or before the feast. Others, however, despondent over their failure at mining or about the general

situation of their sojourn, turned to gambling as a last resort where they might find wealth in another man's misfortune.⁵ In one instance, Don noted that a man who had been in New Zealand eight years was killed on a claim at the age of 31 after about an acre of overhang had fallen on the claim. He had no relatives in China, since his parents were dead, and it was his village mates who took care of the burial of the body (NZP, 1 December 1882:106). Afraid of returning to the claim after this accident, the claim mates, also from the same village, became lottery ticket (paak kop piu)⁶ collectors in Riverton (NZP, 1 February 1883:146). They would go round from claim to claim collecting the marked-off lottery tickets and taking them to the lottery salon. When the lottery was drawn, they would again have to go around to each claim and deliver the accounts to the winners (NZP, 1 February 1883:147). For every ticket they sold they got 1/2d. from the proprietor, and from the winners they would get 1/10th of the amount collected (*ibid.*). An example of one of the accounts sent out to a winner by the collector is as follows:

---	Heavy Knife	(1)
(6) Water	No. 21 mark	(2)
(enter	One -- 5	(3)
(7) (Two -- 6	(4)
(month		
(8) (ponder	Pay)	
(20/-)	(5)
(glad		
(
(evening		
(
(9) Fair Profit House ---		
(10) T'iu		

The figures in parentheses refer to notes of explanation and are read from the right side: (1) A secret mark denoting the day of issue.

(2) No. 21 in order of issue. On one ticket 5 characters struck off corresponded with the winning characters. (4) on two tickets 6 on each corresponded. (5) An order for the total amount won. (6) The cyclic term for the present year. (7) Enter month - "enter" being double entendre for "eight". (8) 29th evening - "ponder" being used for 20, and "glad" for nine. (9) Name of the salon. (10) A manufactured word to represent 9, the number of tickets lodged by the winners. The plain figures 8, 9, 10 are not written on these account slips: it is said to be a bad omen to write them, for if ticket holders were to hold tickets with so many corresponding numbers it would mean the breaking up for a while of the establishment. For 9 tickets lodged the winners would pay 4s.6d., with 2s. to the collector, leaving 13s.6d. net gain. The collector's receipts would be 2s. 4½d., while the bank would lose to the extent of 15s. 10½d. (NZP, 1 February 1883:147).

The obvious implication of this kind of network organized through a lottery is that the movement of Chinese miners could be easily monitored by shop-owner and lottery-salon-owner alike. The role of the collector, then, was crucial in keeping both types of operations, which were run at some distance from their clientele, solvent. There were other gambling establishments, however, which depended on their clientele coming to them. Mahjong and fan tan were played at various establishments, which were especially busy during the weekends, when miners took time off to go to their nearest community centre. Don recorded the presence of over 150 men coming to the Round Hill gambling places on any one weekend (NZP, 1 December 1882:105). Those who tended the gaming tables got an average of 1/- for every £1 spent and were sometimes described as "Lo ka", one who does not usually look for work but waits for work to turn up (NZP, 1 December 1882: 105).

If one looks through Don's material, it becomes obvious that these establishments were located in every place where there was a Chinese shop. Often they were far more numerous, and in some towns, like Cromwell, Lawrence and Alexandra, there were anywhere from three to seven such places at any one time. Don noted that their presence fluctuated with the wealth or the poverty of local miners there and also with the presence of men willing to take out shares to start the business. Usually it took only three or four men pooling their capital to start the operation, and it could continue as long as their shares remained in it.

In Round Hill there once had been as many as twelve gambling houses, and to ensure enough business for all, they had worked out their own calendar in twelve-day cycles, which meant that at least one was open every day (Tour, 1894-95:4). The opening of the hall for the day was initiated by a loud shout down the street indicating the tables were ready for action (NZP, 11 January 1885:126).

If one was lucky enough to win a substantial amount, then it was possible, having paid one's debts, to return to China or, as happened in one instance, at least retire for the year to the nearest town and leave one's claim to be worked by someone else (NZP, 1 October 1886:1).

Gambling was illegal in the gold fields, but the police, generally pre-occupied with mining offences, infrequently arrested or fined Chinese, although periodic fines were reported in the Otago papers. Some Chinese were critical of their countrymen's habits, though, and in 1870 the Chinese interpreter John Aloo (previously mentioned) took it upon himself to announce to the Mount Ida Chronicle

that he was going to rid the gold fields of the fifteen or twenty gambling houses then in existence (OW, 1 October, 1870). Judging by their continued existence and their popularity, it seems unlikely that he received any support. This type of remedy was tried again by a Chinese constable, Wong Ngai, who was appointed to the Riverton-Round Hill area in September 1883 to catch gamblers, thieves and miners without licences. The rationale for this innovation was no doubt that a Chinese person would be more efficient, but the reverse was the reality of the situation. Wong Ngai was too well known, and all the gambling houses closed for the duration of his presence (NZP, 1 December 1883:105). The local Chinese explanation for the lack of success was the fact that Wong Ngai was from Seyip, while most of the locals were from Sam Yap, and therefore the likelihood of him enforcing the law was negligible (NZP, 1 March 1884:162).

The opium trade and the use of opium also became part of the Chinese business community in the gold fields, but little is known of its origin and distribution mechanisms, although the opium and gambling establishments seem to have been the same places in some instances. Initially, it came in as part of New Zealand imports with no restrictions,⁷ but in 1882 the Customs Law Consolidation Act was passed, which placed a prohibition on the import of opium:

...Unless in ships of 40 registered tons burden at least, and in whole and complete packages, each containing not less than 45 lbs net weight and not containing any other goods; and unless into such ports as are or as may be approved by the Governor for the importing and warehousing of opium.

(Drug Dependency and Drug Abuse in
New Zealand, Report Series No.14, 1970:112)

Besides enforcing these requirements, the import of things like opium was probably restricted to licensed dealers under the provisions of the Poisons Act 1871.

The appearance of the habit amongst the Chinese in New Zealand is not recorded, but the 1871 Report of the Select Committee did mention it several times. The newspapers at the time said relatively little about its presence, but Don's articles make considerable reference to the habit. Naturally, like gambling, it was a social problem for Don and the church, since it hindered their work and very often seemed to be detrimental to the health of older miners while costing a considerable amount at the same time.

Don recorded cases of heavy users having consumed as much as £15 worth or four pots in four and a half months, each pot costing about £3.15.0 (NZP, 1 September 1883:47). The weekly rate in this instance would have amounted to 16/8d, while a more conservative user would spend only 10/6d. per week (NZP, 1 November 1884:85). Even this amount would deplete a weekly income of £4 fairly rapidly, with the additional physiological problems of stomach ache and sleepiness, which resulted in lost mining time. If one needed a Chinese doctor, of which there were several, offering their expensive services in the gold fields, one could be confronted with an additional problem, since some of them were heavy users of opium and required that their patients provide them, not only with room and board, but also with a supply of opium; more will be said about this situation later.

In the 1880s and 1890s⁸ anti-Chinese feelings flared up again in the gold fields, and meetings were held in Dunedin, Invercargill and Bluff to suggest ways of expediting the Chinese departure from New Zealand. Because of the problems of direct legislation, it was to be a process of gradually squeezing the Chinese out by making their life miserable. In 1888, the solution of excessive duty on

basic subsistence goods that the Chinese used, previously mentioned but not enacted, was imposed. The duty on rice, tea and opium were all increased.

The Chinese merchants in various ports of New Zealand responded to the increased opium duty and decided that they would deprive the New Zealand government of a sizeable source of duty which they estimated to be £10,000 at the time.⁹ The result was the organisation of the 'Cherishing Virtue Union' 同盟會 which tried to enforce the following rules, which were distributed and posted on placards:

1. No opium is to be sold after October 4 (1888) at the New Zealand ports and after December 2nd up-country.
2. Anyone secretly importing is to be fined £120 for every large chest seized.
3. Anyone buying from a non-Chinese is to be fined £5 for every tin so bought.
4. In both of the above cases the opium will also be confiscated.
5. Anti-opium medicinal pills are to be distributed free to cure those having the opium habit.

(NZP, 1 December 1888:106)

According to Don, subscription lists had been opened at all the 'chief places' to help pay for the campaign, and by December Dunedin had contributed £207 (*ibid.*). The effect of this Association was to some degree beneficial, but only for a short time; smokers tried to quit the habit but often merely replaced it with gambling. The import of opium declined in 1888, as evidenced by the £634 drop in revenue from duty, but the following year it soared to over £7000 (see Appendix IV). According to Don, many shops continued to sell it, and the cure was

distributed in very small quantities (NZP, 1 April 1889:185). Some people had deferred to older remedies, and one that seemed popular included the following ingredients:

two mace of burnt alum
4 mace of opium ashes
Stir into milk or coconut and allow it to
stand for a week and whenever craving occurs
take a Chinese wine cup full of the mixture.

(NZP, 1 April 1889:185).

By the middle of 1889 the Association's activity was terminated, and the organizers posted a public notice which said:

The former arrangements for the Cherishing
Virtue Union with regard to the two matters
of abstaining from opium and cherishing
virtue have unavoidably come to nought
through differences of opinion. Contributors,
on application to the managers who have
received their contribution, may have the same
refunded.

(NZP, 1 July 1889:3)

Although Don does not specify the source of disagreement, it is not hard to guess that the major point of contention would have been the enormously profitable activity of dealing in opium. Judging by the increasing amounts imported and the dramatic drop in 1902 and 1903, when the duty was only £270 and £192, it may be assumed that the largest proportion of the opium trade was in Chinese hands. Although some was exported occasionally to Fiji and the South Seas, it never exceeded £30 worth in any one year except in 1888, when £864 worth was exported to New South Wales. Since this practice seems to have been fairly intermittent, we may assume that most of the imported opium was for internal consumption. Unfortunately, nothing is known of the price, so it is impossible to calculate profits after sale.

Perhaps by far the saddest tales that came from Don's recollections are the stories of sickness, suicide and death that occurred on the gold fields. Some of this could be blamed on economic misfortune resulting from excessive gambling or opium consumption, but other cases were the result of loneliness and old age or accidents. Medical care was available on the gold fields, but the Chinese version was excessively expensive and the European version was distrusted. There was a hospital at Riverton, but few Chinese ever ventured there alive and clansmen even refused to take their friends there for a postmortem. In one instance a man had broken his leg, but his clansmen refused to take him to Riverton hospital because they believed that the doctors used cold water, did not apply linament and plasters, and furthermore, were prone to cutting off limbs with a saw. The latter was also the reason for the refusal of the postmortem. There were two other possibilities for medical care. One was the meagre knowledge of clansmen, which could be used courtesy of the local store that supplied such things as glue, dragon bones, deer sinew, antelope horn, bamboo sap, dried scorpions, black-tailed snakes, ground amber, stalactite dust, cicada exuviae, dried centipedes and ginseng (NZP, 1 February and 1 April 1884:147 and 184).

The employment of a Chinese doctor was more problematic, since he would have had to be summoned from Lawrence.¹⁰ When he came, he would have to be provided for, which, as already mentioned, might include an opium habit. In one case the basic cost for the repair of a broken leg soared from the standard £37 to £200 after two doctors were consulted. Their fees were as follows:

<u>Dr. Chow</u>		<u>Dr. T'aam</u>	
Fares	£ 4	Contract	£37
Contract	£32	Medicines	£ 8
Medicines and		Board and lodging	£10
Doctor's opium	24		
Board and lodging			
for Doctor and			
attendant	£65		
(11 months)			

(NZP, 1 April 1884:184)

Don tried to encourage men to go to the Riverton hospital, where broken legs could be fixed for £10, but the advice was seldom taken, and if it was, other clansmen would ignore the patient, yet if the same patient died they would all appear to bury him.

One type of sickness that curtailed the benevolence of clansmen was leprosy, which occurred from time to time. Don recorded a case in 1884 where fellow miners refused to contribute money for the care or a house in which the fellow could live, and it remained for the local council in Riverton to provide for the patient (NZP, 1 September 1884:44). At best they would contribute money for the victim to go away, but in one case the person sent the money home to his relatives and the purpose of the collection was defeated (NZP, 1 September 1884:42).

Those that died from accident, suicide or old age would usually be taken by a large group of clansmen to the local morgue and later buried. Even if men were without direct kin in the gold fields, those from the same lineage would take responsibility and collect amongst themselves to defray the cost of burial (NZP, 1 January 1883:126). Death in a house or a claim meant that both would be abandoned, as the bad luck surrounding such events were more than the Chinese miners could tolerate.

For some who were old and felt that they would never be able to return home with dignity and wealth, there was a decision to be made. One could either appeal to kin who were in Australia or New Zealand for the money to pay for the return passage or just plan to die in New Zealand and hope that one's kin would feel obliged to send one's body home as a 'sin yan' (former man) with dignity. In the case of the first alternative, there were a variety of possible responses that one might get. A rich man in Melbourne turned down his very poor brother in New Zealand when the latter asked for the £20 for the return trip, so the brother collected some seaweed which he hoped to sell to pay for his passage (NZP, 1 March 1884:162). In other cases requests were made of kin elsewhere in New Zealand, and there would be no response, since this was the acceptable way of refusing to help (NZP, 2 November 1885:86). Sometimes the response was positive, especially if relatives were close by and could not refuse a face-to-face request. Clansmen and relatives would take a collection and pay for the trip and usually provide some extra money, but this was explained to Don as not so much a gesture of benevolence and clan responsibility but rather a pragmatic response. It was much cheaper to collect £20 or £30 from a group of men to send a live body home than to spend as much as £80 for a burial with a celebration plus the cost of disinterment for shipment of the dead body at some later date (NZP, 1 October 1883:67 and 2 November 1885:85). In 1883 a young boy of 17 had been killed in a claim at Round Hill after only two years away from China, and his clansmen of the surname Wong collected £62.14.6 from 156 people for the funeral expenses. Similarly, in 1884 a very poor old man committed suicide because he had not been able to pay his debts and join a number of his clansmen on their homeward voyage. Again the clansmen took up a collection of £44 which paid for the man who cut him down from where he hung in

his house, for some other men that arranged the funeral and also for the feast that was given after the burial (NZP, 1 April 1884:184 and 1 July 1884:4). The man was buried in Riverton with guilt paper (to represent money) placed under the head, a towel over his face and three packs of Chinese playing cards beside his hands (ibid.). The twenty seven clansmen who followed the procession scattered paper money down the road behind them to show the spirits the way to the grave, and many turned up for the feast that followed. It was suggested that some had merely turned up for the food and prospect of a good gathering (ibid.).

Suicide was not too prevalent, but when it did occur it caused considerable consternation amongst the miners. It was thought often to be a form of revenge for a Chinese man who had been wronged and who wanted to achieve redress. By committing suicide and letting others know why, the revenge would be complete (NZP, 1 August 1884:25).

A common activity in many overseas Chinese communities that were made up of men who had intended to go home was the arrangement for the shipment of their remains back to China, where they could lie with the ancestors and be assured of their children's respect. Rather than seeing this task as one which would be the responsibility of individuals it became the responsibility in most instances of an association, as it was also a collective responsibility to celebrate Ch'ing ming each year.¹¹ In New Zealand some bodies had been disinterred by individuals, especially by kin who were returning to China and felt it their responsibility to take their deceased relatives home, but in 1882 an association was started by a number of concerned merchants for the disinterrment of Poon Yu 'sin yan' who were increasingly numerous in the gold fields. In the late 1860s, it appears that Poon Yu people organised a Wui Koon at Lawrence,¹² and it

is assumed that the Ch'eung Shin Tong 昌善堂 was a natural extension of this organisation with the exception that the actual control of the operation resided in Dunedin. The association posted notices in all Chinese shops throughout the gold fields. The notices listed the rules which specified that each person was to contribute £1.10.0, and if one were wealthy one would be expected to give more. Collectors were employed by the association who would go around the gold fields and collect the money, and this in turn would be given to the managers of Sew Hoy's stores. The collector's expenses would be deducted and the remainder would be deposited in the bank to gain interest. Relatives of the dead were to give the collectors the surname and name of the deceased, the village or origin and the place of burial. Receipts were to be issued for donations, and if one was intending to return to China, that receipt had to be presented before departure. Those who absconded were to be fined £5 (NZP, 1 December 1883:105 - see Appendix V).

In total, 230 'sin yan' were exhumed for shipment to China and although there were only five from the Riverton District, £800 was contributed by the Poon Yu Chinese from that area.¹³ When the steamer Hoihow left Port Chalmers for China on 9 August, it carried it's load of 'sin yan' plus forty six living men. The 'sin yan' had all been placed in separate coffins at a cost of £4 for large ones and 10/- for small ones, and despite the costs of the effort, some £2000 or £3000 remained in the hands of the association after paying all expenses (NZP, 1 October 1883:6). Don gave no further information about this balance, but he did record the second operation of the Ch'eung Shin Tong in 1892. The operation seemed to have been run in the same manner with the posting of notices through the gold fields. This time, however, the primary concern was with the growing number of elderly Chinese and the notice read as follows:

Having already favoured the bones of the departed by their removal some years ago, it is a primary duty to care for the aged. We, who do not reckon several thousand miles is far to come, have all as members of a family to make provision for the food and clothing of one another. When they (the old men) came, they were vigorous in body, from east to west they rushed about year following year, they were unable to return home, in a twinkling of an eye (60 years) and more passed away; now weak in body and feeble in mind, unable in the morning to reckon on the evening, finding it difficult to plan for food, what can they do?

(Tours, 1892-93:10)

According to Don, 762 people had subscribed to the fund for the removal of the dead, which amounted to £1098.9.3, and the organisers, believing the funds to be insufficient for the removal of the dead, suggested that those over sixty should be returned to China first. They requested that names of the elderly be submitted to the managers and that more money be donated. When the old men had been sent back to China, the managers decided to meet again and arrange for the 'sin yan' to be disinterred (ibid.).

Don gives us no further details about this collection and planned activity, although there is a slight hint that it never was completed. In 1893 two bodies were exhumed by individuals so that they could be taken back to China when they departed. However, there was some doubt about the operation, since landing at Hong Kong in the first new month of the year was prohibited, being a time of festivities (Tour, 1892-93:41). There was to be one more shipment of disinterred remains from New Zealand in 1902,¹⁴ but the details of that will be given later in this chapter, since it shows the extent of population dispersal throughout New Zealand.

Despite the morbid aspects of death, sickness, conflict and poverty in the gold fields, there was also a number of more positive activities which attempted to gulf the vast gap of time and space that the Chinese faced in New Zealand.

If one could not maintain written contact with friends and relatives, nor afford to visit, then there were other ways of renewing at least superficially, the bonds that tied one to home. Celebrations of festivals in urban communities and the individual observance of what Don called 'idolatry' in their homes marked the maintenance of the folk tradition.

Homes were important to the Chinese gold miners, and, providing there was an opportunity for sedentary existence, they built them of sod, rock slabs or sacking and wood depending on what was locally available. Others, mining particularly along rivers, used natural caves which, barring slips and high water levels, provided adequate but dark shelter. If a more mobile form of shelter was necessary, then they turned, like their European forerunners, to tents or 'sleeping out'. Many appeared, as early as 1878, according to the census, to be living in more permanent houses built of brick, stone, wood, iron or lathe and plaster (see Appendix VI).

Houses or huts, although sparsely equipped, usually with only a fire, table, storage containers and sleeping bunks, were also conspicuously adorned with auspicious inscriptions both inside and outside. Some of these marked the occasion of building a new house and might include the following:

Above the fireplace:	'May those who face me get rich'.
On the door:	'May the people at this simple door become wealthy'.
Opposite fireplace:	'Let prosperity come in the new house'.

(NZP, 1 January 1883:126)

Others were renewed each year at the time of the Chinese New Year to bring special blessings, like the following noted by Don when visiting Lawrence in 1888:

'May Heaven's Ruler Send Blessing'.

'May Five Blessings Descend on this House'.¹⁵

'May this Year Decide the Return to China'.

'May Songs of Return Be Sung'.

Still others actually gave the house a name, like three houses noted at Orpeuki which were called

Peace Harmony Hall

Vast Harmony Hall

Sincere Harmony Hall

(Tour, 1900-01:17).

Some inscriptions were far more pragmatic, however, like one Don saw pinned to the sack door of a cave on the Clutha River (previously Molyneux River) which read:

Outsiders require not enter in;

Things missing many suspicions begin.

(Tour 1891-92:12)

Houses were usually occupied by several men who shared clan or locality as a common factor, and this would endure as long as temperament would allow. Disputes resulted in splits and usually removal from the district, depending on how serious the offence committed had been. As already noted, houses were vacated after a death or suicide had occurred.

Many homes in the gold fields contained, much to Don's disappointment, small shrines which emulated those places in the temples at Round Hill and Lawrence. Two common gods, represented by

clay, wooden or stone figures, were Kuan ti (關帝) and Hung Shing,¹⁶ but there were numerous others that appeared in various houses, including the Goddess of Mercy and the North God as well as ancestral shrines with offerings (Tour, 1909-11:16; Tour 1896-97:44-45). The interesting aspect of this observation is that they seemed to become more prevalent as time went on, and in Don's later tours of the gold fields, when the Chinese population had decreased considerably, there seemed to be a more active appeal to this form of obeisance. One could argue that this was a product of increasing deprivation and solitude in the face of the declining populations,¹⁷ or perhaps Don's previous observations did not include the inside of houses where temples once had been present.

According to Don's record, there were two major temples in the gold fields; one in Lawrence established in 1869 (see footnote 12) and one established in Round Hill in 1883. The one that Don saw in Lawrence had a large relief character for the word happiness at one end on the wall and underneath it a tablet labelled 'The seat of the Ancestor's spirit' (Tour 1892-93:20). The temple or meeting hall in Round Hill was dedicated to Kwan-ti the god of war, and had an elaborate painting of the god as a centre piece with his two attendants on either side (Tour 1890-91:5).

Inside there were 'antithetical couplet-tablets' on the wall that were presented to decorate the hall. One such tablet appeared in 1894 and contained the following:

1. With true relations between ruler and ministers
the dynasty of Han was established. With no
regrets between brother and brother the oath
of eternal friendship is sworn.

2. May the affairs of this society be without partiality, and the right be done when seen. Thus if fulfilled the oracle of Peace will become a guest.
May the people of this hall possess wealth as their hearts desire. Then is realised their longing in the joy of returning home.

(Tour, 1894-95:4)

In the following year another tablet appeared which indicated that the wishes of the previous one had at least come true for some:

Do we not recall in time past we crossed a vast expanse of dashing billows in preparing to pass through hardships to obtain our desires?
Always glad were we to go deep into the precious hills.
Let us rejoice that on this day, with a full myriad guineas we have met, happily, pleasure with profit in becoming wealthy.
So along with our fellows we return to glory home.

(Tour, 1894-95:4)

Besides the maintenance of temples in New Zealand, in at least one case subscriptions were collected to repair temples at home. In the village of Great Cypress Hill, there were three temples in need of repair, and a man had brought a bunch of subscription chits back to circulate in New Zealand. The red strip that acted as both a receipt for donation and a sign of generosity read as follows:

Heung	The Three Hills Princess The Saintly Duke Hong	Three Temples
City	The Goddess of Mercy The Star of Wealth Ruler	Important Repairs
Great Cypress Hill	The Lo Hills Ox God	

"The faithful man.....cheerfully aids the work with gold and silver.....sterling".¹⁸

Curiously enough, most festivals were celebrated at Riverton, where there were three major shops which provided fairly lavish fare for their clients (NZP, 1 September 1882:43). Ch'ing ming 清明 was one such festival (cf. footnote 11) when miners from Round Hill would come to visit the graveyard at Riverton. Don observed that not all miners left work on this festival day, since some had no tombs of friends to worship and clean, and perhaps others really had no interest or could not afford the 10/- per man for the feast (*ibid.*). One shop at Riverton at Ch'ing ming had done some £50 worth of business entertaining 100 men who managed, according to the shopkeeper, to drink considerable amounts of brandy. Other festivals in the lunar year were celebrated in a similar way which included Zhong Yuan,¹⁹ (15th day of the 7th month) or All Souls Festival, Tung Chi Festival (13th day of the 11th month),²⁰ Ch'ung Yeung (9th day of the 9th month), or the Kite Flying Festival, Chinese New Year (usually celebrated in February), the Dragon Boat Festival²¹ (5th day of the 5th month), and the birthday of Fou-tei, the God of the Land (2nd day of the 2nd month).

The variation in the actual celebration of these occasions seemed little, except that the latter two were held at Round Hill. For all festivals, a large feast was held, crackers were let off, and sometimes the food was offered at shrines in the individuals' homes before being eaten. Most men seem to have stopped work for the day. The day was selected by reference to the Chinese Almanac, which was always imported from China and which gave the dates for the following year's festivals. It also listed rules for calculating fates of children, rules for foretelling the weather on a proposed voyage, lucky and unlucky days for washing the head, plus numerous other bits of information on dreams and various signs that could be used to forecast the future (NZP, 1 January 1885:125; Tour, 1893-94:10).

The only celebration that differed was the New Year, when people went around visiting friends. It was the one time - according to one of Don's informants - when Punti and Hakka, Seyip and Sam Yap men were all friends.²² People visited each other and left their cards as well as attending to the old tradition of paying one's debts (NZP, 2 April 1883:184). In places like Riverton and Lawrence, firecrackers were let off, but often local ordinances were passed to ensure that it happened only once (NZP, 2 April 1883:184).

In the late 1800s, when Don returned to Round Hill on his annual tours, he found the temple still operating, and presumably its activity might have been explained by Don's absence. Each year an average of £25 was contributed towards the organisation of the Ch'ing ming, Zhong Yuan and Ch'ung Yeung festivals, and invariably the list of accounts would be posted giving the expenses for ritual paraphernalia and food offering, which usually amounted to £4 or £5. The balance always went for the cost of the feast in Riverton and the trip to and from Round Hill by train (Tour, 1892-93:3).

One point that should be mentioned in connection with both the temples that have been recorded in the gold fields is the fact that they almost certainly represent the interests of the Poon Yu people, since they were well organised by the Ch'eung Shin Tong. Also, according to Don's figures and informants' comments, they, along with Jung Sing people, formed the majority of the early settlers as far as the Chinese community in New Zealand is concerned. As already noted, relations with Seyip people were not always amicable and for many years, Don found himself forced to hold two meetings in certain localities. This was especially true of Roxburgh (Tour, 1905-06:14), Dunedin (ibid.), and even at Round Hill (NZP, 1 February 1884:148),

and Don suggested that the factions had in the early years violently opposed each other, but as time went on there is some indication that the Seyip numbers decreased and peaceful relations were established between the two groups (Tour 1905-06:14). There had even been a court case between a group of Seyip and Sam Yap men in Round Hill in the early years of Don's activity there. A Sam Yap man and two of his friends had been accused of breaking into a Seyip man's house and stealing £7.5.0 (NZP, 1 February 1884:147). Since the Sam Yap man was a Christian, Don had posted bail for him and his friends, but the case went to court. Although Don's friend was acquitted, since there was little evidence, rumours were rife about the dishonesty of Sam Yap people, and one man told Don:

Of the Sze Yap (Seyip) men on Round Hill, if it comes to going to the law nine in ten will swear falsely to help a clansman.

(NZP, 1 February 1884:148)

Besides the implications from this concerning the relationship between Chinese from different counties, the innuendo about honesty before the law seems rather strong. A few Chinese from both areas were known for their unscrupulous behaviour even if it was only accepting an overpayment for their gold when they cashed it in at the bank. Sometimes cases went to court, and justice was attempted despite the incredible language problems that confronted the officials.

Don's position in the gold fields was always difficult and even worse where there was local hostility towards the Chinese. In these situations, he entered the category of all foreigners or Europeans and tolerance was withdrawn. Despite this, Don was often cornered for news of China or for local news that would reveal the state of hostility between Europeans and Chinese. After the 1881 Act was passed,

there were still rumours in the gold fields that the local Member of the House of Representatives would bring in a bill to prohibit the issue of business licences and miner's rights to Chinese (NZP, 1 November 1882:87). At the same time as the event mentioned above the Chinese in Riverton also made a move to get Don's gatherings out of their store by suggesting, as already noted, that they would be willing to contribute for a meeting house that he could use.²³

The generalisation that can be made from this is that, while most Chinese miners, gardeners, and small shopkeepers were content to have Don around or at least to disappear if they did not want to see him, merchants were antagonistic (Tour, 1900-01:30). Don noted in 1889 that merchants never came near his meetings but were polite enough not to oppose him (NZP, 1 April 1889:185).

The Chinese attitude, however, was not so polite to the Chinese catechist, Kwok Wai-shang, who had replaced Don in the Riverton-Round Hill area in 1886 (NZP, 1 April 1889:182), and was later moved to Lawrence in 1889 after a very successful time in Round Hill (NZP, 1 November 1889-86). Kwok spent a few weeks in Dunedin before going to Lawrence and happened to be misquoted in the local paper after making a speech to the Synod. He had said "...some of the Chinese who came out here from China left their country for their country's good", but by the time this got to the local papers the 'some' had been changed to 'many', and by the time it was translated into Chinese it became "...all the Chinese in New Zealand are criminals and dare not return to China" (NZP, 1 February 1888:147). The dislike of Kwok Wai-shang was unanimous, but, as Don noted, it must have been generated by Chinese who spoke and read English. The unwritten and unspoken rule that seems universal amongst the Chinese

here is that one never, as a member of the community, speaks out on behalf of the community unless it is legitimated by a whole group or unless one has status and wealth on one's side to begin with. This limits such voicing to merchants, and even they seldom speak out on behalf of the whole community. Kwok violated this rule and was openly threatened for his transgression (ibid.).

At other times awkward situations were generated by European hostility. Isolated events of open hostility occurred periodically all over the gold fields when miner's huts were broken into and occasionally when larrikins actually beat up Chinese miners, but there was little the Chinese could do except hope for some form of justice. When large meetings of Europeans were held with the aim of expelling the Chinese from the gold fields, however, it was a matter of panic, and news travelled fast. In 1888 an act was passed limiting the number of Chinese on any one ship to one for every 100 tons (instead of one to every ten tons under the 1881 Act), which resulted in a ship with 260 Chinese on board being sent back to China with its passengers (NZP, 1 December 1888:106). The Chinese in New Zealand were outraged, but again there was little they could do, especially in the face of anti-Chinese meetings in Invercargill, Bluff and Dunedin and extensive claim-jumping of Chinese claims by Europeans at Round Hill (NZP, 1 December 1888:106). The limited response was the posting of a placard in Dunedin which extolled the virtues of the Chinese over and above the English and the merchants attempting to organise an anti-opium campaign, both of which were very indirect measures that achieved little. It is interesting to note the contrast between this response and the more sophisticated response from Wellington as early as 1883. In that year the illustrious John Ah Tong

and other Chinese residents in Wellington requested by formal petition that Chinese immigration be freed from poll tax until the number of Chinese in the colony reached 7,000 (AJHR, 1883, Vol. 3, H-I:490 and Chapter 5, page 180).

In 1900, after four years away from the goldfields, Don returned to visit the areas he had visited yearly since 1886.²⁴ While he had been away T.F. Loie, a Seyip man, came from Australia to take Don's place in Otago. When Don returned, he again resumed his tours, taking with him Mr. G.H. McNeur, who had just volunteered as a missionary to go to China. The situation they both saw on this tour, and which Don recorded till his last tour in 1910-11, was one of declining goldfields for the Chinese. Compared to the 3,856 Chinese gold miners in New Zealand in 1881 at the peak of the mining period, there were 1,313 left in 1901 (Census 1881:270 and 1901:396). Just over 68% of these men were over forty five, and Don noted that many of them were barely eking out a subsistence living (*ibid.*). There were now numerous cases of men that depended on the county Charitable Aid Board, which provided 4/- per week in an account at the local shop so that these men could at least get basic supplies (Tour, 1909-10:5). Other ageing men were removed to the old folks home at Dunedin where by 1910 there were twelve old Chinese men living (Tour, 1910-11:26). It is uncertain how many were depending on Charitable Aid, but in 1895 there were six recorded in the whole of New Zealand, so one could expect there would be considerably more by 1900 (AJHR, 1895, H-16). In 1901 the Census recorded twenty three in what they called 'benevolent asylums' and twenty three in 'lunatic asylums' (Census 1901:396). Despite the possibility of care, many preferred to remain alone in a world they knew without the tension in a strange place where only English was spoken.

Many of the Chinese Don saw were concerned about the situation in China in regard to both their home area and the events surrounding the Boxer Rebellion.²⁵ In their home province, a considerable amount of Western influence had led to the development of railways and, according to some, the laying out of new villages and the improvement of the market places, but other reports told of bad times and blamed them on the same factors (Tour, 1909-11:20). In New Zealand, life was also becoming more uncertain. Declining possibilities in gold mining forced middle-aged Chinese, no longer capable of rugged activity, into more sedentary occupations. Don found many working for Europeans, picking fruit, thinning turnips, shearing or fencing (Tour, 1900-01:24), while others were moving towards larger communities where they could establish laundries, market gardens or cook for their clansmen or work in local hotels (*ibid*:20). For some, the costs of the move offset the benefit of a steady income of perhaps £1 a week.

In these local towns, more established Chinese had set up their gambling and opium parlours, and some feared the attraction of these habits should they move from their environment, where their economic enterprise would have to depend on a European clientele. Once the large Chinese population had gone, there was no possibility of maintaining the merchant-shop-keeper complex that had kept miners supplied in the gold fields. Where a whole network of shops and merchants were necessary to keep the vast area of Otago supplied, it was totally unnecessary in urban areas where everyone lived in close proximity, so if one anticipated a move, occupational diversification was necessary, and for many this was too much effort.

Despite this, however, the migration northward to communities both small and large had been occurring slowly since the early 1870s. By 1896, 1,208 of the total Chinese population of 2,963 were scattered in sixty six of the ninety five boroughs in New Zealand (Census 1896:20-21).

The hostile environment the Chinese faced was not of their creation, but they had become the scape goats. New Zealand by 1888, with a population of 600,000, was £38 million in debt and suffering through a long depression (Sinclair, 1959:168). According to Sinclair, the depression created two classes and brought an end to provincialism. The beginning of the Liberal Party brought the end of rule by the colonial gentry made up of 'squatters, speculators, merchants and British gentlemen' and also saw the rise of the trade-union movement, which wanted an end to Chinese immigration and British assisted immigration; according to them, this was only adding to the pool of unemployed (Sinclair 1959:166-168). From 1877 on, the Chinese immigration issue had been a subject of annual debate, gradually entering the public arena. Local overt hostility and the beginnings of the White New Zealand Policy were not far behind.

In 1888 several Chinese were assaulted in Dunedin (ODT, 3 January 1888), a Chinese market gardener had been plundered in Auckland (NZH 13 and 16 March 1888),²⁶ and a large group were waiting to throw stones at Chinese landing from a boat in Dunedin (ODT, 9 May 1888). This kind of violent hostility continued in Dunedin, but the courts seemed to have taken a dim view of this type of activity and severely punished the offenders (NZT, 20 September 1892).²⁷ It was even suggested after an incident in April 1898 that perhaps Lo Keong and Sew Hoy should be made Chinese Magistrates since they were educated and reputable men and therefore could adjudicate in cases between Chinese and 'hoodlums' (ODT, 2 April 1898:6).²⁸

In Wellington the opposition to the Chinese took another form, largely stimulated, according to Sinclair, by active trade unionism, which had been legally recognised by the Trade Union Act of 1878 (Sinclair, 1959:169). A considerable part of the activity in New Zealand seems to have emulated the more radical activity in Australia, but the unemployment in New Zealand meant that much of the organisation was doomed to failure (ibid.).

In the years that followed, the opposition to the Chinese occupied much government time and produced, at best, a difficult atmosphere for Chinese immigrants as they moved into urban and small communities of the North Island (see Chan, 1972:31). Wellington's growing Chinese community for instance, was to inherit the position as the official centre for New Zealand Chinese but the transition was gradual. In the interim a foreboding of what was to face the Chinese came with the last attempt to send their 'sin yan' home, an event that almost commemorated the end of their involvement in gold mining as the number had declined considerably from its peak in the 1870s.

In 1899 the Chinese in New Zealand initiated the last exhumation of bodies of 'sin yan' to be sent to China. The operation of the Ch'eung Shin Tong had been organised from Dunedin by the president, Mr. Kum Poy Sew Hoy, and according to the secretary a collection had been made from 2,500 Chinese throughout New Zealand.²⁹ The whole operation was under the supervision of the Health Department, and the Colonial Secretary had given his consent to the operation. A licence had been granted, which specified:

1. All the bodies must be exhumed within ... days (number of days depends upon number of bodies), not including Sundays
2. The time for working in the cemetery shall be from daylight to twelve o'clock noon.
3. Before leaving off work each day the graves must be filled up, the coffins hermetically sealed, and all cause of nuisance removed to the satisfaction of the sexton.

4. That the coffins are to be exhumed carefully and placed at once in substantial lead or zinc coffins, which are to be hermetically sealed immediately and covered with a strong outer casing of wood.
5. That disinfectants - chloride of lime and Calvert's carbolic acid - be used plentifully during the exhumation.
6. The gates are to be locked and no funerals or visitors are to be allowed in the cemetery during the hours of exhumation.
7. When the coffins are removed from the cemetery they must be shipped off as soon as possible, or deposited in some place where they cannot possibly be a nuisance or source of annoyance to any one in their neighbourhood.
8. The above directions are to be carried out under the immediate supervision of the sexton.

(NZPD, 1902, 122:442-443)

Despite this, a very gory stories crept into the newspapers about the activity which, like the following in the Greymouth paper, gave a picture of anything but an organised operation.

The resurrection proceedings are bad enough in all conscience, but what is happening at Greymouth is even worse. In an iron shed at the cemetery are stored not only the remains dug out of the Greymouth Cemetery, but also that of defunct Chinamen from other parts of the Coast. How long these 'ghastly articles' are to be allowed above ground seems doubtful, but certainly an effort should be made to clean out the charnel-house ere the warm weather sets in, seeing - so we are informed, that a number of bodies that have never been buried are boxed up and stored along with the dry bones of some and partially decayed bodies of other Chinamen.

The Borough Council in question had objected to the operation, but the Colonial Secretary had apparently not acknowledged their complaint (ibid.).

In all, 474 bodies were exhumed, described in the Dunedin paper as follows:

Dunedin	265	(84 large, 181 small)
Greymouth	173	(66 large and 107 small)
Wellington	<u>36</u>	
TOTAL	<u>474</u>	

(ODT, 27 October 1902)³⁰

Those that were recent deaths were placed in zinc-lined cases, and the late Mr. Sew Hoy and Mr. Ah Chung received rimu coffins, as was fitting their status. Apparently the work of exhumation was contracted out to a Mr. Mos Chang, and the cost of exhumation and shipment was about £30 for each body. The actual work was supervised by Mr. Chang, an inspector and a clerk, and the operation was described in the following account:

When the remains consisted of bones alone, they were washed, dried over a fire in a riddle then tied together in a bundle, wrapped in a cloth, and placed in a wooden coffin only. Each bone, before being thus disposed of, was carefully labelled, and the name of the deceased was in all cases attached to the body or bundle of bones as well as to the coffins. The coffins were then ready for removal or storage, in readiness for shipment when the appointed time arrived. The old coffins were replaced in the graves, which were filled in.

...those on which any portion of the flesh remained, on being washed, were wrapped in linen and placed in a zinc coffin, which was made on the ground by the tinsmith, and which before being used, was immersed in water to make certain that it was perfectly airtight. These coffins after receiving the bodies were at once soldered down with great care and then placed in a wooden coffin, made of 1½ in. kauri timber.

(Press, 30 October 1902).

The coffins, once made ready in various areas, were sent to Wellington for loading on the S.S. Ventnor. The Ventnor's cargo³¹ of bodies was insured for £4,650³² with the Alliance Assurance Company, and £1,860 of this amount was underwritten by the South British Insurance Office (Press, 30 October, 1902).

The Ventnor set sail from Wellington, bound for Hong Kong on 26 October, 1902 but struck a submerged rock off Cape Egmont on the following day, and although it managed to struggle on for a while, it eventually sank on October 28, off Hokianga Harbour with the loss of 13 lives and its cargo (Encyclopaedia of New Zealand, Vol. I: 487-488). There were two results of this tragedy: a sadness on the part of all the Chinese whose relatives would never reach home but would lie 300 feet deep off the New Zealand coast and secondly a long protracted argument over the estimated £4000 insurance. The managers of the Ch'eung Shin Tong had endless meetings to sort out the problem, and, according to Don, it was only after three years that a compromise was finally worked out (Tour, 1905-06:8). The managers decided to help repatriate Chinese men who were over sixty-five along with any other coffins that needed to be sent home (ibid.).³³ They also contributed a fund to be spent on a mortuary temple and burial ground near Stone Gate (a Poon Yu village) for 'friendless men who die abroad' (ibid.).

The event itself needed some explanation, and it was to be found in the unfinished strife between Chinese men who had lived in New Zealand. There were two such stories recorded by Don, one involving two men, one a wealthy man who had accused another of misappropriating funds. Because the wealthy one had status, his story was believed, and it was said that only in death could the other seek revenge, resulting in a massive argument between the 'sin

yan' on the Ventnor. Another story told of a man who robbed his partner in China and then came to New Zealand. The China partner sent his nephew to investigate the partner in New Zealand, but the nephew died of suspected poisoning in a Dunedin hospital. Don responded to these stories with the following comment:

With the Chinese experience of money as the main cause of miscarriage of justice in this life, it is easily understood why rich and poor are made equal in the spirit world where justice is done.

(Tour, 1905-06:10)

In a mere thirty-six years of residence in New Zealand the Chinese population underwent considerable change. Even in this short period the three spheres of activity which form the basis of relationships with both New Zealand and China have developed and produced a number of reactions and a noted effect on the New Zealand Chinese community. The apparent simplicity of the gold mining existence becomes a complex network of necessary relationships.

It is very clear that while their initial presence is characterised by a somewhat friendly relationship between representatives of both the Chinese and European community it is short lived and although antagonism is localized and ineffectual it is enough to generate the 1871 inquiry. It is also clear that a supposedly acquiescent Chinese population has the capability, not only to organise vis-à-vis its survival in New Zealand, but also in terms of its cultural ties with China. It takes only one year before the first petition emerges from the Chinese community - a strategy in a European idiom - five years for the first locality association to appear and eleven further years before this association organises the first of three collections to send the dead back to China under the control of the Ch'eung Shin Tong. Social organisation is evident even if only in a male dominated,

dispersed gold mining context and a merchant leadership has, on at least two occasions, flexed its power when confronted with accusations from European society. They counter the accusations of competition in business by pointing to their contributions in customs duty and local trade, and the accusations concerning opium with an unsuccessful attempt to control their fellow countrymen through the Cherishing Virtue Union (1888).

The community is also the victim of its own factions however, some arising from the nature of their economic activity, gold mining, and others from a more traditional source of district and county enmity. The former like the unscrupulous dealings over contract labour in the Chinese community become public issues resolved through the means of European justice but the latter are problems that have to be solved internally, despite superficial resolution in the courts. They become part of the social relations in the community, which even in its early years manifested both fragmentation and cohesion.

With the decline in gold mining as a lucrative endeavour for the remaining Chinese population, moves are made into other areas of New Zealand, unfortunately at a time when European society begins in earnest to be increasingly antagonistic towards their presence. While the extent of this antagonism will be pursued in future chapters it is in the period of the late 1870s when the pressures of economy and politics in New Zealand coalesce to provide a context of anti-Chinese feeling.

If the situation was difficult for New Zealand its Chinese minority faced even graver problems. The Chinese population was hardly in its prime. In 1896 Don recorded in his diary information on 1080 Chinese, including their names, age in 1896, the number of

years away from China in that year, and the number of times they had visited home. Of these 1080, 362 had been recorded as leaving New Zealand permanently before 1914. Of these 362 men, only thirty-nine had been home for a visit, eleven of them more than once. The 362 men had spent a total of 1,677 years away from China, or an approximate average of thirty-two years each, while their average age at departure was fifty-eight. The thirty-nine who had been home for visits had spent an average of thirty-seven years away from home.

The short-term deprivation that would have been anticipated initially by overseas Chinese coming to New Zealand stretches into long-term deprivation for some and at least longer and longer periods of deferred gratification for others.

Don made the following comment about the influence of poverty on Chinese miners:

My own experience of the Chinese in general is this: Shortly after they come from China they work very hard and are very saving so as to be able to return soon; but if after some years struggling they are unsuccessful they seem gradually to lose all hope of ever being able to return, become lazy, drift into the opium habit and spend every penny in opium or gambling. The most prosperous men are the most industrious - working hard because they are prospering and thus adding to their prosperity; while the non-prosperous become lazy and loose, and thus add to their poverty.

(NZP, 1 March 1888:166)

In addition to old age, poverty and prolonged absence from China, there was also a population that would have to seek jobs in other areas of New Zealand inequipped to operate in an English language environment, fully exposed to hostility and restriction from New Zealand society and increasingly uncertain of their homeland's future following the events of the Sino-Japanese War (1895) and the Boxer Rebellion (1900).

Despite problems however, the relatively small North Island population of Chinese in the period from 1891 (541) till 1901 (792) manages to articulate an opposition to the barrage of immigration restrictions that started in 1881 and would continue unabated till 1920 (see Appendix VII). In the next chapter the context and content of this anti-Chinese legislation will be discussed in detail followed by five further chapters which will explore the context of Chinese community in New Zealand as its social organisation responds to the above and changing conditions in China.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4

- 1 The Annual Inland Tour will hereafter be abbreviated to Tour.

- 2 Mr. F.L. Law was from Poon Ye, Crow Lake Village of about 40,000 people. He came from Canton in May 1909, where he had been a student in the Presbyterian seminary and became Don's assistant in Dunedin. He stayed at Dunedin till August 1910, when he resigned over some misunderstanding, according to Reverend McNeur (McNeur, 1951:30). However F.L. Law later took up a position in 1914 with the Anglican Mission in Wellington for five or six years.

- 3 At this time, each Chinese entering New Zealand would have had to pay £100 poll tax to the New Zealand government. Upon payment he would be issued with a certificate which would allow him to return home for a maximum of three years and return again to New Zealand without further payment.

- 4 Don records such names as the 'Profits of New Glory Shop', 'Shing Lei' shop, 'Concord of Mankind' shop and the 'Exalted Arrival' shop.

- 5 Over the entrance of the door of the gambling hall was the inscription 'Enter the door of slaughter' on white paper, and inside the hall there were other inscriptions which read 'Great slaughter on all three sides', 'The Murderer's Star is enthroned here', 'The Murderer's Star must show its power'. According to Don these, too, were all on white paper, the colour for mourning as opposed to red as the sign of joy. The inscriptions were apparently to encourage the bankers at the fan-tan tables (NZP, 1 November 1889:85). It was generally held by the Chinese that there were two types of wealth: that produced by one's own hands, which was honourable, and that gained through the misfortune of others, such as gains from gambling.

- 6 Each lottery starts with the saloon issuing a series of tickets with eighty Chinese words on each of which the purchaser strikes off twenty. Each ticket costs 6d. The saloon gets one copy of the ticket and the buyer gets another copy. On a set day ten words are drawn which are the winning words. If one had struck off five of the winning words, one gets 1/-; six gets 9/6d; seven, £4; eight £21.10.0; nine £40; and with ten words correct £80. Since the 'bank' has only a limited amount, should anyone win large amounts a proportionate division is made (NZP, 2 October 1882:67).

- 7 The first duty levied on the importation of opium was recorded in the Statistics of New Zealand in 1869, but was imposed in 1866 (see Appendix IV). Initially the amount of duty was £1 per lb. imported, which was increased to £2 per lb. imported in 1888. Initially the opium was imported from Victoria, New South Wales and the United Kingdom, but by 1878 it was also imported from China (Statistics of New Zealand).
- 8 By this time, the New Zealand government had passed The Chinese Immigrants Act of 1881 which imposed a £10 poll tax on each Chinese person entering New Zealand and restricted the number of Chinese on each boat arriving to one for every 10 tons of tonnage. It suffices to add at this point, since this subject will be dealt with at length in a later chapter, that the agitation for legislation was influenced by West Coast politicians with Australian experience and those who could convince people that the Chinese living in California, Australia and Hawaii were totally undesirable as immigrants. There was no attempt to try to assess the objective situation of the Chinese in New Zealand, as indicated before.
- 9 After 1901 the Opium Prohibition Act was passed to specifically prohibit the smoking of opium by the Chinese. It made it an offence to import opium in any form suitable for smoking and required special permission for the import in any other form from the Minister of Customs (Drug Abuse and Drug Dependency in New Zealand, Report Series No.14:113). The duty from imported opium in 1902 amounted to £270.11.6 (see Appendix IV).
- 10 One doctor who apparently operated in the gold fields was W.Y.K. Chan. According to an advertisement placed in a Christchurch paper in 1938 he had arrived in New Zealand in 1887 to take over the directorship of the K.Y.L. Company from the grandfather (Press, 19 November 1938). This firm of merchants and herbalists had started, according to the son, in Melbourne and came to New Zealand during the gold rush, later opening branches in Arrowtown, Cromwell and Lawrence. W.Y.K. Chan was a doctor, Buddhist priest and an official in the Kwangshi Emperor's court but later was converted to Christianity by Alexander Don and returned to China to complete a graduate course at Poi Yaun University and a post-graduate course at the American Canton University. He was ordained in 1906 in New Zealand and died in 1934. His son was a herbalist for some years in Christchurch.
- 11 Ts'ing ming or Ch'ing ming is an annual pilgrimage to the graveyard of the ancestors which takes place in the third lunar month between the tenth and twentieth days usually on the 5th of April in the solar calendar. Relatives visit the graves and provide food, money and clothing (paper) and at the same time clean the graves. In New Zealand, crackers, incense, apples, hard-boiled eggs and brandy were offered and later removed for human consumption (NZP, 1 August 1884:24).

- 12 The only evidence that remains of this Association are two plaques preserved in the Otago Early Settlers' Association Museum in Dunedin. It was opened, according to the Tuapeka Times, in September 1869 (TT, 25 September 1869).
- 13 The total Chinese population was estimated by Don to be about 300 in 1883 (NZP, 1 October 1883:67).
- 14 The initiation of this collection seems to have started quite early. Late in 1889 Don recorded the collection of the £1 levy from Chinese on a ship about to leave for China who had not already paid it to the Ch'eung Shin Tong. If they refused to pay this levy, they would face extortion when they arrived in China, according to Don (NZP, 1 November 1889:85-86).
- 15 The five blessings include wives, riches, children, office and old age (NZP, 1 August 1888:26).
- 16 Kwan-ti was a popular god in South China worshipped as the God of War. He was a man named Kwan-yu, born about A.D.160 in Shansi. During the period of the Three Kingdoms, he was a military leader but was beheaded by his opponents in A.D. 219. In the Twelfth century he was canonised and later elevated to a God in 1594. Hung Shing was the God of the South Seas.
- 17 Don noted that the population of Round Hill had dropped from ninety two in 1897 to thirty seven in 1901. Similarly, Alexandra had dropped from fifty two to twenty nine, Arrowtown from fifteen to twelve, Cromwell from seventy seven to forty two, although there were still numerous Chinese miners in the surrounding areas (Census for appropriate years).
- 18 The blanks were to be filled in with the name of the person, and the money would be sent to China with the slip, which would later be hung in the temple (NZP, 1 October 1887:63).
- 19 During Zhong Yuan rituals are undertaken to pacify the unattended ghosts that might otherwise be malign. The rituals involve burning paper clothes and money and making libations to satisfy the needs of the ghosts (Willmott, 1970:93).
- 20 The time of this festival was calculated by the Imperial astronomer, who filled a six-stop flute with the ashes of a special reed and placed it in a room which was sealed. When Tung-chi arrived the ashes would (from draft) fly about. Europeans referred to it as Chinese Christmas (NZP, 1 March 1883:164).
- 21 The Dragon Boat Festival is celebrated in southern China and commemorates the suicide of a faithful privy counsellor of the Prince in the State of Ts'u. Apparently the counsellor was traduced by a competitor and was consequently banished. After his suicide was discovered, his friends went out in boats to find the body and offered large quantities of food so that the spirits would relinquish the body. The boats that are used each year are dug out of the mud and then reburied after use. For the actual festival they are heavily decorated and painted (NZP, 1 August 1883:25).

- 22 This was a traditional antagonism that developed because of the Hakka's migration into Kwangtung coupled with the ethnocentrism of the Cantonese. It erupted into open hostility during the Taiping Rebellion, since many Hakka joined the Taipings (Wakeman, 1966). The war between the Punti and Hakka lasted from 1853 till 1867. The Seyip-Sam Yap conflict will be mentioned later.
- 23 In fact, the local Chinese contributed £90 for the Round Hill mission house. There was also another interpretation given by the Chinese in 1886, when they insisted that they had helped build the Mission house hoping that Don would assist them with their law-suits against Europeans, and they were displeased when he did not do so (NZP, 1 February 1886:148).
- 24 Don went on a tour of America and then to China in the four years he was away. The purpose of his trip was to investigate the organization of Chinese missions in the United States and then to go to China and check the feasibility of placing a missionary in Kwangtung (Don, 1904:6).
- 25 The Boxer Rebellion swept across northern China in 1900, culminating in the siege of Peking's eleven foreign legations in July of the same year. It was essentially against Chinese Christians and those who supported foreigners, and finally it became totally anti-foreign. The rebellion was finally put down by foreign troops in August of the same year.
- 26 (NZH) is the abbreviated form for the New Zealand Herald.
- 27 (NZT) is the abbreviated form for the New Zealand Times.
- 28 See Chapter 3, page 80 for reference to Lo Keong and the description of the Ch'eung Shin Tong for Sew Hoy. This was highly unusual and the only time that a suggestion of this kind was to be made by a European until Peter Fraser became Prime Minister and suggested that the Chinese should have their own organisation to represent their market gardeners. Appeals for representation-consular or otherwise was always to come from the Chinese.
- 29 The total Chinese population in New Zealand in 1901 was 2,963. As in the previous collection, once a donation had been received from a subscriber a pass was issued allowing the person to return to China. If one did not pay, he was subject to a fine of £20 before he could set foot in China. In Hong Kong the bodies would be turned over to Tai Cheun - the Hong Kong counterpart of the Ch'eung Shin Tong - and they would distribute the coffins to their relatives for a fee of £1 (Press, 30 October 1902:5).
- 30 The final report said that 40 graveyards had been visited all over the country, including Auckland, Wellington, Palmerston North, Greymouth, Christchurch, Dunedin and other towns, and that 489 bodies had been exhumed (Press, 30 October 1902).

- 31 The Ventnor's cargo also included nine aged Chinese body attendants, £4,500 worth of Westport coal, and a quantity of fungus that was insured for £320 in Wellington.
- 32 There is some dispute over this amount: another source says they were insured for £5,490 and that Yee Yong of Wellington also shipped 10 coffins with those of the Ch'eung Shin Tong. The latter shipment was destined for Jung Sing county (Ingram and Wheatley, 1961:277-278).
- 33 According to an informant, the Ch'eung Shin Tong still had some £3,000 in 1928. The money was kept in Wellington, Hong Kong and Poon Yu, but the funds in New Zealand were used to repatriate people returning to China. If one had donated once you received £10 and if you had donated twice £15 to help defray the costs.

CHAPTER 5

UNDESIRABLE IMMIGRANTS: LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITYAND ITS CONTEXT: 1878-1920

In the previous chapter the context has been set out for the development of an intensive period of anti-Chinese legislation (see Appendix VII). As indicated, it developed particularly in the 1870s and will be shown here to reach its extreme point under the Liberal era which lasted from 1890 to 1911. While it has been maintained that the architects of this continued effort at anti-Chinese legislation can be limited to a few names and their particular biases (see Ng, B.F., 1959:19-28; Hall and Scholefield, 1927:1-16), this is by no means a sufficient explanation. One cannot lay the hundreds of pages of debate in both Council and the House at the feet of personality alone. Nor can one blame it on a public that demanded an eradication of the Chinese from the shores of New Zealand, for despite the efforts that produced the legislation, none accomplished absolute exclusion. Certainly it is clear that a 'white New Zealand' policy was and would continue to be complimented by Anti-Asiatic groups of various sorts who used the issue to influence government, but, despite both, Chinese immigration continued and the poll tax survived all manner of immigration restriction.

Clearly, also there was an element of dislike for the Chinese, but in neither the public nor the political sphere, as will be indicated, was it great enough to bring about either a total ban on immigration, a purge of the New Zealand Chinese population, or even the systematic collection of evidence to support a move against them (see Ng, 1972:8). If the Chinese represented, as it was repeatedly maintained, a threefold threat of economic competition, immorality and outright danger as a 'coloured race', then one would expect absolute exclusion to be swift (see Ng, B.F., 1959:17). It was not, however; instead there was a constant barrage of amended legislation aimed at restriction.

Given the absence of exclusion and substantive data making a case against the Chinese one is forced to seek other explanations for the activity of this period, and it is argued here, that only by detailed exploration of the context can this be provided.

This exploration reveals several points. First, the continued emphasis on the Chinese leads one to the conclusion that it must have had some use as a political tool both in terms of New Zealand's internal politics and its external relations, especially with Britain. The evidence suggests that restriction without absolute exclusion allowed the Chinese to exist but not flourish. Furthermore, characteristics of the Chinese community itself also added to this role, since it had no representation from a homeland that began to concern itself with its expatriates only towards the end of the period. The dominant European community was unfamiliar with Chinese culture and social structure, and it appeared to them unworthy of such interest and in fact impossible to penetrate. The first task of this chapter, therefore, is to show how the Chinese issue - and indirectly their community - was used to influence internal and external politics of New Zealand.

In addition to the continued use of the issue to stir up local electorates, it became a powerful lever against vested interests of the Legislative Council on the part of the Liberal Party.

More importantly, the whole prolonged process of formulating immigration policy in regard to Asiatics eventually led to its curtailment, and by the end of the period the topic is no longer the subject of parliamentary debate but instead the prerogative of Cabinet alone. This consolidated power in one group as far as policy was concerned and also increased the power of individual bureaucrats who were responsible for its implementation. Externally it became a lever for the colony against the hegemony of Britain as it strived for autonomy and the right to determine the composition of its population. New Zealand's vulnerability became more pronounced as other colonies and countries achieved autonomy in this area and excluded Asiatics from their shores, leaving those less powerful as alternatives.

The second task of this chapter is to show unintended consequences of the activity surrounding restrictive immigration legislation in New Zealand. In particular, parallel changes in China eventually led to a new interest in their overseas population on the part of Peking, especially in regard to the restrictions their fellow countrymen faced. This interest in the case of New Zealand coincided with the local Chinese community's persistent appeals for rights and representatives, which finally resulted in direct relations being established between China and New Zealand in the person of a Chinese consular officer posted to Wellington. Simultaneously, these events led, in conjunction with influences from political changes in

China, to the emergence of organisation in the local Chinese community, a situation feared by the New Zealand government lest it reinforce ties with China to the extent that any allegiance to New Zealand would be impossible.

The earliest discussion of the Chinese question involved the employment of labour on railway construction under the Fox ministry and the more general question which was left up to the activities of the 1871 Select Committee. As previously noted, the issue of labour was more complicated than the case presented in Parliament, and although various members denied the employment of labour there was no question that it took place - only the extent remains unknown. Even Mr. Stout, Minister for Lands and Immigration, said in 1878 that it had been a question considered by the Minister of Public Works at the time, but policy was never implemented (NZPD 1878, 29:420). As for the Select Committee, its results have already been discussed, and all that can be added is the fact that those who opposed immigration at the time were to be replaced by a new group from Westland and later Wellington, and also that the trend set in this report of talking about the local Chinese residents with absolutely no idea about actual social facts and statistics persisted. A large part of the parliamentary debate on the problem tells one considerably more about the participants in the debate and the situation of the Chinese in California and Australia than it ever does about the local situation. The prime requisite for expressing an opinion in the debates on various bills was contact of any sort with at least one Chinese person, and apparently, the fewer the number in one's constituency, the greater the freedom to talk about them.

Although the matter of restriction declined as an issue from 1871 for six years, it again emerged in 1878, brought to the attention of the government by Reeves, M.H.R. for Grey Valley. When Reeves finally got a debate on his motion for restrictions to be introduced, he launched into a long attack stating evidence from Hawaii, California and Australia.¹ The major issues which were used to support opposition were much the same as those heard in 1871, with perhaps more emphasis on the possibility of Chinese spreading leprosy and their competition in the labour market (NZPD 1878,29:417).

The situation of labour had become increasingly dismal after 1870, as already noted in the previous chapter, until in 1877 it merited the term 'depression'. According to Salmond (see Crowley, 1950), every winter after 1877 witnessed worse conditions and increased agitation from the unemployed (Crowley, 1950:29). By late 1878 a wave of anti-Chinese fervour swept through the country following news of the Australian seamen's strike over Chinese labour. Unions such as the Wellington Bookbinders collected funds to support the anti-Chinese strike, although the Lyttelton Times² reporter saw no apparent reason for the support (LT, 16 December 1878). In Wellington a large public meeting was organised where a number of resolutions were passed opposing Chinese immigration. The meeting largely concentrated on the undesirable nature of a competing Chinese labour force whose presence was blamed on the unscrupulous capitalists. It was further argued that New Zealand already had 'an inferior class of people amongst them, and they were, physically speaking, much superior to the Mongolian race' (NZT, 18 December 1878).

In the discussion that ensued in Parliament, members of the House from Totara, Dunstan, Napier, Wakitipu, Thames and Tuapeka did not feel there was any need for immediate action. They spoke

quite favourably about the local Chinese and even the cases of inter-marriage that they knew of, although the member that mentioned inter-marriage also had to read a motion from his electorate, the local Tuapeka Council, which asked that Parliament take measures 'to prohibit any further influx of Chinese' (NZPD 1878,29:418 and LT, 10 August 1873).³ If there was to be legislation, then it should be imposed in the areas of import duty on rice, for which they would either have to pay extra or buy locally produced food. Alternatively, it was suggested that the Chinese could pay a protection or residence fee and have their employment restricted to such areas as were not desired by Europeans. The obvious occupation, to Captain Russell of Napier, was domestic servants in urban areas (NZPD,1878,29:421). In 1878 there were seventy-eight Chinese engaged in this activity in New Zealand (see Appendix VIII). After considerable debate the motions were withdrawn, but a bill was introduced by Mr. Gisborne in the following sessions (modelled on the Queensland Act of 1877) which was to impose a £10 poll tax (after the Chinese population reached 5,000 or 1% of the total); to limit the number of Chinese to one for every ten tons of tonnage; to provide a penalty to the master of the ship of £20 per illegal Chinese on shipboard; to require the master of the ship to provide a list of Chinese passengers or face a penalty of up to £200; to exempt the crew from the poll tax; to allow the vessel to be seized; and to require all Chinese in the colony to get an exemption certificate before 1 January 1880 (Bills Thrown Out, 1879, No.12:3).⁴ The Bill was supported strongly by Sir George Grey on the grounds that the Chinese '...exercise a deteriorating effect upon its [New Zealand] civilization by forcing the European worker to ...descend the scale of civilization...', in order to compete with the Chinese who work

for less wages and have a lower cost of living (AJHR, 1879, D-3).⁵

The bill, however, did not pass, so a private member's bill was introduced by Hutchinson from Wellington the following year.

Hutchinson's bill provided for the same poll tax but made the vessel responsible for the Chinese passengers who were not landed plus imposing a fine of £5 on them before deportation (Bills Thrown Out 1880, No.78:1).

There are three important aspects surrounding this private bill. First, support for the bill came from the unemployed and working class in various centres. Initially it started in Wellington, where two Chinese had been attacked, which in turn led to the Native Minister warning a gathering at the Workingmen's Club that this kind of activity went against their own interests (LT, 6 January 1879). In Dunedin, workers in a local boot factory 'severely treated' local Chinese who were passing during their lunch hour (LT, 14 January 1879), and in Auckland the Workingmen's Club circulated an anti-Chinese petition which had three thousand names by April (LT, 7 February, 8 April, 1879). Auckland working men, according to the Lyttelton Times Auckland correspondent, had been seized by 'yellow fever' and now accused the Chinese of reducing their rate of wages. The article pointed out, however, that the accusation assumed that Chinese would indeed work for less wages, a fact that was nowhere verified (LT, 20 February 1879). In Christchurch the activity was similar, with a public meeting and a set of resolutions passed deploring the state of unemployment, the employment of Chinese for lower wages and their continued immigration (LT, 26 May 1879).⁶

Secondly, the bill questioned the dependent status of the colony, suggesting that New Zealand had the right to determine who emigrated to her shores without consulting the Home Government. Thirdly, its presentation provided a platform for a new emerging leader and one who also responded to the anti-Chinese lobby. This was Seddon from the West Coast.

Seddon, according to Burdon, was opposed not only to Chinese immigration but in fact to any immigration when there were already plenty of people in New Zealand for the jobs available (Burdon, 1955:43).

The results of the debates provided no basis for regional solidarity, and Reid (Hokitika) and Trimble (Grey) opposed the bill along with Shrimski (Waitaki), Te Wheoro (Western Maori), Wallis (West Auckland) and others. Te Wheoro suggested that if the New Zealand government could so easily ignore a treaty between Britain and China then he wondered whether the Treaty of Waitangi would also be ignored, and McLean from Waikouati suggested that Hutchinson knew full well that the bill would never be supported in New Zealand and in fact would never receive royal assent, so the operation was just to get the electorate stirred up.⁷ Seddon and Reeves were totally in favour, with Seddon suggesting, as regards the equality between Chinese and Europeans, that 'There was about the same distinctiveness between a European and a Chinaman as that between a Chinaman and a monkey' (NZPD, 1880,38:97). Grey made an appeal for a white New Zealand: 'Why not let the people of New Zealand - a European race - keep themselves as pure a European race as they possibly can' (NZPD, 1880,38:102).⁸ The Premier opposed the bill as it stood but realized that legislation was necessary. In the meantime, there was to be an

Inter-Colonial Conference of the Australian colonies in Sydney in January of 1881 which would discuss the Chinese question and the constitutional position of the colonies (Price, 1974:204). Before the conference could take place, however, the Chinese Immigration Bill was proposed by the Government and justified on the grounds of protecting the standard of living and the independence of New Zealand. Those opposed to the Bill included Sir William Fox (Rangitikei), Trimble (Grey), Turnbull (Timaru), Murray (Bruce) and Fulton (Taieri), who felt that the legislation was contrary to the British tradition and that the antagonistic feelings were being generated by working-class agitation.

The provisions of the bill were similar to the one proposed by the government in 1879. It limited the Chinese on any vessel to one for every ten tons and provided for a poll tax of £10 for each Chinese landing except for those who would be excused. Those who had paid the poll tax would be issued with a certificate, and those already in the country would have two months to apply for a certificate (without payment of £10), which in both cases allowed the person to leave New Zealand and return without paying a further £10. The act also made provision for fining a ship's captain £20 plus tax if they should try to land Chinese without paying the poll tax.⁹

The funds that were to come from this poll tax would be paid into the Public Account (New Zealand Statutes, 1881, 47:302-303).¹⁰ The bill was passed by the Lower House and then moved to the Council, where it was also passed. The debate in the Upper House was marked by a feeling that some legislation was imminent and this seemed as good as any. The most adamant opponent of the bill was Dr. Pollen (Auckland), who used the findings of the 1871 report and the investigations on the Chinese in the United States to support his claim. He also felt

it was a strange coincidence that this bill was pushed through on the eve of a general election (NZPD, 1881,38:210). Other comments ranged from support of the bill based on public opinion and vehement personal attacks on the Chinese from Hawkes Bay and Otago members, to others who felt that it did not take those Chinese into account who had been naturalized or who might be coming as government representatives (NZPD, 1881,38:208-214). The Act was sent to England for assent and received it, since the Australian colony had already set the precedent,¹¹ and the Act came into force the following year.

In the remaining months of the session the Chinese question was raised only twice, both times by Seddon. He complained in one instance that of 400 Chinese miners in the Westland gold fields only 150 had miner's rights, and he asked that the Warden's bailiff be given authority to collect the fee. Seddon was told that this provision was already in existence, therefore there was no need for the change (NZPD, 1881,39:142). The other point he raised at a later date was actually in the interest of the Chinese community at Waimea and Stafford. He asked that a paid Chinese interpreter - he actually knew a Chinese man who could do the job and was 'truthful' - be appointed, which was to avoid a situation he described where two Chinese interpreters were operating in a court case between Europeans and a group of Chinese miners. The matter was to be considered, but no more was said of it.

The following year, although the government was not as concerned with the Chinese question, they did not let it rest. In the first session a Chinese Mining Exclusion Bill was presented to the House by the Timaru representative on behalf of Mr. Daniel (Wallace), who was absent at the time. It was an act to prevent Chinese mining in the gold fields, and its provisions were as follows:

It shall not be lawful for any Warden administering "The Mines Act 1877" or "The Gold Mining Districts Act, 1873", to grant any mining right, residence area, certificate, lease, licence, or any other right or title to any mining tenement or easement to any Chinese person.

(New Zealand Parliament, Bills
Thrown Out 1882:245)

It went on to make provision for those who already had miners rights but prohibited the issue of any new ones (*ibid.*). Mr. Daniel never spoke to the bill, and its reception was met with cries of 'ridiculous', since many considered it proper to stop Chinese coming to New Zealand but unfair to take away their rights when they were already here.

The second incident of 1882 concerned an Act that actually had nothing to do with the Chinese but which involved Seddon. Seddon asked the government to reduce the naturalization fee from £1 per person to 2/6 and to make provision for the children of naturalized parents to automatically become naturalized. He justified this on the basis of a number of extremely poor Scandinavian 'settlers' at Seventy Mile Bush who could not afford the cost but wanted to stay (NZPD 1882, 42:11). By the time the bill left the House, however, Pyke (Dunstan) had managed to quickly add a statement that said: 'Provided that nothing in this Act contained shall apply to persons of the Chinese race' (NZPD, 1882, 42:166). The House voted in favour of the bill with its new addition after Seddon had told them that the Chinese did not get naturalised anyway.¹² The Council was opposed to the inclusion of the clause and voted against it by seventeen to twelve votes, but the debate took some strange turns. Some suggested that it was the end of the session and if they opposed the bill on the basis of Pyke's clause, then they would lose that legislation of which they were generally in favour (NZPD, 1882, 43:315). Others

felt that the precedent of unequal treatment had been set by the 1881 Act, imposing a poll tax on just the Chinese, so why not make them totally unequal, but for others this did not solve the problem of the few children who had a Chinese and European parent and who, it was felt, should be naturalised (NZPD, 1882, 43:315). A further complication arose when Holmes (Otago) introduced the 1881 Act into the discussion and told the Council that a Chinese woman had just arrived in Wellington with her two New Zealand-born children and had been charged £30 poll tax (*ibid.*). Although not directly related to the Alien Act, it was an indication that the 1881 Act had major problems, for there was also the question of whether ship's Chinese cooks should be charged £10 poll tax when they came off the boat and whether the poll tax was going to be imposed on internal travel (NZPD, 1882, 42:620).

The bill went back to the House and once more to the Council, where it was again opposed by nineteen to fourteen. The compromise in the end was a provision which allowed the reduced fee for all other aliens except Chinese but still allowed Chinese to be naturalised (NZPD, 1888, 60:395).

In the 1883 session the first Chinese petition was sent by Chinese residents in Wellington - one of which was John Ah Tong - to ask that the matter of charging poll tax for internal travel be stopped and that the poll tax requirement be withdrawn till the Chinese population reached 7,000.¹³ Shaw (Inangahua) after an approach from the petitioners, inquired of Major Atkinson (Egmont) as to the status of the petition (NZPD, 1883, 45:180). Atkinson replied that the petition had not been dealt with and that immigration requirements would remain unchanged. The charging of

poll tax when Chinese were merely going from Greymouth to Dunedin, however, Atkinson stated, was an administrative error and could be sorted out (ibid.).

From 1883 till 1886 the Chinese question was not mentioned in the proceedings of either House, and it remained for Seddon to re-initiate the matter in 1887. In 1886 the Chinese population had declined to 4542 from 5004 in 1881, with a substantial drop in arrival between 1882 and 1885 (see Appendix I and II). Although the population had dropped, there had been a substantial increase in the number of Chinese being naturalized. In the five years since the 1881 Act was enforced, 105 Chinese had become naturalised, and Seddon was alarmed. He stated in the House that he had heard rumours of Chinese sending their newly acquired naturalisation papers back to China with enough information to allow other Chinese to come to New Zealand avoiding the poll tax of £10 and saving £9 (NZPD, 1887, 57:227).¹⁴ Also, Seddon had heard news of Chinese Commissioners who were to visit Australia, and he wondered whether they would be coming to New Zealand. In response to his questions Vogel, the Minister of Customs, said that it was not naturalisation certificates that were being used for re-entry certificates, for which they applied if they were thinking of going home for a trip (ibid.). Vogel also stated that the Chinese Commissioners were coming to New Zealand, but with the express aim of easing restrictions, not tightening them (ibid.:228). Several other times in 1887, the question of Chinese legislation was brought before the government by Reeves (Inangahua) and Seddon (Kumara), but Atkinson, the Premier, said that there did not seem to be any need for immediate action. Reeves at one point insisted that there were abuses surrounding the issuing of a re-entry certificate and wanted an end to naturalisation for the

Chinese (NZPD, 1887, 59:320) and Seddon maintained that large numbers of young girls were visiting the Chinese quarters in the colony's larger centres, which he described as totally unsanitary. The Minister of Justice said that he had investigated the latter question and insisted that, contrary to Seddon's assertion, the numbers were small and that the police had no right to interfere unless charges had been made (NZPD, 1887, 59:295).

One curious anomaly did occur in 1887 concerning a bill that appears in the list of Bills Thrown Out but which is not mentioned in the Parliamentary Debates. It appears that Seddon was preparing for the future and tried a bill which was entitled 'Chinese Influx Prevention' intended to replace the 1881 Act. The provisions were as follows:

1. One Chinese to every 100 tons.
2. Penalty to master of ship of £20 to £100 per person for excess Chinese.
3. A complete list of Chinese passengers with name, age, place of birth, former place of residence the absence of which was to be punished by £200 fine.
4. The Chinese crew must be reported to Customs or Master to be fined £20.
5. Poll tax was to be £20 regardless of naturalisation or previous exemption.
6. Poll tax can also be raised to £100 by government if they see fit.
7. Should Master fail to provide poll tax for those who land, he is liable for the amount plus the forfeiture of his vessel.
8. Should Chinese avoid payment they would be tried and fined £20 to £50 and a time would be fixed for the payment.
9. Chinese already in New Zealand have two months to apply for exemption certificates.
10. Naturalisation does not allow exemption, which is applicable only to representatives of the Chinese government.
11. Naturalisation fees to be increased from £1 to £10.

These undoubtedly were harsh provisions but did not provide, as one might expect, for total exclusion.

In the following year Reeves inquired again about the prevention of Chinese landing in the colony and Atkinson replied that the government had been given notice of a bill, which essentially followed the Victoria Act that had already received Royal assent.¹⁵ The bill provided a further tonnage restriction on ships bringing the Chinese to the colonies and imposed a harsher fine. It also exempted Chinese who were British subjects by birth or naturalisation, which was to be a source of much consternation for the Lower House, who maintained that Chinese who were British subjects in Hong Kong or Singapore would be flocking to New Zealand, where they could feel free.¹⁶ It was also feared that, since the United States had negotiated a treaty with China¹⁷ that effectively barred the immigration of Chinese labour into that country for ten years, there would be a tendency to look for more favourable places. Similarly, Australia was also moving towards harsher legislation.¹⁸

There were three major problems that confronted this legislation and which effectively prevented both the House and the Council from achieving consensus. At the time the issue was being discussed in New Zealand, the British Government, aware of its colony's action, was trying to negotiate a treaty with China that would do what the Sino-American treaty attempted to do. Since the negotiations were delicate, Governor Jervois¹⁹ of New Zealand had been asked to try and prevent the implementation of harsh legislation (NZPD, 1888, 60:146). Despite this, there were a number of bills before the governments of Victoria and New South Wales which promised to try and exclude the Chinese altogether. The result of

this action led to a refusal for 350 Chinese to land in Sydney, but the Supreme Court case that followed this Act overturned the right of anyone to do this (NZPD, 1888, 60:152).²⁰ In the meantime, however, it added fuel to the anti-Chinese fever in the House, where some members insisted that this would result in a mass exodus for New Zealand. Since the Imperial government was in a position to negotiate a treaty, it was hardly likely that assent would be given to any new immigration-restriction acts that would jeopardize this procedure, so it was not in New Zealand's interest, according to some members of the House, to push this issue.²¹ If assent would not be given to a new Act, then the alternative was to follow the Victoria Act, which had already received assent and which added increased restrictions in certain areas of the 1881 Act, plus an additional proviso concerning British subjects and naturalisation. Other members of the House, however, claimed that the Imperial government's position related to more generalised international agreements and really did not have the interest of each individual colony at heart; besides, they felt that the Victoria Act had been a failure (NZPD, 1888, 60:32). The more restrictive course of increased poll tax was sought by some, like Ballance (Wanganui), O'Callaghan (Lincoln) and Dr. Newman (Thorndon), who suggested that any on their way could be put in quarantine. Atkinson, the Premier, fielded most of the extreme positions and tried to find a consensus by suggesting that they pass what restrictions they could and then wait and see (NZPD, 1888, 60:37). Seddon merely kept the argument going by attacking the more liberal members and supporting the antagonists. Finally, after a protracted argument about procedure, the Bill to Amend the Chinese Immigrant Act of 1881 was sent to the Council.

The Council was much more hesitant²² about the bill, fearing that the Imperial government's activity might be thwarted and also suggested that it would be wise to wait until the Inter-Colonial Conference had met and discussed the issue. The Conference was to be held in Sydney in June, which was in the middle of a session, making attendance difficult. Some members feared that changing the legislation quickly would only lead to an embarrassing situation where ships would arrive with too many Chinese on board unaware that restrictions had changed, and the whole issue would thus be a source of embarrassment (NZPD, 1888. 60:217).

The naturalisation issue was not seen as a problem. If people were naturalised then they were entitled to the rights that came with it. Besides, the Aliens Act of 1882 still required that Chinese had to pay £1 for the privilege while the fee had been reduced for all others (NZPD, 1888, 60:395). Some part of the debate centred on the discussion of three clauses that prohibited Chinese from voting in local elections unless they paid rates or were naturalised. The Council struck them from the bill. The Council also added a clause that Chinese government officials and Chinese men of war and those who had left China prior to 10 June, 1888 were exempted from the bill's provisions. On the third reading of the bill, nine members of the Council opposed it, but the majority in favour prevailed (NZPD, 1888, 60:524).

When the bill returned to the House with several clauses struck from it and others changed, there was little that could be done. The House argued about the amendments, and Grey (Auckland Central), made an impassioned plea for '...nothing but a European race within the limits of New Zealand...' (NZPD, 1888, 61:176). A committee was

set up to argue for the three clauses struck by the Council, but the Council stood firm (NZPD, 1888, 61:245-276) and in fact set up their own committee, which in due course set out a number of responses to the House's statements. Largely, their rejection of the latter's suggestion was based on the results of the conference in which Victoria, Western Australia and Queensland abolished their poll tax and raised the tonnage limit to one Chinese person for every 500 tons (Choi, 1975:26). Tasmania and New Zealand abstained, the latter because the individual appointed to attend the conference arrived three days late.²³

Generally the results of the conference were fairly mild,²⁴ but not according to Jervois, who sent off a dispatch to London on 10 July after his former suggestion had been politely declined by the Imperial government (Fieldhouse, 1956:334). He insisted that the Australian move to introduce legislation immediately after the conference was founded on a ridiculous pretext that more Chinese would destroy the 'moral and social condition of the people' (Fieldhouse, 1956:336). Jervois' condemnation of the Colonial governments was summed up in his dispatch's final sarcastic note, which actually twisted Parkes' (President of the Conference) summation of the conference results:²⁵

The Colonial Governments in all that they have done... have been studious of Imperial interests, in that they have irritated a valuably ally; studious of international obligations in that they have violated the Treaty of Peking; studious of their reputation as law-abiding communities, in that, irrespective of the outrages above mentioned [these included the wrecking of the Chinese quarter at Brisbane and several other events], the Government itself of New South Wales has so withstood the law as to call down a severe rebuke from its own Supreme Court.

(Fieldhouse, 1956:337)

The response of the Imperial government was again polite acknowledgement but no comment, since it was generally felt that Australia's action would have little effect on diplomatic relations (Fieldhouse, 1956:338).

The House did not like the Council's obvious refusal to budge and especially its insistence that if temporary settlement was enough reason to deprive one of one's rights then this ought to apply to Europeans as well (NZPD, 1888, 61:276). The obvious stand-off was followed by a Free Conference in which members from the House and Council were to meet and discuss a compromise, but it resulted in failure (NZPD, 1888, 61:737). Through the rest of 1888 the House kept inquiring about the bill, and the only response was that it was still under consideration by the government. In the interim Seddon took the opportunity to collect some statistics on inter-marriage and half-caste children and asked that the information in Table 6 be laid before the House (NZPD, 1888, 61:1920).

TABLE 6: Chinese Marriages with Europeans in New Zealand, 1886.^a

	No. of Chinese married or widowed to European wife	No. of Half-Caste children
Auckland	7	6
Taranaki	2	8
Hawkes Bay	1	5
Wellington	7	13
Marlborough	1	3
Westland	1	2
Canterbury	4	11
Otago	28	53
TOTAL	51	101 ^b

^a Although these statistics were called for in 1888, they were actually collected in 1886 and were already two years out of date (AJHR, 1888, H-29).

^b Of these 101 children, thirteen resided in Australia, one in China and the remainder in New Zealand.

Seddon never had the opportunity to use these statistics, but obviously they formed the two halves of his belief that the Chinese were basically immoral and that New Zealand should be white. Despite the fact that the legislation never appears for discussion again, it did come into effect with the following provisions:

An Act to Amend the Chinese Immigrants Act of 1881²⁶

Provisions

1. Does not include Chinese naturalised in New Zealand.
2. One Chinese permitted to enter for every 100 tons of cargo.
3. If, however, one had left China or Hong Kong before 10th June, 1888 the above will not apply.
4. The fine for Chinese evading the poll tax was increased from £20 to £50. If the Chinese do not pay they may spend one year in goal.
5. Chinese duly accredited to New Zealand by the government of China or under the authority of the Imperial Government are not liable.

(New Zealand Statutes, 1888:123-124).

The only other activity in Parliament in 1888 was a question raised by Seddon about the arrest of Chinese under the Gaming and Lotteries Act in Wellington. Apparently all the Chinese arrested were released, which he could not understand, since they had even been treated reasonably well when arrested. It turned out that they were in fact, not gambling at the time of the arrest, so the charges were dropped (NZPD, 1888, 61:358).

In the following year the Chinese issue was first raised by Joyce (Lyttelton), who requested that a return be laid on the table showing the number of Chinese who had paid property tax since 1879 (NZPD, 1889, 64:486). The motive was unknown, but one can suspect that he was trying to refute the case the Council had made the previous

year concerning the rights of Chinese in local elections, which resulted in three clauses being struck from the government bill. The result of his request was as follows:

TABLE 7: Chinese Residents in the Colony who have Paid
Property Tax, 1879-1889.

1879	9
1880 - 1881	9
1881 - 1882	9
1882 - 1883	9
1883 - 1884	17
1884 - 1885	17
1885 - 1886	18
1886 - 1887	17
1887 - 1888	16
1888 - 1889	16

(National Archives, LE 1/1889/101)

Nothing resulted from the above, but Seddon again took the opportunity to push the immigration matter by enquiring of the Premier whether or not a new act would be presented, since the one passed in the previous year was only temporary. Atkinson's response was that the act would continue in force, and in the following months the Chinese Immigrants Act Continuance Bill passed through both the House and the Council with little comment.

From 1890 till 1893 the issue of the Chinese in New Zealand subsided with three exceptions.²⁷

The first was the murder of a young man in the Hutt on 28 September 1890 by a 'Chinaman'. The incident occurred after five youths, having repeatedly, over a period of time, been throwing stones on Chinese gardeners' huts, got caught by several of the gardeners who lay in wait for them. The fight that ensued left one of the youths dead and nearly resulted in a general assault on the local

Chinese by neighbours. The possible revenge situation was averted by another neighbour carrying a gun, and the next day two of the three Chinese men were charged with wilful murder, and a third awaited a similar charge after his discharge from hospital. An inquest was held four days later, where it was revealed that the dead boy had died from excessive bleeding from knife wounds; that one of the Chinese gardeners had also been seriously wounded and that the youths in question had previously thrown stones once before on the same night (NZT, 3 October 1890). It was also stated that the three gardeners in question leased land and operated a garden together.

While the whole affair looked potentially capable of stirring up massive trouble, which was obvious to the Chinese community who attended the initial court proceedings in great numbers (NZT, 2 October 1890), little eventuated. On the same day as the inquest there was in fact a sober letter to the New Zealand Times which summarized the incident.

People may refuse to do business with them [the Chinese], they may criticise them, they may urge the prohibition of the immigration of their countrymen among us. But those who are here must be treated as men lawfully abiding in the country, and entitled to the privilege of freedom from molestation. ...We trust that public feeling will not, in view of the admissions made in the witness box, become excited.

(NZT, 3 October 1890)

The letter went on to insist that justice be handed out equally to both the Chinese and the youths, arguing that the latter had been responsible for the whole situation in the first place (NZT, 3 October, 1890).

In the midst of anti-Chinese feelings, the reason evident in the above letter prevailed. The youths were prosecuted by the police for stone-throwing and molesting, and the Chinese were sent before the Supreme Court. In December their case came up, and after the Chief Justice had heard the case he instructed the Grand Jury that the indictment of murder could be changed to manslaughter (Press, 2 December 1890). The result was the discharge of one gardener and a reduced charge of manslaughter for the other two men, who were to be arraigned at a later date. There was no discussion of the incident in Parliament, and there seems to have been little if any public reaction against the Chinese, contrary to the picture portrayed by Ballance in the following year.

The second occurrence, while far less sensational, was significant in that it initiated a particular type of anti-Chinese activity. With the movement of Chinese into service and shopkeeping activity (see Appendix VIII) it became apparent to Europeans in similar occupations as well as the labour movement that they now had a solid base for opposition to the Chinese. The result was for instance, the appointment of a committee by the Wellington Grocer's and Early Closing Association in 1891 who, alarmed at the fact that Chinese fruit shops often stayed open when they were supposed to be closed, wanted to press government for more stringent legislation. Similarly organisations like the Trades and Labour Council and Knights of Labour kept watch, on not only legislative activity regarding Chinese immigration, but also on any movement by the Chinese which was deemed undesirable. The Knights of Labour opposed the movement of Chinese traders and labourers into the Wairarapa and insisted that they close their businesses on Thursday

(see LT, 8 March 1892 and NZT, 3 November 1892). Two years later the Trades and Labour Council in Wellington were responsible for an unsuccessful charge laid against a Chinese fruiterer over the supposed sale of 'unsound fruit' and the suggestion that a personal residence tax should be levied on the Chinese (NZT, 31 January 1894). What seemed to have occurred was a licence for close surveillance of Chinese activity in the name of scrutinising business practices and unemployment but more accurately for the support of anti-Chinese legislation.

The third occurrence in 1891 was the unexpected arrival of a dispatch in New Zealand containing a request from the Chinese government that consuls or consular agents be appointed to certain of Her Britannic Majesty's dominions. The request was based on the increasingly friendly relations between Britain and China and also the fact that China had opened her country to foreign interests considerably since 1887 when a previous request was made. In the letter from the Chinese legation, Sieh Ta-Jen stated that:

"At more than twenty Ports and places in the Chinese Empire foreigners are allowed to reside and carry on commerce on conditions which, as compared to what takes place in territories of many of the treaty Powers, may also be considered as free-trade, and at twenty-two of these emporia Her Britannic Majesty is represented by Consuls or Consular Agents".

(AJHR, 1891 A-2:8)

The reply from the Foreign Office was favourable, with one proviso that exequaturs to consular offices could be appointed as long as local considerations did not make it impossible (*ibid.*:8). The response from Ballance in New Zealand was to be a case in point. The Secretary of State had assumed that, since the immigration of Chinese to New Zealand was already covered by certain restrictions, there would be no objection, but on the contrary Ballance stated:

...owing to the strong feeling existing in the minds of the colonists against the immigration of people of the Chinese race into New Zealand, it would be inexpedient to grant permission for the establishment of a Chinese Consulate in the Colony.

With regard to Chinese already in the Colony, they have the power to naturalise themselves and become British subjects; while those who do not desire to do so have the protection of the law, and cannot be injured in their person or property with impunity.

(AJHR, 1892, A-1A:4)

The Governor responded to Ballance's statement with a request to know how the Ministers thought increased immigration would be brought about by having a representative in New Zealand. He also stated that he felt the Chinese were a special case and suffered considerable hardship including 'violence and maltreatment' and that they were perhaps in more need of representation than other foreigners. He further suggested that it might be possible to insist on the Chinese Consul being of European nationality, as was the case for other foreign powers.

In due course, Ballance responded to the Governor, but no set of responses from ministers was included, merely the blanket statement that they, the ministers, were 'not prepared to measure the ingenuity of the Chinese by any known rule', and further that they considered the Chinese a special case unlike other foreigners (AJHR, 1892, A-1A:5).

In 1893 the Seddon administration commenced and the first piece of anti-Chinese legislation was introduced in the same year by one of Seddon's colleagues from the West Coast. O'Connor (Buller) introduced a private member's bill in August which was to exclude Asiatics from the right to naturalisation and also from carrying on specific businesses including hawking, manufacturing or shopkeeping

(NZPD, 1893, 81:328). The bill received support from the Wellington and Masterton members, but others feared that such legislation was an Imperial matter and better dropped. The bill died naturally due to a lack of a quorum, but it was unlikely to succeed especially in any case, with the Wellington papers of the day reporting the destruction of a Chinese hawking cart by a drunken European driver and the brutal assault on the hawker by a European labourer after the accident (EP, 19 August 1893 and NZT, 28 August 1893).²⁸ In 1894, the Undesirable Immigrants bill,²⁹ instigated by Reeves, was placed on the order paper. However, it was dropped before the end of the year even though there had been several questions in the House about Chinese arrivals in Wellington and Chinese housing conditions in the cities. Both enquiries had come from Collins (Christchurch), but they received little reaction. The departures and arrivals of the Chinese were almost equal,³⁰ and Seddon insisted that housing conditions were a matter for local bodies (NZPD, 1894, 86:253).

Despite these events, Reeves went to some lengths to justify his bill and was allowed to air his views in the Review of Reviews in 1895. In his article, 'Why I proposed the "Undesirable Immigrants Exclusion Bill"', he admitted that the bill had been publicly condemned but insisted that it had also been misrepresented. The bill's contents, he argued, were the response not to union demands but to a crisis faced by a new Liberal government trying to improve conditions for the masses. Further, in the midst of these attempts, the country was faced with the presence of nearly 15,000 migrants in two years, many of whom were destitute. The bill was seen as a method to protect New Zealand from this influx and to protect those who might come (Reeves, 1895:39-42). The influx, according to Reeves, had brought 'crime, disease and Asiatic labour', which had

also been faced by the United States. In short, if the United States could declare that they were no longer a 'vacant lot' for the 'rubbish of the old world', so could Australasia (ibid.:41). Similarly, South Australia had enacted harsh legislation which had been in effect for three years and had produced very little trouble.

Although no legislation had been passed, the Chinese community obviously felt that it was imminent, and their anticipation resulted in three petitions from Auckland requesting that the 1881 Act be amended. Two points should be made about these petitions. First, they referred to the 1881 Act and obviously were more concerned about the poll tax than the further provisions made in the amendments in 1888. Second, the Auckland Chinese community had seventy males and twelve out of the total eighteen Chinese females in New Zealand. Considering the numbers, the concern is curious, since it was such a small community and especially since there were other, far more urbanised Chinese communities like Wellington (107, Dunedin (147), Alexandra (84) and Greymouth (451) (Census, 1891:19-20). Notably, the remaining Chinese females lived in Dunedin. Third, the petitioners relied heavily on the argument that immigration restrictions were violating existing treaty arrangements:

The petitioners protest against any legislation that imposes, or may impose, restrictions on the immigration and residence of Chinese in this Colony, pleading that such legislation is not only unjust and impolitic in itself, but that it constitutes a violation of treaties now in force between the British and Chinese Empire.

(AJHR, 1888, I-106:3)

which confirmed their knowledge of changing diplomatic relations between their homeland the countries where overseas Chinese resided.

In 1895 a new bill was presented to the House by Reeves (Minister of Labour) called the "Asiatic and Other Immigration Restriction Bill" after it had been to the Labour Bills Committee.³¹ The justification for the bill, as presented by Reeves, was based on the assumption that 'undesirable people' cost New Zealand £260,000 a year and that a portion of this was attributed to the Chinese, who he estimated, took an average of £200 each away from New Zealand when they went home (NZPD, 1895, 89:347).³² As far as Reeves was concerned the Chinese in New Zealand had no liabilities, moved around at will, and prevented Europeans from growing vegetables, which he saw as far more insidious than European operations in the treaty ports of China (NZPD, 1895, 89:346-355). In fact, there was no case to support the contention that the Chinese were a liability as far as charitable aid was concerned. The House was presented with statistics that showed there were only six Chinese receiving charitable aid out of a population of 4,067 (AJHR, 1895, Vol. 3, H-16). However, Collins (Christchurch) argued that the legislation was not aimed at the Chinese receiving charitable aid so much as to alleviate the situation of Europeans who were forced to seek aid in the face of competition (NZPD, 1895, 89:362). Collins also insisted that there were two hundred Chinese gardeners in Christchurch (in total actually only fifty three) working for 'slave drivers', which meant that Europeans could not compete in growing vegetables (NZPD, 1895, 89:363). A large part of the debate was based on this question of growing vegetables, and those who spoke in favour of the Chinese generally suggested that their role in this capacity was beneficial to the colony. Duthie (Wellington) argued that the Chinese had provided much needed fruit and vegetables in Wellington at reasonable prices, and MacKenzie (Clutha) supported Duthie, describing the contribution of Chinese growers in Milton who came seventeen miles to supply the people of Clutha with vegetables

(NZPD, 1895, 89:356-375). Other opponents to the bill argued that Reeves was purposefully stirring up people by his involvement with the Anti-Chinese League in Wellington and Christchurch and that to push the bill in the interest of labour was irrelevant, since few Chinese were actually labourers (ibid: 358-385).³³ Earnshaw (Dunedin), however, would not stomach the supporters and accused O'Reagan (Inangahua) of being young and naïve. Earnshaw maintained that you had to be around thousands of Chinese to know how despicable they were, and only those who had seen San Francisco or the gold fields of Otago could possibly understand the situation (NZPD, 1895, 89:365). As far as he was concerned "...New Zealand shall be a country for white labour..." (ibid.).

Others were more moderate in their demands and felt the proposed poll tax of £100 too much and the expectation of captains as regards their passengers too extreme (ibid.:366-367). One, more liberal, member felt that New Zealand was indebted to the Chinese for showing them how to rework the gold fields and cultivate unused land, but it was now time that New Zealanders did it for themselves (ibid.:369).

In the midst of this activity, the Wellington Chinese presented a petition to the government, and the Wellington Anti-Chinese League sent their petition signed by Allan Ward and three other residents presenting a strong indictment of the Chinese.³⁴

The Chinese petition was signed by 207 residents and presented by eight Chinese merchants in Wellington, led by Mr. Sung Kwong-lee. The text included the points raised in the 1888 petition but, in addition, took issue with all the other complaints that had been levelled at the Chinese. Its text is outlined in the following seventeen points:

1. In accordance with the Sino-British Treaty (the Tianjin Treaty signed in 1858 - the author) the Chinese may enter any British colony to live or engage in commercial activities.
2. The majority of the Chinese (in New Zealand) are gold miners, some are fruiterers or storekeepers.
3. The Chinese like the Europeans, need bread, meat, and groceries, their attire too is similar to the Europeans. To say the contrary is incorrect.
4. The Chinese have no immoral affairs with (the white) women folk. The contrary is incorrect. This can be borne out by the record of any magistrate's court.
5. It is nothing less than unjust, when no other immigrants except the Chinese pay a £10 poll tax. The petitioners deem it very unjust and unreasonable to impose a higher poll tax than what it is now. (The poll tax was increased to £100 in 1896 - the author).
6. The Chinese are just as kind as other people. Any Chinese who cannot fend for themselves because of old age are helped financially by other Chinese to return to China.
7. The petitioners like other residents, pay taxes and rents. What's more, they pay them off at once.
8. The petitioners do not compete with workers in the lower brackets, nor vie with others in the fields of boot manufacturing and shed building.
9. Before the arrival of the Chinese, fruit and vegetables were scarce commodities to many New Zealand workers and poorer people. Sometimes they had to pay a high price for them. After the Chinese took over the trade, fruit and vegetables have never been short in supply and are selling at more competitive prices.
10. The petitioners buy provisions and clothing from local producers, factories and importers.
11. The petitioners are law abiding citizens, realistic, frugal and hard working.
12. The criticism of the Chinese abodes as being dirty is unjust, because they are bound by health regulations as much as the others. If the Chinese breach the regulations they are subject to fine. It is unreasonable to evict Chinese residents when the inspectors are not performing their duty.

13. The Chinese prospected mines relinquished by the European miners thus drawing benefits from the waste.
14. The Chinese do not recognise the above accusations laid against them. Upon investigating, the government will find that these allegations are concocted on selfishness.
15. The Chinese do not compete for positions in government institutions nor managerial posts in shops. Neither do they add to the burden of unemployment nor seek relief from charitable boards.
16. It is the hope of the petitioners that the local residents who are Christians treat the Chinese in Christian kindness and forgiveness, just as they themselves hope for when going abroad.
17. Owing to the decreasing population of the Chinese and to the reasons stated above the petitioners are of the opinion that the poll tax be reduced instead of being increased.

(Shen I. Yao, 1970:108-109,
translated from the Chinese)

Although the Public Questions Committee said they had no recommendations to make about either petition, the Anti-Chinese League's contribution generated considerable comment in the Council. Shrimski, on hearing of it, immediately asked that a committee be sent to substantiate the allegations, and Rigg, who had introduced it, said that the allegations would only be supported and he could not understand why Shrimski wanted more information (NZPD, 1895, 90:130-131).³⁵

The petition,³⁶ according to the comments in Council, accused the Chinese of disregarding the 'decencies of civilised life', of tampering with young girls, of smoking opium, of herding together, of driving residents away by using urine collected from boarding houses on vegetables, ripening fruit in their sleeping chambers, gambling, and generally contributing to unsanitary conditions (NZPD, 1895, 91:161-284). Rigg (also Secretary of Wellington Trades and Labour Council), in support of the petitioners, threatened the Council with a continued

debate if they did not vote on a motion that labelled the Chinese as 'undesirable immigrants', which merely resulted in all the evidence being presented to the Council (ibid.).

The evidence presented was hardly conclusive: the Sanitary Inspector had reported to the city council that the houses were not too bad, the matron from the Pauline Home testified that there were some girls rescued from presumably opium dens, and the matron of the Alexandra Home said they had one illegitimate Chinese child whose father would not pay any support (NZPD, 1895, 91:283-284). Ultimately, the Council voted thirteen to eight against the motion that the Chinese were 'undesirable immigrants' (ibid.:284), much against the advice of the Attorney General and member of the Anti-Chinese League, Sir Robert Stout, who feared that such opposition by the Council would lead to people organising to bring about the abolition of the Upper House.³⁷

While Sir Robert had his say in Wellington, his wife Lady Stout, had her say at the National Council of Women's convention in Christchurch in April 1896. It was at this convention that the subject of 'undesirable immigrants' was a topic for the session, and Mrs. Tasker, the honorary secretary of the Anti-Chinese League in Wellington, presented a harsh attack on Asiatics, appealing to women and mothers not to '...sell their children's birthright for worse than a mess of potage', (Lady Stout Collection, Hocken Library). Mrs. Tasker continued attacking the Upper House and the Chinese:

Asiatics must be prohibited from coming here with their revolting and degrading code of moral law. They increase the evil passions of the criminal class of the European races. ...It was a well known fact that whenever the Chinese had settled that settlement had been poorer, and the labourers were worse paid than in those places where the Chinese had been kept down. Why should an Englishman be placed on an equal footing with the almond-eyed foreigner? It would mean human degradation, the acceptance of starvation wages, living under conditions bestial in the extreme and opposed to the laws of health and sanitation; in fact decadence of the worst physical and mental description.

(ibid.)

Lady Stout responded to this, first mentioning that her husband was President of the Anti-Chinese League and then arguing that she was opposed to the motion of supporting the Undesirable Immigrants Bill. She stated that the Chinese were most desirable immigrants, industrious, law-abiding, sober, honest and good contributors to our charitable aid funds (ibid.). (The Chinese in Wellington had contributed £10 to the Bruner Fund, and in Christchurch they had contributed £50 to the hospital.) The Chinese gardeners, as far as she was concerned, had made a considerable contribution by turning small pieces of land into productive gardens that provided vegetables at reasonable prices that even poor people could afford, while previously vegetables had been sold at prohibitive prices. When another member of the session opposed Lady Stout, saying that every third man in the world was a Chinaman and that if they were allowed to continue to come, New Zealand would be overwhelmed, Lady Stout merely replied, 'If we are an inferior race then we ought to go to the wall' (ibid.). Lady Stout's opinion of the Anti-Chinese League was made clear the next day, when she addressed the Southern Cross Society on the outcome of the meetings:

With all its outcry against the Chinese... the Anti-Chinese League which had been in existence for more than a year, had as yet not succeeded in growing even a two-penny cabbage.

(Lady Stout Collection, Hocken Library)

If the women of New Zealand were at least partially sympathetic to the Chinese, a Wellington paper saw them as totally opposed to the whole of New Zealand and accused them of being extremely unfit to form any 'stable conclusions' (NZT, 21 April 1896). This went also for their demands to be placed on juries and their support for old age pensions, which, according to the author of the article, would do the same as the charitable aid, which 'degrades and pauperizes' (*ibid.*).

After the failure of Reeve's³⁸ second bill, which had not been proceeded with in the House, he introduced the Chinese Immigrants Bill, which proposed to raise the poll tax to £100. According to Scholefield and Hall, the bill was passed by the House but thrown out by the Council (Scholefield and Hall, 1927:9).

In June the following year Seddon took over where Reeves had left the immigration issue and introduced the Asiatic Restriction Bill No. 1. Several important points emerge from this bill. First, it attempted to exclude all Asians, and in specifying Asiatics as 'persons of the coloured races of any part of Asia or of the islands adjacent to Asia, or in Asiatic seas' (NZPD, 1896, 92:258), explicitly added the criterion of race to the already overworked economic arguments. Second, the bill clearly impinged on an area of the Governor's jurisdiction, which allowed him, upon assessing a bill's effect on the government, to reserve it.³⁹ While this was the case, Seddon also knew that an 1891 Privy Council decision specified that no aliens debarred from landing in the colonies had any right of action against local governments.⁴⁰ Finally, it would seem that Seddon

wanted to force the hand of the Legislative Council by exposing them as acting contrary to the interests of those they represented.⁴¹

Seddon's introduction of the bill was direct and swift. He argued, without proof, that large numbers of Chinese were coming to New Zealand, that urban Chinese were increasing in numbers, and finally that the purity of race was of great importance for the future of New Zealand (NZPD, 1896, 92:252-258). Out of all the responses to Seddon's move, only Bell (Wellington) and Newman (Wellington Suburbs) broached the issue of the Home government's reaction in regards to both Japanese and the Indians who were British subjects (NZPD, 1896, 92:254-257). The bill passed through the House quickly, only to become an item of hot debate in the Council. Walker, Minister of Immigration, introduced the bill and used the same line of argument as Seddon had done in the House. In addition, he maintained that in the name of economics and racial purity it should be the right of New Zealand to pass such legislation (NZPD, 1896, 92:372-452). Two issues competed for prominence in the debate, on the one hand whether loyalty to the Empire could best be shown by protecting natural inhabitants or on the other by adhering to the edicts of the Imperial foreign policy. The latter gained prominence and much of the argument dwelt on the British subjects, namely Indians, who would be excluded under the act and consequently this would represent an insult to India. When the Council voted on the bill, it was defeated only by the casting vote of the Speaker.

The results were in some degrees predictable. Seddon was furious with the Council, even though his Labour appointees had tried hard to get the bill passed. The Anti-Asiatic League responded, in a last effort, officially presenting a resolution to Seddon sympathising

with him and condemning the Council (NZT, 2 July 1896). It further suggested that if Seddon made the bill applicable to the Chinese alone they were sure it would pass (NZT, 2 July 1896).

Another outcome was the despatch of a report by the Governor to the Secretary of State, Chamberlain, in which the events surrounding the bill were described. Glasgow, the Governor, made it quite clear that he felt Seddon was exaggerating his claims about Chinese immigration but was doing it purposefully to get at the Council. Chamberlain was also informed that Seddon was proceeding with a bill to abolish the remaining life membership in the Council (see C.O. 209/256, 8 July 1896 quoted in Kay, 1973:26).

The newspapers divided over the issue in line with their traditional positions, the New Zealand Times supportive of Seddon and the Otago Daily Times in Dunedin supportive of the Council's position. According to Kay, the Otago Daily Times interviewed a member of the Council who maintained that the bill had been thrown out because there were enough restrictions already and that if such legislation had passed it would have been an embarrassment to the government (Kay, 1973:24). The Mayor of Dunedin who had attended the National Municipal Association Conference in Wellington during June, was the only one in New Zealand to show sympathy for the Chinese (Willis, 1974:34). The other mayors present sided totally with the Mayor of Greymouth, who presented the following remit:

That provision be made in the Local Government Bills to enable boroughs to cope with the Chinese difficulty:

1. power (be given) to confine the Chinese to a separate district.
2. to issue licences to opium dens and stores where opium is sold, with heavy fee for such.

3. to limit the number of persons who may legally occupy the same tenement, with the exception of Chinese families.
4. to make it an offence against any Chinese householder if he harbours or encourages any European of immature age; any infant found on the premises being prima facie evidence of harbouring.

(Willis, 1974:34)

Despite the fact of hostility noted by Willis, it is also interesting that only (3) and (4) in the remit were passed (ibid.).

Three days after the previous bill had been rejected, the Asiatic Restriction Bill No. 2 was introduced, which had, according to Seddon, a number of the offending clauses of the previous bill removed, although the term 'Asiatics' was still employed. Dr. Newman (Wellington) supported the bill but felt that the inclusion of Japanese under the term 'Asiatics' might be problematic because of the treaty signed between Japan and Great Britain and wanted it changed to 'Chinese' (NZPD, 1896, 92:466). As far as Seddon was concerned, since New Zealand had the option of agreeing or disagreeing with this treaty, it would not apply to New Zealand (ibid.).⁴²

On the whole Seddon was pleased with the way the House received the bill and because of the reception decided to add several more restrictive clauses when it went into committee. The additional clauses removed the right to naturalisation⁴³ and made re-entry to New Zealand possible only after payment of the poll tax or with prior naturalisation (NZPD, 1896, 94:310). Two additional clauses defined a 'Chinese' person as anybody of Chinese race and gave the Colonial Secretary or anyone appointed by him the right to decide whether anyone was or was not Chinese (ibid.). Those who opposed the legislation, like Button (Auckland), were too soft in Seddon's view.

The argument that Britain had forced her way into China and developed the opium trade was not enough, in Seddon's opinion, to merit an open-door policy in New Zealand, since New Zealand was hardly responsible for these deeds. Besides, Europeans had forced their way into New Zealand with the 'rum bottle and scriptures', and that was no reason "...why we should not protect our race" (NZPD, 1896, 93:471).

Other members tried to get the proposed £100 poll tax reduced to £25, but the majority supported the £100 (NZPD, 1896, 94:310). Duthie (Wellington) and Hogg (Masterton) argued about the rising Chinese population in Wellington and the monopoly of the fruit and vegetable industry by the Chinese. Duthie maintained that the Wellington population had increased to 212 only because of a recent influx from the West Coast not from China; that the Chinese made a considerable contribution to the fruit and vegetable industry and that Seddon was using this to satisfy the agitators just before the general election even though he (Seddon) knew that it would be thrown out by Council (NZPD, 1896, 94:311-312). Hogg accused Duthie of saying things in the House that he would not dare say before his electors and also went on to castigate the Chinese, who lived in 'dens', worked as cheap labour and "...live off the smell of an oily rag" (ibid.). Other criticisms of the bill included some support for Chinese merchants by MacKenzie (Clutha) and Thompson (Marsden), who under its provisions would now have to pay poll tax to re-enter New Zealand if they departed (ibid.: 311 and 313). Seddon's response to this was that he knew there were some 'good' Chinese even including some who went to school and one practising law, and if they wanted to leave and return the Governor of the Colony had the power to grant permission (ibid.:318).

When the bill went to Council, it had few opponents, the most vocal being Shrimski (Otago), who tried to stem the tide of what other members saw as an inevitability. He could not understand why this legislation was needed when the Chinese population was decreasing as he readily proved with arrival and departure figures from the Registrar General. From 1881 to 1895 there had been a nett loss of 1293 Chinese (NZPD, 1896, 94:427). Furthermore, he could not see how a petition, signed by four hundred women of the social and political leagues of Wellington, who wished to see the Chinese prevented from entering Wellington and the Colony, but who represented only 1% of the entire population, was enough to justify legislation.⁴⁴ Shrimski also took time to dispel some innuendos that his opposition to the legislation was purely for mercenary reasons. He confessed that his wife leased six acres to a Chinese gardener but added that she received the £20 per year rent only occasionally (NZPD, 1896, 94:427). Others also opposed the bill for a variety of reasons. McLean (Otago) thought that the provisions of the bill were going too far, even exceeding the restrictions of other colonies, and furthermore, it was providing unnecessary problems for ship's captains (*ibid.*:428). Mr Williams (Auckland) also opposed the bill, maintaining that the British treatment of China should at least be countered by some conscience in the colonies. He felt that the poll tax, if it was to persist, should be used to train the Chinese in the colonies as missionaries to be sent back to China (*ibid.*:429).⁴⁵ He also argued that the evidence that had come from the Anti-Chinese League was totally misleading and went out of his way to prove that the Chinese were honest by reading the following from the Wanganui Chronicle:

The first meeting of the creditors in the estate of Liu Kum, storekeeper, of Hunterville, was held at the office of the Deputy Official Assignee on Tuesday, Mr. J. Notman presiding. The debtor filed a most complete statement of assets and liabilities, showing every transaction clearly and fully. Both Mr. Notman, the Assignee, and Mr. Marshall, who appeared for Ching Chow, one of the three creditors who have claims against the estate, complimented the debtor upon the excellence of his statement, which they said would do credit to any European traders.

(NZPD, 1896, 94:428)

Mr. Reynolds (Otago) suggested that the Council should oppose the bill and allow the electors to decide at the following election, and Mr. Ormond tried to make a distinction between the acknowledged repugnance one would naturally have for a situation where New Zealand was flooded with 'Chinamen' and the use of the matter as a political tool. Ormond, as Minister of Works under Vogel, had found himself in a position of having to resolve the ultimatum of Brogden - no labour, no railroad. As already noted, the suggestion of Chinese labour was floated but never fully institutionalised. Despite this, however, Ormond gained some reputation then as being in favour of this 'alien race' and was later held to account for this attitude when he was a candidate for Napier. It so happened that the accuser, who was using the issue as a political tool, was the very person who, as Superintendent of Auckland in the 1870s, had given full approval to Chinese immigration, suggesting then that any fears were unfounded, so Ormond had no problem dispensing with the accusation. Ormond's argument in 1896 was that one would have to acknowledge the bill but curb its excessive nature. It was permissible to oppose immigration, but to oppose it excessively was to use it as a political tool. On the one hand, he agreed that too much was being made of a small number, but on the other, it was permissible to legislate against the immigration of large numbers (NZPD, 1896, 94:431).

Mr. Kerr (Westland), however, was far less diplomatic in his statements, describing the Chinese as undesirable immigrants who were prone to thieving, immorality and corrupting female children (NZPD, 1896, 94:432). He suggested Shrimski should put nationalism before humanism and that 'real' objections to the Chinese presence preceded their implications for use as a political tool (ibid.). He added that he had nothing personal against 'Chinamen' but hoped the Council would approve the bill. Bonar (Westland), Peacock (Canterbury), Bolt (Otago) and Walker (Canterbury) spoke before the vote was taken. Bonar supported Shrimski's position, offering substantive proof that from 1890 till 1894 only forty-six Chinese had been convicted in New Zealand, representing .71% of all convictions and also maintained that further legislation seemed inappropriate at a time when Li Hung Chang was in London negotiating China's position (NZPD, 1896, 94:434). According to Bonar, the Council had opposed the previous bill but now had it back again under the guise of a compromise which was even more harsh than the original provisions, a clear indication that the House had worn the Council down.

The remainder of the speakers supported the bill largely on the basis that something might have to be done and perhaps this was it, and it was better to implement it now. As to its use as an electioneering measure, the response was consistent: the issue had been around too long to be used in this manner since it affected legislation which went back to 1881.

The bill passed the second reading with a majority of nine (NZPD, 1896, 94:435). Although Shrimski tried in committee to get some changes, the only major amendment was the removal of a clause requiring both a fingerprint and photograph for the naturalisation

certificate. When it returned for the final reading, the positions were largely the same, but despite the result eleven members of the Legislative Council laid a protest before the Governor for submission to the Queen: it stated,

We the undersigned Members of the Legislative Council of New Zealand respectfully record our protest against the passing of the Asiatic Restriction Bill on the following grounds:- That it is an arbitrary measure based on the assumption that the Colony is threatened with an immediate influx of Chinese and other Asiatics, while the Registrar General's statistics show that the number of Chinese, now less than four thousand has been decreasing since 1881, and that the number of Asiatics of other nationalities in the Colony is inconsiderable; that it is inadvisable and impolitic for a Colony, which forms a comparatively small part of the Empire, to pass a law practically excluding from its territory the greater part of the population of Asia; and that such action is calculated to restrict trade, to lead to international complications, and possibly to embarrass the relations of the Imperial Government with the intelligent nations of Asia.

(Fieldhouse, 1956:341)⁴⁶

This submission was forwarded with the Act to England for Royal Assent without the signature of the Governor. Once this occurred and it was indicated that it might be some time before any decision was made, Seddon moved back into action and in September 1896 gave notice of an 'entirely new Bill', the Chinese Immigrant Amendment Bill (NZPD, 1896, 95:605). The next day Seddon introduced the contents, describing it as a provisional measure to stop the Chinese coming in, which was actually an amendment to the Chinese Immigrants Act already in force. The new bill would merely increase the poll tax from £10 to £100 and increase tonnage requirements from 100 to 200 tons (NZPD, 1896, 96:7). What caused some concern in the House was not so much the nature of the bill but the fact that Seddon wanted it discussed and debated before members had even seen it. After a protracted debate on this point, the bill arrived from the Government Printer and was finally read and passed.

The bill went to the Council and passed with only one amendment which exempted Chinese in transit before 1 October 1896.

There are some curious anomalies in the passage of this bill. In the first place, it had always been possible to amend the earlier act legitimately and impose at least some of the restrictions that were desired and in fact contained in the 1896 Asiatic Restriction Act. Secondly, if total exclusion was the ideal professed in the 1896 Act, then it was certainly not explicit in the Chinese Immigrants Amendment Bill, which if anything tolerated immigration but increased its contribution to the Consolidated Account through an increased poll tax. There seems to have been therefore, an internal and external dimension to the issue. Internally the issue was (a) to undermine the power of the Council and (b) to ensure some financial return to New Zealand. The external issues seem to have been a lever to establish some notion of independence for New Zealand in a situation of colonial dependency. The way to independence was seen partially through the ability to form and implement legislation that might or might not coincide with British Imperial interests.⁴⁷

In England the Asiatic Restriction Act was submitted to scrutiny, and while it was acknowledged that it applied only to the Chinese and Japanese, the provisions included were deemed too drastic (Fieldhouse, 1956:342). An internal minute of the Colonial Office suggests that the act was deficient on two counts:

...the absence of any power to the Executive to suspend the exclusion or poll tax as regards any individual or class except the few cases specified in sec.(24), and (2) the making of aliens of native born British subjects are serious objections to this law, and the provisions of sec. (11) will make it practically impossible for a Japanese ship or a ship with a partly Chinese crew to trade with New Zealand.

(Fieldhouse, 1956:342)⁴⁸

The Secretary of State, Mr. Chamberlain, concurred with the above and agreed that the matter should wait till the Premier's conference in June, when they would all be in England for the Jubilee celebrations. It was also clear, as far as the Colonial Office was concerned, that the colonies needed to be brought 'into line in regard to this matter' (ibid.). The Office also apparently replied to the protest from the Council's group of eleven, but the exact nature of the reply was never conveyed to the Legislative Council or to the eleven members who signed the original document.⁴⁹ All that the eleven learned was in fact what the Governor conveyed to them, which noted their protest and that the bill concerned was being returned to New Zealand for amendments (NZPD, 1897, 100:124).

At the Premier's conference the Secretary of State, Mr. Chamberlain, made it quite clear that the several bills presented on the matter of immigration could not be accepted, except for the one from Natal (NZPD, 1897, 100:759).⁵⁰ He sympathised with '...the determination of the white inhabitants of these colonies which are in comparatively close proximity to millions and hundreds of millions of Asiatics and appreciated the fact that if they came with alien religion, customs and civilisation they would probably interfere with ...the legitimate rights of the existing labour population' (NZPD, 1897, 100:759). However, one should '...bear in mind the traditions of the Empire, which makes no distinction in favour of or against race or colour', and to exclude Indians or for that matter Asiatics '...would be an act so offensive to those peoples that it would be most painful...to Her Majesty to have to sanction it' (ibid.:759). Chamberlain therefore was not opposed to the idea itself as long as it was done properly:

What I venture to think you have to deal with is the character of the immigration. It is not because a man is of a different colour from ourselves that he is necessarily an undesirable immigrant, but it is because he is dirty, or he is immoral, or he is a pauper, or he has some other objection which can be defined in an Act of Parliament, and by which the exclusion can be managed with regard to all those who you really desire to exclude.

(NZPD, 1897, 100:763)

The Alien Immigration Restriction Bill introduced by Seddon upon his return from England was an attempt to meet these suggestions by implementing the language requirement of the Natal Act.⁵¹ It passed safely through the House and would have been passed by the Council if the issue of the missing dispatch had not led to its indefinite postponement (see footnote 49).

In the course of the debate about the dispatch, some light was shed on the bill. Shrimski gave notice that he was going to ask for a new clause which would allow naturalised Chinese already residing in New Zealand to bring their wives out and have them enter exempt from poll tax. He was attempting, apparently, although unsuccessfully, to remedy a situation that he had been made aware of by a letter from Chin Ting, a merchant in Pahiatua. The issue which Chin Ting brought up had been going on for over a year and actually involved a case of his cousin, H (F)ook On of Yee Chong Wing & Co. in Manners Street, Wellington. Fook On, who was naturalised, had returned to China, married and brought his wife back to New Zealand. When he arrived, he found that he had to pay £100 for her to enter, according to the letter he wrote to Shrimski (NZPD, 1897, 100:873).⁵² As far as Chin Ting knew, Fook On had never received his refund, so it was assumed that even if a Chinese person were naturalised it would convey no special rights unless, according to the Colonial Secretary, Parliament approved of these rights.

In 1898 the Immigration Restriction Bill was introduced, which coincided as far as was possible with the needs of New Zealand while at the same time adhering to the Natal Act. After some debate it was passed by the Council despite some feeling expressed that a language test might select out useful Scots and Irish who could not write (NZPD, 1897, 104:176). Its passage in the House was less successful due to the lateness in the session, and the bill was dropped (ibid.:616).

In the next session Seddon introduced for its second reading the Immigration Restriction Bill (2), which on his own admission complied with the Natal Act (NZPD, 1898, 105:158). Despite compliance, however, the introduction of the bill again occasioned considerable debate. The major areas of controversy were fourfold. First, the dictation test to be administered to all incoming aliens proved problematic since the content was arbitrary and it appeared from the Act that it would be applied indiscriminately (NZPD, 1898, 105:159-176). Second, there was opposition to the use of literacy, disease and criminality as criteria for the exclusion of future immigrants, when these had not previously been employed. Third, the purpose of the Act, as some understood it, was precisely to restrict, if not stop the immigration of Chinese, yet this Act, in clause 21, was made not applicable to the Chinese.⁵³ Fourth, there was some feeling that Seddon was pushing legislation for the sake of it and that the bill was ill devised (ibid.). Some even felt that Seddon had been carried away by the Premier's conference in introducing a bill that was generally acceptable to Britain (NZPD, 1898, 105:176). The bill failed on its second reading.

While the government received considerable opposition to the bill, Seddon also came under personal attack from the opposition member for Patea, George Hutchinson. The verbal assault came during the Financial Statement debate, when Hutchinson accused Seddon's uncle of embezzling the Kumara Borough accounts and Richard Seddon of being a partner in a Chinese gold-mining claim. Hutchinson, when challenged by Seddon, stuck with his story and further refused to retract or substantiate its content then or even later in Committee. Seddon, determined to clear his relative's name if not his own, had a committee assigned the task of investigating all the allegations. The Bun Tuck affair, as it was named, was duly reported, and the Seddons name was cleared, but of more importance, the proceedings gave for the first time some clear indication of Seddon's personal relations with the Chinese.

Seddon had been a registered mining agent on the West Coast and in this capacity appeared for many Chinese clients in disputes over claims. He also helped them conduct their business (AJHR, 1898, I9:78-80).⁵⁴ In the case mentioned, Bun Tuck had been a shareholder in the Chinese company of Tum Shum & Co., which was made up of ten shareholders. Seddon was the agent for the company, and when Tum Shum left New Zealand, his share in the company claim was transferred to Seddon. The claim in total was worth £1500, and Shum's share was £100 of which £85 had been paid by Ah Lie, who had worked it after Shum's departure. There was no question of Seddon having a partnership, nor was there any indication of hostility towards Seddon by the four Chinese witnesses called to testify.⁵⁵ According to J.A. Murdock, a solicitor who replaced Seddon as the agent, "He [Bun Tuck] was very friendly disposed towards yourself as were all the Chinese there" (AJHR, 1898, I9:86).

While 1898 had been a difficult year for Seddon, it was not without at least one victory in the Old Age Pension Act. After three years of debate the Act finally passed, ensuring the survival of the Liberal Party at the polls the following year while at the same time providing a non-contributory assistance scheme. Clearly, the Act was one about charity, but it also made the limits of this charity clear. In Section 64, three clauses which were never the subject of debate during the passage of the bill specified the following:

This Act in so far as it provides for the grant of pensions, shall not apply to,

2. Aliens
3. Naturalised subjects, except such as have been naturalised for the period of five years next preceding the date on which they established their pension claim,
nor to
4. Chinese or other Asiatics, whether naturalised or not.

(Statutes of New Zealand
1898:58)

In 1898, election year, the 1898 bill again came up for debate. The Council faced it for the second time, but aside from Shrimski's critique which denigrated the lack of opposition from the "swamped council" and also drew attention to the unfairness of an education test when one only had to consider that 75% of the British people had not been able to read or write in 1875 (NZPD 1899, 106:530), little other resistance was shown. It passed through its three readings with little trouble, helped somewhat by the amendments in the House which included the exclusion of those of British and Irish parentage from the application of the bill and the granting of a right of appeal should a person be refused entrance (NZPD, 1899, 110:532).

The passage through the House was somewhat more stormy, and, as already mentioned, gave rise to several amendments. After a long debate on the second reading, Seddon finally gave his summation of the reasons why the bill should be passed. First, if people were rejected from other colonies it was extremely likely that they could flood to New Zealand and would saturate the small business occupations already in existence.⁵⁶ According to Seddon it was likely that they would come from China and the Pacific and even closer - from South Australia, Victoria and New South Wales, who had already passed similar acts (NZPD, 1899, 110:383). Seddon went so far as to suggest that "new Zealand is a dumping ground for the rejects of Australia" (*ibid.*:469). Very clearly, the Liberal Party wanted to be seen not only as the protector of small business but also as aware of the fact that legislative dependence in immigration matters for some colonies might lead unintentionally to dependent status for others, especially during times of Britain's expanding trade network which invariably stimulated emigration.

Those who attacked the bill wanted amendments which would clear up the definition of parentage and also provide exceptions for tourism (NZPD, 1899, 110:461). O'Regan (Buller) objected to the whole fuss that was being made about "alien migration" and suggested that there were no "Assyrian Hawkers" in New Zealand, only people from the Island of Cyprus, Mount Lebanon and Egypt who, he admitted, were small businessmen running competitive businesses with their New Zealand counterparts. He further stated that New Zealand should be part of the expanding British Empire, and to be part of it meant to accept all those who were in it (*ibid.*:461), no matter what race or colour. Seddon could certainly accept the notion of Empire but not the masses in it that might flock to New Zealand.

One other interesting observation came from Pirani (Palmerston), who noted that it seemed now that the Council would "swallow almost anything" that Seddon put forward and also that it had been left to the opposition members of the House to bring about the change which provided for the exemption of people of British or Irish parentage or birth (NZPD, 1899, 110:463). After both the House and Council were done with the bill, it went to the Governor, who in turn reserved it "for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure". In May 1900 the Act finally received assent, and on 8th August it was brought into effect.

In 1901, while the larger issue of immigration faded to some degree, the government took the opportunity to tighten up a loophole with the implementation of the Chinese Immigrants' Amendment Act. In that year the Commissioner of Customs apparently discovered that it was possible for Chinese to get into New Zealand as members of a ship's crew. Previously crews were allowed to go ashore, and according to Seddon there was nothing to stop a captain of a vessel bringing a number of Chinese as a crew, paying them small wages and then allowing them to disappear ashore once in New Zealand. The new Act, once in effect, made captains responsible for their crew (NZPD, 1901, 116:361). The master of a ship now had to present a list of all Chinese crew members to the Customs Office upon arrival which would be checked at departure to insure a similar complement. Failure to comply resulted in a fine of £50 (*ibid.*:393).

In the following year the appointment of a representative for the local Chinese community became an issue for the third time in ten years⁵⁷ (see Chapter 6, pp. 294-295). The Petitions Committee who received

the petition passed it on to the government for favourable consideration. From all accounts, the government stalled and did nothing. Duthie (Wellington), aware of the lapse in time, requested the status of the petition (NZPD, 1903, 125:563). At the same time he added his own thoughts that the absence of a representative for the Chinese was the cause of many of their problems, for otherwise, he suggested, they were good citizens and gave liberally to public subscriptions (NZPD, 1903, 125:563).

In the two following years the domestic situation of the Chinese attracted little attention except for the insinuations of Rigg and Moss in Council that the Chinese were now being brought into Wellington by a wealthy syndicate (NZPD, 1904, 128:430). While there was no support for this claim of indentured labour in New Zealand, Seddon had been aware since 1903 of the complicity of the British government, which had agreed to the importation of Chinese coolies as indentured labour into the Rand mines of the Transvaal. Seddon was outraged: not only had Britain engineered New Zealand's immigration legislation to serve the interest of Empire but now they were actively engaged in supporting the lobby of wealthy miners who wanted Chinese labour in a country which had been recently created thanks to the lives of New Zealanders and others that fought there in 1900.

Seddon related his feelings in a personal letter to W. Hutchison Esq. of Johannesburg, saying amongst other things that:

The cause of Empire freedom, and justice is worth struggling for against all odds. To have the Transvaal peopled by the British to give them self government and to have ultimately a federated British South Africa should be the aim and object of all who are well wishers of our country.

(Seddon Papers 1904, Series 2, Item 17)

Seddon went on in the letter to suggest that once they had a Chinese population, Chinese traders and merchants would follow and then they would have '...in Johannesburg a Chinatown with all the attendant horrors equalling in immorality, degradation and debasement of humanity the Chinatown of San Francisco'; however, he never once mentioned the situation in New Zealand (ibid.).

In 1903 and 1904 Seddon tried his best to construct a case against a British policy decision that would act in favour of the Rand Mines. He enlisted support from Canada, Cape Colony, Natal and Australia, but Canada considered interference inadvisable; Cape Colony had already protested, and Natal was opposed to making an objection. This left Australia as the only accomplice, but Deakin, the Prime Minister, suggested that the issue should be discussed only between self-governing colonies without appeal to the Imperial government. He felt that an appeal to the Imperial government over legislation in another colony might set a dangerous precedent. Although Seddon disagreed with Deakin's approach, he chose to take his advice and sent a telegram of protest to the Colonial Secretary of the Transvaal and the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony.

In the telegram, Seddon made three points which are worth noting, since they reflect the historical circumstances surrounding Chinese immigration to New Zealand. He suggested, firstly, that the 'practical prohibition' of Chinese immigration is linked directly to the potential or actual powers of 'responsible self government' (ibid.: telegram to Colonial Secretary, Transvaal, 18 January 1904).⁵⁸ In other words, it would appear that Seddon would define responsible self-government and effective control of immigration as synonymous. Secondly, Seddon suggested that the introduction of Chinese, based on the

New Zealand experience, would lead to 'grave perils, racial, social, political and sanitary' and that no matter what restrictions one imposed regarding their introduction this situation would still prevail. Thirdly, he stated that the introduction of Chinese creates 'vested interests on the part of employers, which render it extremely difficult to terminate practice once it has been sanctioned' (ibid.).

It is clear from Seddon's analysis of the New Zealand situation that the presence of Chinese had resulted in three actual areas of conflict. Their presence had led to a confrontation with Imperial foreign policy as it affected New Zealand immigration law. It further had produced a conflict between the Legislative Council and the House of Representatives, both having a vested interest in particular spheres of the economy. Lastly, it had produced a public conflict which was embellished by 'racial', 'social', and 'sanitary' condemnation of the Chinese. While this is to some degree an accurate assessment, it is hardly a situation that was caused by the Chinese. Nor was the situation met with a total ban on immigration, but, however unintended, it clearly provided the basis of anti-Chinese sentiment. In the months that Seddon was involved with this affair, he received support from various Trades and Labour Councils (Nelson, Auckland, Canterbury, Hawkes Bay and Wellington), branches of the Liberal and Labour Federation of New Zealand (Cook County, Auckland, Mangaweka, Marsden and Wellington), the Amalgamated Engineers (Auckland), the Dunedin Wharf Labourers' Union, the Otago Workers Political Committee, the Seamen's Industrial Association (Dunedin), and two public meetings in Christchurch and Masterton (Seddon Papers 1904, Series 2, Item 17). The majority of the statements justified their support on the grounds of opposition to slavery, to

the deprivation of white and coloured labour and to the self-interested activity of capitalists. Even both houses of the New Zealand Legislature passed a motion that noted with regret 'the introduction of Chinese labour into the Transvaal without the expressed and direct sanction of the government being granted' (AJHR, 1905, A-1). Despite this, however, the efforts were in vain, since by the end of 1904, 20,000 Chinese coolies were already employed in the Rand and, according to Burdon, 'Balfour's government (had) basely surrendered to the importunities of South African plutocrats' (Burdon, 1955:305).

After the Transvaal issue faded, attention was again directed towards the New Zealand context. In the Council, Rigg asked the Attorney General what steps had been taken to prevent Chinese evading poll tax by coming to New Zealand as supposed returning residents. Rigg had received information to the effect that 234 Chinese had arrived in the financial year ending 31 March 1905, 153 of whom were new arrivals and 81 returning, while only 137 had departed from the colony.

The Attorney General informed Rigg that the Collector of Customs was watching the situation carefully and that for each Chinese person departing the Customs Department retained a duplicate certificate which included a set of fingerprints that could be compared with those on the original certificate upon return (NZPD, 1905, 134:397-398). If the Chinese person had left without the certificate, then they were required to pay the poll tax upon returning until such time as they could get a 'reputable European' to testify that they were previous residents of New Zealand (ibid.).

In the House, Moss (Ohinemuri)⁵⁹ took up the issue of Chinese immigration, pressing the Commissioner of Trade and Customs for increased poll tax considering the excess of arrivals over departures for 1904-05. The Commissioner preferred a more historical view, however, and suggested to Moss that departures exceeded arrivals in the period 1899 to 1904, which indicated to him, at least, that the poll tax was adequate (NZPD, 1905, 134:412).⁶⁰ The following week Moss again took Commissioner Mills up on the issue, arguing that the arrivals had exceeded departures in 1903-04 and 1905, but was met with the response that a large proportion of those entering in 1905 were actually returning to New Zealand (NZPD, 1905, 134:617-618). Moss, frustrated by the exchange, added that he would 'do his best to see that fair play was given to the Chinamen now in the country' but that he would not tolerate a 'further invasion' (*ibid.*:618)⁶¹

While there was no legislative action against the Chinese, one Lionel Terry took it upon himself to protest against alien immigration and shot Joe Kim Ling (Yung) in Haining Street, Wellington, on Sunday 23 September 1905. Terry had been in Wellington in 1903 but in the intervening period had been a trade unionist in Canada and South Africa. On the evening of the act, he wrote to both the Governor and the local newspaper stating in the first instance that in order to make a protest against alien immigration he (the writer) deemed it 'desirable to put to death a Chinaman in Haining Street this evening' (*Press*, 26 September 1905), and in the second that:

Having spent several years in various portions of the British Empire, enquiring into the subject and the results arising from alien immigration, and being convinced of the evil consequences arising therefrom, I have decided to bring the matter before the public eye in a manner which will compel the attention it demands. I will not, under any

consideration whatever, allow my rights and those of my brother Britons to be jeopardised by alien invaders, and to make this decision perfectly plain, I have this evening put a Chinaman to death in the Chinese quarter of this city known as Haining Street.

(Signed) Lionel Terry, British Subject.

(ibid.:5)

Terry's victim, Joe Yung had been away from China for forty years, four of which he spent in Victoria. In New Zealand he had spent thirty-three years on the West Coast as a miner and labourer until he had broken his leg tree-felling and had been hospitalised in Grey for six months, after which he was supposed to have returned to China with the benefit of the contributions made by the local Chinese community but after a brief sojourn as a market gardener in Palmerston North had obviously moved to Wellington (ibid.).

Terry, in his trial on 21 November, testified that he had killed a 'race alien...not a man' (Tod, 1977:47). In effect, Terry maintained, British law was for a particular race; Joe Kum Yung was not of that race, therefore he should not be protected by that law, and the act he committed should test this proposition. However, the judge made it clear that the law applied equally to all, and the jury found Terry guilty but asked for mercy. The judge sentenced Terry to hang, but in the interim clemency was granted on the grounds of insanity, and Terry was confined in various institutions for the remainder of his life. While the case commenced in court, others fearing that the law might not be 'applied equally' compiled a petition to appeal the death sentence. It had been circulated directly after the trial, and according to Tod 'thousands' had signed it (Tod, 1977:49).

Towards the end of 1905, the subject of Chinese immigration was raised again in the house by MacKenzie (Waikouaiti), who asked the Premier if, considering the steady influx of Chinese, it would be advisable to increase the poll tax. Seddon replied that the matter was

being watched carefully and that he saw no reason for alarm, since the Chinese population had decreased by 250 in the period from 1899 to 1904 (NZPD, 1905, 134:817).

In 1906 anti-Chinese activity ceased briefly in parliament with the death of Seddon, leader of the Liberals and Premier since 1893. In the same year, Ward assumed the Premiership and inherited the legacy of the Seddon administration and its immigration policy.

By 1907, when New Zealand became a dominion, it was abundantly clear that the entire parliament was agreed in their opposition to further Chinese immigration. In the first Session of 1907, both Davey (Christchurch East) and Poland (Ohinemuri), who moved and seconded the Address in Reply, spoke of the prohibition of Chinese immigration. Davey justified the demand on the basis of news from the Transvaal, where the once desired Chinese labour force was being repatriated as no longer desirable. He further noted, as both Poland and Massey (Leader of the Opposition) would do, that there was a rising tide of anti-Chinese sentiment in New Zealand (NZPD, 1907, 139:22, 26 and 34). Given the above statements, it was safe for Ward to add that '...my firm conviction is that the sentiment of the whole country is against the importation of Chinese into New Zealand ' (NZPD, 1907, 139:42). He also added, however, the point that absolute prohibition would not receive the assent of the Crown and therefore it was the responsibility of the government to introduce legislation that was 'sufficiently restrictive' (ibid.:43).

The anti-Chinese 'sentiment' recognised by members of the House, while evident, was by no means ubiquitous but what there was had been largely encouraged by a rabid and sensational campaign in the press, and in particular Truth. The paper started in 1907 by detailing a court case against two Wellington Chinese accused of having 'carnal knowledge of two European females' (Truth, 12 January 1907).

A week later Truth continued its campaign by reminding the government of its avowed White New Zealand policy and by applauding Lionel Terry for his effort as an 'instrument of a higher being' (Truth, 19 January 1907). In the same article the paper also dealt extensively with miscegenation, which could result at worst in total opium addiction or at best in a higher standard of living than a European marriage but residence in a bad neighbourhood (*ibid.*).⁶²

The next day Truth continued with an article called 'Another Phase of the Chow Curse', which dealt with the supposed unscrupulous activity in the fruit and vegetable business. On the evidence of one customer and a Truth reporter who lived in a hotel behind a Chinese fruit and vegetable shop, the article accused them of keeping disgusting premises and charging excessive amounts for inferior produce (Truth, 20 January 1907). In the one case Truth investigated, they had called in the City Inspector, James Doyle, and he ensured that the shop was cleaned up. However, the paper maintained that the city had done little to ensure that the Chinese shops were carefully watched.

While the campaign was sensational in one sense, it was also subtle. Reading the articles separately gives one the impression of an attack on the Chinese, but read together the attack is actually against European women who in some cases offer themselves to the Chinese, frequent their opium dens and in other cases even marry them and most certainly purchase fruit and vegetables from their shops. The substantiation of this was brought home in two other articles. One documents the case of a Martinborough Chinese shop-keeper who had a sixteen-year old boy working for him, competed unfairly with local European shops, had a Maori 'sleeping partner' and whose shop was constantly frequented by the 'impudent little daughters of local

residents (Truth, 20 January 1907). Of course, the paper did not hesitate to gauge the results if the young women were not kept away from the shop and did so explicitly in the following article, which documented the fate of a young girl in Newtown who was pregnant to a part-Chinese boy and who was forced to marry him (ibid.).

Truth had made a sustained call for what they described as an 'Anti-Chow Society', and by June such organisations were beginning to appear,⁶³ pushing the government to introduce total restriction and the public to stop all transactions with Chinese business.

The first groups formed were in Masterton and Palmerston North. In the first instance we find Mr. J. Cameron, the organiser of the anti-Asiatic movement in Masterton, invited to address a meeting in Wellington on 19 June where Mr. Fisher MHR was in the chair. The evidence from Palmerston North was the Anti-Asiatic League rule-book, which outlined the league's policy and organisation. The League maintained that by Rule 1 and 2 the organisation would pressure the government to increase the poll tax, by Rule 3 they would urge tighter control of Chinese business by including them under the Factory Act, by Rule 4 they would push for the deportation of 'undesirable Asiatics', by Rule 19 they would dissuade their membership from patronising Asiatic business, and finally by Rule 20 they would push for the removal of the "Yellow Peril" from the colony (Anti-Asiatic League, Palmerston North 1907).

In Wellington a civil servant, W.A. Lloyd, resigned his job with the government and formed the "White Race League", which was to pressure the government to increase the poll tax to £500 or £1000, which he thought would break the monopoly the Chinese had over the fruit and vegetable, laundry, opium and gambling businesses in the city (ODT, June 13 and 19, 1907).⁶⁵ The other aim was to force the Chinese to

conform to the 'laws of working and the mode of living' (ibid.). Curiously, part of Lloyd's fervour had been stimulated by his responsibility for Mr. Hwang Hou Cheng, a Chinese commissioner sent by the Chinese government to 'make investigations into the condition of the Chinese residing in various places in those parts of His Britannic Majesty's Dominions before they took steps to appoint Consulate Representatives' (AJHR, 1908, A-2:2), while he was in New Zealand.⁶⁶ The Chinese commissioner had told Lloyd, after visiting the area of Wellington where Chinese lived, that '...they [New Zealand] must not judge the Chinese by the representatives of the race, mostly from the slums of Canton, they saw here...' (NZT, 20 June 1907). He apparently went on to suggest that the only way to stop the Chinese coming to New Zealand, after Lloyd had stated that these were the very people they had to deal with, was to starve them out by not patronising them (ibid.).

Lloyd related his experience at the same meeting called to listen to Mr. J. Cameron from the Anti-Asiatic League in Masterton.⁶⁷ The aim of Cameron's League was to effect legislation that would 'absolutely prohibit' the entry of Asiatics into New Zealand (ibid.). The justification was the monopoly of the fruit trade by the Chinese and the fear of a growth of this monopoly to other trades including laundries. At the request of the meeting, both Ward and Massey provided statements of support. Massey, as leader of the opposition, said that he had asked the Premier to do something about the immigration of Chinese and would go so far as to support a doubling of the poll tax (NZT, 29 June 1907). Ward's contribution was as follows:

...I have consistently, in my place in parliament on the public platform and on every opportunity which favoured my purpose, advocated the most strenuous efforts to maintain the purity of our race: and, consequently the exclusion from our shores of peoples whose admission, in my judgement can only make for the deterioration of the physical moral and well being of our people. I always have used, and am still prepared to use, every means in my power to effect the end I have mentioned, and exclude from New Zealand the immigration of Asiatics. The history of the Victorian cabinet-making industry shows but too plainly how the competition with the Chinese can reduce the competent workman to want. Such a state of things, must, in my opinion, be vigorously resisted, and, if I am satisfied that the competition of the Chinese in this country is bearing unfairly upon the honest competition of the Europeans here, I shall be ready and willing to bring in legislation to remedy such a state of things.

(ibid.)

The challenge had been put and the promise made; it remained only for it to be followed through. Cameron quashed the idea that a general boycott of Chinese business would have the desired effect by arguing that people of the 'poorer class' depend on these outlets for fruit, and Westbrooke, a representative of the Trades and Labour Council, moved a motion "That this meeting declares itself emphatically in favour of a White New Zealand, and urges upon the government the desirability of passing legislation prohibiting the immigration of Chinese and other Asiatics" (NZT, 29 June 1907). While there was unanimous support for this motion in the end, the boycott issue was also pushed, but Westbrooke maintained that evidence from overseas had suggested that the Chinese merely went into other trades when they were excluded from their current ones (ibid.).⁶⁸

While the gist of the publicity and the speeches in the House indicated the decidedly undesirable nature of Chinese immigration, one lone voice, that of Malcolm from Clutha, tried to grapple with what he saw as a rather contradictory situation. His speech sounded very much

like a relic from the Council of the early Seddon administration which often argued, as Malcolm was doing, that China had opium and foreigners foisted upon her and to now prohibit Chinese immigration to New Zealand was unfair. Further, was it not the case that the Chinese were disliked more for their virtues than for their vices? (NZPD, 1907, 139:82). He stated that he had personal knowledge of an unscrupulous European market gardener in Dunedin who complained of Chinese competition to a female customer in order to solicit her business. It was later proved that he in fact bought his vegetables from a local Chinese grower (*ibid.*). Even after this, however, Malcolm, like his colleagues, supported further legislation, and the government eventually specified its intent in the Financial Statement later the same year. It contained a proposal to add 'a higher educational test' to the already existent poll-tax requirement, a move which received unanimous approval (NZPD, 1907, 142:606, 612, 618).

The legislation, the Chinese Immigrants Amendment Bill, was introduced into the House by Ward. Essentially, it specified that no Chinese could enter New Zealand without successfully reading a printed passage of not less than one hundred words in English. If the person was dissatisfied with the test, they had the right of appeal to a magistrate, who could re-administer further tests. A penalty was to be imposed on ship's captains and defaulting Chinese. Ward described the legislation as the only means of satisfying Imperial demands while at the same time maintaining 'purity of our race' (NZPD, 1907, 142:838). The support was fairly general. Davey (Christchurch East) like his colleagues Barker (Newtown) and MacKenzie (Motueka), agreed with the bill but wanted the poll tax raised to £200 to discourage Chinese who he had heard were already learning English in China (*ibid.*).⁶⁹ Fisher (Wellington Central) was particularly supportive, since his electorate

contained the second largest number of Chinese as well as Haining Street, which he described as a 'state of things that should not be allowed to exist'.⁷⁰ He maintained that naturalisation should be discontinued and concluded with an endorsement of Ward's advice to Freemantle, Australia, which he viewed as equally applicable to New Zealand: "Make it White and keep it White" (NZPD, 1907, 142:840).

Gray (Christchurch North) also concurred with the bill but was adamant that people's actions should coincide with the intent of the legislation. If, in Gray's opinion, people did not want the Chinese in New Zealand, then they should not trade with them, and they would be eradicated in six months (*ibid.*:841).

Finally the bill went to Committee, where Malcolm (Clutha) attempted to amend it to exempt Chinese preachers accredited by the Christian churches in New Zealand. The amendment was negated, but only to be rephrased by Ward, who suggested that Chinese ministers would be exempt if the Colonial Secretary was satisfied with their legitimacy (NZPD, 1907, 142:843).⁷¹

After a brief return to the House, the bill again went to Committee, where Heke (Northern Maori) proposed an even stronger bill that would prohibit the Chinese from landing in New Zealand (NZPD, 1907, 142:844). Undeterred by defeat of this, he went on to propose that the government should '...expel all persons of the Chinese race now living in New Zealand' which, in his opinion, would '...cleanse the pakeha community of the immorality brought about by the Chinese owing to their contact with the pakeha people' (*ibid.*:844).⁷² The Speaker, however, ruled the clause out of order, and the bill was finally reported.

In November the bill went to the Council, where it was received with little question and only one opponent. Questions largely related to the date of implementation and the publication of the bill in relevant areas of China. The major opponent was Trask, who not only argued for a twelve-month postponement of the bill coming into operation but also that it was '...unfair, unpolitic and...detrimental to New Zealand in the eyes of the Chinese people' (NZPD, 1907, 142:963). As far as Trask was concerned, the legislation would only initiate counter legislation which would affect British interests, and they in turn would impose pressure on New Zealand to change its stance (*ibid.*:963-964). Despite Trask's prophetic words, the bill had its final reading and was sent to Britain for the assent of the Crown, but not without protest. The Chinese community of New Zealand sent an extensive petition⁷³ requesting that His Majesty not give the bill his assent. The government got their assent, however, and the Chinese community received a reply, which stated that '...the question of the immigration of aliens into the Dominion is one which must be determined according to the will of Parliament and people of New Zealand' (AJHR, 1909,A-2:7). However, the reply also suggested firmly that '...His Majesty's government have every confidence that the government and Parliament of New Zealand will afford all just relief to Chinese residents who are domiciled in New Zealand and who may have occasion to pay temporary visits abroad' (*ibid.*).

Trask was partially right, but it was not to be Britain who brought pressure to bear on New Zealand: it was China. In early 1907 the Colonial Office received a note by way of the Foreign Office from a Chinese minister regarding the appointment of Chinese Consular Officers in Australia and New Zealand. It was clear that Mr. Hwang's report (see page 228), indicating the concerns of the New Zealand and Australian

Chinese and the trade potential of the South Pacific, had produced positive results. The decision of the Chinese government was to appoint a Consul-General to Melbourne, one Consul in Wellington and a Vice-Consul each for Freemantle, Sydney and Brisbane (AJHR, 1908, A-2:2). Both New Zealand and Australia were informed, and neither government expressed opposition to the appointments. Some leading Chinese in New Zealand, however, were obviously dubious about a Peking appointment to Wellington and made it clear to the High Commissioner for New Zealand that one Henry J. Marriner of Christchurch would be suitable for the post (NA, IA 08/211 17 December, 1907). The High Commissioner passed the request on to the Chinese Foreign Office and was duly informed that only Chinese officials and merchants were eligible for diplomatic and consular appointments (*ibid.*).

The following year the Colonial Secretary was notified by the Chinese legation that Mr. Liang Lan Hsu would be appointed as Consul-General in Melbourne and Mr. Hwang Yung Lian, an American-educated Chinese who could speak English, would be appointed as Consul in Wellington (*ibid.*, 26 May 1908). In the same year, the Immigration Restriction Amendment Bill⁷⁴ was put forward by the Minister of Customs, Mr. Millar. The source of the initiative for the amendment, as revealed by Dr. Findlay later in Council, was diplomatic representations to the Minister of Marine (NZPD, 1908, 145:786). The proposed bill was to remedy the situation for returning Chinese residents, who were being subjected to a reading test, but it still required residents to register their name and thumb print before departure (NZPD, 1908, 145:722).⁷⁵ The bill was to come into effect on 1 January 1909, after which date overseas residents could return freely as long as they satisfied the Collector of Customs as to their identity. In future they would be able to stay away for up to four years and still re-enter as long as they fulfilled the requirements of the Act (*ibid.*)⁷⁶

The bill received little attention except in the House, where Heke insisted that if 'they' really desired to stop the Chinese they should prohibit them totally (ibid.).

While the House and Council had been liberal in their approach to the Immigration Restriction Amendment Bill, the Cabinet met with the opposite intent. In 1908 the Minister of Internal Affairs decided not to naturalise any more Chinese in New Zealand and presented this proposition to the Cabinet. Accordingly, the Cabinet decided on 4 February, 1908 to decline any further rights of naturalisation to the Chinese (NA, IA 116/7, 24 June 1946).⁷⁷

In 1909 the 1907 Act came under further scrutiny, but this time it was from the Chinese Legation in London by way of the Wai-wu Pu in Peking. The approach was in the form of a note to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from the Chinese Minister Li Ching Fong.⁷⁸ It showed clearly that the Chinese government were aware of the 1907 legislation and further that they considered the restrictions imposed 'oppressive and undiscriminating' (AJHR, 1910, A-2:44-45) and 'derogatory to their [the Chinese] dignity and respect' (ibid.). The note continued:

As New Zealand is within easy distance of China, and has made great progress within the last generation in the development of various industries, and also in her economical conditions, it would be to the advantage of both countries if facilities were afforded to Chinese subjects to visit the Dominion not only for the purpose of encouraging trade, but also for intellectual studies.

(ibid.)

The Chinese Minister further suggested that they had given this matter considerable attention and had enclosed a set of modifications for the existing immigration rules (see Appendix X for full proposal).

Essentially, it required that Chinese merchants, students and officials

be accorded the same treaty rights as they had with Britain; that Chinese residents in New Zealand for more than three years should be allowed to bring their wives and families to New Zealand and at least should be allowed to depart for temporary trips without having to leave a thumb print; that Chinese passing the language test be permitted to land exempt from poll tax; and finally, that neither Chinese passing through New Zealand nor those who could pass the entry language test should be subjected to poll tax (AJHR, 1910, A-2:45).

The following year Ward responded, agreeing to the first and the fifth of the modifications (C.O.209, 27 February 1909), and the House was presented with another Immigration Restriction Amendment Bill. Besides satisfying some of the Chinese government's demands, it also remedied the problems arising from the use of only a single language test which by 1910 was deemed to be well rehearsed by new immigrants.

Foulds introduced the bill, as Minister of Customs, stating that New Zealand was the only country in the British Empire that made it impossible for students, tourists and merchants to arrive without the imposition of poll tax or some other kind of restriction (NZPD, 1910, 151:401). The proposed bill, according to Foulds, would remedy this as well as making it possible for Chinese in transit to proceed without being subject to restrictions in New Zealand and for New Zealand residents who went insane on departing from New Zealand to be returned at New Zealand's expense (ibid.:402).

Massey, as Leader of the Opposition, was in favour of the bill and added little except his approval for the representative of the Chinese Empire who was then in New Zealand (NZPD, 1910, 151:402). Ward affirmed his support for a white New Zealand and stated that this legislation brought New Zealand into line with Australia, Canada and America (ibid.).⁷⁹

Malcolm (Clutha), more reflective in his approach, saw the legislation as initiating new relationships, not as merely keeping up with other countries. He maintained that, while China had been legitimately ignored as a power previously, this was no longer justified or satisfactory. Now, as the Chinese had themselves already pointed out, China should be accorded the rights and privileges of other European powers that dealt with New Zealand (NZPD, 1910, 151:405). He maintained that future legislation should be made in consultation with the Chinese. Foulds replied curtly that this legislation had emerged from just such consultation (ibid.).

In Council the bill was introduced by Findlay without mention of the Chinese. He remarked, however, that certain 'Orientals' had mastered the language test, and to avoid this several forms of the test would be used in future (NZPD, 1910, 152:258). When questions were asked, it was only in terms of the Chinese finding loopholes in the provisions or that various aspects might be difficult to enforce; otherwise the bill passed with little discussion. In its final form it allowed Chinese merchants and tourists to come to New Zealand and stay for up to six months provided they had a bona fide passport and placed a £10 bond with the Collector of Customs. If they had no passport, the bond was increased to £100 (New Zealand Gazette, 1911, 22:1047). Under the Act, students could remain for up to six years, and all categories included could appeal for an extension. If the immigrant was prohibited, then they could stay only twenty-one days provided they deposited a bond of £200.⁸⁰

Despite the four preceeding years of legislative activity, the desired effect was not attained until 1909, for in both 1907 and 1908 arrivals still outnumbered departures (see Appendix II) by 363 persons.

This was due presumably to a large number of residents returning to New Zealand before the imposition of the increased restrictions. Although Chinese immigrants continued to arrive through the war years, it was not until 1915 that arrivals again outnumbered departures in any single year. In the entire period from 1907 to the end of the war, there was in fact a net gain in Chinese migration, contrary to O'Connor's contention that the legislation had provided an effective bar (O'Connor, 1968:459). While it would be possible to argue that many of these were returning residents and therefore do not constitute a new migration, it must also be acknowledged that an increasing number were Chinese women. In the period from 1906 to 1921 the number of Chinese women in New Zealand had increased from fifty five to 273. Generally, explanations for this persistence in migration usually blamed the return of Pacific shipping to normal after the war and the ability of the Chinese to master the language test (see ODT, 9 April 1920). While these reasons are significant, there is no mention of a more important variable, namely, the changing events in China.

From at least 1907, revolutionary activity in southern China was becoming more intense, although thwarted by many failures. Then, with the Wuchang plot on 10 October 1911, a potential failure because of discovery, came the sudden end of the Manchu regime as provinces of Central, Southern and Northwestern China proclaimed their independence.

These events had important consequences for the overseas Chinese population. Clearly, intellectual ideas about reform in both political and economic spheres had made a steady impact on segments of the Chinese society, and these ideas became more and more focused on revolutionary change and through a set of circumstances found a leader who was himself an overseas Chinese. While Sun Yat Sen was proclaimed President of the Republic on 24 December 1911, this merely heralded the beginning of three

decades of turmoil for China which affected both the private and public lives of all overseas Chinese.

Many Chinese were faced with the dilemma of deciding between repatriation or continued residence overseas. The situation in their homeland, and particularly in their home counties and villages, was of immediate concern. Trying to get information about this became a preoccupation alongside a continued concern for their economic welfare overseas in the face of public protest and hostility. Increased poll tax and a changing occupational structure which demanded more capital input and a predictable labour force led to a form of stability in New Zealand which had to be weighed against the attempts to increase status for the family in the home village. Once chances of status and wealth in China became precarious, there was little alternative but to transfer the same desires to the New Zealand context, albeit to a situation that was less than receptive.

In 1911 the Imperial government in China fell, and the two decade hegemony of the Liberal Party in New Zealand faltered. The Liberals had tried to hang on, but in a few months Massey and the Reform Party finally succeeded in forming the government. By 1914 this new party had consolidated its position with strong support from urban and rural employers (Lipson, 1948:221).

The strength of the urban Reform supporters and their firm opposition to the Chinese was equal to that of former Liberal supporters, as evidenced by a confrontation that developed in Christchurch in 1912. Seventeen years previously Christchurch had been the scene of anti-Chinese feeling and an Anti-Chinese League, and in 1912 the events were much the same with one unfortunate addition. In the first year of the war two Chinese fruit shops opened 'with attractive window dressing and very reasonable prices' which attracted customers and protests staged by

European hawkers (LT, 26 February 1912).⁸¹ Within three days of the first confrontation, the Chinese Consul, Hwang Yung Lian, wrote to the Chinese mayor (J.J. Dougal) drawing his attention to the disturbances (LT, 29 February 1912).⁸² The Consul asked the mayor to:

...be kind enough to see your way to exercise such a favourable influence as to contribute to preventing a recurrence of such unlawful and arbitrary procedure against my countrymen. I would indeed feel deeply gratified if you could use your kindly offices to calm the passions of these unreasonable men, so that justice may be accorded to the subjects of a friendly nation, who at all times endeavour to live peacefully with their European brethren.

(ibid.)-

The mayor contacted the police, but his efforts, like those of the Consul, made little impression on a public unconcerned with diplomacy or war allies. A week later the news spread that a Chinese fruit and vegetable shop was to open in the Christchurch suburb of Sydenham, and the local burgesses' association met in earnest opposition (LT, 13 March 1912). Supported by the local fruiterers who had met the previous evening, the burgesses' association agreed on a boycott of Chinese shops to break the 'fruit ring' (ibid.). Compared to the invective of the meeting, which at one point suggested that Lionel Terry should be let loose and at another that the government should raise the poll tax to £1000, the motion was civil, recommending that the meeting: 'suggest to the citizens of Christchurch the advisability of buying their fruit and other goods from Europeans and of confining their patronage to white tradespeople' (LT, 13 March 1912).⁸³

The correspondence in the local press on the issue of the Chinese was extensive and was by no means totally opposed to the presence of the Chinese. Some suggested that the Chinese charged low prices 'a blessing in disguise' (see LT, 18 and 28 March 1912). The Canterbury Trades and Labour Council meeting had nothing to say on the issue (LT, 18 March 1912), but the South Christchurch branch of the Labour Party

approved a remit for the annual conference urging a total ban on Chinese immigration and a 'White New Zealand' (Press, 16 March 1912).

By the end of March an Anti-Chinese League had been organised at a meeting of fifty or sixty 'workers, grocers, tobacconists, cabinet-makers, fruiterers, launderers and general public' (Press, 28 March 1912). The meeting also passed a motion condemning the action of those who rented premises or businesses to the Chinese, but not before it was argued that Chinese fruiterers were needed until such time as a municipal market was provided where 'poorer people could get cheap commodities' (LT, 29 March 1912). While matters simmered through most of April, towards the latter part rumours spread from Dunedin and Wellington that a Chinese furniture factory was to start in Christchurch (ODT, 27 April 1912, Press, 6 May 1912). Almost immediately the whole machinery of opposition moved into action, and articles in the local press debated the implications of Chinese competition in the business. The Anti-Chinese League started a hunt for the factory (Press, 13 May 1912) even though the Inspector of Factories stated categorically that no such factory was present in Christchurch and the Trades and Labour Council voted in favour of a total ban on Chinese immigration (see LT, 9 May and 10 May 1912). Tired of the verbal attack by certain members of the Anti-Chinese League who had amongst other things accused the Chinese of being the 'scum of Asia', two local Chinese men responded with their own attack (LT, 16 May 1912). Mr. Chew Lee and Mr. W. Tim denied the story of the furniture factory, maintaining that it was absurd to think that the local Chinese had either enough capital to invest in such a venture or were, in effect, stupid enough to enter such a competitive business (ibid.). As to the accusation of being 'the scum of Asia', Mr. Tim suggested that Mr. Cameron and Mr. Willis who had made the statement should come into their shop and repeat the statement and prove it or

'...I (Mr. Tim) will put him where he will have an opportunity to clear his brains (LT, 24 May 1912).

Following the end of the war and the repatriation of New Zealand veterans, the issue of Asiatic immigration was again resurrected. This time the protest was initiated in Auckland,⁸⁴ where the local branch of the Returned Serviceman's Association met to draft a political programme which would be submitted to the annual meeting of the RSA later in the year. One of the remits said simply, 'That the principles of a White New Zealand be affirmed' (Quick March, 1919, Vol. II, No. 13:11).⁸⁵ By doing this the Auckland branch intended to initiate national political action by the RSA, but the remit was rejected as an addition to the constitution at the annual meeting, and the RSA remained essentially non-political (QM, 1919, Vol. II, No. 14:33).

While the situation fermented in Auckland the government, according to O'Connor, remained largely oblivious, more concerned with the Undesirable Immigration Exclusion Act which was expressly developed to protect New Zealand from Germans, Australians and Hungarians who might be socialists or Marxists (O'Connor 1968:52). By this Act the Attorney General was given the power to prohibit the landing of 'disaffected persons and to deport persons likely to prejudice the peace, order and good government of the country' (Scholefield and Hall, 1937:275).⁸⁶ As Ponton notes: '...for the first time the principles of rigid immigration restriction received almost universal sanction, even though the price was high - arbitrary power which could be used unfairly (Ponton, 1946:44).

The trends set in motion by government and the opponents of Asiatic immigration in 1919 persisted in 1920. At a March meeting of the RSA in Timaru the Chairman was quoted as having brought to the attention of the members the unfair competition that a recently arrived

Chinese fruit shop was giving to three returned soldiers.⁸⁷ The complaint was laid against all those who supported Chinese business which undercut any attempts by those who fought for New Zealand to establish themselves (QM, 11 March 1920). The chairman also accused the Labour Department of complicity with the Chinese, who were allowed, according to some at the meeting, to contravene rules about hours of business (ibid.).⁸⁸

By April, after a concerted campaign by the local RSA entitled 'Support Local Industry by Purchasing from a Retired Soldier' (Timaru Herald, 16, 17, 19 April 1920), some of the community took matters into their own hands. On 19 April, a group of 'young fellows' wrecked a local Chinese fruit and vegetable shop and forced it to close (Timaru Herald, 19 April 1920). Even after the shop closed the produce outside was destroyed and the windows smashed. The police intervened, but the crowd only moved on to two other Chinese shops, and it was not till later the same evening that they were finally dispersed (ibid.). The general aim of the protest was to get the Chinese out of Timaru and ensure that legal and institutional means were taken to stop Asiatic immigration, according to the paper. Another article in the same issue referred to the raid as 'A Discreditable Demonstration' and suggested it was not the fault of the Chinese that they were here but the fault of laws made by government which had allowed them to come (ibid.). It maintained that the young men involved had no idea of the seriousness of their action and that the Chinese had the right to live in peace (ibid.).⁸⁹

Nine days after these events, the Auckland Watersiders met and unanimously decided that Indian and Chinese immigration must halt on the grounds that:

1. The influx of Asiatics to this country can only have one ending - the lowering of the standard of living of the workers.
2. The fusion of the Asiatics and whites will produce a piebald population.
3. Their presence will lead to unfair competition in all trades and callings.
4. If immigration is permitted by all means give preference to England, Ireland or Scotland, and;
5. We condemn the Government for its failure to cope with this serious menace and favour a white not piebald New Zealand.

(Auckland Star, 28 April 1920)

A month later the Watersiders informed the Advisory Board of the Transport Workers Federation that they would discontinue work on vessels carrying Indians and Chinese. The justification was the continued growth of Chinese and Indian involvement in the fruit and vegetable industry (ibid, 2 June 1920).

Following this event a local Auckland orchardist wrote to the paper complaining of Chinese middlemen buying apples for 9d. a dozen and selling them for 2/- a dozen, and it was reported that the local Customs Department had caught three Chinese leaving for Australia with currency in excess of the £5 allowed (Auckland Star, 1, 3 June 1920).

In July the mounting opposition finally filtered through to the government, and Poland (Ohinemuir) asked the Prime Minister in the House what steps he was taking to satisfy the complaints of both the RSA and the Farmers Union (NZPD, 1920, 186:18). Massey responded that legislation was already being drafted (ibid.). The Auckland RSA that had initiated Poland's request in the House had received complaints from an Auckland trade union and a returned serviceman who was a fruit and vegetable supplier. The former told the RSA that some

Chinese in Auckland had started manufacturing furniture, and the latter complained that a Chinese supplier had successfully got the tender for supply of fruit and vegetables to the Rotorua Military Hospital (QM, 19 July 1920). In Dunedin the RSA branch had been asked by local fruiterers to help protest Chinese competition that was apparently starting at the time (ibid.).

The case of the Rotorua Military Hospital was taken up with the Minister of Defence, the Hon. J.G. Coates. Coates replied that the RSA had been in error, since the Department of Defence was not giving 'preference' to the Chinese but merely accepting a favourable tender which was in the public's interest since it was public money being spent. He concluded:

All money being equal the Department would naturally prefer to deal with reputable firms, such as Messrs Johnson and Cooper, in preference to Chinese merchants (Sing Key Chong), but in making contracts there could be no question of giving preferential treatment to any particular firm.

(QM, 10 August 1920)⁹¹

The RSA was dissatisfied with the reply and went directly to Surgeon General McGavin to lay their claim that there could be no such thing as equality in this kind of arrangement. The Chinese cost of living and pay rates were too low to make equality justification for refusing the contract. While there was no immediate success, the Auckland RSA was satisfied with McGavin's response (QM, 10 August 1920).

Shortly after this, the Immigration Restriction Amendment Bill was presented to the House, and in September it received its second reading.⁹² In the interim the Chinese Consul, reading of the Bill in the local newspaper, after specifically requesting notification from the Prime Minister should such a bill eventuate, reacted strongly, writing the following to Massey:⁹³

So far as the Bill itself it concerned, I am quite unable to understand how the Government of this Dominion can offer such a studied insult to every foreign nation.

To make entry into this Dominion subject to the whim of an official is a strange element to present to the community of nations, while the proposal that the Governor General may by order in Council declare "that the provisions of this Part of this Act shall not apply to nations or peoples specified in "such Order in Council" will no doubt be appreciated very highly by such countries as Japan, France, or the United States of America should they be selected for preferential treatment.

The Bill, however, appears to me to be specifically designed to enable the Government of this Dominion by a stroke of the pen, to exclude Chinese absolutely.

This being the case, I cannot appreciate the empty compliment in the proposed abolition of the thumb-prints, and I am surprised that the iniquitous poll tax was not coupled with the thumb-prints. As the Bill now introduced into Parliament means total exclusion of Chinese into this country, what is the reason of retaining the inhuman poll tax about which I have made more serious complaint than the thumb-prints.

If your Government had any regard for the treaty between His Majesty the King of England and the late Emperor Kwang Hau, which treaty is still in existence, having been ratified and confirmed by the Governments of our respective countries, such an insult as this Bill would never have been offered.

In order that it may not escape your memory, I again quote the clause which is as follows:-

"It is agreed that subjects of the two powers shall each within the territories of the other enjoy all the privileges, immunities and advantages that may have been, or may hereafter be accorded to the subjection of any other nation".

To profess to put all nations on the same level, and at the same time to retain the right to give any particular nation or nations preference over others without saving treaty obligations is a distinct violation of the treaty to which I have referred.

In order to show that the Chinese Government is not unmindful of the domestic prejudices of the people of New Zealand, I now state briefly the conditions to which I am authorised to assent.

1. Every Chinese proposing to land in New Zealand should be provided with a passport and a certificate of good character, and in the case of temporary visitors of sufficient means to enable their return home.

2. That the number of people of the labouring class to be allowed to land should be subject to reasonable limitations. I myself suggested to you not more than 300 per annum.
3. That accredited Chinese should be allowed to bring wives and family of tender years with them.
4. Abolition of all such degrading and barbarous conditions such as poll tax, thumb-prints, etc.

I hope that your better judgement will yet prevail and that the Dominion of New Zealand will not distinguish itself by throwing a treaty to the winds.

(MS 985/1/44, 12 August 1920) ⁹⁴

Massey ignored the Consul's words when presenting the bill in the House. He justified it stating that in six months prior to June 1919, 476 Chinese had entered paying the poll tax, and 174 Indians, 18,774 people from Britain and 829 from other countries had also arrived (NZPD, 1920, 187:905). The bill being presented, he argued, "...is the result of a deep-seated sentiment on the part of a huge majority of the people of this country that this Dominion should be what is called a "white" New Zealand and that the people who come here should as far as it is possible for us to provide for it be of the same way of thinking from the British Empire point of view..." (*ibid.*). He went on to maintain that the legislation proposed intended no injustice to people who were already in New Zealand or who would come later, but he affirmed New Zealand's right to approve of those who came (*ibid.*).⁹⁵

The bill before them required any person not of British or Irish birth to get a permit from the Minister of Customs before entering New Zealand (*ibid.*).

In effect, it replaced the education test and fingerprinting exercise provided for under previous legislation without, however, removing the poll tax requirement on the Chinese. The legislation also

specified as the Council had pointed out, that the Governor General by Order in Council could declare the provisions of the bill inapplicable for any specific case if warranted, which removed the necessity for further immigration legislation in the future. The debate in the House was interesting, for now the wartime coalition had broken up, and a three-party system emerged, with Reform premiers governing, a fading Liberal Party surviving (until 1928) and a growing Labour Party with eight newly elected members under Holland. Now it was the Reform Party who, representing the wealthy new farmers created by the land legislation of the Liberals, wanted absolute prohibition of certain immigrants on the basis of a 'white New Zealand' policy. Labour argued for a more moderate means of exclusion while at the same time presenting the image of a consolidated labour force including both Chinese and Indians resident in New Zealand.

Sidey (Dunedin South) asked why birth and parentage conferred by naturalisation were not accepted and further why it was that aboriginal inhabitants did not count as of British parentage or birth, for under the bill, Maoris leaving New Zealand would be required to get a permit to return. Massey merely pushed the issue aside, retorting that for the purpose of the bill, "The Maori is a European..." (NZPD, 1920, 187:907-908). Massey ignored several other questions asked, and it remained for Downie Stewart (Dunedin West), a person with some sympathy for the plight of the Chinese to redirect the debate. Downie Stewart had also been in communication with the Chinese Consul, Lin Shih-yuan prior to the presentation of the bill to the House and had received first hand the Chinese government's feelings about the legislation imposed on the Chinese in New Zealand. The Consul had initially considered a circular letter to all members of Parliament

stating his case but had according to a letter to Downie Stewart reconsidered the tactic fearing that Massey would use it against the Chinese community (MS 985/1/44:10 August 1920). Lin Shih-yuan did, however, write a lengthy statement to W.B. Matheson (which was also sent to Downie Stewart). He described the movers of the Bill in the following:

(They)...are actuated solely by personal interests, and they are parochial, and cannot see beyond the end of their own noses. If their clamorous voices are allowed to produce echos without being checked, narrow minded prejudice will mould public opinion and the government, possibly seeking votes for future elections will be led in the direction of mischief.

(MS 985/1/44:1 June 1920)

He went on to argue against New Zealand's parochial stance stating China had now 'awoke' and would be directing her attention to development of all her resources which would necessitate trade with countries like Britain and New Zealand. Furthermore, he reiterated article XVIII of the Convention between Great Britain and China of 1894 included in his letter of Massey (see page 245) and then proceeded to list the privileges, immunities and advantages bestowed on the Chinese in New Zealand:

1. Thumb-prints are used in China in the identification of criminals, and, consequently, is a very cruel and unjust thing to apply it to the Chinese who are free from guilt and who are the subjects of one ally of the intents of the late war.
2. The heavy capitation tax imposed on our Chinese is tantamount to suggest that they are not considered as human beings, but only as animals or goods. Well, they are human beings, and those who treat human beings as animals are not humane. The design of such a tax recoils from the victim on to the imposer.

3. The literature test is the most unfair of all. Before they are allowed to land, the Chinese immigrants are called upon to pass the test. The white man is asked simply to read his own language, but a Chinese is required to read 100 words of a language foreign to him. These 100 words are selected by a customs officer, and the reading must satisfy him, and he has great power in this respect. Now those Chinese who have bad luck and fail in the examination, unless appealed to the magistrate at once, must, according to the law, be deported immediately by the boat in which they came, and find their way back to their native land without even a brief stop after a long and fatiguing trip on the ocean. Moreover, those poor creatures may be children or wives of wealthy Chinese merchants here who came to join parents or husbands; nevertheless, failure of the test results in a perpetuation of the separation of the family. Fortunately, the present Customs Controller, Mr. W.D. Montgomery shows great consideration, and in special circumstances will allow a few weeks' respite. If humanity means anything, such a state or condition should not be allowed to exist any longer. So, for the sake of humanity, I appeal to the conscience of the New Zealand people, and ask, if the positions were reversed, would they tolerate it?

I venture to say that the way that New Zealand treats the Chinese is worst among all the white states.

(MS 985/1/44:1 June 1920:3)⁹⁶

While sympathetic to his own people in New Zealand the Consul was by no means totally supportive describing them as 'small farmers and rustics' unlike the 'millions of Chinese of high intellectual attainments who are found among officials, students and merchants' (*ibid.*:4). He was not in favour of Chinese labourers coming to New Zealand - although he would accept the notion of a quota - being much more supportive of the American system of allowing the entry of Chinese merchants, their wives and children. Downie Stewart's presentation in fact followed the Consul's argument closely. He essentially approved of the bill but maintained that it was likely to exclude people like the French and Americans, which he felt was

unnecessary (NZPD, 1920, 187:910). Stewart went on to argue that there was no need for the poll tax to be retained. It had, he maintained, never been entirely satisfactory, merely leading to syndicates being formed to provide passage money for the 'coolie class'. Desirable Chinese immigrants like merchants and tourists would not submit themselves to the indignity of the poll tax, according to Stewart, and furthermore the Chinese Consul had singled this out as the worst aspect of New Zealand's immigration legislation (ibid.)⁹⁷ Stewart wanted the poll tax abolished and a quota system for Chinese immigration established,⁹⁸ which would change the class origins of immigrants and presumably defuse the arguments of organised labour and their party.

Holland (Buller), leader of the Labour members, followed Stewart but maintained that he supported the bill primarily so that the standard of living in New Zealand would be preserved (NZPD, 1920, 187:913). He agreed with Stewart's statement on the poll tax and also with the notion of continued immigration of the Chinese provided through a quota system. He saw the means of changing the class of origin as already existent in the education test which he argued should be an education test at the Sixth Standard Level in English and Mathematics. It should, he maintained, provide the means to select immigrants rather than a means of prohibiting all immigrants (NZPD, 1920, 187:913). While he was strongly against the idea of introducing a competitive labour force, he did, however, mention that while he was editor of the Maoriland Worker a number of Indians had joined local unions and shown themselves to be quite capable (ibid.:913).

Holland's concluding comments represented an attack on the government. He stated categorically that it was clear the government intended to use Cabinet decisions (Orders in Council) from now on to manipulate the contents of the bill and further that he viewed the discretionary powers given to the Minister of Customs as excessive (ibid.:914-915).

Once the two positions had been made clear, other members added their bit in accordance. McNicol (Pahiatua) supported Stewart, but he also noted that he had seen "a new class of Chinese" - one well dressed commercial traveller travelling by train - which he described as a 'class of parasites' and hardly preferable to the Chinese market gardener who grew vegetables and contributed to the health of New Zealanders (ibid.:919). Savage (Auckland) supported Holland, arguing for government-to-government negotiation and also noting that local Chinese and Indians he knew were in favour of limiting the numbers of their fellow countrymen. Stratham (Dunedin Central) decried the Cabinet's new powers and noted that if one did not have provisions to vet the applications in the country of origin then there was little point in having such a system, and Hanan (Invercargill) thought it was pointless to negotiate with governments and that it was certain that Indian trade unionists would not last (NZPD, 1920, 187:922 and 929).

Generally, the five hours of debate were rational and polite except for a brief heated exchange between McCombs (Lyttelton) and Hanan (Invercargill) about Labour's inconsistency in policy towards immigration. In committee Holland attempted to get the education and quota requirement included as well as a provision to stop Cabinet seeking exemptions to the bill in order to provide a source of cheap labour should the demand arise (NZPD, 1920, 187:1019-1020). His

attempts failed and the only changes made were those from the government side. One in particular related to the Maori, who would now under an amendment be excluded from any provision in the act (ibid.:930). The Hon. Mr. Ngata (Eastern Maori), who had requested this change, also made a brief statement sympathising with the British, whom he described as not the 'highest' but the '...best civilisation that has so far appeared on the face of this globe...' (ibid.:931). After the flattery, however, he said quite bluntly that he could not understand why the New Zealand government and people, who obviously did not want Chinese in New Zealand, could not tell the Chinese people directly that they did not want them to come here (ibid.:931). Also, he could not understand why there was pretence of negotiating with China when New Zealand had no diplomatic basis for this except for indirect negotiation through the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Finally, he found it hard to see how the Minister of Customs could evaluate anybody's eligibility on the basis of an application which said nothing (ibid.:931).

Aside from the debate the bill received no major hinderance in the House and proceeded to the Council in September, where it was introduced by Sir Francis Bell, Attorney General. Bell, in a careful fashion, approached the bill by essentially laying out all the areas which might generate discussion and then defining these areas as irrelevant. In this way, the poll tax and the fingerprinting requirement were removed as issues and Bell verified that the education test was not meant as an education test in the first place but as a deterrent, and all that was important in terms of the bill before them was the application for a permit to enter New Zealand. The bill passed the Council with little discussion, and it became an Act on 1 January 1921. The Act provided that all persons not of British birth or

parentage must obtain a permit to enter New Zealand unless Orders in Council had been passed to exempt certain nations or peoples, or on the other hand the Minister of Customs could use his discretion to exempt certain persons or classes of persons from the provisions of the Act.⁹⁹ Temporary permits were to be granted to bona fide visitors.

The Chinese government disliked the bill and sent a telegram to the Consul Lin Shih-yuan especially opposing the retention of the poll tax. Lin passed on the substance of the telegram to Massey in a letter where he stated that in his government's opinion the poll tax was to obviously remain '...as an indication of the mercantile value placed by New Zealand upon intercourse between that country [New Zealand] and China' (MS 985/1/44, 27 August 1920). The Consul appealed to Massey to think about the international situation and future alliances and reconsider erradicating the poll tax and making immigration arrangements the prerogative of government to government negotiations and not that of the 'arbitrary decision of an official' (*ibid.*).

During 1920 while the bill went through Parliament, 1029 Chinese arrived in New Zealand, and the RSA continued to watch the situation with alarm. The South Taranaki Branch passed an unanimous resolution calling for increased restrictions (QM, 10 September 1920). The Auckland Branch tried to pass a resolution prohibiting the immigration of Chinese into New Zealand and Samoa (*ibid.*: 11 October 1920), and Wellington, in alarmist fashion, passed a series of resolutions calling for a halt to the 'invasion' and the repatriation of all Chinese who had arrived since 1914 (*ibid.*: 11 October 1920). In December the national executive of the NZRSA met in Wellington, discussed the recently passed bill and then went on to discuss means of stopping the rapid influx of Chinese. Curiously the suggestion put

forward by the General Secretary was one that endorsed a quota system where the Chinese would not exceed 5% of the population (ibid.: 10 December 1920). The suggestion was short-lived, however, when Mr. Long from Auckland made it clear that the RSA had 'made a name for itself in connection with the Asiatic Question and had taken the lead in educating the public on the question', so if the current legislation failed they must push for absolute exclusion (ibid.:40).

In October 1920 the new bill was sent to London with a memorandum by the Governor, Lord Jellicoe, stating his confidence in the legislation, but in a separate telegram he aired his feelings that the government in New Zealand would resent any interference in this bill because of its priority (O'Connor 1968:63). Jellicoe added also the comment that if any amendments were required he was sure they could be done in the next session (ibid.).

According to O'Connor, the Colonial Office disliked the bill, partially because it violated the Natal arrangements and mainly because it now meant that the New Zealand government could amend the legislation by Order in Council, in the absence of London's scrutiny. Their response, therefore, was to ask that they be notified of any changes or exemptions before they were actioned, thereby removing the chance that New Zealand might exclude some nations and exempt others which could upset Imperial agreements (ibid.).

In January 1921 the bill was finally gazetted, but not before Jellicoe had insisted on the removal of some inconsistencies.¹⁰⁰

In 1921, therefore, after more than half a century of nearly continuous argument over the issue of Asiatic immigration, the matter had been resolved. The legislation had now removed the matter from the arena of public and parliamentary debate and lodged policy decision with Cabinet and implementation with the Minister of Customs and later the Minister of Immigration.

From 1921 onwards Hansard contains little if any mention of the issue, with the exception of 1923 when Downie-Stewart, Minister of Customs, was asked to evaluate the effectiveness of the legislation. He argued that it had the required effect since in the eighteen months prior to the Act 1,234 Chinese had entered while in the eighteen months after the Act only 166 Chinese had arrived (NZPD, 1923, 201:152).

While one would suspect that the whole tenor of Asiatic immigration restriction had been inexorably directed towards total prohibition and that the 1920 Act was the culmination of this effort, the facts speak to the contrary. In 1921, despite an unappeased Auckland population witnessing a doubling of the Chinese population in their province, the Cabinet approved a quota of 100 Chinese a year (Ponton, 1946:68). In the period from 1922 to 1926, when the quota policy was in effect, 390 permits were issued and 397 Chinese arrived (Ponton, 1946:89).¹⁰¹

While it appears that Ponton's figures coincide with some figures presented by the Census and Statistics Office (see Appendix XI) for the period 1922 to 1927, it is clear that this is only part of the immigration picture. A memorandum to Internal Affairs in 1937 gives additional statistics. Firstly it must be noted that at least forty five of the arrivals in the period from 1921 to 1927 were women (see Appendix XI) but that according to Appendix XII, 148 Chinese women arrived. The complexity of this is further compounded when one finds out that the Customs Department excluded women from the quota of permits in 1926 and maintained this provision until 1935 (NA, L/22/1/81:2). This move was apparently justified on the basis that local Chinese '...either had no intention of settling permanently or were just not interested in bringing their wives here' (*ibid.*). If either figure

for the arrival of women is correct this would hardly seem the case; on the contrary one is led to the conclusion that the Customs Department was aware that permanent settlement was desired by many local Chinese. Similarly, whereas Ponton's material documents the arrival of only 447 Chinese, the Census and Statistics memorandum gives a figure of 2,930 arrivals in the period 1922 to 1927 (see Appendix XI).¹⁰²

Clearly, if the permit or quota system was strictly enforced, the number of immigrants should not exceed one hundred, so one must assume that the excess were returning residents or people granted temporary permits. Whatever the case, the policy is unclear. Ponton maintains that the quota system was in effect from 1922 till 1926, while the New Zealand Herald stated in 1930 that no permanent Chinese residents had been permitted since 1923 (NZH, 13 October 1930). Similar problems arise for the period from 1928 to 1936 (see Appendix XIII). If one compares all three Appendices from the Census and Statistics Department (including Appendix XI and XII) discrepancies are noted. The most obvious point is the large number who are not returning residents and who must therefore have received permits, either temporary or permanent, but Ponton maintains, as stated previously, that the quota system was discontinued in 1926 and further that the temporary permit system was discontinued for Chinese in 1930 (Ponton 1946:87). Obviously, given the numbers entering, there must be some error in Ponton's assertion, but no proof remains.

Hall, in his critical evaluation of New Zealand's Asiatic Immigration policy in 1927, suggested that the large numbers of Chinese entering despite the permit system might have reflected a testing of the temporary permit system by organisations interested in Chinese immigration (Hall, 1927:233).¹⁰³ The logic of this analysis depended,

however, on the assumption that Chinese immigration involved a highly structured system run by syndicates who were dealing in indentured labour. These syndicates, according to popular mythology, had knowledge of the legislation and therefore were availing themselves of the 1911 provisions which allowed tourists, merchants and students to get permits and also to have them extended.¹⁰⁴

Hall argued that few tourists and merchants would be interested in coming to New Zealand, so by inference it must be an organised labour migration (Hall, 1927:233). This, however, neglects the provision for students made in 1911 and the fact that the supposed syndicates would have had to post a bond for their temporary workers which could go as high as £100, a proposition which would be very unlikely. Aside from this, there has never been any evidence produced to support the contention aside from the case of Ho Ah Mei (see Chapter 3). The more likely explanation would be a system of rotating migration which would be made up initially of students who would become merchant-retailers in a partnership for a period of years and then return to China, leasing or placing their business interest in the hands of another person. The government was aware that people under temporary permits were in fact working and took steps, according to Ponton, in April 1924 to stop it by prohibiting work in any occupation other than 'a technical expert or specialised field', but apparently there was no attempt to enforce the decision (Ponton, 1946:86).

Regardless of government regulation during this period, the poll tax revenue continued to accumulate. In the period from 1921 to 1936, £193,746 was collected, £102,950 of which was paid in 1921 alone (see Appendix IX). This amount was equivalent to £432 for every Chinese person in New Zealand at the time, an amount that would take a shop assistant sixty-four weeks to accumulate.

If one looks at the total arrivals and departures (in Appendix XII) from 1921 to 1935, there was a comparable number of people arriving and departing, although for the entire period departures outnumbered arrivals by 706.¹⁰⁵ The result of this was an actual decline in the overall Chinese community in New Zealand as it went from 3,374 in 1921 to 2,943 in 1936 (see Appendix I) but a real increase in the number of females in the community from 273 in 1921 to 511 in 1936. This increase was acknowledged for the first time in 1928, when the Abstracts of the 1926 Census started appearing. The New Zealand Herald maintained that this had far graver consequences than the male Chinese population which had formerly caused so much consternation. Now, according to the Herald, the principle of a 'White New Zealand' was under threat, with the presence of females. Now, it argued, 'the race must multiply in the Dominion', but at least, the majority were New Zealand born and bred, although sadly Chinese fathers were sending their children back to China for education so they could maintain their economic position (NZH, 14 May 1928).

While the paper's statistics are correct, it certainly cannot explain the total Chinese female population through natural increase in New Zealand, since from 1921 till 1927, forty five women arrived (Appendix XI), and in the period 1928 to 1936, 133 of the 244 Chinese women who arrived were not returning residents (Appendix XII). It is also quite noticeable that the departure rate for women almost doubled in the latter period.¹⁰⁶ The evidence seems to suggest as the Herald points out, that Chinese families were being reconstituted in New Zealand, at least briefly, but the phenomenon also produced a new legal problem. If Chinese couples, even on a temporary permit, had children in New Zealand, those children automatically received certificates of registration that

allowed for re-admission should they ever leave. While there has been no documentation of this problem prior to 1939, at that time an Order in Council required persons to be at least fifteen years of age in order to receive a certificate of registration (Ponton, 1946:11).

The period 1879 to 1920, previously discussed, marks the most intensive efforts on the part of the New Zealand government to limit or exclude Chinese from the country. It is clear, however, that the aim was never totally realised, and in fact much of this chapter leads one to the conclusion that total prohibition was never intended. In forty-two years, twenty-one separate bills had been introduced, eight of which passed, although most of these were amendments to major acts or bills to consolidate previous legislation. In addition, the Old Age Pension Act specifically excluded the Chinese from receiving the first national form of social welfare.

The endless pages of debates that document the above process give some idea of the positions and interests represented. As Hall noted in 1927, the sectional economic interests and economic history of New Zealand have obviously influenced the anti-Chinese legislative activity. He maintained that the 1870s and early 1880s with their adverse trade balance and the depression following in the late 1880s and early 1900s are sufficient explanation. Further, he argues that economic explanations give way to racial arguments and those of bureaucratic efficiency after 1907 (Hall, 1927:288-299).

It was true that the post-1878 deluge of unpassed bills coincided with the working men's opposition and that the 1895 legislation was accompanied by economic opposition. However, contrary to Hall's assertion, the white New Zealand philosophy paralleled both phases of legislative activity and gave rise, finally, in 1895 to the Anti-Chinese association which would appear again in 1907 and in 1926

and would probably have existed in 1918 had the RSA not performed the same role. Race, as a justification for the actual legislation was made explicit by Seddon in 1896 and it has been noted that politicians were not strangers to any of the anti-Chinese organisations. If the economic interests were a key determinant it was probably more apparent in the area of political representation. Clearly, there was a group of landowners, merchants, shipowners and professionals whose general humanity and wealth afforded a paternalistic attitude towards the Chinese presence. Reeves described them as the 'employing class' who, together with the 'humanitarian school', the Colonial Office and capitalist economists, had tried to hamper the law-makers in their efforts to 'bar the yellow men' (Reeves, 1901:598). The economic interests that opposed the Chinese presence came from the organised labour and the working man of the colony, who, to quote Reeves, thought Chinese competition 'foul, contrary to nature and unjust' (*ibid.*). Siegfried agreed with Reeves and argued that the Chinese being only sojourners could exist with few of the expectations that colonists had, making life at least considerably simpler if not cheaper (Siegfried, 1914:221). It was the Protestant thrift, admired as a virtue by colonists that now became a sin for aliens like the Chinese, regardless of whether or not they had become Christians. Organised labour therefore opposed Chinese immigration and the 'employing class' was partially supportive. The former had the Liberal party who in the interest of staying in office supported the demand for a non-competitive labour market and the latter had the Council. As Siegfried observed both organised labour and the Liberals wanted 'a little country free from outside taint...small and happy' (Siegfried, 1914:211). This at least was the situation until Reeves left New Zealand.

When Seddon took over, the alliance between organised labour and the Liberals gradually diminished, and although labour remained adamantly anti-Chinese it was the small business community who were encouraged in their anti-Chinese fervour, particularly at a time when the Chinese communities were developing in urban areas. Seddon, secure with this support then proceeded to wage battle with his Council, the Governor and British hegemony over the New Zealand colony.

The Council was not only a group protecting particular vested interests but also the conscience of New Zealand vis-a-vis Britain's imperial desires. Their reluctance to approve immigration restrictions against the Chinese, on more than one occasion, thwarted the efforts of Seddon. In 1896 and 1898 they had stopped legislation and on one occasion in 1896, complained to the Crown about Seddon's exaggerated attitude to the Chinese. While this may have inadvertently helped the Chinese it was more likely that they were protecting their own interests with the exception of a few members, in opposing Seddon, for it had been the same Council in 1881 who approved of unequal treatment for the Chinese by retaining their naturalisation fee at £1 while it was reduced for all others.

Successive Governors had also hindered the government's intent and in both 1888 and 1896 they had complained to England about New Zealand's alarmist behaviour as well as suggesting that Seddon was using the issue to get at the Council. As for Imperial interests, they appeared to continuously interfere with New Zealand's right to self determination, a point that was made blatantly clear when Britain supported the interests of capital in procuring Chinese labour for the Rand mines in 1903.

Seddon in his lifetime was able to remedy only one of these problems, and by 1898 he had gained sufficient influence over the membership of the Council to make any opposition ineffective but he died in 1906 and thereby missed the granting of Dominion status to New Zealand the following year. It remained for later governments to find the remedy for the other two problems.

The solution to the remaining problems was to be found in devising legislation that circumvented the Governor's scrutiny and by placing the administration of the new restrictions under the jurisdiction of a government department rather than Parliament. Both strategies, originating in the first place from the Natal Act and in the second from the War Conference in 1917 were suggested by the British government.

The 1898 Immigration Restriction bill (2) and the 1907 Immigration Amendment bill complied with the Natal Act and the 1920 Act fulfilled the War Conference statement that gave British Commonwealth countries the right to control immigration. The permit system in 1920 did exactly this as well as carrying on the precedent set in the war for the head of a government department to have the right to approve or deny access to New Zealand.

While the administration of the restrictions had been made explicit in this legislation, there were inconsistencies that remained despite a method that could be used for absolute exclusion. The two provisions that remained were the exclusion of Chinese only from the right of naturalisation from 1908 till 1952 and the survival of the poll tax requirement till 1944. It is not clear from the evidence why these two provisions remained although one could make arguments in terms

of revenue and the ability to stop the establishment of Chinese families in New Zealand. The former could be substantiated from Appendix IV and the latter from the explicit statements about naturalised Chinese males conferring the right on their spouses, but in the face of the permit system they remained anomalies.

A more likely explanation seems to lie in the observation that the excessive attention paid to the Chinese immigration question had created what Hall called in 1927, 'racial consciousness'. He contended that it was not '...too far fetched to assign to New Zealand agitation and legislation a contributory part, however small, in creating the situation from which arose that striking reaction of racial consciousness...' (Hall, 1927:231). No matter how exclusive immigration restrictions had become the New Zealand government still did not want a Chinese minority in this country, even though Hall had admonished private and semi-public organisations to erradicate racial consciousness through 'sympathetic treatment and a general raising where necessary of economic and cultural standards' (Hall, 1927:236).

As noted however, it would be many years before the remaining previously mentioned restrictions were removed, an indication that 'racial consciousness' was persistent.

While it is clear to Hall that racial consciousness had affected the kind of milieux the Chinese had tolerated in New Zealand since their arrival, he had not noted its impact on the social structure of the Chinese community with the exception of his observation about Chinese quarters. In other words the persistent activity by government not only created racial consciousness amongst New Zealanders but also amongst resident Chinese (see Ng, 1959:47). A parallel process then, to the anti-Chinese activity, was the emergence of a Chinese community

conscious of a need to survive in New Zealand and also influenced by its homeland, which had become aware by 1887 of its overseas communities and their problems. Already in the 1870s the Chinese population in the gold fields had organised the Ch'eung Shin Tong and Cherishing Virtue Union, the former providing for the internal needs of the community and the latter for its continued existence in New Zealand. At the same time the petition had become a medium for articulating the needs of the community, specifically for alleviation of restrictions.

Although organisational development will be dealt with in the following chapter the use of petitions linked the early organisation of the gold fields to later developments. They continued through the late 1880s ending only with the arrival of diplomatic representation for the local community. These petitions, did little to modify immigration restrictions but did provide evidence of an organised community which managed to alert Peking to its plight in New Zealand. The result was two Chinese Commissions which came in 1887 and 1906, resulting in the appointment of a Chinese Consulate in New Zealand with the permission of the New Zealand government. Peking had particular feelings about its overseas population in New Zealand as did successive Consuls, both being supportive of their own class, that is merchants and students (educated Chinese) but intermittent in their defence of the many other Chinese who came.

The unintended result of New Zealand's adamant anti-Chinese stand was, after 1908, direct contact with China which, while beneficial to New Zealand in terms of controlling the local Chinese, also reinforced the minority's contact with their homeland. The contact, as noted prior to 1900, had been in terms of cultural patterns of behaviour

but gradually social relations in the Chinese community, especially with the move to other areas in New Zealand and an increasing tendency to become urbanised began to reflect political changes in China.

While diplomatic developments have been discussed it remains now to indicate how a Chinese community organisation develops to cope with New Zealand society, and government, their homeland and the fragmentation in their community largely caused by decisions in the former relations.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. Throughout his career Reeves was capable of vehement and sustained attacks on the Chinese. His article 'Aliens and Undesirables in Australia' has several sections which are examples of his invective. For instance.

...to begin with the Chinese are admitted by all observers to be utterly unfit to use political rights in democracy. They have no conception of government and public duty as these are understood in Europe. Their civilisation is an arrested development, their education petrified, their learning confined to a handful. ...Industrious they are, but industry without certain social qualities is a doubtful virtue. A man may be industrious and yet be dirty, miserly, ignorant, a shirker of social duty, and a danger to public health. All these most of the Chinese immigrants are.
2. The Lyttelton Times is hereafter abbreviated to LT.
3. It becomes quite obvious when going through the debates that if a member knew local Chinese in his constituency it was usually a merchant or a family where a Chinese man had married a European woman and whose children attended the local school. See the case of Manders from Wakatipu, who knew a Chinese merchant, well known in Dunedin, Queenstown and Melbourne and Sydney, and Brown from Tuapeka, who knew a case of intermarriage where the children were of comparable intelligence to local European children (NZPD, 1878, 29:419).
- 4 This does not quite concur with Scholefield and Hall (1927:5) or Price (1974:20).
- 5 Grey submitted a memorandum to both Houses of the General Assembly regarding the immigration of Chinese into the Colony, in which he argued for a colony of a 'coloured population' and 'industrious immigrants' from China to be established in Northern Australia and for the preservation of the pure bred descendants of the Anglo-Saxon population in New Zealand by the passing of restrictive immigration laws. He substantiated the second point by suggesting that, because the Chinese tended to settle in one place once they had arrived, they would be very useful to the holders of large properties, and that this was not what New Zealand needed (AJHR, 1879, D-3).

- 6 One of the thrusts in this meeting was the acknowledgement that the Public Works Department had money available for employment and that this money might be used to employ cheap labour for projects, as had been tried in 1873. This was also made clear at a meeting in Dunedin, where a resolution was passed prohibiting the employment of Chinese by local councils or contractors (LT, 29 May, 1879).
- 7 The alternative suggestion is perhaps that he was merely getting the House stirred up, paving the way for less harsh restrictions the following year, since much of the debate would have already taken place and most members would have agreed that they would have voted in favour of it had it not called for total prohibition.
- 8 This firmly establishes the beginnings of a white New Zealand policy and in fact concurs with Premier Ward's statement in 1907, when he boasted, according to O'Connor, a twenty-five-year-long devotion to the ideal of a white New Zealand (O'Connor, 1968:44).
- 9 W.P. Reeves was struck by the extent to which provisions were made in various acts for fining ships' masters and ship owners. He suggests that many colonies blamed their so-called 'yellow influx' on the money-making exploits of steamship owners, yet it was the colonies who were being criticised for their exclusionist policies, "...the same British trading spirit which, while poisoning Chinese with opium in the interests of India, was ready to champion the cause of China when money was to be made by swamping Australia and New Zealand with yellow barbarians" (Reeves, 1901:604).
- 10 Appendix IX gives the recorded amounts of poll tax deposited in this account for each year available.
- 11 By 1881 New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Queensland by the 1877 Act had poll-tax provisions and tonnage limitations (Choi, 1975:26).
- 12 This was not correct, since it can be seen from Appendix X, that between 1852 and 1881, 48 Chinese had been naturalised in New Zealand, the majority of whom were merchants, shop-keepers and gardeners. What is perhaps more important is the fact that there was quite a noted increase in the number naturalised from 1882 (26) to 1888 (40) and that the occupational range spread considerably to include professional, service, mining and labour (see Appendix VIII).
- 13 Unfortunately this petition and many others submitted by the Chinese community have since disappeared from the New Zealand Archives, so the actual text remains unknown.

- 14 Seddon's allegation was the subject of a Supreme Court case in 1916. In the case it had been proved that a Chinese man had assumed the name of another Chinese man who had previously been naturalised in New Zealand and returned to China (NZLR, 1916:1095-98). The accused obtained his fellow countryman's naturalisation certificate and used it to obtain identification papers. This, in turn, allowed him to go to Sydney, marry and bring his wife back to New Zealand exempt from the poll tax and reading test imposed at the time. By 1908, however, naturalisation was prohibited to the Chinese in New Zealand, which made the establishment of a family even more difficult than it had been in 1887.
- 15 This inquiry was made pending the landing of the ship Te Anau which was to arrive with Chinese settlers early in 1888. Its arrival had already led to a mass meeting in Invercargill where a member of the House of Representatives, J.G. Ward, had stated that

...the time has arrived when the Anglo Saxon race of New Zealand should make a stand against an invasion of its shores by a host of Mongolian barbarians, this meeting pledges itself to boycott any person or persons who employ or deal with the said race.

(LT, 7 May 1888)

The meeting decided to form a vigilante committee to take action against the landing of Chinese in conjunction with the Dunedin Carpenter's Union if the government did not intervene to stop further Chinese immigration (LT, 8 May 1888). However the Chinese landed in Dunedin safely although amidst hostile crowds (see LT, 9 and 11 May 1888).
- 16 There was considerable debate on this point as to whether or not naturalisation was transferable from colony to colony. Atkinson insisted that it was relevant only to the colony where one was naturalised (NZPD, 1888, 60:38). Others, like Hutchison, insisted that it was applicable if you were naturalised in any British colony.
- 17 The Treaty, signed on 12 March 1888 by which China was to prohibit Chinese labourers coming to the United States, was never ratified, and two other Acts were passed to hasten the same result (see Tung, 1974:18-19).
- 18 There was considerable expression of fear that Australia would increase her restrictions to the point that New Zealand would be the only viable place for emigration in the Pacific.

- 19 Jervois had actually written to England to outline the problem as he saw it in the colonies. He stated that people in the Australasian colonies were afraid of being swamped by Chinese and also afraid of competition from Chinese labour. He suggested that the first statement was 'thoughtlessly and unreasonably proclaimed' and that the second was perpetrated by the 'idler sections of the working classes' (Fieldhouse, 1956:327-28). He went on to add his own opinions of the Chinese, which were largely favourable, suggesting that they were disliked for their virtues not their vices, and further suggested that '...the tropical portion of Australia, or some part of it, should be excluded from the operation of the treaty; that the territory...should be opened freely to Chinese immigrants; and that it should be placed under Crown Colony Government (*ibid.*). This latter suggestion seems similar to that made by Grey in 1879 (see footnote 5).
- 20 According to Jervois in a dispatch to London, the number refused entrance to Australia had been 600 (Fieldhouse, 1956:336). Atkinson, the Premier of New Zealand, had been informed by the Premier of Melbourne that at least one ship, the Afghan, had been turned away from Melbourne and was on its way to New Zealand ports with sixty-eight Chinese immigrants aboard (AJHR, 1888, A6:3-4). They were refused the right to land because the ship had an excessive number of Chinese for the tonnage it carried and also because the naturalisation papers carried by some Chinese passengers were determined to be false (*ibid.*). The same dispatch told of fourteen other Chinese who had been sent back to Hong Kong from Sydney without landing. Atkinson had tried to stop the boat by contacting the Union Company but was too late (*ibid.*).
- 21 Bruce (Rangatiki) mentioned that the Chinese Ambassador in London had already described colonial legislation as 'exceptional and exceptionable' (NZPD, 1888, 60:33), but Seddon insisted that the Chinese commissioners in Australia had said that the colonies were eminently suitable for emigration (NZPD, 1888, 60:35).
- 22 While the Council pondered, some sections of the House plotted. Seddon, in particular, suggested to the Premier that a measure should be introduced through the Appropriation Act, since the Council could not amend or throw out an Appropriation Act. The Premier, however, declined the suggestion, maintaining that the situation would have to be drastic for this avenue to be used (Press, 31 July 1888).
- 23 The Hon. Mr. Oliver (Otago) was assigned the task of attending the conference, but due to some 'urgent business' in New Zealand Mr. Oliver missed three connections and at least two boats going to Sydney. When he did leave, he ended up in Melbourne and then had to travel to Sydney. Seddon, who inquired as to the whereabouts of Mr. Oliver, was extremely distressed by this situation (NZPD, 1888, 61:200).
- 24 For the resolutions proposed, see AJHR, 1888, A-6:11.

- 25 See Parkes' cablegram to the Secretary of State in AJHR 1888, A-6:10-11.
- 26 Scholefield and Hall present a different version of this Act with several additional provisions which include a £100 fine for ships with an excess of Chinese on board; Chinese men of war exempted and that the Act would be in force for one year (Scholefield and Hall, 1927:8).
- 27 In 1890 the Liberals took power and according to Lipson this provided the fundamental shift in the role of the state. For the following two decades the state increasingly fulfilled a more prominent place in shaping New Zealand's future. According to Lipson, the state was to determine what benefits would be shared and how they would be distributed, and consequently "...as many persons as possible would be brought into direct economic dependence upon governmental machinery..." which the Liberal party could control (Lipson, 1949:198). Liberal politicians, unlike previous participants, were of the lower middle class and even some workingmen, and their supporters were the previously unrepresented urban and rural proletariat (see Lipson, 1949:198 and 221).
- 28 The driver of the truck was taken away, and the labourer who assaulted Mr. Lee Long was also arrested. The police charged the labourer with assault, and despite the fact that Lee Long had stabbed the man in self-defence, he got six weeks hard labour. The judge received support for his action in the New Zealand Times, a pro-Liberal paper (*ibid.*).
- 29 This bill received wide publicity and was fairly well ridiculed, but it is interesting to note that the following year Reeves (Minister of Labour) said that the bill had been brought forward only to familiarise the public with the issues and was not meant to be pushed through. Because of this, he maintained that the 'crudities and mistakes' in it were acceptable (NZPD, 1895, 89:278).
- 30 Russell (Riccarton) had ordered that a return showing the number of Chinese who had arrived in and departed from New Zealand in the years 1886-1894 be laid before the House. It showed that 1,196 had arrived, 1,420 departed and 251 died in the colony. Out of the arrivals, 663 paid the poll tax, 533 were exempt (AJHR, 1894, H-21).
- 31 All bills that had anything to do with labour went to this committee.
- 32 In 1894, 170 Chinese had left New Zealand, and Reeves estimated that they had taken £34,000 with them. Collins (Christchurch) thought Reeves' estimate was too low and suggested that £200 to £400 was much more likely, based on the fact that fifteen Chinese who left on the Catterthurn which was wrecked, had a total of £5,800 worth of gold with them (NZPD, 1895, 89:363). Collins does not acknowledge the fact that Chinese invariably took home money for friends and relatives, so estimates of individual income are meaningless. It is interesting to note, however, that the amount required before Chinese would leave New Zealand had inflated from £50 or £100 up to £200. Reeves failed to note that the Chinese had already contributed £11,360 to the Consolidated Account (see Appendix IX).

- 33 The Wellington Anti-Chinese League was started at a combined meeting of the Trades and Labour Council with the newly organised United Furnishing Trade Union in September 1894 (see NZT, 1 September 1894). The Christchurch version was started in June 1895 (see NZT, 8 June 1895) stimulated, like its Wellington counterpart by the active agitation of people like the Hon. W.P. Reeves and a member of the House Mr. G.J. Smith at a public meeting in April 1895 (see Press, 25 April 1895). The rules of the Christchurch branch (see below) brought together the concerns expressed by different interest groups opposed to the Chinese (see page 191):

To educate public opinion, to assist in all social movements and support all legislative efforts in the direction of restricting the Chinese and other undesirable competitors in the Colony's labour markets by raising the poll-tax on Chinese to at least £100, by enforcing the inspection of premises occupied by Chinese and other Asiatics, by urging the Government to refuse mail subsidies to any steamer or other vessel carrying, as a whole or part of the crew, any Asiatic, Lascar or Kanaka; by the members pledging themselves and inducing others not to deal with any Asiatic grower and vendor of any marketable products or with any European retailer who supplies such products, or with any trader who sells, or causes to be sold, any goods, except such as could not be made by our own workers, manufactured or produced by Chinese and other allied races.

(NZT, 8 June 1895)

- 34 The petition was not the only activity of the Anti-Chinese League. It had also been involved in trying to get the Wellington city council to restrict Chinese to residence in certain specific areas (NZT, 15 August 1895), and having failed in this turned to attempt the undermining of the Chinese market garden-hawker-fruit shop network in the city, by asking the Works Committee of the Wellington City Council to organise a fruit, fish, vegetable and flower market to replace the free market already operating (NZT, 24 September 1895). The move was made in conjunction with the Hutt Farmer's Association and the Fruiterer's Association and was intended to eradicate the hawking business and encourage European consumers to buy direct from the market rather than through their Chinese retailers (NZT, 27 September, 1895). Although the market was not formed, despite receiving Council approval, public moves were activated along similar lines. In a Wellington suburb 200 families boycotted their local Chinese vegetable hawker, in Auckland the Chinese fruiterers had been excluded from the business and in Christchurch the vegetable auction was refusing vegetables to a newly arrived Chinese fruiterer (The People, 5 October 1895).

- 35 In March 1895 Shrimski's efforts on behalf of the Chinese were to be reciprocated in part with the presentation of a silver tea and coffee service by the Chinese residents of North Road, Dunedin. The presentation was made by Mr. W. Ah Tong, who noted the high esteem accorded to Mr. Shrimski by the Chinese community for his past and current work on their behalf. The contemporary reference was to his work in the Legislative Council in supporting the rights of the Chinese as 'strangers in a strange land' (New Zealand Mail, 15 March 1895).
- 36 Petition no longer extant.
- 37 Sir Robert Stout held office in the Anti-Chinese League and was also the attorney for a Round Hill syndicate which he knew employed Chinese labour, since he had drawn up the contract. Apparently Stout's partner had to make sure that the Chinese were hastily removed from the job. Seddon had discovered this and used it to attack Stout (NZT, 4 April 1896).
- 38 In 1895 Reeves, one of Seddon's "ablest Cabinet colleagues" according to Lipson (1948:208), was appointed as Agent General for New Zealand and left for London. Reeves' absence from New Zealand led to the decline of the Wellington Anti-Asiatic League (see Willis, 1974:40-41). According to Willis, Reeves, in league with the New Zealand Times (of which he was a director see O'Connor, 1922:33) and the Anti-Asiatic League, attempted to enlist the support of the middle class, who had been essentially sympathetic to the Chinese. However, Reeves, while successful in getting six labour bills passed in 1894, failed to get any immigration bills through, which led finally to the demise of the Anti-Asiatic League (see Sutch, 1969:124-25). According to the New Zealand Times, the League was in debt for £109.6.00 by February 1896 (NZT, 11 February 1896).
- 39 The Governor could reserve a bill that was 'inconsistent with obligations imposed on us by treaty' or prejudiced 'the trade and shipping of the United Kingdom' or finally a bill which had not already received assent (New Zealand Gazette 1892, 57:1026).
- 40 The outcome of this was that petitions from foreign powers or local minorities affected by New Zealand legislation had presumably to be addressed to the Home Government. As already noted, the Chinese had taken their chances and appealed to the Legislative Council, but in 1896 they sent two petitions directly to the Governor, which were consequently forwarded to the Colonial Office after comments had been added by the Premier (see C/O 209/256, Nos. 47, 48 and 60, Glasgow to Chamberlain, 21 December 1896). Similarly, one notes that the Chinese and Japanese governments both approached the British government about immigration matters (see AJHR, 1891, A-2:7-8, AJHR, 1892, A-1:4-5) for Chinese Consular activity and O'Connor, 1972:55 for the Japanese reaction to the 1896 Bill).

- 41 The Liberals had managed to get twelve Councillors appointed to the conservative Council through an appeal to the Colonial Office, and by 1899 Seddon succeeded in constructing an entirely pro-Liberal Council (see Lipson, 1948:357).
- 42 In 1895 Japan had defeated China after a clash of their naval fleets in September 1894 over Korea, which was a humiliating event for China and for the Chinese in New Zealand. Don's tour report in 1893-94 was filled in large part with questions about the war, and many of the Chinese he visited were enraged at the thought "of the Great Chinese Empire yielding to the Dwarfs" (Tour, 1893-94:17).
- 43 Seddon had already taken the initiative upon himself to stop the Customs Officers from issuing naturalisation certificates and restricted the right to the Colonial Secretary or the Commissioner of Customs (NZPD, 1896, 82:470). This was also the subject of a petition from the Chinese community to the Governor in 1896 (see Chapter 6, p. 292). Seddon responded to the Governor over the petition asserting the following in regard to naturalisation:

The statement made by the petitioners that it is proposed to make it unlawful to grant letters of naturalisation to Chinese is quite correct. In taking this course, the New Zealand Legislature is undertaking that which has been in force in New South Wales for several years, and there is nothing in the legislation just passed which is either exceptional, cruel, or unjust. To preserve the purity of race by restricting the increase of Chinese is considered of paramount importance.

(C.O. 209/256, 17/767)

The legislation referred to is the Asiatic Restriction Bill No. 2 which was sent to England for Royal Assent without the Governor's signature. Obviously Seddon had terminated the right to naturalisation without waiting for Assent.

- 44 This petition had been presented to the Council by Rigg (Wellington) before the second reading (NZPD, 1896, 94:426).
- 45 In this connection, Mr. Williams noted that Mr. Chang Luke, assisted by several members of the Christian Endeavour Society were already providing Bible classes to some of the local community (NZPD, 1896, 94:429).
- 46 The protest was signed by eleven members including Bowen (Canterbury), Bonar (Westland), Shrimski (Otago), Reynolds (Otago), Whitmore (Hawkes Bay), Taiaroa (Otago), Williams (Auckland), Holmes (Otago), Scotland (Taranaki), Captain Baillie (Marlborough) and Barnicoat (Nelson).

- 47 There is some hint of support for this view in an article by Gowen where he is discussing the relationship between the Dominions and Britain during the 1911 conference and the Alliance with Japan which spanned two decades. Gowen suggests that there was a clear intent on the part of the colonies to be self-governing and to be aggressive racialists. The colonies '...had erected immigration walls impassable to Japanese and other Asians on the assumption that Britain would forever rule the waves' (Gowan, 1980:386). When Britain made the treaty with Japan which had clearly shown its superiority in defeating the Russian fleet in 1905, the Pacific Dominions felt abandoned. It was in Britain's interest to have Japanese power in the Pacific while its own forces attended to Germany, but it was certainly not in the interest of the colonies to be put in this position. Gowen adds the comment, however, that unlike Australia, New Zealand was more realistic about her defence capabilities and was prepared to side with the notion of Imperial defence rather than expect to be independent (Gowan, 1980:385-413). Similarly, Siegfried, in Democracy in New Zealand, quotes Sir Charles Dilke who stated "To the colonies the Chinese question appears to present itself in a very different aspect from that in which it is viewed by us at home; and it is difficult to induce the men of the colonial lower middle or working classes, dependent upon labour or trade for maintenance, to take what we shall call a broad international view of Chinese immigration" (quoted in Siegfried, 1914:225
- 48 The act had neglected to make exceptions for merchants and tourists as was the case with the Australian acts.
- 49 This return dispatch became the centre of some controversy as it was requested to be laid on the table at least three times without any results. Walker had been requested to produce it, but the first time he forgot to ask the government for it and on the second time maintained that '...the dispatch was simply a formal acknowledgement of a certain letter' (NZPD, 1897, 100:760). On the third request, which actually went to the Government, the response was that the Council had all the information they needed (*ibid.*:873). Because of this situation, the Council killed the new Asiatic Restriction Bill for the Session even though it embodied suggestions acceptable to the Council.
- 50 The Natal Immigration Restriction Act of 1897 required a literacy test in any European language before admission (see Choi, 1975:27).
- 51 There is a curious anomaly here. The Scholefield and Hall article suggests that the 1897 bill complied with the Natal Act, but the Colonial Office dispatch (to inform the same of the Bill) suggests that it did not follow the Natal Act (see Fieldhouse, 1956:343, C/O 209/257 NZ No. 1967). This second view is also supported by the exchange between Chamberlain and Ranfurly, in which Ranfurly eventually stated he had convinced Seddon to comply with the Natal Act (Kay, 1973:40) and also the C.O. minutes which contain instructions that suggest the Governor be given a "confidential hint" to get New Zealand to adopt the Natal Act (Fieldhouse, 1956:343).

- 52 This version tends to disagree with the actual sequence of events outlined in the material attached to the petition which Fook On made to the Government through his lawyers, Brandon and Hislop. Apparently, Fook On had tried to avoid the £100 payment to the shipping company in China by proving that the person he was actually bringing to New Zealand was his wife. The lawyers found that there was no provision in the Act to issue a Certificate which would absolve the shipping company of risk. Fook On paid the £100, and then Brandon and Hislop attempted to get it refunded by the Crown Law Offices on the grounds that under the Naturalisation Act 1870, Section 10, Sub-Section (I), a married woman is decreed to be a subject of the state of which her husband is for the time being a subject. They further got a declaration from a Chinese missionary, Reverend Cheok Hong Chong, that Fook On's marriage was legitimate in Chinese law. The Crown Law Office in response merely suggested that Brandon and Hislop had the wrong Act and referred them to the Aliens Act of 1880 Section (14), which declared that any alien woman married to a naturalised person be deemed to be herself naturalised, but in this case, they insisted one could not accept the marriage from a country where polygamy was accepted.
- 53 It is interesting to note that the Act made specific reference to the Asiatic Restriction Act, which it noted, did not receive Her Majesty's assent and had never been in effect in the colony. The Council presumably saw this as a direct attack on them - at least the non-Seddon appointees - and had the clause deleted (NZPD, 1899, 107:91).
- 54 One of the roles of the agent was to procure access to Crown Lands for the Chinese, which according to the report could take a long time and cost the Chinese claim-seeker as much as £60. (AJHR, 1898, 19:85).
- 55 Two Chinese witnesses who were called, Joe Tie and Hoe Gett, knew Seddon well since they were interpreters and had been on the coast eighteen and eleven years respectively before moving to Wellington, where they had become shop-keepers (*ibid.*:82-83).
- 56 He used the example of Syrians who had come to New Zealand and who, in his opinion, had come only so that they could engage in business malpractice (*ibid.*:383).
- 57 There had been a similar approach in 1891 (from China) and in 1900 (from the New Zealand Chinese), the latter of which fails to be mentioned in any government document (see Chapter 6).
- 58 It is hard to ascertain whether the notion of 'self government' is used here to refer to freedom from domination by internal sectional economic interests or freedom from Imperial control (see Burdon, 1955:305). On this issue it seems to have been used in both senses. More precisely, it is clear that 'self-government', correct economic policy and Imperial relations are inextricably linked together although not perceived as such by economic interests (e.g., Rand mines). Clearly 'responsible self-government' was for whites only.

- 59 The electorate of Ohinemuri had one Chinese resident in the period 1905-07.
- 60 There were three sets of figures quoted in the House concerning Chinese immigration. One came from the New Zealand Year Book, another from a letter sent by the Attorney General to Moss which confirmed the figures that Rigg had presented in the Council, and finally those of the Commissioner of Customs. All three sets vary in accordance with their respective intention.
- 61 Mills made one final attempt to clear up the statistics by presenting up-to-date figures on Chinese immigration that covered a period he called 'for some years'. In the period, 562 Chinese arrived, 330 paid poll tax and 232 were returning to New Zealand, while departures for the same period were 849 (NZPD, 1905, 134:619). Moss's last effort was to try to catch Mills out some time later by inquiring as to the status of twenty-seven Chinese arriving in Wellington by boat from Sydney. Mills calmly responded that ten were in fact returning (NZPD, 1905, 134: 823).
- 62 The evidence used to support the contentions about mixed marriage came entirely from reports that appeared in newspapers in Chicago and San Francisco.
- 63 It is interesting to note that the anti-Chinese movement in this period, excluding the cases of Masterton and Palmerston North, seemed to have been engineered and organised by government, which is to some degree, analogous to the 1894-1895 situation except for the absence of Trades and Labour involvement. This leads one to speculate on the disenchantment felt by the labour movement with the Liberal Party which was clearly evident by 1907.
- 64 The remaining fourteen rules outline the organisation of the League. Unfortunately little is known of its membership or longevity.
- 65 Apparently civil service regulations required that Lloyd give up his job, since his activity was mentioned in the House by Malcolm (Clutha), who approved of the man's efforts and hoped that he would get his job back on completion of his work for the League (NZPD, 1907, 139:82).
- 66 See Chapter 6 (page 304) for further information on this visit of Mr. Hwang Hou Cheng.
- 67 Both Cameron and Lloyd did much to propogate the idea of the League by speaking in various centres (see NZT, 29 June 1907; OCT, 13, 25, July 1907).
- 68 It is unclear what happened to this movement of anti-Chinese groups and White Race Leagues, since information in the papers faded after legislation was introduced by Ward later in the same year.

- 69 The most consistent argument against raising the poll tax stated that the higher the poll tax, the longer the Chinese person would have to stay in New Zealand to pay it off and the more contrary the situation would be to the interests of New Zealand. As regards the learning of English in China, Ward was later to suggest that China would not bother educating its "inferior classes" for such a test (NZPD, 1907, 142:842).
- 70 Seven electorates had no Chinese residents: Bay of Islands, Franklin, Egmont, Hurunui, Kaipoi, Selwyn and Waitaki. The electorates with the predominant number of Chinese were Grey - 262; Wellington Central - 191; Tuapeka - 175; Westland - 155; Wakatipu - 138; and Dunedin South - 107 (NZPD, 1907, 142:839).
- 71 The Governor finally amended this to allow the Minister of Internal Affairs this jurisdiction (NZPD, 1907, 142:1157). This move seems to verify the presence of suspicion on the part of government about the role of some New Zealand churches, particularly the Presbyterian Church, which had acted historically as a lobby for Chinese. Its role was already well known and now met with concern in some quarters. In June 1907 Alexander Don, a Presbyterian Minister, had rebuked those who wanted to boycott Chinese businesses by suggesting this would be tantamount to 850,000 boycotting 2550 Chinese (ODT, 17 June 1907). In August 1907 Truth attacked the members of various churches saying that "...a number of black-coated clerics... have suddenly come to the conclusion that the much-maligned Mongolian is a dear lost brother" (Truth, 10 August 1907). The paper maintained that the churches always opposed any national movement that spoke for 'progress', 'prosperity', and 'enlightenment' and would be better employed saving young girls who fall under the influence of the Chinese than trying to protect the latter (*ibid.*). After the passage of the bill, Truth went so far as to accuse Ward of pandering to the 'black coated brigade' (Truth, 23 November 1907). Ward, a Roman Catholic, was as far as Truth was concerned, setting a dangerous precedent by allowing the church to interfere in politics, especially as this would now result in a 'special brand of coloured wowser' being permitted to enter New Zealand without restrictions (*ibid.*).
- 72 In the several instances when Maori members have spoken to this issue there is a sense in which the comments reflect less the racist attitudes of Maoris than the Maoris' impatience with pakeha insincerity. On the one hand, the pakehas continued to allow Chinese to come to New Zealand and pay the poll tax, while at the same time continuing to devise new means of restriction (see also page 234).
- 73 This is the last petition sent from the New Zealand Chinese community in a situation without diplomatic representation. Its contents and the establishment of the Consul will be dealt with in the next chapter.

- 74 In 1908 the Immigration Restriction Act was also passed, but it merely consolidated eight pieces of prior legislation into one Act and was not the subject of debate (New Zealand Statutes, 1908:711-720).
- 75 The provision required a Chinese who desired to leave New Zealand and return to apply for a certificate of registration in duplicate with a picture and a thumb print on each. If the Collector of Customs was unsure as to identity then he could take a duplicate thumb print and compare them (New Zealand Gazette, 26 November 1908:2996).
The requirement of fingerprinting before entry to and departure from New Zealand, however, had been required of the Chinese since 1900 (Circular Memo 64, Department of Trade and Customs, 15 May 1900) and was formalised even more in Circular 350, 1904 entitled 'Instructions for Taking and Comparing Finger Impressions of Chinese Entering and Leaving New Zealand'. In a memo to the Colonial Office from the Foreign Office it was suggested that the finger-print requirement be abandoned for Chinese of good standing who were well known, educated and with property. This situation, according to the memo prevailed in the Transvaal (C/O 209/257, 12 January 1909). However, there was no objection by India or China, so the Act was accepted as originally proposed (C/O 209/257, 27 January 1909).
- 76 Even this provision was to cause problems. In Lum v Attorney General 1919, a Chinese man requested a judgement on the status of his six children should he and his wife return with them to China. Neither Lum nor his wife, Chu Ag Nui, were naturalised, but they had both lived in New Zealand prior to 1905, when they were married. Under the provisions of the 1908 Act and later amendments, it was feared that the children, should they remain away from New Zealand more than four years, would have to pay poll tax and pass the reading test prior to re-entry. The judgement of the court ruled in favour of the plaintiff, and it was deemed that the children were and would remain British subjects and were entitled to the same exemptions as Chinese naturalised in New Zealand, which was a provision of the 1908 Act (NZLR, 1919:741-753). Clearly, since naturalisation was unavailable to the Chinese after 1908, the only possibility of conferring similar rights on family members was to make sure they were born in New Zealand.
- 77 This move remains unexplained, although one can speculate on a number of reasons that a Minister might give to support it. For instance, the problem of naturalised Chinese marrying and expecting to bring his wife to New Zealand as a naturalised person and thus avoid immigration restrictions could only be overcome by refusing to accept the legitimacy of Chinese marriage (see case of Fook On in 1897, page 213). Alternatively, if naturalised Chinese had children, they were, under the existing legislation (Aliens Act Amendment 1892), legitimately naturalised by right. While legitimate reasons may exist for this decision, there is some questions as to its legality. Under previous legislation dealing with naturalisation, it was the Governor alone who had the power to decide on individual cases, yet this prohibition applied to a whole category of people. In this way, Cabinet had fettered the discretionary power of the Governor as it applied to individual cases by passing a broad policy. One legal opinion has suggested that this move, while appearing to be ultra vires, was probably unintentional, since they would not have been aware of statute law. However, one cannot but notice the effect on the Governor's powers.

- 78 The initial approach by the Chinese legation, according to Colonial Office correspondence was to have been direct to the New Zealand government through the Chinese Consul General then in New Zealand. The Colonial Office received notice of the note and maintained that this was inappropriate but said it was for the Foreign Office to object (C/O 209, NZ 28930, 24 August 1909). This resulted in the Chinese Ambassador re-writing the note in London, deleting all reference to the Consul General and sending it to the Secretary of State (ibid.).
- 79 America had made such provisions by Treaty in 1881; Canada by an Act in 1885, and Australia between 1901 and 1906. Australia in fact, made separate provisions for each category of immigrant.
- 80 The objection to fingerprinting was ignored by the legislation and was only dealt with in 1920 after more drastic protest by the Chinese Consul.
- 81 Harrassment of Chinese shops actually occurred at three different times, 26 February, 9 March and 16 March, and in all three cases Europeans were arrested (see LT on appropriate dates).
- 82 It is curious that Hwang responded to this situation since according to other information he had already been appointed as Consul General in Australia in 1911. One must assume that he remained in New Zealand and continued to act in his capacity as Consul despite the appointment of T.H. Shah as Acting Consul (see Chapter 7, page 326).
- 83 This meeting had the backing of the Metal Workers Union and the freezing workers, who had proposed a boycott on 8 March (LT, 9 March 1912). On 22 March the Canterbury Drivers Union also supported the cause (LT, 22 March 1912).
- 84 In the period from 1911 to 1921 the Chinese population in Auckland province increased from 419 to 867, and in the first three months of 1920, 217 Chinese arrived in Auckland of whom 10 were women (ODT, 9 April 1920). In the same period (1911-1921) the Chinese population in Wellington Province increased from 753 to 1135. The percentage of Chinese in the North Island had increased from 52.85% of the total Chinese population in 1911 to 77% in 1921.
- 85 Quick March is hereafter abbreviated to QM.
- 86 The prototype for this had been rehearsed in 1914, an election year, when the Reform Party Handbook for Candidates listed the Immigration Restriction Amendment Bill as one of their accomplishments. As O'Connor points out, the bill had not in fact been passed, but Massey had already consulted the Imperial government (O'Connor, 1968:49-50). The Secretary of State responded with the advice that if New Zealand could emulate the South African and Australian legislative equivalents without publicising the grounds of exclusion all would be well. The secret of this, according to the correspondence, was to allow full power to the Minister or Customs Officer concerned to approve or bar admission (ibid.).

- 87 Timaru in 1921 had a Chinese population of sixteen.
- 88 The RSA, in its concern over infringement of the Shop's Act, invited the Inspector of Factories to one of its meetings. Mr. Arnold, the Inspector, assured them that neither Europeans nor Chinese had broken the law as far as he knew, and as it stood fruit and vegetable shops could stay open as long as they liked provided they sold only produce. If they sold silk or tobacco as alleged, he would be willing to take the case to court (Timaru Herald, 19 April 1920).
- 89 On 11 June the Timaru Herald reported that charges against three men had been laid regarding the incident in front of the Chinese shops and that one was dismissed while the decision on the remaining two was reserved (Timaru Herald, 11 June 1920).
- 90 In 1892 a similar accusation had been made in Auckland, where the Charitable Board was accused of contracting with a Chinese grower for the supply of vegetables to a local hospital. In this case the Knights of Labour investigated this and another accusation that the Chinese were supplying the Union Steamship Company. The latter case was proven true, but the former was proved false (LT, 22 August 1892). No action seems to have been taken in regard to the Steamship Company contract.
- 91 Coates did not mention, however, that Messrs Johnson and Cooper had received state aid to establish a business and furthermore had been supplying the hospital for three months (QM, 10 August 1920).
- 92 This was the first piece of immigration legislation in New Zealand to be formulated by a civil servant. According to Sir Francis Bell:
- The suggestion of this method of controlling the immigration of foreigners was due to the genius, the work, and the wisdom of the then Chief of Customs, Mr Montgomery.
- (Downie Stewart, 1937:297)
- 93 Massey in his reply to Lin Shih-yuan stated that he had not made, and indeed could not make, any promise to circulate the legislation before it was sent to the government. Massey further denied that the 1920 bill singled out the Chinese for exclusion and stated that it provided the means for one to visit the country for the purposes of pleasure, business or health. He also accused the Consul of using 'unusual' language in his letter which he obviously deemed unjustified (Ms 985/1/44, 16 August 1920).
- 94 These are very reminiscent of the suggestion made by the Chinese Minister in response to the passing of the 1907 and 1909 immigration restrictions (see pp. 234-36 and Appendix X).

- 95 This had been established at the Imperial War Conference of 1917, where it was agreed that

It is an inherent function of the Governments of the several communities of the British Commonwealth, including India, that each should enjoy complete control of its own population by means of restriction of immigration from any other communities.

(NZPD, 1920, 187:905)

- 96 Informants have confirmed that arrivals unable to pass the test were allowed to stay for a period in which they usually received intensive coaching from local bilingual Chinese in order that they could pass the test. Yue Jackson, in particular, a person attached to the Consulate, and bilingual, was of considerable help.
- 97 Canada was the only other Dominion that maintained the poll tax, and even there merchants and their wives and children were exempt.
- 98 Downie Stewart had ascertained from the Chinese Consul, Lin Shih-yuan, that Canada had initiated negotiations with the Chinese government to establish a situation where the poll tax would be discontinued and the accumulated revenue would be turned into scholarships for fifty Chinese students to study in Canadian schools and universities each year. The agreement would also establish a quota of 500 Chinese immigrants per year (NZPD, 1920, 187:911). Stewart does not however, add the information from the Consul that the scheme was turned down by the Chinese government who considered it a case of adding 'insult to injury' considering the source of the money (Ms. 985/1/44, 3 September 1920).
- 99 Ponton points out that New Zealand was not alone in allotting this amount of power over immigration to a Minister of Customs. In Britain, the Secretary of State had been given power over aliéens in 1920. Similarly, the Minister of Immigration in Australia and the Boards of Immigration in South Africa had identical powers (Ponton, 1946:63).
- 100 O'Connor points out that the original draft contained a statement that even though Chinese were in possession of a permit they would still be prohibited immigrants. Jellicoe had this rectified (O'Connor, 1968:64).
- 101 In 1926 the Cabinet decision was rescinded to appease public protest (Ponton, 1946:68). According to Ponton, on 26 June 1926 Cabinet decided that no further Chinese were to be admitted except wives and fiancées of New Zealand-born residents (*ibid.*). Ponton approved of this, even in 1946, when he added that the Chinese were a 'prolific race' and that it was better to restrict numbers than try and control morality (*ibid.*).

- 102 The important point here is that Ponton's arrivals are in excess of permits issued, so one would assume this includes returning residents, but the Census and Statistics figures suggest that the returning residents in this period exceed permits arrivals by 2,485 (see Appendix XII and Appendix XIII), and not the 52 people from Ponton's table.
- 103 Hall's 1927 article documented the excesses in legislative and economic discrimination in regard to Asiatic immigration and particularly what he called an 'excessive' racial consciousness' which he viewed as a 'mass problem' in New Zealand (Hall, 1927:228-238). For his clear thinking, Hall received sharp reaction especially in the local papers of Taranaki, Wanganui and Westport (Ponton, 1946:72).
- 104 Even the policy over extensions seems to have been variable. Extant poll tax records indicate that in at least one case a Chinese doctor was able to get his permit extended from 1924 till 1928 after the government received a petition from a large number of the Chinese community. It was also noted in the same records that it was legitimate for permits to be extended from several months to several years (Poll Tax Records, Department of Labour). Ponton maintains, however, that the policy of extending permits was changed in February 1927 to limit the period to two years (see New Zealand Gazette 10, 24 February 1927).
- 105 It will be noted here that the figure of 706 obtained from the Census and Statistics report to Internal Affairs is markedly different from the decline in population reported in the Census of 431.
- 106 This change in immigration pattern will be dealt with in the next chapter, but it suffices here to suggest that these figures and the observation by the Herald about mothers and children returning to China for economic reasons seems to relate to the depression which was felt to be more easily tolerated by local Chinese without having to maintain a large family in New Zealand.

PART III

CHAPTER 6

THE NEW ZEALAND PETITIONS: 1880-1908

By the 1920s, a community of a little over 3,000 Chinese survived in New Zealand, despite a continual barrage of immigration restrictions, waves of anti-Chinese fervour, periods of buoyancy and depression in the New Zealand economy the discontinuation of the right to naturalisation, exclusion from welfare provisions and the uncertainties resulting from substantial changes in their homeland. Coincident with this survival, however, was the purposeful development of internal organisation (a segmentary structure) which attempted to respond to the various pressures facing the Chinese community. The organisations that made up this segmentary structure had a political function in that they can be seen to allocate and legitimate power and authority in the Chinese community. This segmentary system and its organisations developed for three reasons: a) continual formal and informal pressure from New Zealand society which threatened the socio-economic survival of the community; b) external pressure resulting from changes in China, mediated through the role of the Consulate, which variously affected New Zealand and the Chinese community; and, c) the articulation of interests resulting from a) and b), which produced sufficient tension in the community to necessitate at times a reformulation of the segmentary structure. This

segmentary system co-ordinated decision-making, administration, authority, power and provided sanctions, but it also, and more importantly, could be the basis of either fragmentation or cohesion within the community. These polar alternatives implicit in the nature of a segmentary system provide the dynamic nature of the Chinese community, which gradually moved into a cycle alternating between cohesion and fragmentation.

The purpose of the next three chapters, therefore, is to continue the history of the Chinese community more from the perspective of the organisations which evolved and formed the segmentary structure. At this point (1880-1907), however, three significant changes occurred which set the parameters for future development in the Chinese community.

First, immigration restriction and the added disabilities that affected the maintenance of business and the establishment of family were met with protest, which largely took the form of petitions to the government, countering the sojourner stereotype attached to the Chinese by Europeans. Similarly, unjust treatment, whether by individuals before the courts or by the public, was increasingly confronted.

Second, the economic base in the gold fields was supplanted by the other activities once adjunct to the mining and now moved to new locations throughout New Zealand. Whereas disenchanted and old miners had often turned to gardening and retailing, it was now taken up by a somewhat younger generation. The new economic base, like the mining, was dependent on Chinese labour, but unlike its counterpart in the gold fields, it now depended almost entirely on a European clientele.

It was this business, often allied to market gardening, that formed the base of a new social structure reminiscent of the mining community and mining group. It recruited new members from overseas, provided both food and income and a job with more security than mining.

Finally, the community responded to changes in China. A consulate was established in Wellington, the intended consequence of local Chinese action and the unintended consequence of the New Zealand government's fervour for exclusion. The presence of a consul, however, had its own consequences, for after his arrival, the New Zealand government had an informant - a person who was as close to the Chinese community and China as he was to the New Zealand government. The Chinese community, on the other hand, had an advocate who presumably could be called upon to support their interests (see Chapter 7, pp.357-60) and a person who increasingly represented the national concerns of China to the overseas community. In this latter capacity the consul has been described alternatively by informants as merely a facilitator or figurehead of organisational development within the community or, on the other hand, as the catalyst responsible for its initiation.

The task of the next three chapters then is to unravel the social and political structure as it developed in the Chinese community while at the same time relating it to the social context in which it occurred, remembering the concluding assumptions of the last chapter that both events in China and New Zealand helped create and direct the socio-political structure of the Chinese community.

The first chapter covers a period from the late 1880s till 1907, characterised by numerous attempts on the part of government to restrict Chinese immigration. This legislative activity coincided with a

Chinese community that was re-organising both its residence and occupational structure, and the result was an attempt by some in the Chinese community to represent their countrymen in trying either to reduce or halt legislation, to obtain legitimate representation to the New Zealand government and at the very least to change their stereotype profile as far as European New Zealand was concerned. The action was, therefore, a reaction to the New Zealand government and directed at this same body. The socio-political structure that emerged was a merchant/missionary alliance, which formulated, with the help of co-opted others, a series of petitions aimed at the above mentioned objectives, and despatched them to the House of Representatives, the Prime Minister, the Governor and finally the Colonial Office in England.

The second chapter covers the period from 1908 till 1935. It begins with the arrival of a particularly dynamic and vocal consul who spoke on behalf of the local Chinese. However, while the consul in fact assumed the responsibilities of those who had previously organised the petitions, he also had to cope with another parameter of socio-political organisation within the Chinese community which reflected changing events in China. The emergence of K'ang Yu-wei and Sun Yat-sen, representing two alternative directions for China, divided the overseas community into two factions. The Consul saw this as counter-productive and established a Chong Wah Wui Koon (Chinese Association), a non-political organisation dedicated to preventing political feuds and arguments. The action was initially successful, but it centred largely on Wellington as time went on and was eventually unable to cope with the influence of post-revolutionary changes in China and another wave of anti-Chinese sentiment in New Zealand. The community-oriented Chong Wah Wui Koon became obsolete

in the 1920s with the wave of enthusiasm amongst overseas Chinese for the KMT, which was organised nationally in New Zealand with local voluntary branches. This was only one half of a response, however; the remaining half was the re-emergence of district associations, this time more abundant than their gold-fields equivalent. These fulfilled the functions of the Chong Wah Wui Koon, caring for the specific interests of district members both within the Chinese community and in their dealings with Europeans.

From the demise of the Chong Wah Wui Koon in the early 1920s till 1927 the socio-political organisation was fragmented and localised. Local areas celebrated Double Tenth while the locality associations and the KMT seem to have been concerned only with the internal affairs of their community, unresponsive to the serious threats from the European community, which were left to the Consul. However by 1927 the unresolved antagonism between existing political factions, the CKT and the KMT, developed into an open dispute in the community only to be resolved by the influence of Chiang's success and that of the KMT in China. This conflict, plus increasing anti-Chinese hostility, the depression and the virtual exclusion of Chinese immigration to New Zealand embodied in the 1920 Act led to renewed attempts to bring existing associations together under a community organisation. In 1927 another Chong Wah Wui Koon was founded with its headquarters in Wellington but also with branches in four other centres and it was this organisation that effectively provided a united front for the community during the years of the depression. For the first time the entire community took on the blatant anti-Chinese activity represented in actions by certain segments of the population. More importantly the Chinese were seen as a community to share the experience of the depression without excessive reliance on their dominant host society.

The third chapter begins in 1935, when the Chinese community, having survived the depression becomes increasingly aware of a deteriorating situation in China while faced with the continuing restriction on immigration to New Zealand. Stimulated by nationalism and a felt need to preserve their community in New Zealand as well as their family members in China, the New Zealand Chinese Association was started, and in 1937 the Anti-Japanese Movement Collection Campaign was launched. The association and the collection campaign re-organised the Chinese community into twenty-six regional branches incorporating local Chong Wah Wui Koon already in existence and acting alongside the various branches of the KMT. Each had an executive modelled on the Wellington headquarters and each was in charge of its own local collection effort. For a time, district and political differences were sublimated to national ideals and support of the homeland. The collection was a massive collective effort, but it peaked in 1939 and then trailed off to the end of 1944. By that time a whole new community of reunited families faced repatriation, there were arguments over remaining monies that had not been sent to China, and a tendency emerged for local communities to seek a return to autonomy away from the aegis of the national association. Furthermore, sectional economic interests emerged, with the Chinese Growers Association granted its legitimacy by government to represent a large body of the Chinese community spread from Auckland to Invercargill. Merchant interests also re-established themselves with the return to normal shipping and turned their attention with other support to capitalising on their homeland's - and later Taiwan's - post-war development. This post-war development, however, forms the basis of the final chapters.

The easiest place to pick up the threads of the reconstructed social structure after the decline of the gold-fields community is with a series of petitions that originated in the Chinese community (see Appendix XIV for the complete list). They are important, as already noted, because they preceeded the re-development of formal community organisation and illustrate the concerns of at least the signatories. They also coincided with the growth of anti-Chinese legislative activity and in fact almost ceased once diplomatic representation was established and more formal organisations appeared to represent the interests of the community.

The first group of petitions presented to the New Zealand government emanated from the Auckland Chinese community in 1888 and 1891. As noted in Chapter 5, there was evidence of a small but nevertheless growing community which consisted of twenty-one males and three females in 1881 and seventy males and twelve females by 1891.¹ In 1879 the first Chinese was naturalised in Auckland, followed by eight in 1883, five in 1884 and five in 1885. While hardly significant alone, these represent 26% of those getting naturalised for these years; 75% of all Chinese naturalised in the North Island (see Appendix XV). Outside of Dunedin, Auckland was the one place with a significant number of Chinese women present in the community.

Both the 1888 petition and the three petitions in 1891 asked for amendments to the 1881 Act, which in the interim period had been further strengthened. While we know little about the counties represented by the petitioners, at least one of the initiators of the first 1891 petition was a merchant from Toy San, Seyip. None of these petitions received much note, nor were they in any way influential enough to sway the government.

When it was clear that legislative restriction would continue the Wellington community filed a lengthy petition to try and

halt the continued 'oppressive laws' in 1895. The document was formulated by eight merchants and signed by 207 of the local community. Judging by the total Chinese population in Wellington for 1896, 214 males and three females, the petition would seem to represent a strong consensus. Clearly, a merchant elite had emerged by this time, capable of wielding public opinion, and furthermore of summarising the major arguments that had been levelled against the Chinese since their arrival in New Zealand. The petitioners maintained that the Chinese were eating and dressing like Europeans, were moral, kind, provided their own social welfare, paid taxes and rent promptly, were law-abiding, did not compete with local labour, were clean, produced useful products (fruit and vegetables) and bought local products (see Chapter 5, p.198 for Text). All of this was contrary to previously expressed opinions and largely resulted from an acknowledged change in their economic base with the decline in the gold fields. The Chinese population had clearly spread throughout New Zealand by 1896, and their profile was much more apparent than it had been previously when hidden away in the depths of Otago.

At the same time as the petition denied the accusations of the past, it also, like the Auckland petition of 1888, drew the New Zealand government's attention to the obligations present in Sino-British treaty provisions. The document therefore summed up a set of internal and external relations for the government, unfortunately with little benefit to the petitioners.

The following year, the Chinese community in Wellington again attempted to change their situation, this time directing their attention to the Governor, presumably hoping that the petitions would reach England rather than end up in the hands of the House.

Two petitions were formulated, the first of which reacted to the proposed increase in the poll tax and the possible termination of the right to naturalisation. The petition was an appeal based on the fact that the proposed provisions were 'exception, cruel and unjust' particularly if China and New Zealand were to be considered friendly nations (Appendix XVI). It was signed by the interpreter (the son of John Ah Tong; see Chapter 3), a Chinese missionary Chang Luke, and four merchant companies. The second was a more elaborate petition sent to the Governor specifically on behalf of naturalised Chinese, who, according to the petitioners, were now contemplating permanent residence, since they had become used to the country, and desired to bring out wives, families and relatives (see Appendix XVII). Clearly, the flurry of legislative activity by Seddon and the threat to curtail naturalisation rights drastically altered the options open to local Chinese residents. In the light of this, the Governor and the Crown remained their last resort. In the first instance they hoped that the legislation would not receive the Governor's assent or failing this, that the Crown would overrule colonial legislation on the basis of international treaty obligations.

The Chinese made it clear in the second petition that no legitimate inquiry had been set up in New Zealand to prove or disprove the accusations against them, and since there was no just reason for restricting the legitimate settlement of Chinese families, impediments should be removed (see Appendix XVII). The Governor sent both petitions to Seddon, who responded in two memoranda. The first, on 29 September 1896, told the Governor that the Chinese were right, naturalisation would be discontinued, justified on the basis of 'race purity' and the fact that a similar provision had existed in New South Wales for several years (C.O. 209/256, No. 39). Furthermore, the

issue was a domestic matter and there was nothing 'cruel or unjust' in the proposed legislation (*ibid.*). On 29 October, Seddon replied more politely to the second petition, saying that if the petitioners were sincere and could prove this to the satisfaction of the government, then the Governor could remit their poll tax under the provisions of the 1881 Act.

As noted in the previous chapter, the appeal fell on deaf ears, although the Governor, probably favouring the Chinese position or at least not supporting Seddon, refused to sign the bill that was sent to England. The poll tax was raised, and the naturalisation issue remained a mystery. In contrast to the ninety-five Chinese naturalised in 1894 (fifty-five were from Wellington out of which thirty-nine were shopkeepers, merchants), there were only seventeen naturalised in 1895 and sixteen in 1896, none of them from Wellington. The following year there were none, and between 1898 and 1902 only fourteen received naturalisation. As for rights conferred by naturalisation, the case of Fook On discussed in the last chapter (page 213) showed that the issue, in the end, depended entirely on the legitimacy of Chinese marriage, which was not accepted in that particular case, although proof was provided. The efforts of 1896 had proved if anything, that naturalisation in New Zealand was hardly worth the cost or effort. If the Chinese had been accused of non-participation in New Zealand justifiably in the past, it was to continue to be the case but not by their own choice.

Four years later the Wellington community tried another petition, attempting to get the New Zealand government to act on their behalf in negotiations with China. The petition was addressed to Acting Premier J.G. Ward and contained the following text (translated from the Chinese):

We the undersigned natives of China, now resident in the city of Wellington, humbly request that you will approach the Chinese Government on our behalf. On many occasions we have felt the want of a Consul or someone belonging to the British race and activated by a wish to see justice done to the weak and friendless, who could represent us in time of trouble or anxiety. Our desire is to be useful citizens and law-abiding colonists, but as nearly all of us are either unacquainted or very partially acquainted with your regulations, we are liable to conflict with the authorities and to be prosecuted and punished for things that are simply owing to our want of knowledge. If we had someone appointed by our Government and nominated by yourself or the Governor-in-Council, who would take an interest in our welfare and help us adapt ourselves to British and New Zealand methods, it would be a great advantage to us and to colonists with whom we earnestly desire to live on the best of terms. We therefore pray that, for the reasons set forth, you will recommend a Chinese Consul or Protector.

(E.J. Arnold papers, Turnbull Library, MS H-19).

The covering letter from Ah Kan and the interpreter stated that the Chinese population was about 4,000 (1900)² and he hoped the Premier would 'use his influence' in getting the appointment of the official (*ibid.*). The letter went on to state that the Chinese preferred Edwin Arnold, JP, of Wellington, 'who has taken an interest in our race and continues to do so' (*ibid.*). The petition itself was signed by 172 people representing Seyip (Toy San - 63, Sun Wui - 39), Sam Yap (Poon Yu - 37) and Jung Sing - 33, 69% of the Wellington Chinese population.

We know little of what happened to this petition, although the request was a diplomatically impossible task for New Zealand, having no direct links with Peking. All such arrangements would have had to go through the Colonial Office and the Chinese Embassy in England. The important point, however, is the suggestion of a European as an advocate; this was to occur again in 1902-03 (see Chapter 5, p. 219) and represents a shrewd, if not last resort, assessment of what kind of advocacy would work in the New Zealand context. There have always been

a small handful of individuals, solicitors, churchmen and women and others who have befriended the Chinese and who have been accepted for their regard. People like Alexander Don and, later, Reverend McNeur of the Presbyterian Church; Brandon and Hislop, Skerrett and Wylie, O'Regan and Dix, all solicitors in Wellington; Shrimski in the Legislative Council, Richard Edward Green of Christchurch and Peter Fraser, Prime Minister (1940-1949) are all remembered at least as benefactors if not for the actual help they gave.

The petition also represented an abased stance apparent in the language used. Compared to the arguments presented in previous petitions, the use of 'weak and friendless' as justification for their request and the statement that conflict with authorities stems from their misunderstanding of customs, language and law strike one as far less assertive. While it was one thing to negate the stereotypes the Chinese had been castigated for in earlier years, in 1900 it was more important to solve the problems emerging in the urban areas as clientele changed and business required more sophisticated understanding of their environment, including local by-laws.

Two years later another petition requesting essentially the same provision was organised by one Louis Kitt³ and signed by 314 Chinese residents of New Zealand.⁴ The tone of the petition was more assertive and claimed that, since Chinese were carrying on business operations all over the Colony, it was necessary that the Chinese have a representative who could 'conserve their rights (before the law) and interests (in business)' where, it was claimed they were at a disadvantage (NA, LE 1/1903/11; 1903/2053). It was with some justification that Chinese now called for a representative to 'conserve their rights', for under the Opium Prohibition Act of

1901 a constable with any suspicion concerning the use of opium could enter Chinese premises without a warrant, (see below page 298-9). Unlike the situation in the gold fields where Chinese were accorded the same protection under the law as all others, in the urban setting they found not only that immigration restrictions were made specifically for them, but also that other rights were being eroded.

The signatures collected from twenty-seven towns (see Table 8) represented 11% of the 1901 Chinese population resident in New Zealand and would have required a visit by Louis Kitt or his deputy to ensure this success.

TABLE 8

Distribution of signatures for 1903 Petition

Masterton	25
Carterton	1
Greytown	2
Pahiatua	4
Petone	1
Woodville	1
Waipawa	2
Taradale	12
Napier	5
Papakura	7
Hastings	1
Christchurch	65
Oamaru	3
Timaru	9
Auckland	29
Gisborne	7
Dunedin	20
Lyell	7
March Creek	3
Sanding	1
Flash Creek	3
Reefton	3
Kaikata	1
Greymouth	17
Martahita	37
Murchison	1
Nelson	19

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The diversity of occupations was consistent with the 1901 occupations (see Appendix VIII), including market gardeners, storekeepers of various types, restaurant owners and hawkers.⁵ As noted in the previous chapter, the petitions committee passed the petition on to the government for favourable consideration. The government did nothing until Sir J.G. Ward received a letter from the Colonial Office stating that the Chinese residents of Wellington had brought to their attention the matter of an appointment of a European official and had actually sent a copy of the petition to the Colonial Office (NA, IA, Chinese Consul, 12 September 1903). In early 1904 Shack Horne,⁶ a signatory to the 1903 petition, wrote directly to the Colonial Secretary about the matter and asked what action had been taken (NA, Chinese Consul, 8 March 1904). Four days later he received a curt reply that the government would take no action (ibid.).

Between the two aforementioned petitions, however, other activity was undertaken by the Chinese community which can only be described as an attempt to demonstrate their changed attitude toward two 'vices' which Europeans had consistently used as evidence against the Chinese community. The 'vices' included opium and gambling, and the response of at least part of the Chinese community was to initiate petitions which asked, firstly, that opium importation be stopped and that sale and use be controlled and, secondly, that steps be taken for the suppression of gambling. In all, there were eight petitions relating to opium and one to gambling. The first, in 1900 (actually collected in 1899) from Young Hee (a law clerk in Greymouth) and 541 others, acknowledged that opium importation was increasing as was use by Chinese and some Europeans (NA, LE1/1900/9, No. 211). It is admitted the habit-forming nature of opium and the fact that the

Chinese were the major consumers of the amount imported. The curious factor, the petitions noted, was that the Chinese population was declining but that opium importation was increasing towards the amount imported in the 1890s, when the Chinese population was 53% larger than in 1900. The petitioners argued that their efforts were a continuation of those started in 1888 and probably were supported by many who had been party to the original attempt sponsored by the Dunedin merchants. While it is clear that merchants lent their support to the petition, as evidenced by the fifty-seven who signed the document, predominantly from Dunedin, Greymouth and Cromwell, the legitimization for the government's sake came from the fact that Daniel Wong, Chinese Missionary in Greymouth, May Lilly Macfarlane, teacher in Hokitika, and Alexander Don of the Presbyterian Mission to the Chinese in Otago-Southland witnessed all the signatures. Clearly it was the missionary network that provided the basis for its distribution. It is therefore curious that there are some rather obvious Chinese settlements missing, including Round Hill with a population of 190, which Don knew extremely well.⁷

In the following year, six similar petitions were circulated in other areas of New Zealand, with a total of 180 signatures collected.⁸ Unlike the 1900 petition, which was recommended for favourable consideration by the petitions committee, the later ones met with the response that the committee had no recommendation to make since the matter had already been dealt with by the Opium Prohibition Bill. The bill, which in 1901 became an Act, later to be consolidated with amendments into the Opium Act 1908, required:

"Customs permits for each import and each export, and the keeping of records of all quantities which any person bought or sold in a ledger retained for that purpose. It prohibited the smoking of Opium, and authorised any constable to enter and search premises occupied by Chinese without a warrant if he had any reasonable cause to suspect that opium smoking was going on or was permitted or abetted in that house or in those premises. A search warrant was required for premises not occupied by Chinese.

(Drug Dependency and Drug Abuse in New Zealand, 1970, Report No. 14:15.)

While the above restricted the importation of opium and severely infringed the privacy of the Chinese, it did not restrict the sale of the drug to Chinese. This inconsistency was resolved in 1910, when the Opium Amendment Act was passed making it unlawful to sell to "any person of the Chinese race" any preparation of opium which might be made suitable for smoking unless permission had been given by a medical practitioner or the Minister of Customs (ibid. 114).

New Zealand's restrictions on opium importation and use were in advance of the rest of the world, but some local Chinese were not satisfied with the 1901 provisions. In 1904, Louis Kitt, two other merchants, the Chinese interpreter from Wellington and the Chinese missionary from Greymouth sent two more petitions to government. The two problems dealt with separately were opium importation and gambling, both of which were decried by the petitioners, and requests were made in both cases to tighten restrictions, asking that police be granted the right to obtain a search warrant in order to search Chinese premises for opium and that more severe penalties than fines be imposed for gambling (NA, LE 1/1904/9.No 21). The Public Petitions Committee was motivated to the extent that they called witnesses for both issues in the presence of Louis Kitt. The major witness was Inspector Ellison, who stated to the committee that he thought the claims in the petition about opium were exaggerated

and that, contrary to the contention of the petitioners, police powers were sufficient and Customs Department efficiency in apprehending illegal importation was high (AJHR, 1904, I-1D:2). He noted that the petitioners seemed to be ignorant of police search powers as regards the Chinese and assured the committee that these were being used but also added that the Chinese caught had been found to have procured their opium from Wellington chemists and that in most cases the fines had been quite severe.⁹

As regards gambling, Ellison stated that it was indeed prevalent amongst Chinese all over New Zealand and that it seemed to be the only recreation they had (ibid.:2-3). He confirmed the presence of the lotteries (paak-kop-piu) as stated by Louis Kitt and added that he knew of twenty two of twenty four agents operating in Wellington alone which perhaps, he speculated, were connected to other centres through the Chinese shops which seemed to have branches in many other places (ibid.). The committee seemed quite interested in the way the lottery worked and the possible amounts one could win, which were identical to Don's description in 1882 (Chapter 4, page 131), despite the twenty two years that had elapsed.

Two other points bear mentioning in regard to gambling. First, in giving his evidence Ellison stated that he had no objection to gambling within the Chinese community and that in fact their propensity for this activity was no greater than Europeans. If it was suppressed it might, he suggested, lead to other forms of 'evil' (AJHR, 1904, I-1D:3). If anything was wrong with the gambling in this context, it was the fact that 'young men, middle-aged men, or old men ...mingle with the Chinese', and this was 'bad' and in his opinion should be a punishable offence (ibid.). Secondly, Ellison noted that

the law was 'defective' as regards convictions under the Gaming and Lotteries Act 1881. In several cases in 1902 where convictions had been made in Magistrate's Courts under this Act, appeals had been lodged and convictions quashed.¹⁰ In the period 1901 to 1907, nine separate gambling cases came before the Supreme Court to appeal a Magistrate's Court decision, and in all cases the Chinese appellants won their case. While the courts may have supported the Chinese on appeal, the petitions from Wellington seem to indicate that the profile of a gambling community and the publicity from such cases was counter-productive for some of the community. According to most informants, the cause of gambling's popularity in the early 1900s, and to some extent in the 1930s, was in the first instance urbanisation of an ageing population and, in the second, a result of unemployment in the Chinese community. In the period between 1891 and 1921, the age distribution in the Chinese population changed as the population in the 25 to 45 and 45 to 65 declined in most of the period, with only the resurgence of the 25 to 45 category by 1921 (see Appendix XVIII). The 65 and over category, having peaked in 1916, started to decline in 1921 as a more youthful group took over. The 65 and over men would have little to look forward to in places like Wellington, and while they may have been able to work in shops, their lack of English and vigour would have made it extremely difficult for them to be useful. As Don's records show, the absence of family in China or kin in New Zealand removed the rationale for much of their activity, and it was in the end only necessary to survive. This survival, however, in a context that provides no social security, must of necessity become the concern of the Chinese community, but they seemed reluctant to offer benevolence to deviants, instead opting to inflict more hardship on them and make them the wards of the adopted state.

In 1907 the last major petition of the Chinese community was circulated. This was before the appointment of the Consul but coincident with Hwang Hou Cheng's investigation into the conditions of Chinese in Australia and New Zealand prior to the appointment of Consular representatives.¹¹ Hwang came to New Zealand most probably in response to knowledge of Louis Kitt and Shack Horne's 1903 petition, but the petition in 1907 at the time of the visit makes no mention of representation. The petition summarised immigration restrictions passed against the Chinese; described their occupations and general characteristics, and suggested that the 1907 bill make it impossible to come to New Zealand in the first place or, for that matter, to re-enter New Zealand after an absence. The general tone was one that reflected the interests of a settled population that wanted to become permanent residents, replenish their own community and have the right to come back to New Zealand if they should leave to visit home. Land ownership, naturalisation, hard work, payment of poll tax, minor offending and a decreasing population were the justifications for their request and proof of their commitment to permanent resident (see Appendix (XIX) clause 1, 2, 3, 4 and 15). The actual request was that the 1907 bill, described as 'not fully and adequately considered and discussed' and which had been reserved by Plunket, the Governor of New Zealand, should not receive the assent of the Crown.

Both the Prime Minister and the firm of solicitors who had prepared the petition for the Chinese responded to the petition, sending letters to the Governor. The Prime Minister, Ward, made two major points, firstly that since there had been a long precedent of anti-Chinese legislation in New Zealand then surely this indicated sufficient opposition to justify yet another Act. Secondly, since numerous Acts had been passed without objections from Imperial

authorities then there was no reason to suppose that the New Zealand Parliament did not have the Constitutional right to legislate (see Appendix XX). This was a predictable response but to some extent contradicted by the solicitors submission. The two Wellington firms, Skerret and Wylie and O'Regan and Dix described the process of collecting the signatures. They noted that it was a unanimous response even though there were only 650 signatures. There had been misunderstanding in obtaining signatures since often only an employer would sign the petition on behalf of all his employees, a situation, if remedied, according to the solicitors would have led to considerably more signatures. There had also been problems in translation which had to be done to enable signatories to read the document before signing. As far as the petition was concerned they supported the claims of the Chinese maintaining:

...that in their opinion there had been no public demand for a Bill which we protest is an infringement of the rights of these residents. We consider the measure is calculated to embarrass His Majesty's Government at a time when intimate diplomatic relations exist between His Majesty's Government and the Government of China, and when the public feeling of this country does not demand any such harsh legislation.

(C.O. 418/62, 21 April 1908)

They also objected to the fact that no provision had been made for the exemption of Chinese residents of New Zealand by the use of Ministerial discretion or a right of appeal (ibid.).

While the petition was unsuccessful in its aim the previously requested Consul representative was appointed. The decision was first published in the 'Ting Wah Times' of Sydney which had received news from the Chinese ambassador in London that consuls would be appointed to Australia and New Zealand; it was later quoted in the New Zealand Times (NZT, 6 April, 1908). In May of the following year, Sir

Edward Grey M.P. received notification from Li Ching Fong of the Chinese Legation that Mr Liang Lan Hsu had been appointed Consul General at Melbourne and Mr Hwang Yung Liang, Consul for Wellington (NA, IA, 08/201).¹² Customs was informed by Internal Affairs of Hwang's arrival, and permission was granted for the Consul to bring a servant as long as he departed with the Consul at the end of the former's assignment (NA, IA, 08/201).

With the presence of diplomatic representation, the strategy of using the petition as a means of articulating the needs of the Chinese community was almost ended. Essentially, the effort had been directed at the New Zealand Government attempting to change legislation as regards immigration, gain the appointment of a representative or manipulate their own image amongst the dominant European society. In the end the appeal for representation was the issue that was successful, but this seems more the result of a change in China's foreign policy than the consequence of action in New Zealand. Of more importance, however, than the success or failure of these initiatives is the fact that Wellington became the center of the New Zealand Chinese community, and it was there that the leaders of the community formed the first organisation, largely as a response to an overseas Chinese movement.

By 1905 Sun Yat Sen had started to consolidate his overseas following by creating the T'ung Meng Hui, based on a secret - society model, which had as its first three aims the 'expulsion of the Manchus, restoration of Chinese rule, and the establishment of a republic' (Schiffrin, 1968:358). In 1905 or 1906 the organisation started in Wellington under the guidance of Louis Kitt and Wong Kwok Mun, according to informants. While its organisation, membership and aims

have been lost, older members of the community have confirmed that it followed the aims initially set by Sun Yat Sen and was probably started here under the influence of the Australian Chinese community in Sydney.

The petitions had essentially therefore paved the way for formal associational activity providing the means whereby an emerging merchant elite with an increasing vested interest in an urban clientele, both European and Chinese, could establish power and authority over the community. In a sense the petitions had tried to mediate relations both within the community as well as those between the community and New Zealand society and China. Once associational activity emerged initially specifically directed to political events in China and later to the eradication of the factions created by this divided allegiance and a Consulate arrived, a formal organisational structure emerged within the community and henceforth it is this structure, through a number of organisations, which responded to the various relations that confronted the community.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. Auckland includes the Census Borough's of Auckland, Newton, Newmarket and Parnell for the purposes of this statistic.
2. This is a curious exaggeration. The Chinese population in 1901 was 2,857 and had not been close to 4,000 since 1891.
3. Louis Kitt 呂洪傑 was from Jung Sing and lived in New Zealand with his wife and five children till they returned to China in 1916. According to one very old informant, both Louis Kitt and Shack Horne were part of Wong Shee and Company in Wellington.
4. The reference to this petition in the Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives states that the Petition was from 322 Wellington Chinese, whereas the signatories in fact number 314 and are from 28 different communities in New Zealand (N.A. LE1, 1903:11; 1903:2053).
5. Although all occupations are not listed, enough are present to indicate the diversity.
6. It was stated in the Otago Daily Times that Shack Horne had been in Dunedin collecting signatures for this petition on behalf of the Chinese Reform Society. The article further noted that the petition was being forwarded to the House of Representatives, since the Chinese Government was too 'unprogressive' to move on such a matter (ODT, 4 March 1903). According to informants, Shack Horne's Chinese name was 石漢, and he was an interpreter for the Seyip community. Greif (1974:38-39) asserts that this surname had been 'made to look European' on purpose and is probably 'Han or Hom', but informants have told me that the change is often a result of romanisation that occurred with Immigration authorities recording Chinese names. Once the name was written on the poll-tax certificate or re-entry permit, Chinese were bound to abide by the spelling. Shack Horne's name re-appears in 1931 and 1933, when he attempted through petition to get four of his six children born outside New Zealand into the country exempt from poll tax. The petition in both cases was supported with over 200 signatures and received favourable consideration because he was 'a naturalised British subject', and further because of his long residence in the Dominion and the services rendered by him, and in view of his son, Willie Shack Horne, having served with the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (AJHR, 1931, 1-1:4).

7. The other communities missed include Alexandra, Riverton and Invercargill.
8. Unfortunately, only two of these remain, one from Auckland and the other from Christchurch. The former contained 36 signatures (five merchants, 21 gardeners, six laundrymen, and four storemen) and the latter contained 33 signatures (23 gardeners, five laundrymen, three storekeepers and two storemen). The notice of these petitions in the AJHR registers only 35 signatures from the former and 33 from the latter. (AJHR, 1901, I-2:7 and NA, LE1 1907:7).
9. In support of this, one can note the petition from Wah Lee and Sue Chong, laundrymen in Wanganui, who appealed against what they described as excessive fines (NA, LE 1, 1904:9, No 782). They had been fined £25 each for possession of opium, £5 each for smoking it on two separate occasions and were now unable to pay the total fine, which was in excess of £100 (*ibid.*). The petitioners argued that they had not tried to induce Europeans to smoking and that possession and smoking should not be considered as separate offences. The petitioners were unsuccessful.
10. The appeals concentrated on points of law: a) that lotteries under the 1881 Act could not be considered 'games of chance'; b) that before a conviction could be made against one running a gaming house or others who assisted, it had to be proved that one actually existed; c) that it took more than the presence of lottery tickets to establish this point, and it was seldom possible to prove that the lottery was going on, since the building involved would be used only intermittently (see NZLR Vol.24, pp 585-598 and 645-654). These ambiguities were to a large degree resolved in the 1908 Act, which made fan-tan and paak kop piu illegal (NZ Statutes, 1908-57, Vol. 5:512).
11. Attempts to locate Huang's report have met with little success. Diplomatic documents for the late Ch'ing (Ch'ing-chi wai-chiao shih-liao) were checked in Taipei and at the National Library of Australia, but all that remains is a reference to the report in a letter to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Wang Ta Hsieh (April 18, 1907). Wang's letter, while discussing the position of Chinese in England, Canada, America and Australia, mentions New Zealand only in passing. Hwang's report is acknowledged and the fact that he and Tan Yee Fan were sent to Australia and Canada respectively to 'take some measures to improve the situation' after 'harsher regulations [imposed] in recent years caused so much hardship that people sent cables continuously to the Embassy complaining' (Wang Ta Hsieh to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 18, 1907:324).
12. Hwang Yung Liang was born in Anhui province, was a graduate of Yale University and had become a Methodist. He spoke English fluently (NA, IA 08/201).

CHAPTER 7

CHINESE ORGANISATION AND THE CONSULATE: 1908-1935

The next period spans the time from the arrival of the Chinese Consul through the depression of the 1930s. As in the past the external relations and internal dynamics of the Chinese community provide the impetus for continued developments. The Consul's role is important for it represents both the official link with China and the recognition by the New Zealand government of the New Zealand Chinese community.

Initially the Consul was responsive to growing political factions in the community which emerged in reaction to differing political groups in China and attempted to hold the New Zealand community together under the aegis of a Chong Wah Wui Koon, which recognised residence in New Zealand as more important for membership than locality or political association. The Consul was also supportive of local Chinese concerns but the period under discussion shows a clear preference on the part of diplomatic representatives for the status of China and only merchants and intellectuals in the overseas community. The Chong Wah Wui Koon, while attempting to curtail factions failed, giving rise to further segmentation in the community as locality associations developed to deal with more immediate needs of individuals in addition to the CKT,

monarchists and KMT which maintained their following. The resolution of arguments between political factions was not terminated until the success of Chiang's Northern Expedition which, in conjunction with growing concern amongst the New Zealand Chinese over developing hostility from Europeans, led to the suggestion that a community organisation be established. By 1927 a growing merchant elite had developed and thrived partially helped by the Consul, but largely supported by a slowly growing established Chinese community. It was this group who now provided the direction for the community and achieved power and authority to do so. The Consul abided by their recommendations, and a second Chong Wah Wui Koon was established, this time on the basis of consultation with all existing associations. The new community association with a headquarters in Wellington successfully performed the role as a representative of the Chinese community both in terms of its position in New Zealand and vis-a-vis relations with China.

Counter to this tendency towards centralisation in the Chinese community however, there was also a move towards local community autonomy especially exacerbated by the need for survival during the depression and the emergence of somewhat isolated large Chinese market gardening concerns. Local communities tended to depend on their own resources for income and welfare during the depression. Double Tenth was celebrated by local communities as public events for the first time. While the Chong Wah Wui Koon, as a national association, represented the interests of all Chinese, local community branches developed in response to their own particular concerns. The kind of community structure that emerged during this period was extremely important, for the leadership and organisation that developed provided the basis for an organised community which would have to confront the continued assault on their existence in New Zealand and the war against Japan which would engulf their homeland.

In February 1909 the Consul arrived complete with family (Dominion, 4 February 1909). He was met by the press, who wanted to know what he thought about the immigration restrictions, and by a delegation of local Chinese, who said that the immigration laws were not as severely enforced on Japanese (ibid.). Hwang replied in the first instance that the Chinese did not like the restrictions and he wanted to learn more about them. He also said that China was developing and was going to take more interest in its overseas community, but he made no response to the local delegation.

A month after the Consul arrived came news from China that Peking had terminated the right of overseas Chinese to hold dual citizenship despite the fact that they might already have done so. The issue of naturalisation had been difficult enough for Chinese in New Zealand, but now they were faced with pressure from China and the situation became more complex. Worst of all, it now gave the New Zealand government the justification it needed for terminating the right. Hwang was immediately contacted in Wellington to comment on the move. He insisted he knew nothing of the decision but, on the other hand, could equally well see no reason why overseas Chinese would want to become British subjects 'while they are held in contempt by the people who grant them the privilege' (Evening Post, 7 April 1909). Further, he maintained that he had looked at the position of Chinese carefully in New Zealand, and while they might make more money here, their purchasing power was small. Considering the recent developments of 'railway, manufacturing and mining' in China, they would do better to return home to be with their own people (ibid.). If Britain was friends with China, he argued, then surely the Chinese as 'free men' should not be subjected

to fingerprinting in New Zealand. He maintained that 'fingerprinting was for criminals' but then noted that the Chinese were frugal, industrious and poorly dressed, and this seemed to be an 'offence' in New Zealand (ibid.). Having said all this, the Consul then concluded that this was all his personal opinion: 'As a Consul I have nothing to say' (ibid.).

The curiously outspoken Consul's statements did not end with the above. Before long he had left Wellington to make visits to Auckland and Dunedin and the West Coast with his interpreter, T.H. Shah,¹ leaving Wang Chung Siang² in charge (NA, IA 09/608). Hwang's speeches in Auckland and Dunedin maintained more or less the same stance, except that there was no further mention of repatriation. In most cases the Consul elevated the status of merchants, stating that they were traditionally honest, impartial and friendly and that the United States would benefit from the provisions they had made for Chinese students, merchants and visitors (ODT, 1 and 21 September 1909).³ His role in New Zealand was clearly to represent the merchant's interest - 'to develop trade' (ODT, 21 September 1909) - but not entirely to the neglect of others in the community. In Auckland he had taken issue with Millar, the Minister of Labour, who had previously been approached by laundrymen in Wellington complaining that Chinese laundries were exempt from the requirements of the Factories Act because they operated their businesses as partnerships.⁴ The Consul refused to see the provision of the Act as the real issue and maintained instead that it was the fact that the Chinese were actually getting European clientele which aggravated the situation (ODT, 2 September 1909). In Dunedin he took the opportunity to make it clear that the situation of the Chinese in New Zealand was a product of the context here. What do you expect, he asked, from people

who have no 'social intercourse, few wives because of the poll tax and immigration provisions, and who get no encouragement to improve their appearance, social standing or English?' (ibid.).

In the following year, after Hwang had returned from a trip to Greymouth, the Truth newspaper took him to task over his continued criticism of New Zealand. Truth was alarmed by the sudden public profile of an American-educated Chinese man which had never existed amongst the Chinese that Truth knew. The paper described at length:

We know him in New Zealand as a moral danger to our females. We know him to be lazy and vile in his habits. In his wake comes a pollution that is positively repellant to the clean living European.

(Truth, 24 December 1910)

According to the paper, this version of the Chinese deserved the treatment they had been accorded, and it was unfair of Hwang to suggest that Europeans would probably have as much trouble passing the language test as the Chinese did were they subjected to it. Truth recommended that Hwang familiarise himself with 'Public Opinion', which would tell him that New Zealand was 'white' and that the 'cute capitalist Chows' were not wanted, since 'working women' have enough trouble holding their own as it is (ibid.). Truth was caught in the unusual dilemma of reluctantly having to accord status to a Chinese person while at the same time castigating him as a supporter of the capitalist class who, to them, was exemplified by the small shop and laundry owners in the Chinese community, not the large merchant concerns whom Hwang would support. Despite this, however, Hwang was the first publicly vocal Chinese advocate for the local Chinese community, described many years later in the following:

When Hwang was appointed he didn't know where New Zealand was and then found it on a map - two little dots a way in the south. However, he was prepared to come and he was quite conversant in Chinese and English. He was quite a good organiser and did a lot of good things here.

(NZCGMJ, 1 September 1954).⁵

Hwang's most important role, however, was his attempt to stop the Chinese community from dividing into two factions. Unfortunately, evidence of this rift is only scant, since the men alive during the events were either too young at the time to be aware or have long since died or returned to China in the early 1900s never to return. Despite this, however, informants have indicated that by the time Hwang arrived in Wellington the CKT, or Chinese Freemasons, was already operating in Wellington and Auckland. It was established in New Zealand in 1907 following the ~~f~~^ounding of the T'ung Meng Hui, considerably later than its appearance in North American Chinese communities (Lyman, 1970 and Willmott, 1970).⁶ Its role overseas, Lyman maintains

...unite(ed) various traditional solidarities into an organization, gave aid and protection to its members engaged in control over and sale of illicit goods and services, and provided an occupation and avenue to upward mobility for those unable to achieve success through legitimate means.

(Lyman, 1970:45)

Paradoxically, the petitions that have already been discussed seem to indicate that the more positive facts, namely the first and third activities, had been emphasised while the second was actively discouraged, but it has not been ascertained that the signatories to the petitions were all CKT members. If they were not supporters of the CKT it is probable that they may have supported the T'ung Meng Hui or the Chinese Reform Society. The link between these groups is important in the

overseas Chinese communities of the time, which were made up of Cantonese people, for both K'ang Yu-wei as leader of the earlier reform movement and Sun Yat-sen as the emerging leader of the 1911 revolution were Cantonese and relied heavily on hua-ch'iao for their support. While it is clear, in Schiffrin's opinion, that the Chih-kung T'ang initially supported the more traditional reformer by 1904, Sun was able to enlist the help of the organisation and divert some of the funds going to support K'ang (Schiffrin, 1970:331-334).

In the New Zealand case, however, the CKT emerged after the T'ung Meng Hui and seems not to have moved in its political stance from the more traditional support of K'ang. In the opinion of informants, it represented another faction in New Zealand and was most probably opposed to the aims of the T'ung Meng Hui.

It is unlikely that the small New Zealand Chinese community could get sufficiently organised at this time to offer collective support to either movement, as they would do later to help fight the Japanese in 1937, but division in the community was apparent, and Hwang immediately took steps to encourage the founding of a Chong Wah Wui Koon. In 1909 the organisation was formalised in a constitution which stated the following in its preamble:

History has borne out the fact that a wise emperor would always attach supreme importance to peace and well-being of the nation, and to achieve this end, solidarity of the people and of different strata of the society must be realised. We have not seen a divided nation that survives.

His excellency Hwang Yung Liang has instructed us over and over again that to forge closer ties amongst the Chinese in New Zealand is now our over-riding task. To facilitate this goal we should work all out to establish an association of New Zealand Chinese.

(Rules of the New Zealand Chinese Association, 1909:1, see Appendix XXI)

Explicitly:

The Association endeavours to forge better friendly ties amongst our compatriots, foster the spirit of mutual help, and play an intermediate role in the case where divergent or conflicting opinions arise among our people.

(ibid.)

but:

This organisation promotes the progress of the society as a whole and is not involved in party politics nor religious affairs.

(ibid.)

The paradox was complete, as an association created by the influence of factions with an aim of preventing conflict in the community was to remain aloof from politics and religion.

The remainder of the document states that the association would be centred in Wellington and would provide a reading room and night school, the former to provide news of China and the latter to teach English and Chinese. The teachers were to be paid by the students taking lessons, whose tuition was to be £2 a year (ibid.:3).

All Chinese would be eligible to join the association for a fee of 5/- per year, and those returning to China would be liable to a levy of £1 plus a commission of 10/- to be paid to the association for procuring their steamer ticket home (ibid.:2).⁷

The executive of the association was to be in Wellington, with a president - in 1909 the Consul, Hwang Yung Liang - three vice presidents, three treasurers, three inspectors (one of which was the Consul's interpreter), one caretaker and fifteen commentators, all with specified responsibilities.⁸ A committee of six from the executive was assigned the task of monitoring the affairs of those travelling to and from China and had the right to refuse to be guarantors for travellers 'should they think their honour was [sic] at risk' (ibid.:2).

While Wellington-based, the association did have delegates from sixteen other centres with no more than three for any one centre, and it appears that the organisation was operating well by the time the constitution was actually framed, since they had a total of 1,573 members, donations totalling £2,658.5.0 and the levy and commission from at least 25 men returning to China. Wealthy donors, like the Consul who gave £10, an Auckland merchant who gave £25 and two Wellington merchants who gave £10 each, would have their names displayed in the Association hall, but many others obviously contributed what they could, and judging by the return, approximately 61% of the Chinese community were convinced that membership and possibly a donation were justified.⁹

The success of Hwang and the Wellington executive must be interpreted in the light of three influences: the arrival of the Consul as the first representative of their interest, the existing factions responding to changes in China, and most importantly the emergence of community. The last aspect was founded on a particular type of socio-economic structure which maintained the community and gave it the necessary base for survival. Hwang responded, at least partially, to the knowledge of its existence, so it seems germane at this point briefly to describe its most prominent aspects.

The occupations of the gold-mining period had now given way to businesses with a stability only formerly attributable to a few concerns in Otago or the home village environment (see Appendix XXII). This stability meant a predictable income from a predictable clientele and for the first time the possibility of a planned life. Visits home, regular savings (in the context of an anti-opium and gambling sentiment) rotating managerships, contracting and expanding partnerships all became part of the fruit and vegetable, laundry and market gardening enterprises.

With this type of stability, however, came a new type of responsibility. Unlike mining, the shop, garden or laundry had to be maintained over a period of time to ensure a constant return. Knowledge of the enterprises filtering back to home villages stimulated a renewed interest in going abroad like other relatives, fathers, brothers, uncles or nephews who had already established themselves overseas. Pressure increased on those already overseas to support newcomers, but the cost of the passage and the £100 poll tax selected against many would-be migrants who would have easily acquired the little capital it had taken in former years. Now the reliable and hard working ones were those who got family and overseas support unless, according to one informant, the family was wealthy enough to despatch wayward sons to be put under the authoritarian surveillance of a father or uncle.

Two periods of renewed immigration regenerated the New Zealand Chinese community prior to and in the 1920s. The first period lasted from 1903 till the implementation of the language test in 1907, when 995 Chinese came in, each paying the £100 poll tax. The second period, which was even more dramatic, was that preceeding the introduction of the permit system and just after, when 1,743 Chinese entered from 1919 till 1926 also paying poll tax (see Appendix II). This would have yielded £273,800 to the Consolidated Account and also represented a considerable drain on the local Chinese economy. This point is difficult to confirm, but a majority of informants maintain that the money for passage and poll tax came from the overseas community rather than from the home village, and from relatives who were in most cases hardly able to bear the cost.¹⁰

The Chinese population in New Zealand at this time was therefore the result of the above immigration pattern, plus a steady circulation of former residents. The economic situation of local Chinese was therefore variable and consisted largely of three categories of people. One category was in debt for poll tax and passage money, recently arrived and partially bonded to pay off the debt. Another category of people sponsored new immigrants and would have labour available, and the third category was people returning home with the intent of selecting worthwhile future immigrants or trying to finance immigration of their wives and children to New Zealand.

Given the variables influencing this situation - the changes in China and the changing immigration restrictions - it is no wonder that a structured business activity emerged in New Zealand, particularly in the North Island. Structure in this situation refers to both a proliferation of businesses, increase in personnel involved and in the number of partners committed to any one enterprise and a set of interdependent ties which linked occupations.

According to informants, shops and gardens in the gold fields were of minimal size, with only the mining enterprise itself attracting large numbers. By the early 1900s these numbers were being duplicated in market gardening, where it was not unusual to find gardens ranging from a one-man enterprise with an acre of land to an enterprise of fourteen or more men working as much as forty-one acres (see Appendix XXIII).¹¹ Don recorded the existence of such gardens in Nelson, Otaki, Wanganui, Fielding, Palmerston North, Foxton, Napier, Gisborne and Auckland. The largest were, even at this early date, in Wanganui, Otaki, Nelson, Auckland (Mount Albert, Parnell, Epsom and Mangere)¹² and Foxton

in addition to those already established in the South Island at Christchurch, Timaru, Oamaru and Dunedin. Similarly, shops and laundries, although to a lesser extent, were made up of partnerships (as many as four people for either business), each making a contribution to the capital costs and each drawing regularly on the revenue. Other employees without partner status, particularly youngsters and newcomers, would wait their turn or, frustrated by wages and the dwindling possibility of partnership, would strike out on their own, looking for a retiring shopkeeper or someone returning to China who wanted to retain his shop and was willing to leave it in trustworthy hands. Partners also availed themselves of any opportunity to strike out on their own, representing in both cases clear emphasis on self-employment as an ideal which not only gave stability to their existence, but also status within their own community.

While the constitution of these partnerships may have seemed fluid due to migration either within New Zealand or back to China, predictability was possible through limiting co-workers and partners to village mates or at least those from the same district or county. One notes that in cases where Don recorded partnerships or groups working together they invariably came from the same district, and in some instances from the same village within the district. In some cases, Jung Sing, Poon Yu and Tung Goon people worked together, but Seyip people were on their own. People coming to New Zealand would seek out fellow district mates, often having received a name of a shop, garden or laundry before they left China. If they stopped off in Sydney on the way, they would stay in rooms or in a business owned by people from the same district or village.¹³

Once the newcomer arrived in New Zealand, he would be placed under the control of a relative who would look after his welfare until, depending on the circumstances, he might be passed on to another relative who was wealthier or needed extra labour.

Exceptions to the above arrangements would be the emerging Chinese families, prevalent amongst some of the established merchants and to a lesser extent amongst fruit and vegetable shop-owners whose premises and occupation made family life and habitation possible.

There was a sense in which part of the community was occupationally linked together, since grower, retailer and hawker all handled the same commodity and controlled its distribution. Those who grew the crops and retailed them for the most part constituted the younger proportion of the community, while older men carted the vegetables by hand or with dray and horse if they were still keen to earn a living. Others who had migrated to the urban centres as elderly men either passed away the hours in talking, gambling or smoking or took up part-time jobs if they needed cash for various things. Gambling was an activity which brought the Chinese trouble and some of their buildings an infamous reputation but viewed differently it could be described as one form of social service within the community which provided entertainment, a small income and companionship when employment by Europeans or other Chinese was impossible. It is notable that these places are dated by most informants from the turn of the century, playing a role in several urban centres from then till the end of the depression. Elderly, lonely men by this time had either passed on or returned home, and those who had suffered the full brunt of the depression had similarly survived to do other things or had followed the path of their elders. Wages could amount to £3 - £4 per week from paak kop piu enough to provide for the cost of living in austere surroundings. While

the police seemed always to have considered this activity illegal, it was seldom the brunt of a wholesale effort on their part to close them down, unlike the situation with opium. Generally, their attitude was one of curiosity, which in several instances led them to note the extent of the games played, the honesty with which the establishments were run and the large stakes that often exchanged hands (see Star Sports, 29 April 1967).

Shops and land were predominantly leased in the early years, while a hawker required capital for some kind of conveyance, and considerable energy. One hawker who had worked in Wellington described a six-day week involving three different routes, each visited twice during the week and with at least two of them in a very hilly terrain. Leasing, on the other hand, allowed the lessee to vacate the premises or land quickly or pass it on to another who would in turn take over the lease. This arrangement benefitted all, for it removed the Chinese from the necessity of heavy capital investment while yielding a tidy rent for the shop or land owner. The average capital investment for a shop owner would have been from £100 to £150 and for a market gardener slightly less, depending on the existence of other gardeners who would lend equipment. The land in many cases was uncleared and non-productive, according to informants, so European owners found the arrangement attractive. Again, it is clear that while the Chinese may have preferred to keep their options open as sojourners, the kind of economic structure they found themselves admitted to hardly encouraged permanent settlement or guaranteed stability: leases, after all, were word-of-mouth agreements and could be terminated at any time by the owner.

Shops were leased for between £2 to £5 per week, and land, depending upon its state of productivity, could be leased for seven shillings an acre for uncleared land in the first year, increasing to £1 to £2 in the second year and perhaps £4 to £5 in the third year. This meant that the result of added value by the Chinese was an increased rent demand by the owner.

Acreage leased, as already noted, depended largely on the number of men who were willing to work together. Hand-cultivation, planting, weeding and picking limited the amount cultivatable by any one person to two to three acres. Shops were more flexible and could be expanded or contracted by increasing the labour as long as space was available to clean and store vegetables. In this early period cleaning was solely the job of either the hawker or retailer, since the auction system acted only as a clearing house and growers were many years away from washed and pre-packaged crops. While the shop may have been convenient, it was, according to informants, harder and more time-consuming than any other form of employment. One older ex-shop owner described it in the following way:

The number of decisions that have to be made are very difficult and may cause the success or failure of the shop. You have to know when to buy and sell, how much to buy, how much you can store and what has to be sold immediately. You have to buy cheap and sell for a small profit so that you are competitive - too much profit only sends your customers elsewhere - and you cannot afford this loss, especially when one is Chinese.

Besides the intricacies of the business, there was also the ever-watchful bureaucracy and other shop owners who wanted to see that Chinese did not stay open past closing hours. While this suggests that evasion was the prerogative only of the Chinese, a judge noted in 1905,

before prosecuting a number of both European and Chinese shop owners, that none of the Chinese and only half of the Europeans seemed to be complying with the 1904 Shops and Offices Act (EP, 5 June 1905).

The laundry business, like both shops and land, was usually passed on by each successive tenant or group of tenants. The newcomer and his partners, if he needed them for capital, would purchase the business for £300-£400, which would give them the basic necessities - large coppers for boiling water heated with coke, a gas-heated roller, a wringer and some large, heavy irons. On top of this, they would pay a lease of perhaps three to five shillings per week for the premises. According to informants, laundries were hard work, but they had little trouble getting clientele - all European - who would drop their laundry in during the day. All laundries were in downtown areas close to the pedestrian traffic in a time when shopping and housing were much more centralised. Most of these people were fairly wealthy to be able to afford the service: fourpence for a starched collar, five or sixpence for a shirt, an amount in the early nineteen hundreds that would have bought a sizeable piece of meat. Average earnings for a laundry were from £6 to £10 a week, or £300 to £500 gross a year before rent, rates, overheads and remittances were subtracted.¹⁴ If one needed help, then one could hire a fellow countryman for £3 a week or have one's children help, although the latter were seldom required to do physical labour but more likely to help with customers and marking the tickets.¹⁵

While the fruit and vegetable shops, groceries and laundries were essentially places for business, in many cases they were residences for the owners and some employees and also eating places. Some men who came to New Zealand in the early 1900s invariably shared the experience of living in business quarters and sleeping wherever there was room to place a mattress. The long hours of work, poor living conditions - which

often were rather a shock to some whose life as youngsters had been slightly easier in China - and the often omnipotent authority of an older relative who had little patience for dissention made self-employment and/or movement elsewhere very attractive. The consequence of this flexibility in economic structure was a highly mobile male population that was used to moving around New Zealand to locate in places where business activity was viable. As long as land was leased and the scale of retail outlets was small with minimal capital investment, there was no long-term cost to internal migration; on the contrary, considerable job experience was gained. The other type of mobility was of course the continual stream of people going back to China, which was in excess of 200 per year in the period from 1908 to 1938, a number only duplicated once previously in the period from 1873 to 1881. The earlier period of increased departures seems to be explained by a fairly well-off community, who were able to afford the trip home with presumably enough money to ensure a welcome at the other end. The latter period seems similarly to have related to a secure economic base and the possibility of some surplus income, but more importantly changes in China and a youthful overseas community allowed more emphasis to be placed on the future of new families still in China.¹⁶

For those who had already been reunited as families in New Zealand, estimated at 131 families in 1927, life was considerably different, as children's education and home life had to be established (Mawson, 1927:3). The women who came often could not speak English, which meant that much of their life revolved, of necessity, around the Chinese community, home and business in particular. Their contact with European society was minimal, for at that time in New Zealand there was no help available for non-English-speaking immigrants. The husbands, or children as they

learned English, were responsible for all transactions with the society they lived in. The conditions that newly arrived women found were in many cases hardly the ideal for a family home. Men living in groups or alone seemed to have provided little in the way of home comforts, so with the presence of wives and children life changed considerably. However, some conditions remained much the same, as the following statement reveals:

There was no doubt that life of the Market Gardens those days was primitive. They were work places on which men folk lived [sic] as cheaply as possible and not investing on buildings as the land was rented. Womenfolk and children later fitted into these camps and still with a very temporary atmosphere as without permanent stay in New Zealand no one bought land...

(New Zealand Chinese Association,
Canterbury Branch, Annual Report
1978:28).

Once the family was established, however, another migratory pattern emerged, with the wife and children returning to the village in China so that the children could be educated in Chinese and the boys could have future marriages arranged.¹⁷ Many of these children apparently stayed in China for five or six years, returning to New Zealand alone to take up a job, and perhaps returning again to China still later to get married. This would mean that in the space of perhaps twenty years, a young Chinese male would have been back and forth to China perhaps as many as three times, sometimes alone and sometimes accompanied by an older person from the same district or village. In New Zealand they would try to learn as much English as they could, only to lose it when they returned to the dialect of their local village, making the transition back to New Zealand just as difficult the second or third time.

If one was to characterise the Chinese community of the first twenty years after 1900, it would be of an extremely busy community in which an intense work ethic developed. It was also a community where relationships had many expectations attached to them as younger men came under the impatient tutelage of an elder. As described by one informant, 'You were only told once how to do a job - then you were expected to be able to do it'.

Aside from these observations, however, it also becomes increasingly apparent that the Chinese community in New Zealand had a changed profile. By 1920 they were more exposed as their occupations and residence took them into urban areas and to increasing numbers of small towns where they of necessity attained a much more public profile, reinforced by the rapid changes that confronted their homeland. For the Chinese community, both these changes, in forcing their profile to change, also made them more vulnerable.

In 1911 the consul, Hwang, left for Australia to become Consul General, while Mr. T.H. Shah, his translator, was appointed Acting Consul for New Zealand and Yue Jackson (Yue Yun Wah) became his private secretary in April (Prime Minister's Department 1911/962).¹⁸ By July, Chow Si Lanchu was confirmed as the new Consul. He arrived in September from his previous post in the Philippines with his wife, one clerk, three man-servants and three maid-servants (*ibid.*:1946).¹⁹ The new consul stayed only until April 1912 however, when he was replaced temporarily by Brandon (Barrister and Solicitor), who was appointed as Acting Consul, with Yee Yun Wah remaining in his post till 1913 (NA,IA 1912/1014, 26 March 1911). When Kwei Chih arrived from London as the new Consul in 1912, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs appointed Yue as Secretary of the Consulate.

The year 1912 had not been good for the Chinese in New Zealand. According to Don, the market gardeners had had a 'ruinous summer' and the unsettled conditions in their home districts had affected the men, making them restless, which in turn led to increased gambling, especially, as he noted, from 'noon until midnight on Sunday' (McNeur, 1951:31). When I asked informants about life in their districts in China during this time, they confirmed Don's contention in 1912, and one produced an appeal from his village to their overseas people asking for help in raising funds to complete four forts which would protect the village from bandit raids. The contents of the appeal (translated from the Chinese) are as follows:²⁰

Raising Funds for Building Forts to

Protect the Sun Kai Village Against

Bandit Raids

To Overseas Chinese in Wellington

Our Sun Kai Village commands important geographic features with a long history of several centuries. It is developing with increasing prosperity and is noted for the numerous overseas villagers now living abroad. Indeed, Sun Kai is enjoying a reputation for wealth which few could boast of.

Our village has been plundered by bandits. They caught us unprepared, rather by non-resistance. In the fight defending our homes, our fellow-villagers displayed commendable heroism, killing and wounding more than a dozen of the thugs.

However, we were completely swamped by their superiority both in number (which was estimated in the hundreds) and in weapons.

The robbers have made it plain to us that they were not satisfied with the loot carried off, and they threatened to return. The residents are in a constant fear, and the well-to-do families have left to seek safety. Should we not take action to strengthen our defence capability, our rich hometown will one day be deserted.

The over-riding tasks now are to revamp law and order in Sun Kai, construct a number of forts and purchase new weapons. The cost of this project is estimated at £20,000.

As we have no accumulated funds of any type, a general meeting of the Sun Kai members approved the proposal of raising funds by the following three ways:

- A. by taxing each family according to the number of adult males;
- B. by taxing each family according to the area under cultivation;
- C. by means of donations.

Despite unparalleled fervour shown by the villagers who have tapped their financial resources to the extreme, we still fall short of the planned figure. So far we have raised just over £10,000.

In the past, Sun Kai Village relied on brothers and sisters overseas and two rich families in our precinct for money for public causes. We are sure that you will show the same enthusiasm as in the past in giving donations for this very important project which has a vital bearing on our home-town. Your deep nostalgic feeling will not allow thugs and robbers to overrun our homes.

It is our earnest hope that you will do your utmost to support the schemes, and we would be more than delighted to see that, with your help, our target is overfulfilled. Thus, we will have the strength to repulse any armed attack. Even bandits in thousands will not have the heart to launch invasions upon us.

While the former village resident was unsure of the amount collected, he produced a photograph that confirmed the existence of the fort-like towers providing a vantage point from which to survey the neighbouring area. Evidently the balance required was remitted.

At the same time as these local areas were in jeopardy, China's national government moved towards chaos. Yuan Hsi K'ai, creator of China's modernised army, the one who overthrew Kuang Hsu on behalf of the Empress Dowager and who, after displacement, was again reinstated

under the Regent, made a deal with the Republicans. He alone could unify China, and Sun Yat Sen relinquished his provisional Presidency to Yuan, who became the first President of the Republic. Yuan, however, had no intention of supporting the Republican cause and continued to maintain the structure of the vacated dynasty to provide for his future role as Emperor. A parliament was elected in 1912, but it was never intended to endure. Yuan's rule was brief, however, for while he had favour with those who wanted the return of the monarchy, he had not anticipated Japan's action in presenting China with her Twenty-One Demands. Unfortunately for Yuan, he faced a world hostile to the Republic who sided with Japan, particularly Britain and some European countries, and his hope for the monarchy faded. His credibility waned, part of his army revolted, and Yuan himself died in 1916. After his death several governments tried to assume power in the north and Sun Yat Sen re-established the Republican Party in Canton - but in name only.

In the period between 1916 and 1925 the whole political structure of Chinese society as it had been under dynastic rule dissolved into what became known as the period of warlord rule. The army that had revolted against Yuan in Yunnan came south in 1916 to unite with southern troops opposed to the Peking regime, occupying much of Poon Yu one of the home districts of the New Zealand Chinese (Foreign Missions Report, 1917:14).²¹ When Yuan died, the gathering army turned their attention against the Governor of Canton, a supporter of Yuan, but Governor Lung's troops proved too strong, and in revenge they destroyed many of the local market towns as they pursued the retreating army (ibid.).

Although civil disobedience and exploitation worsened, there seems also to have been a mellowing of attitudes towards foreigners in the Canton area. This generalisation is surmised from the extensive material recorded by the New Zealand Presbyterian Church in the Canton Village Mission, which had been inaugurated in 1902 and was based in Fa Yuen, Poon Yu and Jung Sing, all home districts for the New Zealand Chinese. In the early years the Mission faced considerable hostility, particularly from certain villages, and McNeur, an early missionary, recalled an instance which exemplified not only the hostility and the power of the local clan elders but also the use of land as the basis of clan hegemony. The first notice appeared in an Upper Poon Yu village in 1906, and its text, translated from the Chinese, is as follows:

Prohibition of Christianity adopted and placated by the elders of Lau clan in Leung Tin village, Upper Poon Yu.

All of our descendents must obey the traditional mores and regulations. They are not allowed to believe in the religion [Christianity]. Anyone who violates the regulations will be expelled from the clan including their descendants and predecessors. Their relations must also be stopped from being part of local ritual and the ancestral hall.

Our area is not allowed to establish a church or help Westerners stir up the local area. If anyone offers land to establish a church, they, regardless of whether they are young or old, will dismantle it. No tolerance will be given to those, who with the help of Westerners, break the regulations.

No one in the area is allowed to attend a sermon of Jesus because of its evil effect. Should anyone attend the sermon they will be fined 72 cents (Chinese coinage). This regulation is to be enforced. Everyone should ask their sons and relatives to abide by it.

From Lau Hsu Lung Tong
Kwong Shui 31st year of Kuang Hsu
5th day of 10th month 1906.

(McNeur Collection, Hocken
Library)

The Presbyterian mission forwarded the notice and letters to the head of Poon Yu county stating that one baptised Chinese woman had already been mobbed and threatened with expulsion from her village and that if this type of action spread there would be no place for the Christian church. In due course the church received a reply.

I received and read your letter yesterday as well as a copy of the prohibition.

The role of your church in this area was approved at an early date by treaty. It is, therefore, unreasonable of Leung Tin village and the Lau clan's elder to stop their people from believing the religion or expelling clan people from the clan or abolishing the ancestor's position in the clan.

My bureau has now ordered Poon Yu officials to notify the elder of the Lau clan that they must inform their clan members to behave themselves.

Concerning the sermon of your church in the village, you are advised to treat the clan people in peaceful manner. Whether or not they believe in your religion or choose to be baptised should be their own choice, for the purpose of good will. They should not be forced to do anything.

My bureau also informed the leaders of the clan that they should tell clan members not to prevent any person from receiving baptism.

(McNeur Collection, Hocken Library,
translated from the Chinese)

Perhaps the most striking features of this exchange, both the initial protest and the reply from the authorities, is the similarity it had with the New Zealand context with which many of these same villagers would have been confronted. To make this point clear it is worth setting the above events beside a particular incident that occurred in Auckland in 1921, when the manager of the Hippodrome Theatre excluded local Chinese from the premises. The manager, like the village elders, had posted the building (in this case) with notices stating 'No Chinese are admitted to this Theatre by order of the Manager' (NA, IA, 13/408, 11 April 1921). The local Chinese 'merchants and residents' were indignant and organised a meeting which, from some accounts, came close to 'a hostile demonstration' but instead settled for an appeal to

Consul Lin Shih Yuan for help. The Consul in turn appealed to Downie Stewart, Minister of Internal Affairs, stating that he had also received, aside from the above, a lengthy petition signed by the executives of all the 'Chinese societies' in Auckland and that he now wished for some help in the matter (NA, IA 13/408, 14 April 1921).²²

The significant part of the response sent to the Consul by the Minister was as follows:

You will, I think, recognise that the question is not one for the interference of the government, but must be left to the taste and good feeling of the proprietor of a theatre. These proprietors are private citizens whose actions cannot be considered as representing the attitude or inclination of the government. It is to me a matter of regret that the action of a private citizen should hurt the feelings of a great and friendly State like China...the Government did not associate itself in any way with the action complained of.

(NA IA 13/408, 2 June 1921)

Clearly the government would not have tolerated collective action against the Chinese organised by the theatre manager, a situation which has never occurred in New Zealand in any context regarding the Chinese. Similarly, the bureaucracy in China would not allow the collective action of the clan negotiated by the elders, but it did uphold the right of the individual clan members to decide on their own destiny as regards Christianity, much as the Minister of Internal Affairs protected the right of individuals to exclude the Chinese, in this case, from their premises.

In regard to the opinions held by Chinese in their home districts about foreigners, one has only to look at the opposition the Presbyterian Church faced in 1909 when it opened a hospital in K'o Tong Village staffed by a European doctor and employing local Chinese women as live-in help. Within a short time of the opening, a

neighbouring village organised and posted notices decrying the fact that Chinese women were being treated by a European male doctor and also the fact that Chinese women were living in the hospital. The notice equated the results of this situation with the treatment of North American Indians, Russian Jews, Japanese in Taiwan and the Indians under British rule. They forbade anyone to patronise the hospital in future on pain of a substantial fine. As far as the organisers were concerned, this situation, if allowed to persist, could only lead to the destruction of the whole Chinese race and its customs (see Appendix XXIV for full text). There seems little difference between this opinion directed against the Europeans and the remarkably similar opinions that the Chinese had faced in New Zealand from 1866 onwards.

Despite opposition, both the hospital and the mission itself survived, but largely if not entirely because of the extensive links, built up through time, between the Chinese in New Zealand and their home districts by such people as Alexander Don and the Reverend McNeur. As individuals who went between the two countries, they could see quite clearly that the hostility they faced in China and the reasons for it were very similar to the hostility the Chinese continued to face in certain areas of New Zealand (see Chapter 5, pp. 238-41).

While the New Zealand Chinese community may have been despondent in 1912, they still managed to celebrate the establishment of the Republic with an event in Wellington which was recorded in the Maoriland Worker. It was notable, according to the article, that all the local Chinese had once and for all removed the symbol of domination - the queue, (Maoriland Worker, 1 March 1912).

The following year Britain recognised the Republic, which fact was in turn communicated to New Zealand and allowed Kwei Chih's credentials as Consul to be accepted (NA,IA 1912/4070, 11 October 1913).

Kwei Chih was Cantonese and, according to at least one source, was instrumental with Yue Jackson in getting a re-trial for a Chinese man who had been found guilty on a charge of murder in Invercargill. The re-trial was successful, and the accused was acquitted, leaving both men with considerable status in the community (NZCGMJ, 1 September 1954). The Consul's political sympathies, however, remain unknown, although the association started by his predecessor, the Chung Wah Wai Koon, became the KMT under the indirect influence of events in Australia. The situation in Australia, according to an older resident, had already manifested some of the political splits that were to be duplicated in New Zealand. After 1911 at least three groups existed, the CKT, the monarchists (Yuan Hsi K'ai 袁世凱) and the KMT. One of the early leaders of the KMT in New Zealand was Chiu Gok Jun, originally sent to Australia to be editor of the Mun Kwok Bow (the KMT publication). Opposition from the Chinese community in Sydney, ardent supporters of Yuan Hsi K'ai, led to an appeal to the Chinese Consulate in Sydney to have the man expelled. The Consulate complied, and the Australian government was informed, resulting in the departure of Mr. Chiu to New Zealand. To circumvent identification as a member of the KMT, despite the fact that New Zealand, by virtue of Britain's recognition of the Republic, also recognised the regime, Mr. Chiu entered New Zealand as a Baptist minister, according to informants.²³

When he arrived in Wellington, the membership of the KMT was as yet very small, but Chiu Gok Jun and Luey Hung Jok, a local member, helped to increase the membership. According to informants, however,

it was not until a Wellington man, Tse Gay Fee, and three men from Canada took over the organisation that the membership grew more extensive. One of the men from Canada, Joe Bing Lum, knew Sun Yat Sen and was in fact the only New Zealand Chinese to have met him.

By 1918 the KMT had spread to Auckland, being organised there by four men, one of whom was later to become head of the KMT in New Zealand. During this period the membership grew and the organisation established branches in other centres, but the headquarters remained in Wellington. Membership cost £3 per person, and from most accounts it had a community focus involving Chinese women and children and some Europeans who had become interested in China and supported the new Republic. Still later in the 1920s, the KMT branches in Wellington and Auckland established weekly papers (Mun Sing Bow) but none survived, and in fact according to informants the papers closed due to financial difficulties.

The divisions in the community that arose from allegiances generated by changing events in China, in addition to the hostility the Chinese people faced in New Zealand, began to take their toll by 1916. The Chong Wah Wui Koon, described by older residents as a largely Poon Yu group, split with the Poon Yu contingent reforming their traditional district association (including Fa Yuen) which they had originally organised in the gold fields. When people were asked why this happened, they made two responses. One indicated that the presence of factions in the community - at the time relating to the government in China - often led people to be more concerned with personal interests, in this case the interests of people from one's own district. The association would, therefore, be responsible for helping Poon Yu people handle situations of contact with Europeans, ensuring financial support

if needed and celebrating certain occasions such as Ching Ming. This allowed members an alternative allegiance to that of the more encompassing Chung Wah Wai Koon or later the KMT. The other response related specifically to the antagonism they faced in New Zealand. According to those who are willing to talk about it, it was not pleasant, and each newcomer was told of the kinds of attitudes he (in most cases) would face, summed up in the two following statements which have been passed down as a summation of the European's opinion of the Chinese:

One foreigner can beat 300 Chinese - its easier
than looking after a bunch of sheep.

and

Nine Europeans said they would wipe out the whole
of China.

(NZCGMJ, 1 December 1965)

The association, then, was to insulate the local community from this situation, consolidate its own group and perhaps maintain the links with the home district, avoiding the implications of factional politics.

Four years later another district association, this time representing the people of Sun Wui (Seyip) and particularly the Wong clan²⁴ of Auckland started the Kwong Chew Club.²⁵ The rationale for the founding of the Club is recorded as follows in a document, translated from the Chinese, prepared in 1967 to report on the expansion and renovation of the association building:

The club was founded in the vicinity of 1923 when New Zealand and the rest of the world were in the throes of economic depression. The vital factor which brought the club into being was the Wong Hsu-mei incident. The incident took place in Cook Street, Auckland in 1921. Wong Hsu-mei saw a black person having a quarrel with a Chinese and went up to mediate. However, he was beaten to death by the black person. The murderer was put on trial and was sentenced to two years imprisonment. The Seyip Chinese in Auckland were indignant with the Court's decision and felt that the punishment was too light for the murderer. They

intended to refer the case to the supreme court and lodge a protest, but they lacked the leadership, organization and the support of the other Chinese communities. Some of the Seyip Chinese saw the necessity to form some kind of organization to weld the Seyip people together. That was how the Kwong Chew Club came into being. Four founders of the Club, Wong Doo, Wong Sing-fou, Sia Da and Wong Ko-yeing, arranged the finance and bought the club rooms for £2000. The subsequent years saw great expansion in the Club's membership and its influence in Chinese circles.

(First Report of Sun Wui Club,
1967:1-2, translated from the
Chinese)

The association also offered accommodation to travellers to and from China, Chinese classes for children, relief funds for those who were sick or in need of assistance, and funds for the celebration of Ching Ming.

Four years later, a third district association started in Wellington, the Tung-Jung Association which combined people from Tung Koon and Jung Sing districts. While the explicit events which generated this association are unknown, informants have agreed that it was stimulated by many of the same reasons that prompted the founding of both the Poon Yu and Kwong Chew Club. The principles included in the preamble to their constitution also affirm this:

The principles of the association are cooperation, goodwill to help one another and to help in any difficult matters so that no harm may interfere with the general good of the community.

(See Appendix XXVI, Tung Jung
Constitution 1926:1, translated
from the Chinese)

The aims of the association were similar to those of the Kwong Chew Club in that the association provided accommodation for travellers to and from the districts it represented, care for aged or crippled members, and a funeral service for those who could not afford one (*ibid.*).

In addition, the association booked passages for members who paid it a commission for this privilege. If they failed to pay, the association terminated their privileges. The constitution also provided for the expulsion of any member but prohibited the resignation of committee members, who were required to serve their full term of one year (see Appendix XXVI).

The effect of these three associations was to bring together at least five of the districts whence the largest segment of the new Chinese community had come and to ensure that those circulating between New Zealand and China received care and also made their contribution to the maintenance of the association. While this development appears as a collective response, these associations must also be interpreted as factions within a community which no longer had a clear-cut or single leadership, nor the authority of a Chong Wah Wui Koon. Lin Shih Yuan (previously Consul in Vancouver, Canada), who replaced Kwei Chih as Consul in 1918 (NA,IA 13/35/13, 22 January 1918), was much more concerned with KMT business than with the Chong Wah Wui Koon and spent much time travelling back and forth to Australia. Not unlike Hwang Yung Liang, however, he supported the overseas merchant elite, as evidenced by his activity regarding the Hippodrome Theatre in Auckland and particularly by his attempts to interpret their activities to the New Zealand government.²⁶

The activities referred to included the importing business which developed in the early 1900s, often pioneered by the men who were or would become leaders in the community, forming the executive committee of its associations.

Initially, the Consul became involved because of a Customs Department inquiry into the nature of Chinese merchant importing activity. The investigation of importing started immediately after the war in 1918,

when the number of Chinese merchants increased as well as the quantity of imports.²⁷ The major problem that emerged from this concerned import duty and how Customs was to evaluate the 'real' value of the goods in order to levy the appropriate amount. Two things confused the situation. First, there were several forms of currency circulating in China: taels, of which there were Shanghai and Haikwan ones; Shanghai dollars; Yuan and Sun, which were the same denomination as Mexican dollars; and fine silver grain. Some of the conversions for these currencies are given below:

1 tael	=	35/11½d.
1 tael	=	1.38 Mexican dollars
1 (Haikwan) tael	=	1.50 Mexican dollar = 583 grains fine silver
1 (Shanghai) tael	=	520 grains fine silver
1	=	7.90 Mexican dollar
1 Mexican Dollar	=	35/6d.

(NA, Customs 1/739/4, 23 September 1911, 14 June 1919, September 1919)

The second problem related to the way Chinese merchants organised their importing network via China, Hong Kong, and New Zealand.

In 1919 the Consul Lin Shih Yuan tried to explain how business was carried out to the Comptroller of Customs. Lin suggested that the merchants deal directly with their own countrymen, therefore the invoices represented actual costs to the particular companies in New Zealand.

The price may be lower than other invoices for similar goods to Europeans, but the Chinese being in closer touch with the manufacturers than those merchants who are obliged to deal through European middlemen in Hong Kong or Shanghai approximate more nearly to the fair market value of such goods when sold for home consumption in the principal markets of China.

(NA, Customs 1/1386, 5 March 1919)

Customs were able to confirm some of the apparent anomalies that were occurring when they asked a local Chinese importer of fireworks why he was able to import them so cheaply when other importers showed a substantially higher cost. The response confirmed the Consul's contention: the importer was buying his fireworks through a brother-in-law who lived in Canton, direct from the factory, Faat Kee Co in Fati. The brother-in-law had lent the company money to get started, so they gave him goods at 30-40% of cost and he sent them to New Zealand without charging commission (NA, Customs 1/1726/3, 15 August 1927). Similarly, in another case there was some argument about the import of silk to New Zealand, and it seems that there was considerable variation in price quoted from one merchant to the next. Again, the Consul made it clear that a European buyer would be charged at least $2\frac{1}{2}$ to $7\frac{1}{2}\%$ by the European middleman-buyer, on top of which he would have to pay the Chinese commission middleman a commission in Hong Kong, whereas the Chinese merchant would deal directly with the company and their agents in Hong Kong and with the collecting and shipping agents. It was also pointed out to Customs that there were several varieties of silks, Kwangtung (White), Shangtung (Yellow), and silks of at least four other provinces, which were all distinctive. These would have different prices, and to compare them, according to Lin, would have been the same as 'comparing the market for Merino wool with a market for cross-bred wool' (NA, Customs 1/1386, 21 March 1919).

The Customs officer in Dunedin contributed perhaps more insight when he presented a comparison of the value of foodstuffs from three centres and tried to explain some of the differences. He concluded that the prices varied with the method of buying and variation in quality and availability. Buyers who were closely acquainted with their New Zealand merchant's requirements often bartered with merchants in Hong Kong until a reasonable price was obtained, since price-cutting was freely condoned (NA, Customs 1/1726/3, 7 November 1927:2). Presumably also, merchants who dealt with their own parent company in Hong Kong achieved some savings, as did those who were attached to companies with particular affiliations to their home districts.²⁸ Quality varied in accordance with the place of origin, method of preparation or variety used. For instance, dried mushrooms could vary from ninety cents to £2.10.0 a pound depending on the place it came from and the variety grown. Similarly, dried fish caught and dried quickly were said to be better and more expensive than those landed slowly. Scarcity was particularly a problem with rice in the northern winter months, when its ability to keep was in question and the price rose (six to ten cents a pound), but by February and March when the first harvest occurred, the price was quite favourable (NA, Customs 1/1726/3, 7 November 1927:3). National festivities like Chinese New Year in February also caused shortages for certain goods, particularly fireworks, which inevitably increased the price.

The solution to these complexities arrived at by the Customs Department was to add 100% to invoiced prices in cases where they were doubtful of the value stated. This was particularly the case with an Auckland importer whose import prices were doubled for duty purposes by the Comptroller of Customs as early as 1910. This situation prevailed

till 1927, when the importer questioned Customs, asking for a refund amounting to the excessive charge of duty over fifteen years. In 1927 this would have been equivalent to some £800, and Customs investigated but could neither extract any records from the importer nor in fact find their own records as to the nature and implementation of the 1910 decision (NA Customs 1/1726/4, 16 November 1927). The Customs legitimised their 1910 decision on the basis of the Customs Act 1913, which stated in sub-section 3 of section 17 that:

If the Collector has reason to believe or suspect that the fair market value of the goods for purposes of duty is greater than the amount of the said invoice, after making such deduction as aforesaid, he may value the goods at such higher sum as he thinks proper, and assess the duty on that value accordingly.

(NA, Customs 1/1726/4, 4 November 1929)

They substantiated their refusal to consider the fifteen-year period for refund by referring to sections 147 and 148, which allowed the importer to make a claim against His Majesty for excessive duty 'within one year and for not more than three years previous' (*ibid.*).²⁹ At the same time, the Customs Department set about comparing the costs of goods to importers from several firms in New Zealand, including T.W. Doo, Ah Chee, Wah Lee, Jang Hing Loong, H.K. Leong, Kwong Kai, Wah Jang & Co. and Luang Fong Bros. of Auckland, and Sew Hoy and Shanghai Trading Company of Dunedin (NA, Customs 1/1726/3, 7 November, 1927).³⁰

In Wellington several discrepancies showed up as they compared the Chinese merchant prices with those of Flockton & Co., who also imported from Hong Kong through the Kinhai Trading Company.³¹ The discrepancy amounted to prices 20-25% less than those charged the European firm, and Customs threatened action even though they

increased the value of the goods for the purposes of import duty (NA, Customs 1/1726/3, 25 January 1930:1).³² On the eve of Customs taking drastic action, a sub-collector in Wellington took action which averted a major confrontation. By this time, Yue Jackson, the Acting Consul, had become involved, and a meeting was arranged with him, as a shipment of goods had arrived for Wellington merchants which had substantially lower prices on their invoices than even the Auckland merchants (NA, Customs 1/1726/3, 30 April 1930). The Acting Consul called a meeting of all merchants and apparently emerged with the authority to negotiate, since an amnesty was concluded on condition that all future shipments would be correctly valued and that the Comptroller of Customs agreed to such an arrangement (ibid.:2). Yue Jackson also tried to get some assurance that retroactive action would not be taken by Customs against merchants who received past shipments 'palpably undervalued', since the savings had been passed on to the consumers (ibid.). According to the sub-collector's rendition of the story, in support of the merchants he added the fact '...that the Chinese had paid cheerfully whenever the goods had been assessed by the Customs, in fact, paid just what they were asked' (ibid.). Again the sub-comptroller deferred to the judgement of the Comptroller of Customs but said he would certainly support such a move.³³

While this issue took ten years for the Customs Department to resolve it was also a crucial ten years in relation to an emerging elite within the Chinese community, for it was the merchants of these major companies who eventually formed the group who led the Chinese community through its crucial years of World War II. Their status as merchants, their rapport with the Consul and their networks, acknowledged previously by the Wellington Customs officer, provided the basis for

control and power over their local communities. It was also these men who to some extent controlled the vital link with Hong Kong which gave the New Zealand Chinese their entry to Kwangtung and home.

At a more general level, however, one gains from these incidents, some insight into the attitude of the Chinese community towards authority, rules and sanctions. Similar to a situation that would occur many years later (see Chapter 10 p. 525), the Chinese merchants, according both to the documents quoted and to their own admission, did not set out to defraud Customs but viewed an opportunity as a gambler might view a chance hand. If you win, it is all to the good, and if you lose, then you pay up and say nothing. The cost of loss is not only in terms of sanctions levied by government or court, however, for the loss of status or reputation within the community can be devastating, diminishing only slightly with succeeding generations. Power was, therefore, fragile and could be assaulted within one's own community, in China, or by the government of one's chosen overseas country. None of the three contexts lent itself easily to rectifying the reputation of the individual.

By 1925, Canton and the surrounding districts had survived the events of 1924, when the Merchant Volunteer Corps, originally developed to oppose the growing power of unions, was stopped forcibly by the Canton government troops and its members, who were armed, were chased into Poon Yu and Fa Yuen. Now the city faced the problem of the Yunnan and Kwangsi generals whose troops were initially brought by Sun to liberate Canton from the stranglehold of General Chen (Our Fields Afar, 1925:9). The generals had taken over the opium and gambling in the city and were now extorting money from the local government to pay the army, which in turn led to increased taxes. Finally, the Canton army, with Russian advisers, re-took the city in 1925, but

immediately following this event the wave of strikes and anti-foreign feeling swept south initiated by the May 30th incident in Shanghai.³⁵ In Canton a large protest march filed past the French and British concessions which included a large contingent of armed cadets (McNeur, 1926:42). British and French troops were armed behind barricades, and in the course of the march shots were exchanged, killing 100 cadets and wounding many Chinese civilians (ibid.). The event sparked an even more intense hatred of foreigners, especially the British, and by historic connection New Zealand was included (Our Fields Afar, 1926:19).³⁶ McNeur made specific reference to this growing distrust of foreigners and its implications, at the Presbyterian Missionary Conference in 1926:

The representation of our dominion Government at the Washington Conference by the Late Sir John Salmond, the participation of so many delegates in the Institute of Pacific Relations held at Honolulu last year, along with the enlightening articles on such subjects which appear from time to time in our best papers, have brought New Zealand's connection with China before the minds of many thinking people. But the average New Zealander has not begun to realise that the future of his country is in any serious way bound up with the happenings in China. China is awake. Is New Zealand asleep?

(McNeur, 1926:49)

New Zealand was not 'asleep', but nor was it awake in the way McNeur would have preferred it to be. Instead, it was developing its own virulent form of anti-foreign fervour for the third time since 1895. The trouble began in 1925, when Chinese and Indian growers moved into the Pukekohe and Mangere districts near Auckland. The New Zealand Herald was quick to pick up the concerns of the European residents and maintained that it was impossible for these Europeans to remedy the situation once the 'Asiatics' were resident but that the government ought to take steps to restrict entry (NZH, 21 December 1925).

In the same month, the Pukekohe Branch of the 'White New Zealand League' was formed, and they produced their first pamphlet, which included their aims, an explanation, supportive newspaper articles and the Franklin County Health Inspector's report (White New Zealand League, 1926:22).³⁷ The introduction acknowledged the 'progress' of Chinese and Indians into agricultural and commercial life but maintained that this was at considerable cost to local residents who had to put up with their 'crude habitations', 'unhealthy environment' due to lack of sanitation, their method of working '18 hours a day', 'frugal living', and 'generally our failure of [to] assimilate them into our population ' (ibid.:4).

The objects of the League were as follows:

1. The exclusion of Asiatics from New Zealand.
2. To secure, protect and preserve our heritage of a White New Zealand for our children, and our children's children.
3. To maintain the purity of the Maori and the White Race and to preserve them from Asiatic contamination.
4. To procure provision by Statute to make leasing, letting or sale of land to Asiatics now resident in the Dominion subject to the approval of Local Bodies.
5. To enlist the aid of Local Bodies and Municipalities to enforce the Public Health Act and compel the erection of suitable habitation and sanitary conveniences under the provisions of such Act.
6. To secure legislation to bring Asiatics more rigidly under the provision of the Shop Assistants' Act and Amendments thereto, and giving particular attention to supposed partnership and compel same to be validated.
7. To secure contribution by way of taxation for Defence purposes in lieu of personal service from which Asiatics are at present exempt.
8. To bring pressure to bear by constitutional means upon the responsible authorities to secure the consummation of the objects of the League.
9. To cooperate with any other organisation having similar objects and to procure from and to communicate to such organisations such information as may be likely to promote the objects of the League.

It will be noted that the polemic is much the same as that generated by the Palmerston North League in 1907 except for the addition of two points (see Chapter 5, p.227) : the 1926 version included Maoris as a priority for their concerns about racial purity and designated 'Local Bodies' as the guardians of land use, health and habitations.

The explanatory notes added little except to accuse the 'Asiatics' of having the ability to take over 'the means of production in this industry [market gardening] in a few years' and maintain that they are of no 'economic value to the Dominion' (WNZL, 1926:5). The health report included contained only one report on a Chinese dwelling:

Joe Shing Lee, Pukekohe Hill: The premises occupied by these Chinese are constructed of old timber, having a rough boarded floor. The building is occupied as a sleeping and a living room. A water supply and privy accommodation are provided. Built alongside the house is a roughly constructed urinal, which holds two tins to urinate into. At the time of the inspection both tins were partly filled. The waste water from the house is thrown down an open ditch which runs partly under the house and alongside it. I consider that notice should be served to remove the urinal and fill in the drain, and that they be compelled to cease occupying the premises, also that a suitable house be erected on the premises.

(WNZL, 1926:19)

The problem, admitted by the health inspector, was that there were no building by-laws to control the erection of premises in the district, and in fact the Council had declined to develop them, since administration and enforcement would prove too great a task over such a large area (WNZL, 1926:21). The point the inspector made was that living in a room fourteen feet long, twelve feet wide and six feet high was plainly unhealthy, and the sanitation provisions were inadequate, but he did not engage in any speculation as to the desirability of the people.

The description of these premises was not, according to informants, an exaggeration for that period and has been confirmed in the following description of a Chinese market gardener's residence:

In some market gardens the open fireplace was used for cooking. Across the open fireplace were two iron bars, barbeque style, on which pots and pans could be rested for heating. No such thing as shiny aluminium pots... The kitchen was always warm in winter and impossible in summer.

Many of us did not have electric hot-water systems till later in [the] 1940s. After the cooking a large 6-gallon potful of water will be placed onto the fireplace to utilise the remaining heat of the coalfire. Each person would take one or two dippersful of hot water from the pot into their own basins to be carried away for their own toiletaries. Next to the fireplace would be a soya sauce wooden barrellful of cold water from which water is replaced into the 6-gallon pot to replace the hot water taken out.

Clean scrubbed - sometimes not so clean - wall-to-wall floorboards with the odd large wheat sack as scatter rugs. Truly rustic and "ethnic". Beds made from placing wooden planks across banana boxes can be relatively comfortable.

(New Zealand Chinese Association
Canterbury Branch, Annual Report
1978:27).

Clearly, the problem required by-laws, not a 'White New Zealand League'. In January 1926, a deputation from the League called on the Franklin County Council and received a sympathetic hearing. The League maintained that the Chinese and Indians now leased 200 acres in the surrounding area and were close to becoming a 'land-holding population' (Auckland Star, 23 January 1926). The Star evaluated the claims of the League and announced that their activity could not be described as 'sensational scaremongering or racial animosity' and it supported their concern, maintaining that 'introducing alien views of life and standards of social conduct must inevitably tend in the long run to impoverish, to degrade and to disintegrate any white community in which

they form a part' (ibid.). On the other hand, given the immigration restrictions and the ministerial power over the matter, it could not see that the 'situation [was] in any way critical' (ibid.).

It was 'difference', not 'inferiority', which legitimised exclusion. Almost as an after-thought, the article added:

What this may mean in the long run in the sphere of international politics...is not for us to predict or discuss right now.

(ibid.)

The movement spread, and in twelve months Auckland had a branch, which produced its pamphlet maintaining that the League now had the support of 160 out of 200 local bodies (representing 670,000 people) and wanted Asiatic immigration terminated for twelve months (WNZL, Auckland, 1926:1). The League included in their publication supporting evidence from Senator Dr. Jas. Phelan, Mr. John Fuller, governing director of Fuller's Theatres Ltd., the Right Rev. Dr. K. Stephen, Bishop of Newcastle, N.S.W., the late Mr. Massey, Sir Henry Parkes, Mr. Coates P.M., and Mr. S. McDermott, proprietor of the Graphic and director of half a dozen companies. The relationship, however, between the aims of the League and the quotations is debatable, Mr. Coates' statement being a case in point:

There are calls on the community to assist in what is the duty of every true New Zealander. We want to see New Zealand populated by a strong, healthy, virile and intelligent race, New Zealand wanted to keep the race pure. She would fail in her duty if she did not help the Mother Country by taking as much of the surplus Home population as possible.

(WNZL, Auckland, 1926:6)

Generally, this document was more abusive than former ones describing Asiatics as people who enjoy 'all the privileges of British protection'. contribute 'nothing to defence' or the 'prosperity of the district' and 'rob the soil of its inherent fertility as they farm for immediate

profits' (ibid.:6). If one leased land to these people, the pamphlet concluded, one would lose the 'goodwill and respect' of one's fellows and stand 'convicted of a deplorable absence of parochial pride' (ibid.:7).

In 1927, a Wellington branch of the same organisation appeared with a similar pamphlet pressing the urgency of the matter; it used less space and more invective than its predecessors (WNZL, Wellington 1927). Although the position had strong support, it was not without its critics, one of whom responded to the New Zealand Times on behalf of Chinese market gardeners. Yang Kwei (foreigner), as the writer signed the article, maintained that, had it not been for the pioneering Chinese growers, vegetables would not have been available, and while the conditions of their existence might be uncomfortable, it was not necessarily because the Chinese desired it but rather because the 'rapacious white freeholder' who leased the land (at £15 an acre) refused to provide a bungalow for his tenants (NZT, 20 April 1926). According to the author, '...the white [must] realise that his labour is worth only the market value of the work done, and that if he lives in a mansion and buys his vegetables he can never compete successfully with his fellow who lives in a cottage and grows cabbages in his back yard' (NZT, 26 April, 1926).

While there is no remaining history of the League's activity, Ponton states that the government decided to withdraw the quota system in 1926 (see Chapter 5, pages 225-6) but as noted before, there is some uncertainty that this occurred. The movement seems to have died in Wellington, but the Pukekohe situation fermented.

At the time the New Zealand Chinese confronted the League's activity, they also had to face division within their own community.³⁸ An argument developed over organisation for the 1927 Double Tenth celebration in Wellington. The committee organised to handle events

was made up of the CKT, KMT and presumably the existant locality associations. Since the CKT and the KMT each supported a different government in China, arguments emerged over which flag was to be flown to show support for their respective governments. At the time, the CKT still supported the Peking government and wanted the five-colour flag, while the KMT wanted the white star on blue to be flown. According to press coverage of the events, the majority of the Wellington community were Peking supporters, and the KMT was forced to withdraw from the committee (Press, 12 October 1927).³⁹ The paper maintained that the community did not want the 'revolutionary flag' and sided instead with the 'Neutral party', which was the Republic of China as far as Peking and the British Government were concerned (ibid.).⁴⁰ Two flags were flown at the celebration, but according to the paper one group celebrated at Hutt Park (ibid.). In Christchurch a similar celebration was held at English Park with a thousand people attending the function. The flag of the Republic of China was saluted by 150 Chinese residents, who then listened to speeches by local elders. While it was a nationalist celebration commemorating a political event, the funds collected in the early years were given to local charity, in 1927 to the Citizens Unemployment Fund. By far the most dominant aspect, however, was the sports activities, which were to prevail at such annual gatherings from this period hence. There were diverse events, including an apple-eating race, cycle race, sack race and blind man's buff, and there was also a football game between local Chinese teams, one of which had played in previous years against Wellington.⁴¹ Sport in this situation was important, for it was seen as a means of maintaining high morale and morality in the community. Being an acceptable activity to the dominant society, it became the first context in which the European public,

including the press, had access to the Chinese community in a situation which could not be criticised. During the depression which followed, the Chinese shared a similar economic condition, and their willingness to assist by donation⁴² or in any way they could, helped remove the stigma with which they had for so long been inflicted.

The changed public profile of the Chinese community, however, was matched with a privatised profile in the existence of the district associations. According to informants, the hiding of internal conflicts and the provision of a group of people who could act as arbiters between themselves and the European community were primary reasons for the existence of these associations. The implications, therefore, of the political events in China represented in New Zealand by the KMT and the forced closer relationship with European society were manifested both in a public and private response and the development of appropriate structures to handle each context. Viewed historically and taking into consideration the organisations that emerged after a period of individual leadership at the turn of the century, one can discern a cycle of activity. Initially individuals responded to constraint and antagonism imposed by the New Zealand context and later organised themselves in response to events in China. The outcome of these two activities was the presence of a consul and factional interests in the community which were consolidated under the aegis of the Chong Wah Wui Koon. This represents the first phase of the cycle. The events following this represent the second phase of the cycle as political factions emerged, particularly the KMT and the CKT, undermining the Chong Wah Wui Koon and leading to the creation of district associations which attempted to calm the political differences in the community and ensure a mediated relationship with Europeans. The most important aspect of this stage of the cycle was the location of power in the community,

which clearly rested with a group of merchants and the consul. While merchants may have had consistent views on business and the Customs Department, their political allegiances and district affiliations might contradict any initiative for cooperation, which provided obvious problems for a community association like the Chong Wah Wui Koon. Given any disruptive change in the context of the community, however, this factionalised power might find itself forced to consolidate, bringing the various organisations under one representative body as had occurred in 1909. Clearly the events during the depression, later in China, with the influence of the Second World War on New Zealand, were to provide the catalyst, but with a more dispersed Chinese community it was not clear where the impetus for change would come from. The core of the Chinese community, generally assumed to be Wellington, seemed to be the locus of decision-making, but during the depression peripheral communities retained the prerogative to exercise power and influence over their own communities, since there is no evidence to suggest that the KMT functioned in a manner similar to a national Chong Wah Wui Koon.

Before the cycle evolved further, however, events in the market-gardening area around Auckland where the Chinese and Indians had settled became the focus of more national attention than the League's earlier attempt had succeeded in providing. The predominant issue of 1929 was 'Racial Mixture' (Sun, 28 February 1929), 'Problem of the Half-Caste' (Evening Star, 3 April 1929), 'Native-Asiatic Mingling' (Sun, 12 June 1929) and 'Racial Purity' (Sun, 17 June 1929) - in short, miscegenation. A set of social facts had by the late 1920s coincided to produce a problematic situation. Initially the Chinese had been accused of separatism, immorality, failure to assimilate, failure to settle with their families and of taking accumulated capital back to China. Most of these characteristics were the very basis of the rationale for the

'white New Zealand' policy but by 1928 a New Zealand Herald article showed that they were not all still applicable. It appeared as though some Chinese were settling and even intermarrying. The article already quoted (see Chapter 5, page 258) had multiple titles: 'Race Alien Problem', 'Position of Chinese', 'Alarming Statistics', 'Rapid Female Increase', and 'The Race Firmly Planted' (NZH, 14 May 1928). The article noted that the government had stopped the issuing of permanent resident's permits in 1926, in itself a debatable point (see Chapter 5, page 256), and as already mentioned in Chapter 5, spent much time dwelling on the increase in 'full blood' and 'half caste' Chinese women. It predicted that this situation could lead only to a multiplication of their numbers in New Zealand, the - 'race aliens have established a firm foundation' (NZH, 14 May 1928). The following year the Te Akarana Maori Association protested against the 'growing association between men from the East and Maori women' (Sun, 28 February 1929).⁴³ The essence of their statement was summed up in the following:

In many North Island districts Maori labourers, many of whom are young girls are found to be working in groups in Chinese gardens, and entirely dependent for their livelihood upon their employers. Pleasant Otaki, near Wellington, possesses the doubtful distinction of being a centre where Chinese and Maori association is particularly pronounced. The Maoris who are forced to rely on Asiatics for an existence are mainly those who have lost their land possessions.

(ibid.)

The result of the above situation was Chinese-Maori half castes, which the Association found abhorrent, especially since they considered 'Maori social life [to be] generally improving' (ibid.). While the issue of Chinese-Maori relationships dominated the above article the letter sent by the association to W.A. Veitch, Minister of Labour, suggested that living conditions, hours of work and wages were the important issue

(Sun, 12 June 1929). Andrew Ngawaka, 'a leading chief of the North Auckland tribes' who visited Auckland, stated:

I have noticed that many of them - women - are living and co-mingling with Hindus and Chinese, and I have felt almost ashamed to acknowledge myself a Maori.

(Sun, 12 June 1929)

He maintained that 'the government and the people of New Zealand are neglecting their duty in allowing such conditions to exist' (ibid.). The chief wanted a government inquiry, and the Association wanted legislation prohibiting the union of Asiatics and Maori women (Sun, 15 June 1929). Sceptical reading of the newspaper debate that kept the issue in front of the public indicates that it was being used to elevate the position of the Maori, defined as a group that lived in 'amity' side by side with white New Zealanders facing at some future time 'absorption', which, in the opinion of the writer, the Maori accepted:

To the thoughtful Maori there seems to be nothing objectionable in this tendency. His attitude is determined by a perhaps subtle acknowledgement of the British as a superior race, yet at the same time as 'one of the family'.

(Sun, 17 June 1929)

If the Maori accepted this, then:

There is something humiliating in the idea that members of a race which New Zealanders are inclined to accept as equals should be reduced to squalid relationships with Chinese of a class which has no intellectual aspirations.

(Sun, 17 June 1929)

Clearly, Maoris were being enlisted in the attack on the Chinese, and as Wornall-Smith notes, '...the general attitude of the mid-twenties retained definite elements of assimilation theories prominent in the earliest native policies' (Wornall-Smith, 1970:3).

By July the Chinese were accused of actually 'canvassing' for Maori women in Auckland to go and work on their gardens, while at that time, according to the Te Akarana Maori Association, already fifty-four Maori girls were employed and living in Chinese 'quarters' (Sun, 12 July 1929).⁴⁴ The consternation spread, and a reporter was dispatched to Thames and Kirikiri to investigate reports of similar activity. The report that came back confirmed that Maori women did indeed work on Chinese gardens but that whole families accompanied them and there were no 'unfortunate results' as the euphemism went (Sun, 7 July 1929). Wages were agreeable and negotiated frequently and the only dispute which had arisen concerned the sale of pea sticks and tomato stakes by Maoris to Chinese agents who in turn sold them, plus commission, to their compatriots. In this situation the commission was the problem (Sun, 29 July 1929).

In the same month the National Council of Women joined with the Te Akarana Maori Association. Dr. Mildred Staley summarised their feelings:

Chinese associations are dangerous, morally, spiritually and physically. Special efforts are needed to fight the evil...The Chinese are riddled with disease. Drastic legislation is urgently wanted; it can be got now that the treaty ports are closed.

(Sun, 26 July 1929)

The NCW gave its support, inviting two Maori women to join their Auckland branch (ibid.). Despite the alliance of Te Akarana Maori Association, The White New Zealand League, North Auckland Chieftains, the Treaty of Waitangi Maori Welfare League and the Maniopoto District Maori Council, the speeches of Sir Apirana Ngata in the House and the support of the National Council of Women the government was slow to move. The issue, however, stayed in the newspaper through July and August until

a commission was finally set up in the early part of September on the insistence of Sir Apirana Ngata.⁴⁵ The Commission was made up of Dr. T.J. Hughes, Medical Officer of Health for Auckland, Mr. W. Slaughter, Officer in Charge of the Labour Department in Auckland, and Mr. Tukere te Anga, Native Department (AJHR 1929, G-11:1) with the omission of any representation for Maori women or the Chinese community.

The Commission's mandate was summed up in the following:

1. In the City of Auckland and its environs and the surrounding district to what extent are the Maori people employed either as servants or contractors of Chinese and other Asiatics or of Europeans in connection with market-gardening?
2. Under what circumstances the Maoris are so employed - as to their payment, housing and general health and sanitary conditions.
3. To ascertain as far as possible how many female Maoris are living with Chinese or Hindus, whether lawfully married or not.
4. Whether it is in the interest of public morality that the employment of Maori girls and women by Chinese and Hindus should be permitted to take place.
5. Generally to report such matters affecting the Maori race in any family or other connection with the Chinese or Hindus of which you think notice should be taken in the interests of the Maori or the public.
6. If you are of opinion that the existing conditions require emendation, what remedy would you suggest?

A.T. Ngata, Native Minister

(ibid.)

As the Commission started its investigation, a confrontation developed between the Chinese Consul, Ou Tsin Shuing⁴³ and Dr. Mildred Staley. The Consul responded initially to the statement made by Dr. Staley (quoted on page 356), presuming that she had 'outgrown the impetuosity of youth' and that her accusations were based on her own experience. He proceeded to ask her to respond to the following questions:

1. In what way are Chinese associations dangerous morally?

By way of note I may say that the Chinese youth is taught his duty as follows: "At home a young man should show the qualities of a son; abroad, those of a younger brother. He should be circumspect but truthful. He should have charity in his heart for all men, but associate only with the virtuous".

2. In what way are Chinese associations dangerous spiritually?

Here I may ask you also to say what you mean by spiritually. If you mean from the point of view of your own particular religious dogma, then I would remind you that the Chinese place their national code of ethics governing as it does life on earth on a far higher plane than the Western code of ethics ...To enable you to answer the question fully, I must tell you that the principal duty of a Chinese man is to pay a careful attention to every want of his parents and that in China there is no such thing as a parent applying for a maintenance order against a son.

3. In what way are Chinese associations dangerous physically?
4. What grounds have you as a medical graduate of the University of London for saying that the Chinese are riddled with disease?
5. From whom or where did you learn that the five Chinese Treaty Ports are now closed to the British?
6. I may add that the friendship between Great Britain and China is increasingly cordial, and such unfounded statements should not be publicly and lightly made.

(Sun, 22 August 1929)

Dr. Staley responded:

1. Physically, because these Maori women on Chinese market-gardens have no 'trade union' to protect them from 'overtime', and long hours of overstrain with no facilities for rests in comfortable conditions etc. Also because we found so many cases of contagious diseases among these Maori girls as a result.
2. Spiritually, because it is a disaster when young people throw over their traditional moral safeguards, the religion in which they were reared and which provides some special religious marriage ceremony that satisfies the womanly longings for purity...Naturally this "irresponsible association" with Chinese that has had such results is regarded as a strain on their race by thoughtful Maoris who are quite aware that Chinese men coming here have been married very young in China, so that even civil marriage would be bigamous. It matters not what the religion is; a Hindu caste girl who violates her religious marriage-law by associating with a non-Hindu, has outraged her conscience, and is on a downward spiritual path.

3. Mentally it is dangerous, because you yourself will hardly maintain that these uneducated Chinese market-gardeners understand and foster Maori arts and culture, or that hard labour in the fields (under "slavery" like the "Mui Tsoi" system) is mentally elevating and gives time and opportunity to the Maori girls to revive and cultivate their great gifts of arts and crafts and music, etc?

I trust that what I have very hurriedly written, quite frankly, will show that there is a real and acute problem for all of us to face, and wish to keep in on a high mental and spiritual level, and free from degrading habits.

I hope also that you realise that all that the National Council wants is to help the Maoris to face their own problems wisely, as no doubt you also feel that the time has come when this matter must be settled, with the aid of common-sense and goodwill on every side.

I am too busy to enter on any further correspondence, and I feel sure you will appreciate this clear statement of the Maori case as a help to your own cognitions on the subject.

(Sun, 22 August 1929)

The Consul was hardly satisfied with her response, which in his opinion evaded some of his questions and only reiterated her previous statements about the Chinese. He stated in response that the disease she referred to, dysentery, had been in Pukekohe long before the Chinese arrived and that if 'facilities for rests in comfortable positions' were not available, then her deductions about results must be negated (Sun, 26 August 1929). He maintained that Chinese men had greater respect for women than 'men of the West'; that if Chinese market gardeners are uneducated because they can't speak English then her inability to speak Chinese must qualify her for the same accusation and finally he wondered whether European growers would have provided employment for those who needed work (ibid.).⁴⁸ He concluded:

I presume that you have no objection to my handing this correspondence to the Auckland newspapers.

(ibid.)

Dr. Staley objected to the Consul's final suggestion, but he merely maintained that since she had made public her 'malicious charges' in the

first place respecting Chinese market gardeners he saw no reason now why she should request immunity on the basis of her occupation (ibid.).

The complete correspondence was published, with only one result: George Graham of the White New Zealand League challenged the Consul's response to Dr. Staley, asserting that the Consul's description of various Chinese ethics was perhaps more relevant to China than Pukekohe and that he could perhaps be of more use getting his own countrymen to rectify the cause of some of the allegations, since local Chinese organisations had not responded instead of attacking Dr. Staley (Sun, 27 August 1929).⁴⁹

In October, the report of the Committee on 'Employment of Maoris on Market Gardens' was sent to Sir Apirana Ngata. The members of the Commission had been to several areas where gardens were located and interviewed various people. Table 9 provides a summation of the substantive data gathered. The facts were allowed to speak for themselves in the report, and it was clear that Auckland and Onehunga were out of line as far as wage rates were concerned. As for the number working, it was noted that the Commission was investigating the gardens in the off-season; numbers would have been higher had they visited the gardens in November-December (harvest time) or February.

When it came to the discussion of accommodation, one important aspect was revealed, although the Commission made little of it. It appeared that in Otaki, Ohau, Foxton and Wanganui the Maoris who were working for the Chinese lived in their own homes close by, while in Auckland and Pukekohe they depended on accommodation, since they had to come some distance (AJHR, 1929, G-11:3). It was only in Otaki that there were six cases of children being born to Maori women, but it appears from the report that the Chinese men accepted paternity (ibid.).

TABLE 9: 1929 Survey of Chinese Market Gardens in Seven Areas of the North Island

Place	No. Employed		No. of Chinese Gardens (a)	Mode of Employment (b)	Wages (c)
	Male	Female			
Auckland	80	69	-	Contract/male By day/female	8d + 1/3 per bag of potatoes. 5/-
Onehunga		10	-	By day/female	5/-
Pukekohe	40 to 50 (m and f)		7	Contract/male Hourly/male Hourly/female	10 tons of potatoes/ acre 6d/sack 5 tons of potatoes/ acre 1/3 sack 1/3 1/-
Otaki	20 to 40 (m and f)		6	Contract By day	1/3 to 1/6 per sack of potatoes 7/- to 8/-
Ohau		50	15	Contract By day	1/- to 1/6 per sack of potatoes 10/-
Foxton	4	2	3	By day	6/- to 10/-
Wanganui	24 (m and f)		11	By hour/male By hour/female	1/- 9d

(a) In Onehunga, Auckland (the number of gardens was not listed in the report) and Pukekohe there were both Hindu and European gardens; in Otaki there were European gardens, while in Ohau, Foxton and Wanganui there were only Chinese gardens.

(b) Contract work usually involved harvesting potatoes, while day and hourly work were weeding, hoeing and thinning.

(c) Daily rate in most places included food.

Source: The above is abstracted from the Report (AJHR, 1929, G-11:2-3)

In Auckland and Pukekohe the statistics flowed, but only from the Te Akarana Maori Association, who gave the Commission figures that showed 'forty-five half-caste children had been born to twenty-seven Maori girls by Chinese during the past three years' and that 'seventeen other girls had returned to their homes in trouble' (ibid.:4). Official statistics from hospitals, the Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages, the Registrar of the Native Department or the Government Statistician were unavailable, and the Commissioner of Police refused to help the Commission (ibid.:4).

On the basis of this information the Committee had no hesitation in stating that it was not in the interests of 'public morality' for Maori girls to be employed by Chinese and Indians, but at the same time it added:

The only avenue of employment open to them is employment in the market gardens, which are controlled almost entirely by Chinese and to a lesser extent by Hindus.

(AJHR, 1929, G-11:4)

The contradictions continued: 'indiscriminate intermingling of the lower types of the races,⁵⁰ i.e. Maoris, Chinese and Hindus' will destroy the national life of New Zealand and the 'intermingling of Maori with the lower type of Chinese or Hindus...will have the effect of lowering the Maori standard of living' (ibid.). After all this, however, the Committee recognised that the exigencies of the economic conditions and the fact that Chinese 'are deprived of the right to bring their own women into this country is bound to provide problems' (ibid.).

Two sets of recommendations followed the report, and both addressed their respective areas clearly and concisely, although the second was not required by the initial mandate of the inquiry. The first suggested that suitable accommodation should be required of all market gardeners

employing labour and that the site of such accommodation on Asiatic gardens be approved by local authorities (AJHR, 1929, G-11:5). The committee recommended that Maori females should be at least twenty-one before accepting employment in the gardens, that a minimum wage be fixed and scrutinised and that statistics should be kept by relevant bodies (ibid.:5-6). Curiously the fifth recommendation asked that the education test for the Chinese be revised and raised. The second set of recommendations pertained almost entirely to the Maori situation and suggested that agricultural education be provided for Maoris; that areas for 'farmlets', 'dairy farms' and 'cattle and sheep raising' be made available; that Maori arts and crafts be encouraged with marketing facilities for the products and that domestic training be provided for Maori girls (AJHR, 1929, G-11:6). These met Sir Apirana Ngata's intentions for the Commission and would have helped a people whose population was recovering (62,781 in 1926 and 82,326 in 1936) but was young and forced to migrate to urban areas for employment (see Wornall-Smith, 1970 and Kernot, 1972), but no change was to occur for the Maori in their employment on the gardens until the election of the Labour government in 1946. What is perhaps most curious about the whole exchange that occurred and persisted till the late 1930s over the issue of Chinese market gardens and Maori labour, was that no attempt was ever made to collect information on land-leasing patterns - for instance, who in fact rented land to the Chinese or Indians - or material on Chinese housing conditions. The important relationship between these two aspects was made some years later by Ernest and Pearl Beaglehole (1946) when they ascertained that much of the housing and sanitation problem emerged because of the land-leasing pattern - predominantly by Europeans but some Maoris were involved - to Chinese. Leases, as

already noted, were short term, and Chinese gardeners had little incentive to set up a permanent residence when they were continually faced with moving (Beaglehole, E. and P., 1946:78). Obviously, it was in the interest of both Maori and European to lease land for horticulture, not only because of the rent gained especially during the depression, but also because, as mentioned by a number of market gardeners, the Chinese developed the land, making it particularly suitable for pasture once they vacated the gardens.

The other omission from the report is any kind of statement indicating the obviously drastic differences in the relationship between Maori, European and Chinese in the various situations where they all co-existed. It is clear from the report that things were qualitatively different in Foxton, Otaki, Ohau and Wanganui, for instance, and definitely not as antagonistic as they were in Auckland and Pukekohe. Similarly, one can find other areas in New Zealand with a similar population and history and yet find no overt evidence of hostility. Ohakune and Taetihi were such areas, also in the North Island, opened up by sawmilling and settled by Europeans and Chinese who moved in with the local Maori community.⁵¹ This occurred at the turn of the century, when the first Chinese man arrived, sponsored to New Zealand by a gold-mining relative and bound to search out his own fortune. He noted the demands of a sawmilling community and the railway workers who came with the main trunk line as it pushed through, and opened up a general supply store. His success allowed him to sponsor his eldest nephew to New Zealand in 1908 who, after experiencing work in five other centres finally decided that his uncle's enterprise was perhaps the best possibility at the time.⁵² The business grew, attracting other Chinese men, and finally a partnership was organised in 1914 to incorporate all the members. The uncle and two nephews controlling the business

in 1914 were all from the same village in China. At this time, they had experienced no hindrance to their activity nor were they to, as the business declined with the end of the sawmilling era and the syndicate split and diversified into market-gardening by the 1920s.⁵³ The gardens meant a closer relationship with the local Maori community, and eventually nine out of the original twenty members of the syndicate married Maori women.⁵⁴

This variety of response to Chinese settlement is never emphasised in historical accounts. Eighty-six local communities, apart from the four main centres, had Chinese residents in the 1920s, most of them relatively free from hostility, so the anxiety expressed was disproportionate, considering the extent of their distribution.

While the market gardeners and the Consul were involved with this situation, events in China had progressed to a stage which stimulated the Chinese community, at least in Wellington, to reconsider its situation.

In the spring of 1927 Chiang Kai Shek had almost achieved the intent of his Northern Expedition, which by April had occupied Shanghai and systematically set about exterminating all Chinese Communist Party members in the city. This asserted the might of the Kuomintang, but at the same time destroyed the alliance that Sun had made with the Communists. Effectively, China had one government in 1928, but built upon shaky substance. Meanwhile, the effects of depression began to take their effect on economies and the lives of many people, including the Chinese residents in New Zealand, and with it came insecurity. If there had been any hope for peaceful times in their homeland, they were becoming increasingly infrequent, and the foreboding of an economic depression and a backlash of racism in New Zealand looked equally unappealing.

Some Chinese in New Zealand - the actual locality or people involved remains unknown - became increasingly alarmed and decided that a national organisation of Chinese was necessary both to consolidate the differences that had emerged and to confront any major problems that would affect the community. In 1928, with the arrival of the new Consul, an approach was made to him to secure support for starting a national organisation. A meeting was called by the Consul of representatives from the various associations: it comprised the Poon Fa association (3), Tung Jung (3), Kwong Chew Club (3), KMT (2), GKT (1) and the Consul himself.⁵⁵ According to informants, an association was formed with Joe Lay Choy as the first president and Chiu Gok Jun (see page 334) a Church minister as the Secretary. Initially, two branches were started, one in Dunedin and the other in Christchurch, both affiliated to Wellington, which remained the headquarters.

In 1930 a third branch was started when the forty Gisborne Chinese in Gisborne formed a club which they all joined (Gisborne Association Minute Book, 1937-1944:1). The club was to act explicitly in a liaison capacity for overseas Chinese, resolve conflicts in the community and help those who incurred any expense due to accidents (*ibid.*). A description of this early association maintained it was 'democratic', holding meetings every week, and if there was no urgent business a speech would be given to 'exchange wisdom and give mutual encouragement' (*ibid.*).

According to informants, this loosely organised national association had no official title, but has been called a Chung Wah Wui Koon like its predecessor.⁵⁶

While the structure was loose, the Wellington and perhaps Auckland executives⁵⁷ were able to respond to at least three issues between 1930 and 1932.

The first issue was a move on the part of the local Chinese community to have the 1911 temporary permit provision for students re-activated. Little is known of the original scheme, although there is some contention that it was discontinued either because it was impossible to supervise or because it was not used (see Chapter 5, p. 236). In 1930 the association and the Consul made representations to the government to institute the same provisions again, and the government complied under the following conditions:

1. That the student shall not at the date of intended arrival in New Zealand, be under the age of ten years;
2. that, except with the special authority of the Minister (of Customs), a permit shall not be granted to any person unless his father is domiciled in and is residing in New Zealand;
3. that, except with the special permission of the Minister, nothing in the permit shall be deemed to authorise a student to remain in New Zealand after he has reached the age of twenty-four years;
4. that, while the student is allowed to remain in New Zealand under the authority of the permit he will not engage in any work of any kind whatsoever other than study.

(NA, L22/1/81, Section 2:1)

Predictably, accusations followed close on the provision of such a scheme, as it was feared that the Chinese would use a temporary permit system to get round the total restrictions imposed at the time. However, it must be noted that general wealth in the Chinese community was hardly more than the norm for New Zealand at the time, and the possibility of supporting a student or son for a prolonged period as well as a family in China was not a desirable situation. In fact, departures from the community during the period 1927 to 1934-35, annually exceeded arrivals (see Appendix II).

In 1931, the Wellington branch of the association was visited by Lin Sen, President of the Legislative Yuan (parliament) and member of the State Council (cabinet), along with Chan Yew Foon, Chairman of the

overseas Chinese communities in the United States, Fiji, New Zealand and Australia, to raise money for the construction of the new government building in Nanking. The response was favourable in New Zealand, and after a visit to Wellington and Auckland £200- £300 was donated to the fund.

In the following year the association was called upon to speak for the local community when a petition appeared signed by C.R. Lloyd and 1,456 others in Franklin County urging the government to repatriate all Asiatics, 'particularly Chinese and Indians', so that 'they may be replaced in their occupations by approximately ten to twelve thousand of our own men and boys who are at present unable to earn a living' (AJHR, 1933, I-1, No.16).⁵⁸

The petition was presented to Parliament in September at the time that Ou Tse Shuing, the Consul, left to take up his new post in Melbourne, where he replaced Mr. Chunhow H. Pao who was to come to Wellington (NA, IA 1933/60/15, 18 August 1932 and 1 March 1933).⁵⁹ In the interim until Pao took up his position, Yue Jackson, promoted to Vice Consul in 1931 (NA, IA 13/35/13, 20 April 1931), was acting Consul.

When the news of the petition reached the Chinese, both the Vice Consul and the major Chinese communities in New Zealand responded. A joint statement was printed in the newspaper signed by the leaders of the Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin communities (see Appendix XXIX). Essentially, the lengthy response described the petition as an unwarranted and falacious slander on the 'Chinese nationals' in New Zealand and on China itself (EP, 7 November 1932). It argued, contrary to the assertion in the petition (see Appendix XXIX), that the total population of Chinese was 2,854 and that of the Indians was 1,166; that a local Chinese would be lucky to send more than £50 home a year; that this money would not need to be sent home if the New Zealand

government allowed wives and families to come to New Zealand; that the New Zealand population was not made up of the 'lower classes' but of professionals, agricultural, industrial and merchant classes; and finally that 'industry, thrift and cleanliness' did not add up to insanitary behaviour (EP, 7 November 1932).⁶⁰ They stated they were proud of their country and that if this kind of behaviour persisted they would presume it would jeopardise trade relations between China and New Zealand and also make the life of British nationals residing in China as unpleasant as their own situation in New Zealand (ibid.).

For the first time, the Chinese community responded collectively through their leadership, and the desired result was achieved. The issue died down, and even though the petition had to be submitted again in 1934, since it missed the hearing of the petitions committee in 1932 and 1933, little eventuated and no recommendation was made to the government. The only repercussion was another attempt by the National Council of Women in 1934 to get an improvement in the conditions of female labour in the gardens (Press, 21 April 1934). This time the Christchurch, Wellington and Auckland branches of the National Council of Women co-ordinated their effort but in the end changed the request to specify that conditions should be changed by all employers of female labour (ibid.).

If the period of the late 1920s and the early 1930s was unpleasant for the Chinese, it was even worse for many New Zealanders who faced the depression years with no sustenance payments for unemployment but instead a philosophy of 'no relief without work' which in the end reduced thousands to 'incredible penury' (Sutch, 1966:134).⁶¹ While the government's action was repressive, passing the Public Safety Conservation Act of 1932 outlawing almost any opposition, it was credible that the European population did not seek out the Chinese as a means of venting their frustration, which was clearly justified for other reasons.

Other than the events mentioned above, it seems the Chinese survived the depression with their European fellows and not in a situation of opposition. Clearly from all accounts, the Chinese standard of living dropped considerably, and remittances home declined, but there is also evidence that mutual sharing and their own form of social security allowed them to help the surrounding community.⁶² It seems almost certain that most Chinese preferred self employment or employment within their own community which excluded them from any Benefit or Work Scheme. While it was clear they paid taxes, as pointed out by Andrew Chong, a Chinese born and educated in Auckland, he also maintained they were excluded from any form of help (Press, 11 January 1933). According to him, at least one hundred Chinese were out of work and practically destitute in Auckland; receiving neither relief work nor rations, they were forced to depend on relatives and friends (ibid.). In Christchurch, when the issue of Chinese unemployment arose, the officer in charge of the Labour Department stated that no Chinese had applied for relief, and as far as he knew none were unemployed (Press, 12 January 1933). According to informants, businesses became labour-intensive if only to provide room and board, but also gambling and opium-smoking appeared to be widespread. This provided newspaper copy, but it appeared as news and not as indictment of the Chinese.

In 1934, the Rev. W.W. Chan of the United Chinese Christian Mission tried to organise a gardening scheme in both Wellington and Christchurch to alleviate the unemployment. In the former he estimated there were about 400 unemployed and in the latter, 200, while in Auckland he suggested he would try to bring the 'two tongs' together, which presumably indicated associational conflict (Press, 8 June 1934).⁶³

Chan's scheme never eventuated, as the Unemployment Board would not support the idea because it showed preferential treatment for the Chinese (Press, 13 June 1934). As far as the Board was concerned, the Chinese were to be treated as anyone else and would have to register before any assistance would be made available (ibid.).

This endeavour on the part of the Reverend Chan and the publicity surrounding it produced some concern in the Chinese community, and the Reverend Y.S. Chau, a well respected member of the Auckland community, discretely contradicted Chan's contention, insisting, after his visit to the 'Southern Provinces', that unemployment in Dunedin, Invercargill, Timaru, Oamaru, Ashburton and Wellington was not serious and, furthermore, 'that the Chinese community always looked after its own in these sorts of times' (Press, 27 June 1934).⁶⁴

Throughout the depression, Double Tenth was celebrated in Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin with the KMT dominating in both organisation and speech topics. Calls were continuously made for closer ties and increased trade relations between East and West. But by 1932 there was clear concern over China's apparently impossible position caught between Russian communism and Japanese imperialism (see Press, 11 October 1932 and 11 October 1933). Consul Chunhow H. Pao made impassioned pleas on behalf of Chinese 'nationalism' and 'international justice' (ibid.). The New Zealand Chinese community's first university graduate, Ng Hor Gee (William Wah), became an exponent of the community's interests and spoke forcefully about the need for an internationalist perspective on the part of New Zealanders when speaking to the Christchurch Businessmen's Club and the Returned Serviceman's Association (Press, 12 and 13 March 1934).⁶⁵

Through the early 1930s, the situation in China steadily deteriorated:

...the war situation worsened, the Koumintang's failure to deal with China's internal problems became the source of widespread disaffection. Criticism was repressed. All China's ills were blamed on the Japanese and the Communists. As the war dragged on, the Koumintang became more and more authoritarian. A process of alienation slowly set in, isolating Chiang's harassed government from the people it claimed to be defending.

(Schurmann and Schell, 1967:134)

By October 1934 the entrapped Communists broke out of Chiang's fifth and longest anti-communist campaign and moved north on the epic Long March, which took them eventually to Yennan in the northwest. At the Double Tenth celebration in the same month in New Zealand, the retreat of the Communists was heralded with support for Chiang Kai-shek, while the local press reported Yuan Shih Kai as the new head of state in China (Press, 11 October 1934)!

In Wellington the event was also celebrated, all shops, laundries being closed and work in the gardens ceasing for the day. Two to three hundred people attended, according to the Evening Post, gathering in the St. John's Ambulance Association hall (EP, 10 October 1934). The meeting was presided over by the president of the Chinese Residents Association, William Kwok, and speeches were made by the Consul, Vice Consul, Assistant Consul, and Chiu Gok Jun the Chinese Missioner in Wellington. In his speech, the Consul said nothing about the local Chinese but a considerable amount about the state of affairs in China. He described his country as one that had witnessed twenty-two years of trouble, including social, political and intellectual revolutions, a 'struggle to remove the imperialist yokes' and 'out-of-date treaties', and finally struggle to overcome the effects of floods and famines which

had devastated six provinces (EP, 10 October 1934). In addition, China now faced the hostility of its neighbour, Japan, who had occupied four provinces; the Consul appealed to the world for cooperation so that China could achieve 'political and economic independence' (ibid.). 'The Chinese people are willing to fight and die for their liberty', maintained the Consul, and if the world would help, '...a strong China will be a blessing to the world and is sure to solve many of the world's economic problems' (ibid.).

The second period from 1909 till the establishment of the second Chung Wah Wui Koon is characterised by increasing complexity as the Chinese community responded not only to the New Zealand government, but now also to the divisions within its own community and the growing influence of China on its overseas diaspora.

It was already clear that events in China were being reflected in the New Zealand community as various people, at least in Wellington, aligned themselves with particular causes. Previously, the influence of the New Zealand government had been handled through the means of the petition. After 1909 the petition was replaced by appeals to the Chinese Consul, who in turn represented the interests of the community, or sections of it, to the government. It was clear that the first Consul, for example, had more concern for the merchants than for other segments of the community and was not particularly sympathetic to Chinese who changed nationality, accepting that of a country quite clearly opposed to his people's presence. In this light it was interesting that the Consul, while avowing a non-political stance, blamed the nature of the New Zealand Chinese community on the milieu in which they resided.

The Consul's role also extended to the attempt to quell factions in the community, and to this end the first Chung Wah Wui Koon was established with regional representatives, but the factions, rather than diminishing, increased, due to changes in China, and the association's

authority was fragmented, giving way to the KMT, CKT and the monarchists, who all held strongly to their particular views on China's future. Following this development the community responded to its own political disunity with the establishment of informal non-political groups based on locality. The Poon Fa, Kwong Chew, Tung Jung and the Seyip associations, together with the KMT and the ageing CKT, effectively constituted the organisational structure of the community by the early 1920s. It is these groups, for instance, which sponsored and organised the individual Double Tenth celebrations in the various communities where they existed. It is important to note, however, that communities retained their authority over local matters until at least 1928, when the second attempt, this time originating in the Chinese community itself, was made to establish a national organisation. This again was a response to both internal division, as the KMT and the CKT competed for hegemony over the community, and external influence such as the White New Zealand League and opposition developed to a growing market-garden industry. This time the Chong Wah Wui Koon had representatives from all associations rather than regional representation. While a national organisation failed to emerge as a powerful group, the initiation of this activity did stimulate some communities to develop their own local association which represented local interests but did not, at least as far as I have ascertained, attempt to represent any particular sectional interests. This was important, for it was these very organisations which became the model for a national association in the next period and proved that regional representation was a better model for organisation than the use of associational affiliation. In a sense it was a return to the 1909 solution, but initiated in the more contemporary case by the local communities' needs and their own desire to define their existence rather than the desire of the Consul.

Two other points are important to mention as regards this period. Firstly, the Consul's place of origin and political affiliation are important variables. Consuls from northern China tended to have less influence in the local community, and their political affiliation, as time went on, meant that attempts to raise national pride and support for China amongst the overseas Chinese received considerable impetus from their presence. However, they seldom seemed to be directly associated with the KMT organisation in New Zealand except in the case of Lin Shih Yuan. While there were numerous Consular representatives from China, there was only one representative in the Consul's office from the New Zealand Chinese in the person of Yue Jackson, who maintained continuity of representation despite changes in the office. His unique role was to know the problems of the local community, which meant he was particularly valuable, so much so that his transfer was once opposed, according to informants, by local Chinese.

The second point relates to the relationship between Chinese individuals and their families in China. In a very real sense each individual Chinese overseas was involved in a political quest, trying to increase the power and prestige of his family, village or lineage, and to this end he responded pragmatically to changes in China and New Zealand. This means that immigration restrictions, economic well-being in New Zealand, conditions in the home village - all must be weighed up when decisions are made as to a future place of residence, amount of remittances, or migration plans for family members. In this period the decisions became increasingly difficult to make, and the situation worsened in both contexts with civil strife in China and a depression in New Zealand.

Three responses were made to this situation. This period is the first in which the number of families increased in the Chinese community, predominantly amongst the merchant group, which represented a conscious decision on the part of some to settle in New Zealand, although it would have been no problem for wealthier members of the community to repatriate their families.

The second response was to seek a remedy to the harsh immigration restrictions, since newcomers were excluded from the possibility of permanent residence. The alternative which the Chinese community pushed for through their Consul and associations, was temporary residence, and this was to be gradually extended to students, to replacement for shop owners who wanted to visit home, and finally to wives and children of New Zealand residents in the next period. Their efforts were not totally successful, but the immigration that did take place meant that New Zealand, given a change in external relations with China, had to make up her mind to either repatriate or accept its temporary residents as permanent residents.

The third response was an attempt at another Chung Wah Wui Koon, this time representing the constituencies that were already represented by associations in the community. The ultimate form of the organisation was more like a confederation, for there was no compulsion for other communities to develop a branch and affiliate to the Wellington organisation. However, a number of branches did develop local organisations, and the major branches in larger communities set about representing the interests of their local community vis-a-vis New Zealand and China.

In the following years this organisation would become the collective core of the community as it faced World War II and the Japanese invasion of China.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 7

- 1 There is no indication as to whether or not Shah was a New Zealand Chinese, but Hwang needed an interpreter since he was from Northern China, spoke Mandarin and was not familiar with local Cantonese dialects. He did not need a translator since the written language was similar.

- 2 Wang Chung Siang arrived in 1909 and was accorded free entry with his wife to become Secretary to the Consul (NA, IA 09/608).

- 3 Provisions were made for these categories in 1910.

- 4 According to the deputation made to the Minister, there were 41 Chinese laundries in Wellington out of which only two paid wages to employees (which made them subject to the Factories Act provisions); the others all operated as partnerships which would divide revenue proportionately when needed. The Factories Act applied to the European because, as stated by the deputation, 'Laundry work is...essentially women's work', and therefore laundry proprietors 'must employ female labour' which required specific rates of pay, working hours, conditions and holidays (Truth, 7 August 1909).

- 5 NZCGMJ will be used as the abbreviation for New Zealand Chinese Growers Monthly Journal, hereafter.

- 6 See footnote 39 for further information on the Chee Kung Tong.

- 7 The average wage for a Chinese person in New Zealand would have been between 15/- and 18/- per week at the time.

- 8 The president was responsible for 'general business, vice presidents for assisting the president or replacing him in his absence, secretary to live in the association, treasurers, to 'manage all financial matters': inspectors to oversee all activity of the association, and commentators to attend regular meetings and constitute the quorum. The Secretary was the only paid executive member, receiving £1.7.6 a week plus living quarters.

- 9 This figure of 61% is based on the subscription number only and calculated using the 1906 Census returns.

- 10 While there is discrepancy in the totals resulting from the payment of poll tax in these two periods (see the amounts in Appendix IX and the calculations derived from Appendix II), both indicate that these two periods together made the largest contribution to the poll tax revenue in the history of the New Zealand Chinese. While the business community may have had considerable fear of the competition of the Chinese community and the revenue that they were deriving from their occupations, some careful calculation would have indicated that much of their surplus income was being returned directly to the government's consolidated fund.

- 11 Don recorded the names, occupations and county of origin in his visits during 1909, 1911 and 1913 to Chinese in the North Island so we can gain some impression of the various communities and the occupations of the people (see also Appendix XXII).
- 12 The earliest gardens recorded in Auckland date from the late 1870s located in Carlaw Park, Khyber Pass, One Tree Hill, Mt. Eden, Mt. Roskill, Meadowbank, Mt. Wellington, Panmure and the area from Surrey Crescent to Western Springs once known as Chinaman's Hill (see Coleman, 1967).
- 13 One informant described his stay in Sydney en route to New Zealand in the early 1900s at the age of eleven as a pretty dismal experience. He landed in Sydney at Christmas time and stayed in a Tshang Sheng restaurant for three months sleeping on sacks in a room with fifteen other men. He worked in the restaurant for his room and board.
- 14 Remittances were estimated to be, on average, £20 to £40 per year.
- 15 The ticket system was originally a Chinese character which was written on a clip which could be torn in half - one half for the customer and the other for the bundle. Later when Chinese children performed this task they used Roman numerals.
- 16 Some of the departures would have been older men, since, as indicated in Appendix XVIII, the number of people over 45 steadily decreased in the period from 1906 to 1921.
- 17 Depending on the family's wealth, according to informants, both boys and girls would have their future marriages arranged between the ages of eleven and fourteen, and all boys would have been betrothed before they went overseas.
- 18 Yue Yun Wah (Yue Henry Jackson) was born in Roxborough in 1881, one of five children of a Chinese father and a Scottish mother. Hue's father (a storekeeper) died in 1886, and in 1890 the mother took all the children back to their father's village in Toy San district Seyip. They were met in Hong Kong after a month long trip by two uncles from the same village. Their father had been previously married in China, but had no children from that marriage. The mother's presence in the village and her attempt to remove ancestral tablets from the family home led to considerable trouble, and other overseas Chinese (from the U.S.), had to be brought in to re-establish order. Yue Yun Wah described his early schooling in the village of Lee Yuen, where pupils ranged from 14 to 25 years old, as made up of the Trimetrical Classics. Later he went on to high school taught by teachers who had passed their first Literary Degree, and in 1899 Yue was sent to Diocesan Boys' School in Hong Kong upon the suggestion of Dr. Kew Yee. He learned English at the school, and in 1904 he asked Alexander Don to arrange for his return to New Zealand. Once in Dunedin, he worked for the Yoon Lee Co. while at the same time going to Dunedin Technical School to learn accounting. He went to Greymouth in 1905 and the next year returned to China. After four years' work in Shanghai, he returned to New Zealand with his nearly three-year-old daughter (the mother had died in Shanghai of smallpox). In Dunedin, Yue took over Don's work for six months, then went to Wellington to assume his secretarial duties for T.H. Shah (Jackson, 1917, MS 112).

- 19 This chronology differs somewhat from that provided in the brief history of consular representation in the New Zealand Chinese Growers Journal. According to this source, Hwang was replaced by Joe Lau (Cantonese) and Yue Yun Wah (Jackson Yue). The latter became the second interpreter for the Consul. Joe Lau left New Zealand in 1912 and was replaced by Gwai Jik, who arrived from London (NZCGMJ, 1 September 1954:6).
- 20 Besides the text below the appeal also included a plan of the proposed four forts and a list of the village organisers.
- 21 Hereafter the Foreign Missions Report of the New Zealand Presbyterian Church will be abbreviated to FMR.
- 22 This is the first time that one can see clearly the emergence of two groups in the community separated to some extent by language, one bilingual and the other predominantly Chinese speaking - and also by affiliation to Chinese organisations. There was a tendency for those who were educated in New Zealand to remain removed from the intricacies of these associations until some years later.
- 23 This was not a false role, for the person concerned had a long relationship with the Baptist Church and continued to do so in New Zealand. Mr. Chiu was in charge of the Baptist Mission in Wellington from 1916 till 1922.
- 24 This is the only case in New Zealand where a common surname dominated an association, but it is not a clan association. While there are now large families of the same surname living in New Zealand who can trace their family back three generations, they have never, to my knowledge, organised a clan association. District and county have always been the most fundamental shared characteristics articulated by an association.
- 25 The last of the district associations, formed in 1936, was the Seyip association in Wellington, which, by its constitution in 1947, allowed as members all persons born in or who had resided in Seyip. The aims of the 1947 constitution, as compared to the revised aims in 1949, are in Appendix XXV. The members who signed the original application for incorporation included seven laundrymen, five fruiterers, one gardener, and three importers, two of whom were partners in the same firm, and also executive members of the New Zealand Chinese association during the war years.
- 26 The exception to this selective support was Lin Shih Yuan's involvement with the appeal by the Chinese government for funds to ease the famine in Chi-li province. In 1920 the Dominion printed news of the famine but added this statement:

The white element is doing all that is possible to alleviate the distress, but is practically powerless against the supine attitude of the Government and the Chinese view, which considers famine a visitation from Heaven to clean an overcrowded land.

(Dominion, 11 November 1920)

The Consul responded to the paper, maintaining that the Chinese were attempting to help by collecting money from overseas Chinese

and placing a levy on their own officials and further that the tone of the article was enough to cause tension between the West and the East (Dominion, 16 November 1920). The New Zealand government finally received a request from the British Famine Relief Committee in Peking, and in January 1921 £1137 was sent, £182 of which came from collections and the remainder from voluntary donations sent in response to advertising (NA, IA 13/388/6).

- 27 The actual number of merchants is hard to ascertain, since Census returns after 1916 did not list them as a separate category. However, informants have maintained that this was the period when their activity became firmly established and can readily identify the ones named in the Customs Department correspondence. If one combines the categories for 'General storekeeping' and 'Sales, other goods', there is a clear indication of expansion between 1921 and 1936, but this does not account for partnerships, which were the norm (see Appendix XXVII).
- 28 For instance, Kung Foon Chan was, according to some informants, a company owned by Jung Sing people which not only sold goods to overseas merchants but provided accommodation for people in transit, arranged passage tickets and the shipping of goods. According to some people it supplied goods to Wong Shee Co., Chung Wah Co., Sing On Ke Co., Yee Chong Wing Co. and Wah Kee Co., all of whom were run by Jung Sing people.
- 29 Customs eventually paid the importer £288.40.0. in 1929, one year's excessive duty paid between July 1926 and July 1927, the time when the Customs Department discontinued the added-value policy. From July 1924 till April 1927, the duty paid had been £3547.15.0 and the amount of excessive duty was £872.5.1 (NA, Customs/1/1726/4, 4 March 1933). The importer was unsatisfied with the result and petitioned the government in 1929 without satisfaction, and again in 1932 (see Appendix XXVIII). The resulting investigation initiated by the petition made little difference. Customs maintained that the importer's goods had been compared with goods of Chinese importers and his were considerably cheaper (ibid., 15 May 1933). At the time of the first petition the Department had sought accounts from the suppliers in Hong Kong, Quan Cheung Shing, before they would consider any more adjustments, but no records were forthcoming, since the exporter had moved and records had been lost. The 1932 petition, while receiving favourable treatment by the Petitions Committee, was turned down on the advice of Customs (ibid.). Two years later the importer took up the issue again with legal support, claiming £584.1.1 for the other two years. In the legal submission, the onus of responsibility was laid clearly at the feet of the Customs Department, since their policy was supposedly based on evidence which they retained and since, by discontinuing the policy, they in fact admitted to a discrepancy (ibid., 1 September 1934). The outcome is unknown.

- 30 Wellington firms were not listed separately, but according to informants they included Ching Ting & Co., Wong Shee & Co., Wong Wah Lee, Duk Lee, Kong Wai Cheong, Wah Kee Bros., Sing On Kee Co., and Chung Wah Co.
- 31 The comparison was possible because Flockton and Company was importing similar goods to some of the Chinese merchants, including such things as brassware, laquered goods, gong stands, chinaware, statues, plates, carved furniture, and silk. Otherwise, imports were largely foodstuffs from different companies, which included salt beans, dried oysters, dried mushrooms, salt eggs, peanut oil, egg noodles, salt fish, rice, medical liquor, dried fish, bean stick, canned bamboo shoots, water chestnuts, onion pickle and cucumber.
- 32 According to the records of Flockton and Company, the average cost of imports from China in the period between 1927 and 1929 had decreased by about 5%, but even so, there was still a marked discrepancy between their import prices and those of the Chinese merchants.
- 33 Action was taken retroactively against two merchants in Wellington, but in each case Customs opted for the minimum fine of £100, plus cost of storage and forfeiture of the goods. The alternative would have been a fine amounting to three times the value of the goods, £500 in one case. The rationale for this decision was based on two assumptions: (a) that it was hard to prove the actual value of goods in China and (b) that the Chinese had 'a wireless system of their own for obtaining information about one another's doings', so that news of the fine would spread quickly and would be sufficient deterrence against further infractions (NA, Customs 1/1726/3, 26 June 1930).
- 34 'Our Fields Afar' was the annual Foreign Missions report of the Presbyterian Church of New Zealand published by the Foreign Missions Committee in Dunedin, New Zealand.
- 35 In 1925 the Communist and Nationalist cadres in Shanghai had organised the Federation of Trade Unions which in May held a series of demonstrations aimed at ending extraterritoriality and the return of foreign concessions to the Chinese. In the course of the demonstrations, the British Settlement police fired on the demonstrators, killing several, which led to a boycott on British goods.
- 36 These events plus others that occurred in 1927 led to the evacuation of the New Zealand missions on three different occasions. The anti-Christian movement which began in 1922 and the virulent anti-foreign feeling of 1925-1927 hastened the desire for self-determination by the Chinese church, which by 1927 received complete control of the foreign mission activity. By 1930 only twelve Presbyterian missionaries remained on the staff in China (see Murray, 1969:38-40).
- 37 The White New Zealand League pamphlet will hereafter be abbreviated to WNZL.

- 38 Lin Shih-yuan, the Consul appointed in 1918 had been replaced in 1922 as he had been re-assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking (NA, IA 13/35/13, 18 August 1922). His replacement was Li Kwang Heung, from Peking who according to sources, was not particularly liked in New Zealand (see NZCGMJ 1 January 1966). Li died in office, however in 1928, and it was shortly before this that the underlying factions in the community came to the fore.
- 39 It has never been confirmed that the newspaper report was correct, only that two factions did exist and were opposed to each other. It was only with news of Chiang's successful Northern Expedition that the CKT faction relented, and it is maintained by informants that the organisation more or less ceased active operation after 1928, although a few members survived until quite recently. The Chee Kung Tang actually registered as an incorporated society in 1923. At the time, the entrance fee was set at £5.8.0 per person and membership at £1.6.0. When the organisation was registered the fifteen Wellington subscribers signed the document including five merchants, six fruiterers, two launderers, one gardener and one labourer. The organisation had an English secretary and a Chinese solicitor from Auckland, who prepared the document for incorporation. In 1973 it was realised that this long since defunct organisation held considerable assets in its name. The CKT was reconstituted, and the capital of \$81,000 remaining from land and presumably past donations was re-distributed in 1977 amongst other existing organisations (see also Chapter 10, p.577).
- 40 The Consul, on hearing of the dispute, wired Peking for confirmation on which flag was legitimate and might be flown at the Double Tenth. Peking replied that the five colour was the flag of the Republic and also the only one accepted by Britain. The Consul was told to stop the 'Revolutionary Flag' being flown, but according to the paper the police took no action, although they were in attendance at Athletic Park (Press, 12 October 1927).
- 41 The antiquity of football matches between Chinese teams in New Zealand is not known, but an early photograph of an all-male group in Wellington (circa 1912) shows one one holding a rugby ball.
- 42 Each year during the depression the Christchurch Chinese donated the proceeds of Double Tenth celebrations to charity, particularly the Public Hospital.
- 43 Mere Newton, President of Maori Women's Welfare League, was later to describe Te Akarana Maori Association as the 'voice of practically (2) two people, one being a pure pakeha', and she maintained that Maori women should be consulted over the issue before the 'academic' decisions of the association were considered (NA, Native Minister, Asiatics and Maoris, 8 August 1930).
- 44 An article in the Lyttelton Times (20 July 1929) stated that it was in fact middle-aged Maori women who were canvassing among rural Maoris for young girls to work in the gardens (see Wornall-Smith, 1970:7).

- 45 Sir Apirana Ngata evidently precipitated the setting up of a committee because he was of the opinion that European agitators were generating the interest in Maori-Chinese sexual relations, and he could not see how one could possibly mitigate this situation by legislation (see NZPD, 1929, 221:489 and Wornall-Smith, 1970:9).
- 46 According to Wornall-Smith, no evidence was ever produced to show that Maori women were complaining about the situation on the gardens (Wornall-Smith, 1970:8).
- 47 Li Kwang Heung had died in office in May 1928, leaving the post vacant for some months. By June, Yue Jackson, still the Secretary, was finding the situation more than difficult and contacted Internal Affairs to see if anything could be done. He had already contacted Peking, but they would not accept any application unless it went through the Chinese Legation in London (NA, Prime Minister's Department 6/2661, 8 June 1928). Yue wanted temporary status as Consul so that he could issue passports, take care of deceased estates handed to him by the Public Trustee and generally handle the expenses of the Consulate which meant access to the bank account. As it was, the deceased Consul's widow was not receiving any support (*ibid.*). The situation was remedied with the arrival of Ou Tsin Shui as Consul, who had been detained in Shanghai when Peking fell and was then told to proceed to New Zealand and take up his Consular post.
- 48 The Consul's contention was confirmed at a later meeting of the National Council of Women, when the representative from the Te Akarana Maori Association, Mrs. Bennett, stated that the girls who worked for Chinese got 'very good wages' and that the girls felt they were 'turned away from European occupations on account of colour' (*Star*, 27 August 1929). The statement resulted from a suggestion that Maori girls find work in European houses.
- 49 No explanation has been found for the absences of associational response although there was a tendency at times to leave matters relating to European society to the Consul. Even in 1921, although Auckland Chinese responded through their organisations to the Hippodrome incident, it was the Consul who negotiated with the government. The KMT and the CKT never performed this role, and although locality associations claimed this as part of their function, they have never actually taken part.
- 50 The Committee had the benefit of the wisdom of Professor E. Finch from Wilberforce University, who had attended the Universal Races Congress in 1911 and presented a paper which amongst other things stated:

The dilution of the so-called high races by that of the so-called lower races will either set the species on the highway to extinction or cause a relapse to barbarism.

(Quoted in AJHR, 1929, G-11:6)

- 51 I am indebted to Christine Chan and her paper 'The Lost Chinaman: A Study of the Assimilation of Chinese in the Lower King Country', unpublished, 1974 for this material.
- 52 This practice was commonplace for new arrivals, although ready explanations are hard to obtain. Some informants said that relationships like father/son or uncle/nephew meant close supervision and familial ties making freedom, mobility and self employment attractive. Others maintained that it was done for experience or related to the type of business. In the latter case the absence of accommodation or enough capital to support another employee might mean deferralment of employment until times improved or until accommodation was available. In this case (in text) the man had worked in Auckland, Dannevirke, Rotorua, Hamilton and Wellington which would indicate a fair experience of the north island and numerous contacts.
- 53 The split was also due to internal dissension, since members had left the syndicate to return to China, placing excessive burdens on some of the organisers. One in particular thought this extra work deserved more reward and took his share to start his own business in a town close by.
- 54 None of the original partnership, of the same surname and village, married Maori women, and initially those that did received little criticism from their fellow countrymen. In later years, however, with a more permanent Chinese community in New Zealand, there has been a tendency for this intermarriage to be frowned upon.
- 55 The significance of the representation remains unknown other than for the manifest purpose of establishing a representative organisation. Most informants have maintained that the organisation reflected the strongest group anyway, so its composition would have varied from place to place.
- 56 It is interesting to note that this organisation was initiated through a decision of existing organisations, whereas its predecessor was initiated in local New Zealand Chinese communities.
- 57 No data has been collated on the origin of the Auckland branch, although informants confirm its involvement in these issues.
- 58 The Chinese population in New Zealand was between 3,374 (1926) and 2,943 (1936). The petition estimated that each Chinese and Indian was able to send £100 home each year, which, according to the petition, would amount to £600,000 leaving the country annually (AJHR, 1933, I-1, No.16). This would indicate a population of at least 6,000 Chinese and Indians in New Zealand. With the Indian population between 987 and 1,200, and an average weekly income of £2 to £3 for Chinese in New Zealand the statistics can be seen to be exaggerated.
- 59 Chunhow H. Pao was educated at Peking University and New York University and had previously served as Consul in Batavia, San Francisco, New York, Canada and Melbourne (Evening Post, 4 January 1935).

- 60 The predominant occupation among the Chinese in the community (see Appendix XXVII) were market gardening, laundries and fruit and vegetable retailing.
- 61 The situation grew so drastic that by January 1932 there was a riot in Dunedin, which resulted in '16 police and 200 civilian casualties' (Sutch, 1966:138). In May there were riots in Wellington (ibid.). In 1932 unemployed males numbered 70,000 and in 1933 they reached their greatest number of the depression years, 79,587.
- 62 Rewi and G.T. Alley described the situation of the Chinese in the 1930s:

The whole thing was well organised, and those in need of help would travel from place to place and spend time as was convenient with those who were better off.

But they also noted that:

[older men]...hate to go to a government office even when it is a question of making application for the assistance which is their right.

(G.T. and Rewi Alley, 1938:9)

- 63 Yue Jackson, Vice Consul, reported in a separate statement that only 150 to 200 Chinese out of a population of 500 in Wellington were unemployed, and most were being provided for by relatives and friends during the winter months while working on the market gardens in the summer (Press, 9 June 1934).
- 64 The Reverend Y.S. Chau was one of the important leaders in the Auckland community during the years of the Sino-Japanese War, when he was prominent in the collection campaign and edition of the Q-Sing Times.
- 65 Ng Hor Gee (William Wah) graduated in Law and Arts from Canterbury College and was unable to get a job working for Europeans so was restricted to employment within the Chinese community. In later years he became the English Secretary for the New Zealand Chinese Association and interpreter for the community in Wellington.

CHAPTER 8

THE CHINESE ORGANISATIONS AND CHINA AT WAR 1937-1944

In the period that followed the depression, the responses to the situation outlined in the last period continued to develop. The concern for families, still remaining in China, increased considerably after 1935 as the threat of war with Japan confronted China. The desire for settlement in New Zealand was seen as an increasingly viable alternative even if it was on a temporary basis and the New Zealand government was pushed to consider relaxation of their immigration provisions for the Chinese. While the Chung Wah Wui Koon remained in action it was the Consulate which initially obtained concessions for temporary immigration for wives, children and students prior to 1939. The Consulate also became increasingly concerned that the New Zealand Chinese support their homeland and instigated the commencement of a national association. This organisation was started in 1937 and became, as a result of a massive collection campaign, its national scope and its ability to impose sanctions, the nexus of power in the community. While the Chinese Consul in 1937 was hesitant to impose a mandatory contribution scheme on the New Zealand Chinese the executive of the association and its representative conferences held periodically, had no hesitation. The collection which lasted from 1937 to 1944, aided by the publication of two Chinese newspapers amassed a considerable

sum to refund to the Chinese government with the approval of the New Zealand government. Most of New Zealand felt sympathy for the Chinese community and the extent of this sympathy resulted in the government instigating a refugee scheme to bring wives and children of Chinese men and allow them residence in New Zealand for the duration of the war. While the scheme was discontinued shortly after its initiation many Chinese families were reunited. The unintended consequences of this situation, with a prolonged war in China, however, led eventually, to New Zealand's acceptance of a permanently resident Chinese community but in 1939 repatriation after the war had been considered mandatory. In 1944 the New Zealand government finally removed the poll tax legislation from the statute books and despite some reluctance there was general unanimity in the decision. The reality of legislation both in terms of immigration and naturalisation however, lagged somewhat as will be indicated in the next chapter.

The outcome of the intensive organisational activity in the Chinese community together with increasing numbers of young people and families was not, however, without consequences. The war years, as will be shown, provided the basis and impetus for a national association but the allowed hegemony of the association headquarters was of increasing concern as smaller communities developed and organised. The collection activity, its financial cost to families and its organisation also caused dissension and default, leaving after the war, as will be discussed later, numerous problems. The centralisation of power in Wellington together with its political control increasingly became an issue of discussion and later conflict. The community also, during the war years, underwent considerable demographic change which had begun in the 1920s but which increased significantly in the period till the end of World War II.

The presence of families and children produced new demands both financial and social which were different than those of a largely single male population. Families required economic security and stability and the young needed, as far as the community was concerned, to be contained especially under the increasing incidence of influence and contact with Europeans. In this period these concerns receive some attention but in a situation with unresolved conflicts it remained for the post war community to finally determine compromises which would resolve the conflicts and provide for the needs of a resident New Zealand Chinese community.

In 1935 Consul Pao exchanged positions with the Acting Consul in Johannesburg, Wang Feng (NA,IA 1933/60/15, 4 January 1935).¹ Before his departure Pao was quoted at length in the Evening Post, which revealed his priorities regarding his role in New Zealand (4 January, 1935). He described New Zealand 'as a beautiful and glorious country populated by kind and most hospitable people' and maintained that in his office he had been able to 'foster the spirit of good will between New Zealand and China and to assist in the development of better understanding between the two peoples' (ibid.). He asserted that the local Chinese were 'endeavouring to do their part towards advancing the Dominion's prosperity' and finally closed the interview with an advertisement for investment in China, which 'has unlimited possibilities as a world market and welcomes foreign enterprise and capital as long as it is not made an instrument of political domination and imperialistic penetration or ruthless exploitation' (ibid.).

While Consuls exchanged positions, Vice Consul Yue Jackson approached the government on behalf of the local community, asking that wives and children of New Zealand-born Chinese be allowed to come to New Zealand on a temporary basis (NZCGMJ,² 1 October, 1954:7),

since he estimated that there were less than 100 Chinese families in the country already (NA, L22/1/81, 29 September 1950:2). The government in response introduced a concession of ten permits per year for the wives of Chinese born in New Zealand (ibid.). Unfortunately, no documentation remains concerning this approach by the Vice Consul, and the background papers quoted (NA, L22/1/81) above only speculate that the Chinese either anticipated that the government would permit the issuing of only temporary permits or, on the other hand, most Chinese would want to return after the war anyway, so permanent residence was not necessary (ibid.).³ Although no figures of actual applications remain, the statistics quoted in Chapter 5 (see Appendix XI, XII and XIII) indicate a substantial increase in the number of women arriving in 1935-36 other than New Zealand residents returning. With the fear of encroaching war with Japan and as a result of news spreading about the temporary permit provisions, large numbers of applications started arriving. Simultaneously, applications for student permits increased as local Chinese realised that under the 1930 Immigration Restriction Regulations they could legitimately bring young sons to New Zealand on a temporary basis (see Chapter 7, page 367). Table 10 (following page) indicates the trend.

Under the influence of Wang Feng, the new Consul, and a wave of nationalism that was moving through the New Zealand Chinese community, a new association was constituted in 1935-36. The actual date of its founding is uncertain, but the new association was registered as an incorporated society in August 1935 and at the same date filed a constitution. Sixteen men witnessed the incorporation: seven fruiterers, three importers, one silk merchant, two laundrymen, one Chinese

TABLE 10: Student Permits to Chinese 1929-1942

Year	Permits Issued	Students Arrived
1929	-	6 (originally on temporary permit. Transferred to student permit 1930).
1930	9	1
1931	11	6
1932	3	4
1933	1	1
1934	8	5
1935	11	10
1936	16	13
1937	25	22
1938	66	48
1939	112	83
1940	40	63
1941	27	18
1942	1	-

Source: (NA,L22/1/81 Section 2:1)

missioner and the Vice-Consul for China, Yue H. Jackson (Rules of the New Zealand Chinese Association, 1935), all of whom lived in Wellington. The filed version of the Constitution stated in its first three provisions the following objects:

- (a) To provide for Chinese residents in New Zealand the means of mutual helpfulness, social intercourse, and rational recreation, and to promote the intellectual, moral, and physical well-being of the Chinese in New Zealand.

- (b) To establish schools and classes and to make provision for public lectures, addresses and debates for the education and entertainment of Chinese.
- (c) To provide halls, meeting places, clubs, buildings and premises where members can meet for any of the purposes of the Association.

(Rules of the New Zealand Chinese Association, 1935)

The Association was also allowed by the constitution to raise money for activities of the Association, make application to bring either a Chinese student or person into New Zealand and provide the bond or deed required, and to recover any monies or security offered by the Association (ibid.:2). Membership was to comprise all 'present members of the Association', which indicates its prior existence (ibid.:3). The Association could accept new members by three-fourths majority as well as expel members under the same conditions. The controlling body of the Association was to be nine members, which presumably included the seven officers elected at every annual general meeting and two others.

The remainder of the constitution deals with administration of the Association and adds little to an understanding of its operation compared to the 1909 constitution discussed previously. Curiously, there is no mention of a subscription fee, which presumably was waived considering the levy to be imposed by the Anti-Japanese Movement collection. In its first year of operation for which accounts were registered, the expenses incurred included those for the National Day, Evening School, War Relief and stationery and postage, while the assets came from the Chinese student insurance fees, Chinese National Day collection and Chinese evening school fees, plus cash in hand.

Initially this Association did not have branches in other centres but did collect the first money to send back to China and organised the local Double Tenth in Wellington. The full-scale collection, however, did not really start until the Double Seventh incident in 1937.

After the Japanese attacked the Marco Polo Bridge in Peking and then moved south, eventually into Kwangtung and the home districts of the New Zealand Chinese, the support of what became known as the Anti-Japanese Movement (Go Koh Kong Yut) increased in earnest. William Kwok, as the chairman of the association, was approached in early July 1937 to see whether or not a more combined front could be organised amongst the overseas Chinese. According to informants, the Consul was also approached but feared political recriminations, maintaining that you could not force a population to become involved. Despite this, a meeting was called in September and those who gathered decided to issue instructions that all areas in New Zealand should send delegates to a central meeting in Wellington - a task that would not be difficult after the Chinese Consul had already completed a census of the New Zealand Chinese under instructions from Nanking (see EP, 23 May 1936). The meeting included thirty-seven representatives as listed in Table 11 (following page). The number of delegates from each area, according to informants was decided on the basis of both population and influence, which would explain the discrepancy between the number of representatives from Dunedin and Auckland: Dunedin had a Chinese population of approximately 150, while Auckland's population exceeded 250. Dunedin's community leaders had played a seminal role in encouraging the formation of the model for a branch association and, according to informants, had the best organised local branch,⁴ matched only by Gisborne.

TABLE 11: Representatives at the first 'Save China Conference'
26 September 1937, by Occupation, Place of Residence
in New Zealand and Home County

	Total	Fruiterer	Laundry	Market Garden	Merchant	Grocer/Shop	Other	Home County
Auckland	3	2					1	TK, JS
Hamilton	2	1					1	JS
Palmerston North	3	3						JS, PY (2)
Fielding	1			1				JS (1)
Wanganui	1	1						PY
Otaki	2			2				PY (2)
Gisborne	1			1				JS
Wellington ^a	6	1	1		3	1		JS (4), PY (1) Seyip (1)
Levin	1	1						JS
Masterton	1			1				Seyip
Nelson	1		1					JS
Greymouth	2	2						JS
Christchurch	2	2						JS, TK
Timaru	1	1						JS
Dunedin	5	4			1			PY, JS (4)
Other	5						5	
TOTAL	37	18	2	5	4	1	7	

^a Three of the representatives from Wellington were part of the Consulate, with only the Vice-Consul (Toy San) from the areas represented above.

Source: Personal communication.

Wellington's large number of representatives was clearly a reflection of their historic role in New Zealand and the presence of a number of other associations plus the Chinese Consulate. They essentially became the administrative head for the collection and the publishers of the New Zealand Chinese Weekly News, which started in 1938 and continued until the end of the war.⁵ It was also apparent that the localities represented by an association (Tung Jung Wui Koon and Poon Fa Wui Koon) dominated the organisation.

At the first meeting of the All Representative Congress of the delegates, the collection was launched in full and the means of implementing it laid down.⁶

The events were described at the Fourth Congress of the Chinese Association (1939):

DECLARATION OF THE 4TH CONGRESS OF THE CHINESE ASSOCIATION

The "7th July Incident" has revealed the wild ambitions of the Japanese military imperialists to conquer China, but their action has awakened and mobilized the whole Chinese nation to rise to fight against the invaders. People from all walks of life, rallied around the government and their leaders, have engaged in battles. The overseas Chinese are no exception. Immediately after the 7th July Incident, the Chinese all over New Zealand launched an enthusiastic campaign to donate money to help to repulse the invaders. A long-term system of donation was also worked out. Under the demand for relief work, the First Congress of the New Zealand Chinese Association was convened on 26th September [1937] in Wellington under the auspices of the Chinese Consulate General. More than 30 representatives attended the Congress. A resolution was passed that the Wellington New Zealand Chinese Association was formed to function as the head office in charge of carrying out all the resolutions and other public welfare affairs.

A regulation on a long-term donation system was established at the Congress. According to the regulation, each self-employed Chinese should donate ten shillings per week and each employee two shillings a month.⁷ A penalty on those who refuse donations was adopted. The relief work was carried out successfully until the Chinese central government issued national bonds and offered the donors the bonds for their donations. The bonds and donation system caused some confusion. In order to solve the problem the 2nd Congress was held on 3rd July 1938. It was decided that all the bonds would not be returned to the purchasers. Instead, they would be sent to China in due course to help relief work there. A special

committee was set up to take care of the bonds. However, great difficulties derived from the ponderous paper work. It was impossible for the executives of the Association to carry out the scheme. Therefore, the 3rd Congress was convened ahead of schedule. It was decided that donations and purchase of national bonds would be dealt with separately. Donations were not to be exchanged for bonds. The Congress agreed to impose a more severe penalty on those who evaded or openly refused donations.

Since the convention of the 3rd Congress, the New Zealand Chinese have become more closely united and more enthusiastic in implementing their policies. As a result, more achievements have been made in relief work.

It was in the light of this favourable situation the 4th Congress was opened on 26 September.

(Q-Sing Times, 1 October 1939)

The meeting also decided that regional branches would be started in various centres as listed in Table 12, to aid the collection movement.

TABLE 12: Regional Branches of the Anti-Japanese Movement
Collective Campaign and the Home District of
Counties Represented in Each - 1939.

Wellington	PY and JS
Auckland	JS and Seyip
Otago	PY, Fa Y and Seyip
Canterbury	JS and Seyip
Manawatu	PY and JS
Hawkes Bay	PY and Fa Y
Gisborne	JS and Seyip
Waikato	JS and Seyip
Hutt Valley	PY, Y and JS
Wairarapa	S Yap and JS
Ohakune	PY, Fa Y and JS
Timaru	Seyip and JS
Ohau	PY and Fa Y
New Plymouth	JS
Wairoa	JS
Levin	PY and Fa Y
Otaki	JS, PY and Fa Y
Taihape	JS
Dannevirke	JS and Seyip
Foxton	PY and Fa Y
Rotorua	JS
Greymouth	JS
Hawera	JS, PY and Fa Y
Nelson	JS and Seyip

Note: PY is Poon Yu; JS is Jung Sing; Fa Y is Fa Yuen; Seyip includes Toy San, San Wui, Yun Ping and Hoy Ping with the first two being the most significant in New Zealand.

Source: Personal communication-

It can be seen that the Seyip people tended to be clustered in a few communities while people from other districts were dispersed throughout New Zealand. The result of the establishment of these regional areas was the fact that the groundwork was effectively laid for the creation of the New Zealand Chinese Association which followed and recommended the setting up of its branches in the same areas.⁸ In 1938 the Dunedin branch representing Otago/Southland was formally established and the first annual meeting of the executives recorded in a photograph.⁹ The composition on the executive is contained in Table 13.

TABLE 13 : Occupation and District of Origin of the Executive of the Chinese Association in Dunedin (1938).¹⁰

	Jung Sing	Tung Goon	Poon Yu	Seyip	Totals
Fruiterers	6	1	3	3	13
Gardeners		1	3		4
Merchant			1	1	2
Laundry	1				1
Labourer	1				1
Total	8	2	7	4	21

Source: Personal communication

Similar to Dunedin, Gisborne also formalised their association and became a branch of the New Zealand Chinese Association, setting up an executive modelled on the Wellington format, and still later other branches organised and affiliated themselves to Wellington.¹¹

In 1938 the collection process was activated with intensity, and under the suggestion of the Timaru association, branch donation boxes were to be placed in all shops and gardens for the collection of money to help the injured in the Chinese Army (Chinese Weekly News, 2 January

1939).¹² In order that the Wellington headquarters be reimbursed for their expenses in this and other matters, it was further proposed by the Canterbury branch that each overseas Chinese in New Zealand pay 1/- a year which would in turn be sent to Wellington (ibid.). By October 1938 the Chinese Minister of Finance had received \$40,706 (Chinese currency) from New Zealand which was deposited in the Bank of China in Hong Kong (ibid.). The first itemised list in the Weekly News showed each branch's donation as follows:

Otago-Southland	CC\$ 9,639.00	NZ£ 439.9.0
Wellington	20,280.00	928.7.0
New Plymouth	1,787.00	53.17.0
Nelson	394.60	18.0.0
Taihape	1,948.00	82.8.0
Wanganui	975.90	44.11.0
Rotorua	492.00	19.12.0

(CWN, 2 January 1939)

From this time on, the Weekly News kept the local population informed about events in China and Canton as well as publicising requests from Chiang Kai-Shek or his wife for more funds or, for instance, cotton clothing (see CWN, 6 November 1939). Warnings were received from China urging local Chinese to beware of false requests which the Japanese occupying army had forced local Chinese in Kwangtung to write to overseas compatriots (CWN, 6 November 1939). The particular requests were for funds which the Japanese exchanged for army coupons or counterfeit dollars which turned out to be irredeemable (ibid.). The paper also reported at length on the Double Tenth celebrations held in Dunedin and Wellington, the only centres where they were organised, reporting the speeches and the various statements by the Consul, who continually stressed the importance of 'national unity' and 'strong determination'. By this time, the community's profile, at least in terms of Double Tenth and the appeal was public knowledge and dealt with sympathetically by the local press.

Perhaps the most significant fact about the Chinese Weekly News was that it was national and for the first time brought communities into contact with each other, at least in terms of news from China and the collection campaign. It could not be argued that people in the various localities around New Zealand learned much about each other, but it was clear that the publication of one's donations created notions of generosity and organisation or less generosity and apathy. Similarly, the publication of the names of individuals who had not paid led to a form of public chastisement and community shame that brought rectification quickly. In some cases people either avoided payment or simply could not afford the donation, and in both cases provisions were made for some payment. If the publication of names and continued warnings still resulted in a refusal to pay, the Association took steps to inform the National government in China that the persons concerned should be barred from booking passage home (CWN, 6 November 1939).

At the end of 1939, the Chinese government sent notification of what they referred to as the 'Standard Donation Payment Method', which specified the mechanics of sending money to the government or to particular agencies by local Chinese (in China) and overseas Chinese (see Appendix XXXII). While the document specified forms of receipts that were to be issued and where money was to be sent, there was no concern with foreign exchange regulations imposed by various countries. New Zealand had, in 1939, set out new regulations to control foreign exchange, which placed all overseas funds under the control of the Reserve Bank and prohibited anyone sending or carrying currency out of the country (Q-Sing Times, 15 May 1940). The Chinese Consul consulted with the government immediately, since such regulations interfered with

the remittances. The government then made special provisions for the local Chinese to continue sending money back to China, granting permission for foreign exchange of up to £3,000 each month (CWN, 18 December 1939 and Q-Sing Times, 1 October 1940).¹³

In 1939 the New Zealand Chinese also received a request from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China asking that a general boycott be imposed on goods manufactured in five Japanese factories in Shanghai (CWN, 25 August 1939). It was intended that local merchants stop importing goods made by these companies, which included cotton dye, steel, oil and cooking utensils. New Zealand also added to the long list of requirements by again imposing compulsory registration of all aliens. The Association received a notice drawing their attention to clause III of the regulation, which stated:

All foreigners who stay in New Zealand must register at their nearest police station within fourteen days starting from the day of the announcement of the regulation (4 September). Please take note of this and inform your people in New Zealand to conform to it.

(CWN, 25 August 1939).

While this issue was resolved and publicised, the 'New Zealand authorities', as the Chinese Weekly News described the government, had, at the commencement of the war, authorised the inspection of all foreign letters going overseas. When the 'authorities' found they were unable to read these letters, they then stipulated that they must be written in English or French; otherwise they would not be dispatched. (CWN, 27 November 1939). The Chinese Association and Consul opposed the move, maintaining that it effectively cut off communication between 'our compatriots' and their families. The resolution to this problem was that:

Letters in Chinese language are still accepted by the Post Office, but letters which are to be inspected have to pass through the Consulate for inspection after which they may be sent overseas.

(CWN, 27 November 1939).

While the intensity of the war collection increased, and with it the organisation of the local Chinese, the issue of naturalisation and immigration again came to the fore with urgency. The Japanese were by 1939 in Kwangtung, and the home villages were now a battleground. The ambivalence over residence in New Zealand or China by those already in New Zealand was being forcefully resolved as it became clear they and their families would fare better in New Zealand or at least in Hong Kong. As already noted, there was a restriction on families being reunited in New Zealand with the exception of ten permanent permits issued to wives of New Zealand-born Chinese or temporary permits issued for six months. This led to a barrage of applications and pressure from the Association and the Consul to extend the period of the permit. In 1939, the government changed the system, which resulted in the following:

In 1939 Cabinet approved a concession by which the wives and children under 16 years of age of Chinese permanently resident in New Zealand were admitted on Temporary Permit for two years provided that the husband deposited £200, lodged on unlimited Deed of Covenant executed by himself and two other persons regarding the maintenance of his family or their possible deportation, and entered into a bond for £500 guaranteeing that his wife would take away any children born to her while in New Zealand.

(NA, L22/1/81:3)¹⁴

Ng in 1959 described this as a situation where 'discriminatory restrictions against the Chinese were...eased...', but one is inclined to a different view when one finds that the provisions were quickly withdrawn in 1940 'following complaints that Chinese fruiterers were employing their wives and children in their shops while their assistants

were starting their own business, in some cases taking over shops vacated by European fruiterers who had joined the forces'

(NA, L22/1/81:3).¹⁵ Despite the excessive financial commitment in this arrangement, by December 1939, 240 husbands had made application for their wives and 244 children, of whom 146 wives and 147 children had already arrived (*ibid.*).¹⁶ Considering that Wang Feng, the Consul, had estimated that only 150 Chinese would take advantage of the plan, the response was immense and one the government had not anticipated.¹⁷

The Canterbury Branch of the Chinese Association responded immediately to the government's plan at the New Zealand Chinese Association's Fourth All Representatives Conference held in Wellington at the end of September (New Zealand Chinese Association Report, September 1939). Their remit clearly stated that they felt the two-year permit was too restrictive and that the cash guarantee required was more than most Chinese could afford. In effect, the restrictions were stratifying the community by allowing the reunification of wealthier members and their families. In a sample of 115 families from the 1939 group, the average number of children per family was three and the range was from one to eight including in many cases daughters.¹⁸ While this is hardly a sufficient indicator of wealth, it does allow one to presume a number of visits to China, which necessitated a fairly well established existence in New Zealand.¹⁹ Attempts to verify the background of those who took advantage of the provisions have not provided much substantive data, but generalisation would lead one to suggest the fruiterers and market gardeners were the predominant applicants, who were largely made up of people from Jung Sing and Poon Yu. The fact of the arrivals and their background, however, pales in significance if one asks what it was like for women to arrange transportation from their

local villages to Canton and then to Hong Kong and finally to New Zealand. If the cost of the permit was high, the cost of the above movement was even more and often fraught with the danger of extortion and capture. Granted, the long history of travel back and forth along this route made arrangements a matter of course, but in 1938 the area was occupied by the Japanese and more stealth had to be used in the exit.

When these women arrived with their children in New Zealand, they found often that their new homes were cramped, inequipped for children, and in rural areas, sometimes nothing more than a humble tin shed which was to become home. Most husbands, as fruiterers or gardeners, would have had access to food,²⁰ but limited financial resources, as their own poll tax, passage and bond money for their families and their own cost of living, remittances, and the war collection absorbed any surplus funds. If the women and children who came had to work, it was a necessity to make ends meet, and the ever-present thought of forced repatriation was unpleasant.

If the situation of relatively young families was difficult, the worry of those who were alone, wondering whether their families were safe in China, was considerable. The need for news was pressing, and the Chinese Weekly News of Wellington and the Q-Sing Times of Auckland translated and published material from the New Zealand papers and also received and included items from Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong and Chungking.

The older members of the community also suffered as they faced old age excluded from the Old Age Pension. In 1937, the government was approached again by the Chinese Consul over the issue of naturalisation, but the government stood firm, waiting for the 1936 Census data on Chinese and a report on whose who would be eligible (NA, IA 116/7, 3 November 1937). When the data was produced in 1937, twenty-seven

applications had been received for naturalisation, twenty-one of which would have been eligible for the Old Age Pension and one case for Family Allowance. The calculations led to a total cost of £1,290.18.0 for the Pensions and Family Allowance, according to the Under-Secretary of Internal Affairs (*ibid.*).²¹

Finally, with the Pension Amendment Act of 1937, naturalised Chinese became eligible, but there was no attempt to change the naturalisation restrictions, which precluded the majority from access to the provisions (see Brocklehurst, 1969:32).

The war collection continued until 1944, but the intensity of the first year waned, and less was collected in succeeding years.

Feelings about this situation and the pressure for continuous donations led to declining enthusiasm. Christchurch and Timaru withdrew donations after two years of intensive effort, and Ohakune was sporadic in its activity. The latter case was explained as the result of the unsettled land tenure for the market gardeners, who leased land for three years and then were forced to move on, a situation that was replicated in Levin and Otaki, also predominantly market-gardening localities. Other areas were far more consistent, however, and Gisborne, Wairoa, Hutt Valley, Manawatu and Wairarapa all continued their donations rigorously.

In some cases representatives withdrew from the annual conferences; some areas never sent a delegate, and Greymouth only participated for two years (see footnote 6, page 419).

At the start collectors visited people every week, then once every two weeks, and finally once a month. Each time the donation was recorded in a special book issued to each contributor by the Association for each year. The card allowed one to move in New Zealand and still show payment, thus avoiding condemnation for unpatriotic behaviour, but it also

became the vehicle for imposing sanctions on people who did not contribute. At the Fourth Congress of the Association, the Auckland, Wairarapa, Otago and Gisborne branches submitted proposals for penalties that would be imposed for 'undermining the National Salvation Donations and defying long term donations' (Q-Sing Times, 1 October 1939). The following resolutions were passed:

- a) Request to the Chinese Consulate in Wellington to carry out the policy of long-term donation in the way that all members of the Chinese community who seek assistance from the Consulate must first be approved by the branches of the Association. Those who refuse to pay donations will have sanctions imposed against them.
- b) Any Chinese commercial agent or travel agent will be asked not to sell ship tickets for travelling to China to Chinese clients unless they can produce their donation book from the Association. If travel agents do not do this, they will be penalised in the same way as those defying donation regulations.
- c) Economic sanctions will be applied against those who do not donate.
- d) Those who do not donate are not to enjoy any rights from the General Assembly.
- e) Anyone who has special difficulties in making donations must apply for a grant of favour in advance from the Chinese Association. He may be given a reduction or a temporary exemption. After that, documentary evidence will be issued to him by the Association, which is necessary to prove that he is not an anti-donation element.

(Q-Sing Times, 1 October 1939)

The largest proportion of the funds was given to the 'National Salvation Collection', but numerous other campaigns and methods of collection, including the ubiquitous donation boxes, brought in money. The extent of the collections is outlined in Appendix XXXIII, the total amount collected, £174,149, was equal to the poll tax the Chinese had paid to the New Zealand government between 1882 and 1919, £177,730 (see Appendix IX). The New Zealand Chinese donations were the highest in the South Pacific and ranked second per capita among all overseas communities in the world (NZCGMJ, 1 October 1954).

While this represents an overall view of the mechanics and politics of its operation, the picture was far more complex. As already noted, overall support was neither totally forthcoming nor continuous, and opposition by individuals or communities led to obvious problems which had to be sorted out. Matters of individual refusal to pay were, as already noted, the subject of discussion at the annual representative conference, along with many other issues, but arguments of more substance seldom found their way to the conference. In Dunedin, for instance, there had been considerable opposition on the part of some to the forced nature of the collection and more directly to the person who enthusiastically initiated the collection. This person happened to be from Seyip, while the community was predominantly from Poon Yu and Jung Sing, so factions developed and an effective block to the collection ensued. The situation was smoothed out by discussion, but it was duplicated in other centres too, where it is not easily identifiable as a result of county or district enmity but more likely an argument about the nature of power within the community.

It has been pointed out by informants that the collection became a vehicle whereby individuals involved could accrue power and contacts in the community in spite of their altruism and support for nationalism. Becoming part of the effort was important, as it gave one status in the community and also recognition in China. For instance, those who bought over CC\$50,000 bonds (Bonds of Air Force Strengthening and National Salvation) were to be 'commended' by the Central Government and presented with a plaque containing the calligraphy and picture of Chiang Kai-shek (Q-Sing Times, 1 November 1940). Furthermore, an aeroplane would be named after them.

As for status in New Zealand, it was clear that the central executive in Wellington wielded considerable power and gradually emerged as a community elite which spanned two generations. Executive members in local communities also had status, both as local organisers and as representatives to the annual Congress.

Clearly, this scenario lent itself to possible argument between the core (Wellington) and the periphery (other large and small communities), and just such a situation emerged in 1938. At the time, funds for the collection were channelled to Wellington, and Auckland and Hamilton took issue with this. In March, Mr. Yee Wong, a Chinese resident of Sydney who was appointed representative of the Nanking government, came to New Zealand with instructions to change all the donations of the New Zealand Chinese into bonds.²² The second annual conference of the Association passed this decision, but Auckland changed its mind and threatened to leave the Association if it complied with the suggestion. The Otago and Southland branch, hearing of their decision, asked that a conference be convened to sort out the differences, but even though one was called in August 1938, Auckland sent no representative. The conference, however, did decide to send a delegation to Auckland of representatives from Wellington, Canterbury, Otago and Southland, Gisborne, Wairarapa and Levin. The meeting in Auckland arrived at a compromise: Wellington retreated from its decision on condition that Auckland return to the Association and participate as part of the collective effort.²³ Shortly after this the Auckland community produced its own paper, which essentially contained the same news as the Chinese Weekly News in Wellington. In its first issue, sponsored by a donation of £151.9.0 the editor, Y.S. Chau, stated its aims:

The Q-Sing Times is the official organ of the New Zealand Chinese Association (Auckland Branch) and has been launched for the purpose of fostering the spirit of Nationalism among the Chinese overseas. To this end arrangements have been made whereby all news matters relating to the Nationalist movements is obtained from accredited representatives within the Dominion of New Zealand and abroad (including China). It will be published fortnightly, and in addition to the latest political movements in the Homeland will contain items. THE PROCEEDS OF ADVERTISEMENTS IN THIS PAPER ARE FOR THE CHINESE RELIEF FUND. Price six pence per copy.

(Q-Sing Times, October 1938).

The paper clearly was used to encourage national consciousness and increase the donations to the various causes that were being publicised from China. Articles abound stirring the local Chinese in Auckland to 'Love yourself, love your family, but first of all love your country'; to support, for instance, the China Charitable Relief Society which had been started by the vice-president of the central committee on Overseas Chinese Affairs;²⁴ and most of all to give money. If one was reluctant or unable to see how one could afford such donations, the editor provided the reason and the method:

The Financial Responsibility of the Overseas Chinese when China is plunged into War.

In peace time our financial responsibility is to pay tax to the country and to support our own families. But when the country is in war we have to give money to all kinds of activities, such as "donation to save the country", "donations for the war refugees", "donations to purchase aeroplanes", etc. If one has no increase in his income he will be plagued by donations and become unable to help his motherland and at last lose confidence in repulsing the Japanese and saving China. In order to overcome the financial difficulties I suggest that:

First, one should seek every possible opportunity to make money, to seize every possible minute to make money, the more the better. Second, one should save money. In order to save money one should lead a very frugal life. It's futile to earn money without saving. Third, one should donate his hard-earned money to the country. In peace time after the accumulation of wealth one is encouraged to buy property, but in war time national interest comes before individual. Only then the nation is strong enough to fight against its enemy and win the final victory.

(Q-Sing Times, No.3, 1939)

At other times the editor used the paper to complain of his compatriots' lack of commitment to the cause, accusing them of being motivated only by individualistic interests:

Take our association for example; except for a few activists many Chinese are phlegmatic. They rarely if ever come to take part in our meetings. Their attitude is selfish, peremptory and without discipline. It is unfortunate to see so many in time of war who do not understand the idea of devotion for a national cause or for that matter the notion that one would and should sacrifice for one's country.

(Q-Sing Times, 15 January 1939)

and reminding them that:

The plight of the rich merchants along the sea coast should serve as a warning. Many of them had their wealth and property confiscated or turned into ruins. It is now time to make good use of our wealth. The cry of our compatriots in the occupied areas for help should induce us to donate more money for the cause of national salvation.

(ibid.)

Others also used the paper to encourage other sections of the community to become involved. Of importance was the realisation by the Consul's wife that there were now a significant number of women in the Chinese community, and it was their duty to help also:²⁵

We should not be of the opinion that we, the overseas Chinese women are not involved in the war since the soldiers are the ones who are engaged in the fighting and the government Ministers are taking care of the administration and planning for the nation...

We must get mobilised in our national salvation work and not succumb to inertness. Some of us do not want to take part in the work but are jealous of those who devote themselves to this glorious cause. This is not a time to seek personal gain or fame.

(Q-Sing Times, 15 May 1939)

In the same issue, Miss Ku of Auckland responded, agreeing with the sentiments of Mrs. Wang and suggesting that Chinese women in New Zealand do not want to be mocked as the poet Du Fu of the Tang dynasty had done to the contemporary women of the court:

Singing and dancing the courtesans present
Imperceptible they are to the sorrow of being
Under the yoke of foreign rulers.

(Q-Sing Times, 15 May 1939)

Through the remainder of the war till the Japanese surrendered in 1945, the larger Chinese communities celebrated Double Tenth and Double Seventh as times to encourage donations and maintain the support for Chiang Kai-shek even though, according to some informants, his popularity was beginning to wane by 1943 (see also Schurmann and Schell, 1967:250-251). Each year the national conference of the Association met, discussed remits from various centres which related to both the internal structure of the community and the collection, and each year delegates returned to their centres to try and implement the decisions.

Through 1940 the organisation continued its work, but for the first time concern for their future in New Zealand became an issue. In April, the Chinese Consulate General had been notified by the Customs Department that children of newly arrived families who were on a temporary permit were attending schools without prior permission from the Customs Department (Q-Sing Times, 1 March 1940). The crux of this issue was that under the student temporary permit scheme the Customs Department prescribed the school which the particular individual should attend, and if they changed schools, they faced expulsion from the country. It is evident that the Department had lost control of young people who had come in under the refugee scheme and threatened

to confiscate the £200 deposit unless they had received notification and granted approval. The New Zealand government was not alone in its concern for the newly arrived Chinese young people, as Wellington and Otago Chinese communities set out to establish youth organisations. An Auckland Chinese Young Men's Club was already in existence, originally founded after the 11 September Incident in 1931.²⁶ However, after the Fifth Congress each main centre was to have a youth organisation which specified as its general aims the following:

The aim of the founding of the league is to strengthen friendship, exchange experiences and knowledge among young Chinese, encourage athletic activities, carry out the work for national salvation more efficiently and promote friendship between the Chinese and people of other races.

(Dunedin Youth League in Q-Sing Times, 15 December 1940.)

The Auckland club specified that young people should 'carry out academic study', which clearly emphasised the concerns of elders for the future of their young people. It was not clear at this point, however, whether their future was in New Zealand or China, although informants have said that there was some concern for young people to get a useful skill in New Zealand and then go back to China to help the war effort.

In January 1940, however, the Overseas Chinese Affairs committee in China informed the New Zealand Consulate General of the following:

The State Council has ordered the provincial government of Kwangtung and Fukien and other administrations concerned that any returning overseas Chinese who holds neither a passport nor a re-entry permit from the country where he formerly resided shall be conscripted according to the present conscription regulations after residing in China for two full years.

(Q-Sing Times, 22 January 1940)

It is unknown whether or not Chinese in New Zealand would have been willing to have their youngsters go back to China to fight, but from interviews it does not appear to have been a popular idea.

Contemporaneous with the interest in youth, there was also a concerted effort to provide a physical structure that would serve the whole New Zealand Chinese community. At the Fifth Congress in 1940 the Wellington Chinese Association placed a remit before all the representatives to initiate a campaign for raising money to buy an Association hall. The remit maintained that the rent was now too high and they were unable to pay for it out of subscriptions (Minutes to the Fifth Representative Congress, 2 August 1940). It further maintained that if the war ended most Chinese would return home, leaving the remainder to pay the rent (ibid.). The solution was to purchase land, and they suggested that each of the 3,000 Chinese in New Zealand should donate 10/- which would provide enough for the first term instalment; thereafter they would use membership fees and also call on branches to give money (ibid.).

The suggestion was accepted, and in November the Q-Sing Times published the proposal in full:

The Resolution for the Purchase of a New Building

The reasons for purchasing a new building are as follows:

1. We have found it difficult to rent a venue on occasions when we need it.
2. A new building of the New Zealand Chinese Association will bring about prestige to all the New Zealand Chinese who boast a long history and good reputation.
3. A new building will rally all members of the Chinese community around their own organisation and close their ranks.

4. A new building will provide proper space for a Chinese school and a library. A school is essential for the young Chinese to learn the Chinese language and culture. Relics of the pioneer overseas Chinese in New Zealand their historical evidence can be displayed in the library to inspire the younger generations to learn from their ancestors of their spirit of enterprise.

Immediately after this important resolution was passed, several hundreds of pounds sterling were donated.

We hope that everyone of our 3,000 New Zealand Chinese compatriots will make his due contributions to the purchase of a new building.

Apart from this resolution we should also do our best to carry out the resolution of increasing the relief fund, paying up funds in arrears and organising a 'wounded soldiers' friends club' in the 4th year of the War Against Japanese Aggression.

Fellow countrymen
Who refuse to be enslaved,
It's high time to take action!

(Q-Sing Times, 1 November 1940)

While this plan was accepted in 1940, after the war it became an issue which would be hotly debated and finally would lead to a partial disintegration of the national Association. Again, it would be seen as an attempt by Wellington to increase hegemony over the New Zealand Chinese, and it was not clear to other communities how their hard-earned money used in Wellington could be of lasting benefit to all Chinese in New Zealand. The excuse of indebtedness after the war seemed a flimsy rationale for the building, but obviously prestige, unity and concern for youth and history were more meaningful.

It seemed clear that there was an expectation of permanent settlement in New Zealand, despite the suggestion of repatriation, and that some kind of preparation should be made for this eventuality.

In March 1940 the Chinese community mourned the death of Mr. M. Savage, the Prime Minister since 1935. The Q-Sing Times devoted a whole page to his obituary and described him as '...the greatest friend of the Chinese people in New Zealand' (Q-Sing Times, 1 April 1940). With the

death of Savage, Peter Fraser became Prime Minister of the continuing Labour government, and according to most Chinese, he too achieved the respect of the community for his humanitarian concern. In October 1952, Fraser was the first New Zealand Prime Minister to attend the Double Tenth celebration in Wellington, epitomising the sudden emergence of New Zealand into diplomatic activity after the bombing of Pearl Harbour in December 1941.²⁷ Fraser was welcomed warmly by William Kwok, chairman of the occasion, who drew the audience's attention to the fact that New Zealand was the only country in the League of Nations that had advocated resistance to Japan's aggression (EP, 12 October 1942). Early in 1942 Fraser had received a telegram from Chiang Kai-shek, who had commended New Zealand on her friendly ties with China and hoped for a continuation of these in the future (*ibid.*).²⁸ In 1943 and 1944 messages were reciprocated between the New Zealand Prime Minister and Chiang Kai-shek on the occasion of the Double Tenth and Double Seventh.²⁹ The telegrams sent sympathy to the Generalissimo for the long protracted misery of the war with Japan and wishes for liberation (see EP, 11 October 1943, 8 July 1944, 10 July 1944 and 10 October 1944). Chiang Kai-shek replied thanking New Zealand for its wishes and expressing hope that at the same time cooperation would be maintained between China and New Zealand during the war and in the period of reconstruction that would follow (EP, 10 July 1944).

A more substantial indication of a changed relationship between the Chinese community and the New Zealand government occurred however, in 1942, when Fraser made a suggestion to the Chinese market gardeners that they organise themselves into a group to ensure the exchange of information and the provisions of needed supplies for growing. It was also a move on Fraser's part to fulfil New Zealand's obligation to the Pacific war, since it was now the main source of supply for the American Pacific Fleet.³⁰

Not only did Fraser suggest the starting of what became the Chinese Commercial Growers Association, but he also offered £300 from the New Zealand government to start the organisation. On 15 January 1943, the Association officially began with the general objectives of protecting the growers' rights, uniting their efforts and increasing their knowledge (NZCGMJ, 1 December 1962). In order to accumulate its own funds the Association levied the growers 1/- an acre and maintained the right to ask for as much as 5/- donation a year. More will be said of this organisation in the next chapter, but it is important to note at this stage that it represents the first case of recognition by the New Zealand government of a Chinese organisation, other than the Consulate. While this may seem at first glance to represent a case of co-optation, the history of the organisation is more accurately characterised by jealously guarded autonomy, free from constraints that might or could be imposed by European growers or the government.³¹

Further evidence of New Zealand's goodwill was an incident in 1944, when on 13 December Nash introduced the Finance Bill (3) into the House, which in clauses nine and ten removed 'the discriminatory clauses against the Chinese in the then current immigration Act' (NZPD, 1944, 267:724).³² The provisions erased the poll tax, tonnage restrictions and language requirements. Nash maintained in introducing the Bill that: 'We have no more right to ask the Chinese to pay a poll tax than we have to ask the Japanese the Germans, the Spaniards or the Norwegians' (*ibid.*). There was only one voice in the House that uttered the familiar cry, 'Will there be any check on the influx of Chinese?' and 'Supposing one thousand or two thousand come in regularly?' (Doidge, Tauranga, in NZPD, 1944, 267:725). Nash reiterated his point that the Chinese would now be treated like anyone else except of course, those of British birth or parentage.

Nash's concluding remarks summed up the situation:

I do not know of anything more pleasing from the Government's point of view, and from the point of view of anyone who understands international and racial affairs and knows a little of the history of the Far East and the Chinese people, than the removing of the blot on our legislation. We are merely saying that the Chinese are as good as any other race, and that we will not in future countenance any discrimination against them.

(NZPD,1944,267:725)

Finally, a provision which had caused the Chinese Consul in 1920 to write to the Prime Minister stating:

The poll tax imposed on the Chinese is tantamount to suggesting that they are not human beings, but only animals or goods. Well they are human beings. The disgrace of such a tax recoils from the victim on to the imposer.

(Ponton, 1946:56)³³

had been removed, but it had taken sixty-three years.

While the war had one more year to go, this is a convenient place to end this section of the description in order to evaluate what had happened in the three periods discussed. Primarily, the first period was marked by a developing response from the Chinese community appealing for a change in their status as regards New Zealand. The predominant effort was by merchants, who variously enlisted the help of Europeans sympathetic to the Chinese. It also saw the rise of collective power in the Wellington community as it diverged from Auckland. The conflict was between a Chinese community that felt unjustly treated and, on the other hand, the imposers of that treatment. The strategy used by the Chinese attempted to confront this situation in a number of ways. Through petitions the Chinese appealed, on the

basis of international treaties, humanitarian values and their own ability to fulfil the normative requirements of life in New Zealand including their contribution to the economy, to have immigration restrictions amended or cancelled, to maintain the right to naturalisation, and finally to get diplomatic representation. They tried demanding as well as humble petitions, and by 1907 had exhausted all avenues of appeal including the government, the Prime Minister, the Governor and ultimately the Colonial Secretary. If their success was minimal with the exception of the appointment of diplomatic representation, they did succeed in maintaining a profile that prevented the government from ignoring their Chinese minority population while perhaps preventing any more excessive action than had already been taken. In terms of the internal politics of the community, it allowed the emergence of a small group of leaders who became part of the first organisation which linked the politics of the New Zealand community to the politics of their homeland.

In the early nineteen hundreds the existence of the T'ung Meng Hui, the Chee Kung Tang and the Consulate provided the basis for internal factions within the community and an argument by the Consul for cooperation and a single community organisation. The Consul viewed the survival of the community as requiring a Chung Wah Wui Koon which would represent Chinese communities, not factions within each. While the organisation did exist, the rapidly changing events in China divided the overseas community into three factions, each of whom viewed their own survival in terms of particular strategies for the governing of China. These factions produced further divisions in the community whose concerns tended to counter those of the explicitly political groups. The locality associations cross-cut factions, providing

alternatives which had as their major explicit concern the well-being of their particular communities in New Zealand. While this was their stated aim, it is not apparent that locality associations ever spoke publicly for their own membership.

In the second period, after 1905 when the Chung Wah Wui Koon was organised, negotiations with the New Zealand government or, for instance, over the theatre incident in Auckland were left finally to the Consul. It was not until the second Chung Wah Wui Koon was founded in 1927, with representatives from all existing associations that it assumed a representative role for the whole Chinese community, albeit from only one urban centre.

The importance of the Association was the fact that it mirrored events both external and internal to the community. The successful completion of the Northern Expedition gave added stimulus to support for the homeland, while conflict within the New Zealand Chinese community together with European hostility plagued internal relations. These situations together were sufficient to provide a need for a national organisation.

The Association successfully responded on all fronts but its major role was to provide the basic foundation for a more enduring national organisation during the war years.

In the third period from 1935 on till the end of the war the national Association organised a massive collection campaign to support China in their war against Japan. In this endeavour the Association managed, at least initially, to build a cooperative community around a collective effort, but once the latter was removed or interest waned, other agenda emerged which brought fragmentation. In one sense, local Chinese communities viewed themselves as distinct, guarding their autonomy in varying degrees, and although willing to abide by the

hegemony of a national Association in the name of patriotism, they were not willing to accept its decisions on their behalf. There were, however, splits in these local communities which made their cooperative effort difficult. In most cases, the arguments were over the appropriation of money or the use of power, and in some cases, both. Money was important because of the extensive demands that were made on limited resources. The demands of the New Zealand government, patriotism, personal costs and family remittances were not trivial matters, nor was the possibility that the Chinese were using any of these demands to exploit their fellow countrymen. The legacy of the war collection was a certain group of individuals who achieved status and power in the community, a considerable amount of money that had been collected but never sent to China, a great deal of uncertainty concerning the fate of the war refugees, and those family members still in war-torn China, and finally worry over their own young people growing up in New Zealand. The issues at stake provided justification for national cooperation of all Chinese and at the same time a tendency to elevate the importance of family and their own communities in New Zealand.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 8

- 1 Wang Feng was educated at the National University in Tientsin, had been Secretary at the Chinese Ministry of Communications from 1926 till 1928, when he transferred to Nanking to become First Secretary for China to the Buenos Aires government under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Following this he was appointed to Johannesburg as Acting Consul (NA,IA 68/12, 13 January 1930).

- 2 The abbreviation, NZCGMJ, is for the New Zealand Chinese Growers' Monthly Journal and will be referenced as NZCGMJ. All references to this journal are translated, since it was published in Chinese.

- 3 The interpretation by the Department of Labour in 1950 was that the latter reason was more correct. However, considering the discontinuation of the option to bring wives and children here as permanent residents in 1926 so that the population would not increase naturally, the former reason seems far more likely.

- 4 In order to incorporate the Chinese in Otago and Southland, the Dunedin branch organised six groups including Dunedin, Southland (Invercargill), Outram and Oamaru, with representatives from each. The branch had collected £14,000 from 200 Otago Chinese in a period of three years (see Appendix XXXI).

- 5 Initially the Chinese Weekly News (henceforth abbreviated to CWN) was published with voluntary assistance, but after 1940 an editor was hired. During the entire period of the publication, 300 to 400 copies were produced of each issue, the master copy written by hand then reproduced. This represented a levy of 10% of income per week, a considerable amount considering the slow recovery from the depression that they had just survived and considering the fact that many had paid poll tax quite recently and were probably also committed to remitting monies to their families remaining in China.

- 6 In the eight years of the war effort from 1939 till 1946, eight conferences were held with a total attendance of 330 delegates, according to one informant. The same informant calculated that in all Wellington had 99 delegates, Otago and Southland 41, Auckland 33, Canterbury 29, Manawatu 21, Wairarapa 17, Hutt Valley 14, Gisborne 11, Hawkes Bay 9, Levin 9, Ohakune 7, Timaru 7, Greymouth 5, Wairoa 4, Waikato 4, Taihape 3, Otaki 2, Wanganui 1, Nelson 1 and the Association headquarters 14. No delegates from New Plymouth, Hawera, Foxton, Ohau, Rotorua, Dannevirke or Blenheim attended any meetings. Of the total attendance, over 75% of the delegates came from Jung Sing and Poon Yu, with the remainder from Seyip and one other county.

- 7 This represented on average, a levy of 10% of income per week, a considerable amount considering the slow recovery from the depression that they had just survived and considering the fact that many had paid poll tax quite recently and were probably also committed to remitting monies to their families remaining in China.
- 8 Until 1940 this confederation of branches was under the control of the Wellington Chinese Association. In September of this same year, it was decided at the Fifth Congress to reform Wellington's Chinese Association and reconstitute it as the New Zealand Chinese Association (Q-Sing Times, 10 September 1940). Wellington was to be the head office and to lead the work of the national salvation collection. Appendix XXX contains a list of the branches of the Association and their Chinese equivalent names.
- 9 From this period on, annual executive meetings of all associations were recorded by photographs, although few came to the notice of the general public.
- 10 Only eight of these men are still alive and only three of these still live in Dunedin.
- 11 Both Dunedin and Gisborne were active before they were formally constituted, and in fact some informants have claimed that their existence preceded the institution of the national organisation by some years.
- 12 Hereafter the Chinese Weekly News will be abbreviated as (CWN). All articles have been translated from the Chinese.
- 13 There was also a problem with personal remittances by the Chinese. The Government in 1938-39 limited individual remittances to 5 at any one time. To circumvent this, Chinese were going to several banks to purchase the £5 money orders, a situation that was soon discovered by the Reserve Bank. From then on, the Chinese Association was required to check that people seeking to make remittances had bona-fide relatives in China and were abiding by the regulations. In order to do this, the Association issued identification cards which gave one's town of residence, address, registration number for the Association branch, registration number for head office, the holder's Chinese and English signature and the Head Office seal and signatures. 'Conditions of Use' were printed on the back:
1. Not transferable. Must be used only by person to whom issued.
 2. Card must be presented on each application for a draft.
 3. Valid only in town named on the other side.
 4. Application to Association Head Office for issue of new card must be made on change of residence to new town.
 5. Valid only when bearing the seal of the New Zealand Chinese Association, and the signatures of at least two of the three members of the special sub-committee. And then only for the period stated on the other side.

- 14 The conditions under which this provision was implemented for the admission of wives and children are provided in Pondon (1946:119-120). According to Ponton, they were stringent in order to 'prevent abuse' (ibid.:119).
- 15 The review of this policy in 1950 resulted in this statement:
- This was rather a drastic step taken to solve a problem to which there appeared to be no easy solution. It is obvious, however, that the pre-war policy of allowing the entry of Chinese on temporary permits for long periods was in many ways an unwise one...
- (NA, L22/1/81:4)
- 16 According to the Department of Labour 249 wives and 244 children were finally admitted to New Zealand before the provisions were withdrawn (NA, L22/1/81:3).
- 17 Ponton (1946) described the large numbers that applied as 'astounding' and concluded that they indicated a 'natural desire of the Chinese to have their wives with them' (Ponton, 1946:121). However, he noted the tendency of legislators in the past to ignore this possibility and even oppose it on the basis that Chinese by definition were immoral, a position which he describes as 'little less than criminal' (ibid.).
- 18 In 1974 I was given access to record books which listed the number of applications received in 1939 and 1940, but the total did not equate with those of Ng, 1959 or the ones provided in (NA, L22/1/81:3), so they have been treated as a sample. Attempts to find these same records in 1982 to re-check the data have failed.
- 19 The Evening Post, quoting the New Zealand Herald, which had commented on the new arrivals, maintained that:
- ...the women seemed to be of exceptionally high type while the children were happy, attractively dressed and well cared for.
- (EP, 17 January 1940)
- 20 The availability of food was not a problem other than Chinese foodstuffs whose transportation was interrupted by the war in the Pacific. When the supply of rice ran short, the Consul and Association approached the government and were able to negotiate the provision of special import licences. Twenty-six of these licences were issued to shops, eight in Auckland, four in Dunedin, eight in Wellington, two in Christchurch, and the remainder distributed in smaller centres. The provisions were in effect till 1945.
- 21 Old Age Pension allowance was £1.2.6 per week and Family Allowance was 4/- per week per child in 1937.

- 22 The source of this move was a massive confusion amongst overseas Chinese. In December 1937, the Japanese set up a puppet regime in Nanking under Wang Ching-wei, and the KMT retreated to Chungking. This led to confusion overseas, as it was unclear whom they should support, since the Japanese forced Wang to encourage the purchase of a national bond issue among overseas Chinese. The KMT had to respond immediately and send representatives to South East Asia and the Pacific to clarify the situation. It was not until 1 May 1940 that the Auckland KMT responded by writing a letter to Chiang Kai-shek condemning Wang Ching-wei as a traitor:

Such an unscrupulous renegade of the nation, a deadly enemy of the people should be severely punished. We the Chinese people in New Zealand stand solidly behind the central government in their effort to expel the Japanese invaders and bring the traitor Wang Ching-wei to justice.

(Q-Sing Times, 1 May 1940)

- 23 Auckland reserved the right to remit their own funds to Hong Kong or China and to take care of their own donations but felt obliged to consult the national executive before they tried to introduce a system whereby donations would be automatically deducted from employees within the community (see Q-Sing Times, 15 May 1939).
- 24 According to an informant, this committee sponsored Chen Y.S., a former resident of Auckland who had returned to China and came back to New Zealand in the capacity of managing director of the China Charity Relief Society. He travelled around New Zealand visiting people he had previously known and was able to collect £400 from 200 people in Auckland, £300 from 200 people in Wellington, £200 from 100 people in Dunedin, £40 from 30 people in Timaru and £100 from 100 people in Christchurch.
- 25 This was also stimulated by the involvement of Madam Chiang Kai-shek, who had sent letters of thanks to the New Zealand Chinese community for their 'patriotic enthusiasm' (Q-Sing Times, 15 March 1940).
- 26 The event referred to was the Mukden Incident, when the Japanese invaded Manchuria, but it is more likely that it was the resistance offered to the Japanese army by General Ma Chan-shen in October 1931 that stirred the national pride of the Auckland youth. General Ma was described as a hero who had saved China from the 'utter disgrace of cowardice' (see Clubb, 1964:168). Clubb maintains that 'Ma became "The Hero of the Nonni River Battle"'. His action did more than save the Chinese honour; it stimulated Chinese "volunteers" to oppose the invaders and their Chinese collaborators in spite of Nanking's policy of nonresistance (ibid.).

- 27 In mid-1940, Britain had warned New Zealand that if Japan went to war it was unlikely that sufficient protection could be offered. Singapore had fallen in December 1941 with Pearl Harbour, so the strong British presence that had been New Zealand's hope was gone (Wood, 1958:194). On 23 December 1941, New Zealand had established formal ties with the United States to ensure the 'political integrity and economic well being' of Pacific communities (*ibid.*:195). However, the important aspect of this active role by New Zealand in the Pacific was that Fraser hoped that New Zealand would be consulted in future decisions about the area. He hoped that China, Britain and the United States would see this as important, but in December 1943 these three powers approved the Cairo Declaration in which they agreed to take from Japan all territories seized during the war, without consulting either New Zealand or Australia (*ibid.*:313).
- 28 In 1941 and 1942 Fraser had been in London and Washington respectively and had met with Dr. Wellington Ku, Mr. T.V. Soong and the Chinese ambassador. The Evening Post noted that he had in both places maintained that the Chinese people and their diplomatic representation in New Zealand had represented China well. Fraser said that the people he met had 'expressed great pride in the part the Chinese community in Wellington had played in supporting the war effort of New Zealand and of their own country' (EP, 12 October 1942).
- 29 Chiang Kai-shek had also sent cables to the New Zealand Chinese commending them for their contributions and encouraging them 'to continue to carry on their efforts to the end' (see Q-Sing Times, February 1940). This was used effectively to urge further donations, as the editor added a warning: 'Should China perish in the war the overseas Chinese would suffer great misfortune' (*ibid.*).
- 30 Wood points out that the 'demand for food and services was increasing sharply as American troops poured into the Pacific area', while at the same time ten per cent of New Zealand's population were in the Dominion's armed forces excluding those under British command (Wood, 1958:243).
- 31 The European growers already had their own organisation, the New Zealand Vegetable and Produce Growers Federation, hereafter referred to as the Federation.
- 32 In addition to this, according to Philip Matthews, a journalist, there was a move in 1944 to allow Chinese students special grants in order to attend university. The move was made by the University of New Zealand, but I have been unable to verify the plan (see Matthews, 1946:4).
33. Ponton made the observation that the Chinese Consul in responding this way had done 'very little good and only succeeded in raising the ire of New Zealand officialdom against his own people' (Ponton, 1946:56).

PART IV

CHAPTER 9

ORGANISATIONS AND POST WAR DEVELOPMENTS 1946-1959

If the situation had been complex for the Chinese community in New Zealand during the war years and before, it was to be no less so after the end of the war. The celebration of the end of the war in 1945 saw a relieved New Zealand but only a partially relieved Chinese community whose homeland was still embroiled in a civil war and would be for four more years. Even with the resolution of that dilemma in China, the New Zealand Chinese would then have to again confront the possibility of split loyalties which had plagued the community from 1911 till the late 1920s. The existence of the People's Republic and the Republic of China, New Zealand vacillation over which to recognise diplomatically, and the Korean war made the situation not only politically sensitive but also very difficult in fundamental ways for the vulnerable Chinese community in New Zealand.

The end of the war left the Chinese refugee programme in the balance and New Zealand confronted with the problem of either accepting their Chinese minority or, contrary to all sentiments of international benevolence, refusing permanent residence and sending the wives and children back to China. While the former alternative prevailed, the machinations that emerged over the re-unification of families, in terms of immigration procedure, took many years to resolve, as did the remedies for the sex-ratio imbalance remaining as the historic

outcome of Chinese migration patterns and New Zealand's desires. Naturally, the issue of continued Chinese immigration to New Zealand met differing receptions from the two political parties with their traditional positions on Chinese immigration, but it was also influenced by the political changes in China. Furthermore, it became increasingly ironic that a country formerly highly critical of an all male Chinese population without any semblance of family life was equally critical of a growing resident Chinese population with families and many more who would want to bring spouses to New Zealand. The overwhelming desire of European New Zealanders for the Chinese to become assimilated would not tolerate the possible regeneration of Chinese culture through immigration of kin and spouses direct from China.

While the above made the post-war external relations of the community difficult and unsettled, the internal dynamics of the community were equally difficult and unsettled. With the cessation of the war there was a termination of the collection activity. Freed from the pressures of collective activity, the organisation was dismantled, leaving only the problems attached to the remaining funds which Wellington had kept and intended to use as the legitimate headquarters of the New Zealand Chinese. Other communities, however, felt differently about this assumed power to appropriate funds that had come from Chinese all over New Zealand, leading to considerable tensions being manifested between the core (Wellington) and the periphery as well as a loss of status for the national Association.

The leaders of the community during the war years, now without the power and status of the collection organisation, turned their energy to an import/export company which accumulated capital from New Zealand Chinese shareholders. While initially successful, the company

ultimately became the basis of disagreement and dissatisfaction, as company policy had to cope with political changes in China, some of which were unacceptable to local Chinese.

The legacy of the war years was a community that had no clear direction either in the area of those who had power or in the area of associational activity and the even more generalised area of events like the Double Tenth. From its earliest years, the Double Tenth marked a clear political event which linked the New Zealand Chinese to their homeland, but in the post-war years its focus was blurred and complicated by the existence of two Chinese governments. In addition, the increasing number of new families with young children growing up and educated in European society without the possibility of going to China for their basic education were considered at risk.

If the cultural and political links were problematic for older Chinese, they were even more so for the young, who shared little of the experience that their parents had lived through. The pressure they faced was that of becoming part of New Zealand society, which, while condoned by elders as necessary for survival, led to fears on their part that not only would Chinese language competence disappear but also any trace of Chinese culture. This in the end, it was feared, would affect young and old alike. It was clear that government policy - and, indeed, the prevalent ideology in New Zealand at the time - supported this process, seeing it as a positive attribute on the way to complete assimilation. However, the Chinese community was reluctant to accept this fate.

The period after the war, therefore, was to become necessarily one where a number of issues had to be resolved. The community had not only to solve the problems attached to the legacy of former years but

also to provide for the needs of both young and old in a changing context. The associational response and its development in this period indicated a clear process of the community trying to reorganise and develop an appropriate set of strategies which would provide for its continued survival. The organisations had to hold the youth from complete assimilation, maintain some cultural coherence for the Chinese community and provide for future leadership of the community. While the needs were known, the articulation of these needs in the context of the community's past history together with its changing external influences, made the task increasingly complex and time-consuming, but in the end - with compromise - successful.

In May 1945, the war ended with Germany and in August with Japan. In October the New Zealand Chinese Association gathered in Wellington at the Association headquarters to celebrate the events with speeches from the Executive, including members of the Consulate, the KMT, the Auckland branch and the local headquarters. Delegates from other centres provided entertainment which expressed local Chinese opinions of the Japanese and the performance by youth groups of Chinese national songs (see EP, 17 August 1945). Similarly, in other places the Chinese, like the Europeans, celebrated victory, with the young often joining in the local community celebrations. In the following month a three-day holiday was set aside by the Chinese community all over New Zealand to commemorate, in a more subdued fashion, the eight years of war. Europeans had only a day and a half holiday, but, as an informant explained, they had not been at war for such a long period.

In October 1945, Double Tenth was celebrated with local sports gatherings, speeches and dinners.¹ In Wellington the gathering was larger now, with an increasing number of young children and even a Boy Scout troupe (EP, 10 October 1945). The speeches, while buoyantly encouraging compatriots to enjoy themselves and seek health and physical fitness, also carried a more subdued message that the local Chinese should make sure their countrymen's sacrifices were not in vain (ibid.). The Secretary of the Association said:

...after today they would have to shoulder their responsibilities, realizing that neither the establishment of the Republic nor the gaining of victory over Japan completely achieved the end which this particular day commemorated - the spirit of freedom, of equality, and of political self-determination.

(EP, 10 October 1945)

The message was important on two counts. While the war had ended for the rest of the world, China had still to face an unresolved civil war, and the New Zealand Chinese as a consequence felt little security when anticipating returns to their homeland. On the other hand, if they were to stay in New Zealand, then the legal position of the refugees, students and business managers in the country under temporary permits, also remained unresolved while the government continued to extend the duration of the permits year by year. According to the agreement, repatriation of the refugees was to occur at the end of the war, but it had made no provision for the contingency of continued civil war in China.²

While the former issue could be met only by reaction, the latter became the focus of concerted action by Chinese and European churches, supported by the Chinese Association, the Consul and the local press.

The Chinese Anglican and Baptist churches in Wellington had survived the depression, and their joint mission, which had been established in 1932, lasted till 1949.³ In this period the joint mission had been guided by a Baptist evangelist who had also been a prominent leader of the KMT in New Zealand. When he resigned in 1940, the Anglicans had their turn to designate a leader and appointed a minister newly arrived from China. Unfortunately, the minister had suffered heavily under the Japanese and died a year later, leaving mission activity to be shared between a Chinese lay reader and a Presbyterian missionary. In 1945 the Baptists waived their right to appoint, and the Anglicans, after some trouble, secured a new missionary from Hong Kong, ordained and with considerable experience.

The new minister was to stay for five years, but within one year he had already rejuvenated the church and its buildings and set about organising a campaign for a new church. He visited his region, which included the area south of a line from New Plymouth to Gisborne and the South Island north of Dunedin. He also organised a choir in Wellington (see EP, 19 July 1947). Like the Chinese Association, the church saw its future based on the young people in the community and a building which would ensure its status.

The European church was represented by the Presbyterians, who by now had been able to return to the Canton Missions which had been affected by the war but not totally disrupted.⁴

McNeur, who had returned on furlough to New Zealand from China in 1940, had remained in Dunedin and again taken up the South Island mission to the Chinese (Barton, 1955:30). In 1947, he drew the attention of the Dunedin Presbytery to the need for a Chinese pastor to continue his work and also to the plight of the Chinese refugees. McNeur maintained that if the refugees were forced to return to China

it would split families which had now become established (EP, 3 June 1947). He further argued that these families had made a substantial contribution to New Zealand, and to repatriate them now would not only injure the possibility of future friendship between China and New Zealand but also cause needless hardship. McNeur recommended that they be granted naturalisation like European refugees, which of course would represent the equal treatment promised by Nash in 1944 (see Chapter 8, page 414)⁵

Internal Affairs was also made aware of problems developing in the Chinese community both in regard to naturalisation and because of the refugee situation. In October 1946, the Governor General received a letter in Chinese from Christchurch, which was duly translated by the Secretary of the Wellington Chinese Association. The letter requested that Chinese refugees be allowed to stay in New Zealand and also that older Chinese businessmen who had returned to China should be allowed to send another person to New Zealand to look after their remaining interest. The author justified the request on three grounds: first, the cost of living had soared in China making it impossible for many, should they return, to live; second, China and New Zealand were 'neighbours and should be friends'; and finally, pressure on New Zealand Chinese to send adequate remittances was leading to fights in the community and illegal practices.⁶ The latter situation was one, according to the letter, where individuals through intermediaries were attempting to get extra Identification Cards (see Chapter 8, page 420, fn 13) from the Chinese Association in order to increase their remittances. The Association refused to issue the cards and the Consul confiscated them, which led to accusations against the Association and the Consul. It was clear to the author of the letter that the kinds of pressure placed on local Chinese refugees by their immigration status were counterproductive for the whole community and should be dealt with immediately.

While the press wrote sympathetically about the Presbyterian Church's activities, one journalist in Auckland Philip Matthews, after gathering material for several years, published a preliminary report on the Chinese community in New Zealand (Matthews, 1947). This report is interesting, for it was the only description of the Chinese community to appear since Mawson's 1927 pamphlet. Matthews did not confront the issue of refugees directly in this article. This is especially curious since he had already written an article in an Auckland paper describing the departure of Auckland Chinese to China to look for their relatives (AS, 9 May 1947). The people he described, twenty in 1945 and about thirty in 1946, were middle-aged or older since they alone could get re-entry permits as permanent residents and were now on their way home to search for family.

In the pamphlet that followed this article, Matthews very obviously set about removing stereotypical assumptions about the local Chinese. He described their history briefly, noting that they 'have not the political consciousness of the New Zealanders' and that more are supporters of the KMT than of the CCP (Matthews, 1947:4).

Matthews then proceeded to the issue of Chinese immigration and took a contrary position, he ventured to suggest to that which would be supported by many New Zealanders. To the question 'Do we want Chinese immigration?', he gave a qualified 'yes' provided that, like any migration, it did not undermine the 'standards we have built up over the past century', neglecting to mention that these 'standards' were based on a principle of 'racial purity' (*ibid.*:5). He described the then current treatment of Chinese under the temporary permit system as unsatisfactory, maintaining that it made them neither citizens nor visitors 'but...an unhappy mixture of both' (*ibid.*). In

regard to becoming New Zealanders, Matthews argued that they would so as much as do British-born New Zealanders, but only if they had access to the privileges and responsibilities of citizenship. This according to Matthews, went for the ones that are at present in New Zealand and for those who in the future could be admitted safely, under a quota system.⁷

The only catch in Matthews' benevolent ideas was his suggestion that all Chinese currently in New Zealand be surveyed and classified as to occupation, 'desire to become naturalised' and 'their desirability as citizens' (Matthews, 1947:7). This would provide three groups, according to Matthews, which would

...give a lead as to how future quotas should be distributed vocationally, enable due rights and obligations to be given to those who desire them and...enable us to cancel the permits of those who have proved trouble-makers and send them back to where they came from.

(Matthews, 1947:7).

The publication of Matthews' pamphlet was followed by a meeting of the Public Questions Committee of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church. On the suggestion of the Dunedin Presbytery, it made a number of recommendations to government, some of which were exactly the same as Matthews had proposed (see footnote 1, page 1). The church took a far more liberal stand over the refugee situation, however, appealing to the government to allow all refugee children and women to remain permanently (ODT, 13 June 1947). The resolution argued, as had McNeur previously, that it would be inhuman to insist on sending women and children back to a country torn by civil strife with a rapidly increasing cost of living and starvation amongst children. As for the Chinese in New Zealand, the refugee children were now well settled and were of educational value especially to New Zealand with its 'insularity and isolation' (ODT, 13 June 1947). It was in

the interest of New Zealand, the Public Questions Committee argued, to keep these families united, which would increase the value 'of their contribution to our national life' (ibid.).

The branch of the Chinese Association in Dunedin responded favourably to this initiative. The president stated that he was 'grateful for the kindness of New Zealand in admitting refugees to the country but that an assurance that their stay would be prolonged would be welcome' (ODT, 13 June 1947). The situation, the president maintained, was particularly hard for market gardeners who were unable to plan ahead for the coming year because of the uncertainty over residence. According to him, the Australian solution, which gave the Chinese either the option of returning to China immediately or being able to stay for another three years, was preferable to the unpredictable yearly renewal.

The Wellington branch of the Association also supported the move of the Presbytery and particularly the fact that the issue of naturalisation was being taken up by New Zealanders on their behalf (Southern Cross, 13 June 1947).

In late June or early July, a deputation met with Fraser, the Prime Minister, which was entirely made up of Church representatives. It included the Moderator of the Presbyterian Church and Reverend W. Gladstone of Wellington, Reverend McNeur of the Chinese Church in Dunedin and representatives who could speak for the Chinese Anglican and Baptist missions in Wellington (ODT, 22 July 1947).⁹ The meeting was reported as favourable, and the results confirmed the optimism reported. In July Cabinet met and approved the granting of permanent residence to approximately 1,323 Chinese, as follows:

Refugee wives admitted in 1939	249
Refugee children	244
Children born in New Zealand to Refugee Wives	437
Chinese men admitted temporarily to manage businesses while the owner visited China and who had been here for at least five years	93
Chinese male students who had completed their schooling and had been here at least five years	300 (approx.)

(NA, L22/1/81:3)

In addition to the above persons, 1,408 additional Chinese people on temporary permits, of whom nearly 1,000 had been born in China, were also allowed to remain permanently (*ibid.*). A 1950 survey of immigration legislation by the Department of Labour described this decision as '...rather a drastic step taken to solve a problem to which there appeared to be no easy solution'.¹⁰

The Chinese community response was one of covert relief. Thirty years later it is still remembered as a significant event in the history of their people in New Zealand. This, more than the 1944 Finance Act, signified and confirmed that the New Zealand government had at last changed its stance regarding their presence in the country, changing the status of the Chinese from problems into permanent residents. Shortly after the decision was announced, other Chinese took the opportunity of sending requests to the government to allow them to bring their wives and children to New Zealand (IA,116/7, 16 March 1948). The same year the government decided to grant permits for such cases under the provisions of the Immigration Restriction Act 1920, with the following conditions:

- a) that the Chinese concerned arrived in New Zealand before 30 April 1928, and has resided in New Zealand since that date except for brief visits to China.
- b) that the Chinese concerned has applied for and is considered suitable for naturalization in New Zealand.
- c) that minor unmarried children only who are the lawful natural children of the Chinese concerned will be admitted to New Zealand with the wife; and
- d) that the Chinese concerned will be required to make a statutory declaration regarding his arrival in New Zealand and period of residence and particulars of wife and minor children and to produce a marriage certificate in respect of his wife and birth certificates in respect of minor children or satisfactory evidence in lieu of such certificates.

(NA, IA 116/7, 16 March 1948).¹¹

In a communication sent to the Chinese Consul informing him of the above arrangements, it was also stipulated that not all cases would automatically receive a permit and, further, that only fifty permits would be issued for 1948 and preferably to those who had been married longest (ibid.).

The provisions made for 1948 were extended in 1949, a situation reminiscent of the temporary permit system. By the end of 1949, 100 wives had been admitted with 111 sons and 42 daughters. The age distribution of wives was as follows:

<u>Age</u>	<u>Number of Wives</u>
35 - 39	26
40 - 44	33
45 - 62	41

(NA, L22/1/81:5)

The criteria used to select those married the longest meant that the most recent marriage had been in 1934 and the earliest in 1898 (NA, L22/1/81:5), and it was estimated in 1950 that if the concession was extended the date of marriage would not be later than 1922 and the wife would be about 44 (ibid.).

As regards the children who came in 1948-49, there was a bias in favour of males over females, which was not evident either in the 1939 cohort or, for that matter, amongst the children born to the refugee wives in New Zealand. It was also noted that a number of the families reunited had sons already in New Zealand under the student temporary permit scheme; which had continued to operate (see Table 14 below).

TABLE 14: Permits Issued and Students Arrived under the
Temporary Permit Scheme 1946 - June 1950.

Year	Permits Issued	Arrivals
1946	2	-
1947	37	10
1948	58	54
1949	57	57
1950	7	18

(NA, L22/1/81:5)

The above indicated that the sex imbalance in the population would be maintained and also that marriage partners for single males would be a problem in later years.¹²

The issue now most closely related to continued immigration was naturalisation, which was taken up initially by the Chinese Consul and later by the Presbyterian Church. In late April 1948 the Consul went to Internal Affairs to make representations. Initially the Consul merely clarified the policy of the Chinese government regarding nationality, stating that dual nationality was acceptable. However, he also added a recommendation that Chinese desiring to become British nationals should obtain release from Chinese nationality (NA, IA 116/7, 28 April 1948), a simple procedure according to the Consul.

The second point of clarification by the Consul, however, was far more sinister as regards the Chinese in New Zealand. He maintained that the large majority of Chinese in New Zealand had greater affinity for China than for Britain and that their applications for naturalisation, which had increased, were nothing more than a gesture to enable them to get wives and children into New Zealand (ibid.). The Consul stated that the Chinese, if naturalised, would treat British status as an empty formality, and he recommended that 'high standards' be used in selecting who should be allowed to bring wives and children to New Zealand and further that this issue should be separated from naturalisation applications (ibid.). The Assistant Under-Secretary who talked to the Consul and later described his discussion with him attributed his stand to 'personal and national interests' but did not elaborate this point. The Minister of Customs had wanted, by including a requirement for naturalisation in the provisions, to extend the requirements of standard of living and character to actual membership in the community (ibid.). Internal Affairs, however, had reason to believe that if the Consul doubted the sincerity of an application for naturalisation he would refuse to send his recommendation for release from Chinese nationality when it was forwarded to the Ministry of the Interior in China. In order to avoid this, it was proposed to the Minister of Customs that the word "naturalisation" be removed from the requirements. In the meantime, however, Internal Affairs requested direction from the Prime Minister's department, 'as to the desirability of assimilation, its nature, and its extent' and as regards naturalisation, whether or not it would be wise to incorporate a provision in the proposed Treaty of Friendship with China allowing release for Chinese residents in New Zealand who desired naturalisation (NA:116/7, 28 April, 1948).

The Prime Minister's department responded that the Consul had made release from Chinese nationality appear more easily obtainable than it actually was according to evidence from Canada (NA, IA 116/7, 21 June 1948). In regard to assimilation, the Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's department stated that:

...I am not able to assist you. At present the Chinese appear to prefer to remain within their own community and this may well continue to be so if wives are permitted to come here. The young generation appear to be diligent and intelligent but handicapped in this matter of assimilation by economic ties. I understand that the Chinese are unwilling to employ European assistants in shops and that the work accordingly devolves on members of the family. Contact with outsiders is, therefore, precluded in most instances. There may be a few cases of marriage with Maoris, but the total is bound to be small and is likely to remain so.

In brief:

I do not feel that the Government, in the absence of sufficient information to work on, would be prepared at present to lay down a firm policy in this matter...

(NA, IA 116/7, 21 June 1948)

The Under-Secretary of Internal Affairs reported the following to his Minister:

Despite the importance of the Chinese colony in our domestic life we have practically no knowledge of the ways of life and thought of the local Chinese. We do not know whether the best potential citizens are those with European wives or those who are bachelors. We do not know whether the Chinese should be encouraged to mix socially with the general community or whether it would be better for national welfare for them to be left to themselves. We do not know in what sense, if at all, they identify themselves with New Zealand, or how their attitude towards New Zealand compares with their attitude towards their native land...

In most cases it is impossible for me to judge whether a Chinese with a wife and family in China and himself living in a bach in Chinatown is suitable for naturalization or not; his poor living conditions may mean merely that he is giving the maximum of help to his family, his poor English may denote merely lack of opportunity to mix with New Zealanders, and in fact none of the general problems of assimilation arise until his wife and family are settled here and the children are attending our schools...

(NA, L22/1/81:6)

The most interesting aspect of this dilemma was the enlightened admission by a government department that its knowledge of a group who had lived in New Zealand for eighty-three years was minimal. On the other hand, the more odious suggestion was contained in yet another paragraph:

8. In the light of all the above factors the way appears to be open for a policy of granting naturalization to certain very limited categories of Chinese nationals, so removing the stigma of racial discrimination without committing ourselves to any action--the scope and effects of which cannot be estimated in the light of our present inadequate knowledge of the Chinese.

The limited categories in question would be, essentially, persons who are becoming detached from the fringes of the very compact Chinese community in New Zealand and who are tending towards a British way of life. The types that I have in mind are the man with a British wife (whether Maori or European) whose children are being brought up in a mainly European (or Maori) manner; also, in a lesser degree, the man with a Chinese wife and children resident here, if the children have passed through our schools and are drawing their parents out of the rather primitive domestic and social conditions of the local Chinese community; and finally, the most important category from any viewpoints, any young people who have passed through our schools and who need the assistance of naturalization in order to break out of their Chinese environment with its stock occupations of fruit retailing and laundering, and to get themselves accepted by the European community as tradesmen, office workers, or members of the professions. It may be possible to go beyond these three categories as our experience widens, but I think you will agree as to the types that are known to be assimilable, even though this involves rejecting a certain number of applicants who are of good character, but whose way of life follows the Chinese pattern. It is thought that the number of qualified applicants in these categories will not exceed a score yearly.

(NA, IA 116/7, 12 July 1948:2)

From the above, contrary to the opinion expressed about lack of knowledge, there seems little doubt as to structure of the Chinese community as far as the Under-Secretary is concerned, nor is there any doubt that the 'impact of the Chinese community' with its 'rather primitive domestic and social conditions' should be counteracted.

There is a strange sense in which the Secretary is arguing for total assimilation and biculturalism at the same time, and in ways that were previously (1929) abhorrent to many European New Zealanders. Biculturalism, however, was not an issue in 1948, but the unintended consequences of assimilation were in some ways destined to lead to this and to a new leadership style in the Chinese community. In 1948 however, New Zealand had to make up its mind as to the position the Chinese would occupy or more precisely have its mind made up for it by an effective lobby.

On 27 September 1948, a deputation from the Inter-Church Council went to see Nash, then Minister of Customs, concerning increased allowable earnings for pensioners, employment accommodation for displaced persons brought to New Zealand during the war, and finally the status and position of the Chinese. The two members of the deputation who made statements were the Bishop of Wellington and the minister from the Chinese Anglican Church. The Bishop introduced his comments by stating that the Council viewed the matter of the Chinese from a moral standpoint (NA, IA 116/7, 27 September 1948:2). It was on moral grounds that families ought to be reunited and that the overall number of Chinese wives permitted to arrive should be increased, which would mean substantially changing the requirement of twenty year residence in New Zealand before application (NA, IA 116/7, 27 September 1948:2-3). The Chinese minister added that he had gathered information from the Chinese community and that there were 2,000 married Chinese males in New Zealand of whom 400 had wives with them, leaving 1,600 still without families (ibid.). He described the situation of these men in the following way:

Out of that 1600 they had found that a certain percentage were employed in the gambling trade and in many other not very respectable professions, the main reason being that they had not a family to look after or which could check them. Most of them stayed in New Zealand for such a long time without going back to China. They tried to get back to China, but could not save the money. There were also a large number who did not send money back to China. He had received letters from their wives in China saying that the husbands were not sending them money. Some sent money back, but it hampered their livelihood in New Zealand. They had to keep two homes going, one in China and one in New Zealand. Due to the fact that the wives could not come to New Zealand there were mixed marriages and cases of Chinese living with other women.

The Chinese missionary maintained that the old who still felt some sense of kinship obligation would return to China,¹³ and there were others who did not care, but there was a substantial number who had come after 1928, and it was these people who now wanted to bring their families to New Zealand (*ibid.*:3-4).¹⁴ They were, according to him, people who had businesses and who, rather than having someone manage it while they returned on a visit to China, needed their families to help run and maintain what they had already started. As an example the minister pointed to the situation amongst the market gardeners of Gisborne, Otaki and Taihape who had to decrease their acreage because of labour shortage (NA, IA 116/7, 27 September 1948:4). Before the war these gardeners had been able to hire Maori labour, but now they could not get any help and were facing difficult times (*ibid.*).

Nash responded indirectly by repeating the history of legislation. He reviewed the temporary permit scheme, which he suggested had not been fully utilized by the Chinese, including the war provisions and the concession granted in the post-war period. He offered to review the situation in March 1949, but in the meantime he suggested that preference should be given to residents who had been in New Zealand

twenty years. The government, he maintained, did not want to discriminate against any Chinese, that is why the matter of naturalisation had been dropped from the requirements (NA, IA 116/7, 27 September 1948). As for labour shortages, it was a condition that applied to Europeans as well as Chinese.

Government acted with more expediency than Nash had intimated, and Cabinet on 15 October 1948 decided that:

...the naturalization of the nationals of China be now resumed on like conditions as to citizens of other nations, grants to be limited for the present to the most highly assimilated types.

(NA, IA 116/7, 22 June 1950:2)

However, Internal Affairs seems not to have moved on the decision till June 1950, when the following provisions were suggested:

Grants to be limited for the present to the most highly assimilated types, namely men with British wives, parents with children attending New Zealand schools, and young people educated in New Zealand; in the case of married men the case to be considered in the light of its effect on the whole family, i.e., wives and children.

No grant to be made unless the applicant is considered to stand closer to a New Zealand way of life than to that of the Chinese community in New Zealand.

All grantees to subscribe to a unilateral declaration of renunciation of their Chinese nationality.

(NA, IA 116/7, 22 June 1950:3)

By March 1951 Cabinet had approved the revised policy and issued the following statement, which also included a justification for its contents:

That, unless there are good grounds for believing that the applicant's primary loyalty is being given to New Zealand, naturalization as British subjects be denied to Chinese residents, and that, prior to naturalization, Chinese be required to conform to the ordinary conditions of naturalization, to show that they are closer to the N.Z. way of life than to the Chinese, and to subscribe to a unilateral declaration renouncing their Chinese nationality before a Stipendiary Magistrate when the oath of allegiance is taken.

(NA, IA 116/7, 3 January 1952:2)

The justification for the form the minute took was based on the following:

Firstly, it endeavoured to ensure that only those Chinese were naturalized who had assimilated to a reasonable extent into our community and whose traditional ties to their homeland had weakened to an extent that they regarded as their home and gave their allegiance to New Zealand rather than China.

Secondly, by the requirements that a declaration of renunciation of Chinese nationality be made and the oath of allegiance subscribed before a Stipendiary Magistrate, it hoped to impress the applicants by a degree of solemnity in the completion of the grant the importance of the step they were taking.

(NA, IA 116/7, 3 January 1952:2).¹⁵

While the Prime Minister's office may have had little idea of what the assimilation of a minority involved, it is clear that Internal Affairs did, and further that they understood what process and characteristics constituted an assimilated individual. Cabinet obviously took their prescription and made it into policy assuming that the process and characteristics of assimilation were finite and irreversible. Assimilation became a rite de passage marked by naturalisation as the final ritual before entrance to European society.

It had taken forty years for the Chinese to get back the right to naturalisation, but it would take another four before the first Chinese were again naturalised in New Zealand, although none would have equated the act with becoming assimilated. However, there were signs in the activities of the Chinese community which indicated to some Europeans that assimilation was in fact occurring.

In August 1948 the 12th Annual New Zealand Chinese Association Conference was held in Wellington, where the 1947 proposal by young people in Auckland and Wellington to hold an annual Chinese sports tournament was discussed and approved. Shortly afterwards a committee was formed in Wellington, who by virtue of their central position in the

country would sponsor the first meeting held in October that same year. The representatives who attended that first meeting came from Auckland, Hamilton, Hawkes Bay, Manawatu, Wellington, Canterbury, and Otago (see programme for 3rd New Zealand Chinese Annual Sports Tournament, 1950:21). The gathering was successful although mainly male with only the Wellington community able to put up women's basketball and table-tennis teams (*ibid.*)¹⁶ The tribute paid in 1950 to this occasion thanked those who stayed at home in order that others might attend the meeting. It further stated that 'the social contacts gained were invaluable' (*ibid.*).

Matthews, who had written previously on the Chinese, heralded the event in the Auckland Star as an indication of assimilation. He maintained that previous celebrations of Double Tenth had included a musical concert, play or feast, but now sport had become a major emphasis, bringing Chinese together from all over New Zealand (AS, 9 October 1948). He maintained that

The sports tournament is significant because China is not regarded as a sporting nation like New Zealand. Although the Chinese play games, they are seldom team contests. To go outside sport for an easily understood comparison, they play mah jong and we play bridge. Yet two of the three sports to be played in the Double Tenth are team games.

(*ibid.*)

However, Matthews also noted other changes which he attributed to assimilation but which were also the result of a younger population, educated in New Zealand who could make use of their environment for recreation as well as an occupation. As his article noted, 'Chinese children and adults are going to pictures, to public dances or private parties, to the races [and are]...taking part in church activities, musical evenings and in the summer swimming and fishing'.¹⁷ Their

occupational diversification had increased considerably into surgery, dentistry, engineering, law, nursing, chemical research, agricultural science, radio construction, motor mechanics, commercial flower-growing, cabinet-making, dry cleaning, commercial art, accountancy and clerical work - occupations most of which would have been inconceivable even prior to the war. According to Matthews,

European New Zealanders must take a great deal of the blame for the lack of greater assimilation. We have erected many barriers, statutory and social, to prevent the Chinese entering fully into the life of the country...

(ibid.)

The change was real, but it was less accurately explained by the concept, assimilation, than as the product of the emergence of family life and increased leisure time, both before and after the introduction of the temporary permit system. Pictures of the Double Tenth celebrations in various centres during the war, particularly Dunedin and Wellington, show evidence of a growing younger population, who had been to European schools and on to university. Whereas there had only been one Chinese university graduate at the commencement of the war, by 1950 there were at least six, all of whom were well known in the community and overseas.¹⁸ The group of younger Chinese, both males and females, constituted a new type of community with the support of their elders. However, while their situation was one of relative unity and cooperation, the war had left a legacy in some communities that produced factions and distrust.

By the end of the war several communities, although nominally still members of the New Zealand Chinese Association, disbanded their local groups, which had become divided largely over the issue of the collection monies. Christchurch had faded, and Auckland had applied to Wellington to have their contributions returned. In fact, a considerable

amount was returned, and this eventually was divided between support for Taiwan and their local community centre. In Wellington factions developed over where to locate their Association building, which led in 1949 to a five-member committee being set up with representatives from Auckland, Otago and Wellington. They decided in 1949 to buy a building in Wellington, but Auckland refused to contribute funds.¹⁹ Of the wartime leaders, one sold out his importing agency to a relative and left for Taiwan, another eventually returned to Canton, and another lost his status and reputation within his community. Others retired or went back to their respective businesses. The last flurry of activity, a company formed during the war to promote trade with China and capitalise on China's reconstruction and New Zealand's export potential, was largely responsible for the demise of the wartime leaders. This was the Kin Wah Company, formed in New Zealand but linking New Zealand, Australia, Hong Kong, and Canton through its parent, Yu Kiew Company in Hong Kong. The activities of the Hong Kong company were as follows:

- 1) Trade: dealing in imports and exports, agencies for various forms of foods and agencies for national products.
- 2) Financial transactions: dealing in overseas remittances, operating all savings and deposits accounts, undertaking securities for transactions of land or properties, setting up productive industries.
- 3) Tourist trade: setting up hygienic travel lodges, cargo and baggage transits, catering for overseas Chinese returning home, catering for immigration needs.

(Minutes of First Shareholders
Meeting, 7 August 1950)

Its general situation in 1950 at the first shareholders meeting is summarised in the following:

Year	Shareholders	Share Capital
1946	'few'	HK \$ 50,000
1947	37	150,000
1948	106	310,000
1949	192	560,000
1950	328	670,000

(ibid.)

From 1946 to 1948 the company had shown a deficit of HK\$41,000, but in the period following till the time of the meeting it had declared a profit of HK\$256,000. In New Zealand the Kin Wah Company had seven directors - three from Wellington, two from Dunedin and one each from Christchurch and Auckland - who had all been instrumental in publicising the company's activity and selling shares. These men, however, were at the same time extensively involved in the national collection and the New Zealand Chinese Association. While the predominant number of shareholders was from New Zealand, at least forty were distributed amongst a number of other countries including Australia, Canada, West Indies, New Britain, America, England, Singapore, British Guinea, Hong Kong, and Argentina (List of Shareholders, circa 1950).²⁰

While import and export was slow to develop, by 1949 the company was importing woollen material from England, America and New Zealand, all of which sold briskly in Hong Kong and China. The company also exported Chinese foodstuffs from China and Hong Kong to New Zealand and Australia, which produced a steady profit. The Chinese in New Zealand exported fish, sharks fin, soft fungi, deer's tails and antlers.

The company handled remittances in Hong Kong, exchanging sterling for Hong Kong currency at the rate of £1 = HK\$15.80. It had been able to drop the HK\$2 commission rate operating with the above

exchange rate. Together with commissions from immigration applications and travel agency commissions, which were not as extensive as those from the remittance business, the company had shown an income of over HK\$187,000 in 1949. The travel agency department of the company had also done well, maintaining full bookings in their lodges for people travelling back and forth to China. Then in June and July 1949 the trade changed. With stabilisation in China, availability of cheap commodities and internal security (under the CCP), many Hong Kong Chinese moved back to China. Hong Kong's tourist and business trade collapsed rapidly and the company quickly looked elsewhere as China imposed strict import restrictions. The company's decision was to invest in a dye factory to be built in Canton with the expertise of a man who had already in 1949 set up two such factories in Hong Kong. The secretary of the company in 1950 described the decision in the following:

After the liberation of Canton, Mr Li and I went on a tour to mainland China and, seeing the government's efforts, realized that the setting up of factories in China would have a bright future. From that time forwards we intensified preparatory work, revisiting the places several times for additional information, reviewing the government's policies on industries and making contacts with friends in associated industries. We decided that the setting up of factories is ideal and with the necessary supervision, skills and machinery, we can export great amounts of profit. Thus, we discussed this again with various executives in the company and those shareholders in China, and we have decided to invest HK\$300,000 in Canton to set up the Yu Kiew Dye Factory.

(Minutes, 7 August 1950)

The decision to move assets into China in 1949, according to informants, had no immediate effect on the New Zealand Chinese. Once China nationalised all industries, however, it was realised that no gains would ever accrue to the overseas community but instead would have to remain in China. According to shareholders here, many handed

their shares over to relatives in China, for there was little else to do. The demise of this enterprise caused a split and left the Kin Wah Company and its Australian counterpart defunct by 1949 and effectively brought about a change of leadership in the New Zealand Chinese Association.

In the meantime, the Labour Government, which had done a considerable amount to alleviate the Chinese community's immigration problems, met its demise in the 1949 election, when the National Party took over. The following year the Department of Labour, faced with 200 applications from Chinese who had arrived prior to April 1928 to bring their wives and children to New Zealand and the possibility that 300 ex-students now with permanent residence might want to arrange for spouses to come, carried out the first complete review on Chinese immigration. The problem was to estimate the influence a continued influx of Chinese to New Zealand would have on the local community and on New Zealand, and this was seen to be related directly to the possibility of assimilation.

On the one hand, the report noted that the re-united families and Chinese students, who had most of their education in New Zealand, and the fact that visits to China for education, to see relatives or to get brides would be seriously hindered by the change of government in China. It therefore supposed that the Chinese would look toward New Zealand for their identity and allegiance. On the other hand, the continued arrival of Chinese wives and children, unlikely to move much outside the Chinese community because of cultural and linguistic difficulty, would most likely reinforce their cultural links with China. Furthermore, the tendency for older Chinese to insist on brides from China for their sons would also maintain these links.

It was noted that the application of husbands for wives and children to come invariably brought more male children than female children. This was blamed on the system of arranged marriages before the age of sixteen which, the document argued, meant that female children would more likely be obliged to stay in China. The effect on New Zealand was that it maintained the sex imbalance and would eventually lead to the predominantly male children applying to bring out financees or wives.²¹

Two points were made in the report before the conclusions and recommendations were spelt out. The first merely reported without clarification or accusation the fact that remittances were still being sent out of the country by the Chinese. The report contained the figures shown in Table 15.

TABLE 15: Remittances of the New Zealand Chinese to China
for Nine Months - October 1949 to June 1950

October, 1949	£15,000
November, 1949	26,000
December, 1949	20,859
January, 1950	28,747
February, 1950	13,645
March, 1950	19,201
April, 1950	14,463
May, 1950	13,729
June 1950	39,326

TOTAL £190,970

(NA, L22/1/81:10)

The Reserve Bank advised that 2,500 Chinese were sending an average of £20,000 out of New Zealand each month, which amounted to £8 per month per person or £96 a year.²² This meant that about 72% of the Chinese population born in China (3,446 out of a total of 5,723 in 1951) were able to remit money, but the number and amount were escalating, especially to Hong Kong, where the cost of living had risen

considerably, forcing families who had moved there in anticipation of going to join their kin overseas to return to China, where the monetary situation had stabilised (ibid.).

The second point relates to the 1946 report of the Dominion Population Committee of the House of Representatives, which dealt with 'non-assimilable European types' and by inference was now extended to cover the Asiatics in New Zealand (NA, L22/1/81:10). The report maintained that if more immigrants were going to be accepted in New Zealand, then they should be of 'such a character as will within a relatively short time, become completely assimilated with the New Zealand population and have a distinctly New Zealand point of view' (ibid.:11). The non-assimilable southern Europeans specifically mentioned as tending to 'remain segregated into groups' included Yugoslavs, Italians and Greeks, but 'must apply even more to Asiatics' (ibid.:10-11).

In the light of the above, the report concluded with the following 'significant factors' which it maintained should be taken into consideration in future policy decisions:

1. The non-assimilable characteristics of the Chinese
2. The fact that even when the wives and children of all the married Chinese men now in New Zealand are brought here there would be no foreseeable solution to the problem of finding wives in New Zealand for the surplus unmarried males here
3. The duality of the Chinaman's national interests and the dangers which may attend immigration from a Communist controlled country in the future
4. The traditional opposition by Europeans to any increase in the Asiatic population of the country which is partly based on the fact that they monopolize certain occupations.

(ibid.:11).

If further permits were to be granted, 'it would probably be advisable to consider only the older applicants and to defer policy decision in respect of the younger men until the matter becomes a more pressing one' (ibid.:13).

The policy that eventuated from this in March 1951, although apparently not laid down by the Department of Labour, in effect allowed men to apply to bring their wives to New Zealand if they were married before March 1951. The policy was an 'endeavour to bring Chinese migration to New Zealand to a halt', and it was apparently thought at the time that 'Chinese permanent residents in New Zealand (other than New Zealand born) who wished to marry outside New Zealand after that date would have to leave their wives overseas or else themselves leave New Zealand' (L22/1/115, Memorandum, 7 May 1953).²³ This was a continuation of the allotment of 50 permits granted in 1949, but in 1951 and 1952 provision was made for over 300 permits to be issued which would, it was hoped, clear the backlog of applications anticipated. This arrangement was intended to be secret, presumably so that it could be changed without causing too much trouble (L22/115, 2 February 1954). However, it was made known to the Chinese through the Chinese growers' Journal (see page 459) described by an officer of the Department of Labour as a 'Chinese newspaper which is read by practically all Chinese in New Zealand' (ibid.). The May issue of the Journal in 1951 contained the correspondence between the Consul and the Department of Labour. The response from the Minister of Immigration stated the following:²⁴

Your letters on the question of bringing in family members from China have been transferred to me by my predecessor Mr. Baldwin, the former Minister of Customs. Decisions on the matter have been reached and are stipulated as follows:

- 1) Some 150 new Chinese immigrants are to be issued with entry permits this year, as permanent residents. Consideration will be given to those married before 13 March 1951 and their children must be under 16 and unmarried by the time they arrive in New Zealand.

Priority will be given to applicants according to the length of time in New Zealand as permanent residents.

The applicants must satisfy the department that the following conditions are met:

- a) their wives and children are healthy and their conduct is good
 - b) the moral character of the applicant is acceptable
 - c) the applicants are in a position to maintain their family members
- 2) As for New Zealand-born Chinese, ten applicants will be issued with permits each year for their families to come to New Zealand. They must satisfy the department that the above conditions are met.
- No decision has been reached on those who were married after 13 March 1951.
- 3) Permits for children to come to New Zealand to study will no longer be issued.
 - 4) Those who have obtained temporary permits to stay in New Zealand before 13 March 1951, and whose parents are permanent residents of New Zealand must apply for permanent domicile in New Zealand. The Immigration Department will consider individual cases on their merits.

The New Zealand government has decided that the re-entry permits issued by the Department of Immigration is valid for eighteen months from the date of issue.

(NZCGMJ, 1 May 1951)

The results of this programme are shown in Table 16 (following page).

As indicated by the numbers in the latter period, the concession had been fully utilised and by the end of this period the government considered that all legitimate applications has been made.

TABLE 16: Chinese granted Permanent Residence in New Zealand
1947 to 1953.

	March 1947 to March 1950	March 1950 to March 1953
Wives granted permits	157	307
Children granted permits	206	331
Wives and Children on Temporary Permits now Permanent	1230	
Others granted permanent residence	121	4
TOTAL	1714	642

(L22/1/115, Memorandum- 1953,
no date)

While the immigration issue was of general interest to the community, it was of specific interest to Chinese growers, who found themselves with labour shortages after the war. The growers in 1949 had taken their own request to government for more gardeners to be allowed in from China. The two recommendations made by the growers were consistent with the previously successful temporary-permit concessions. They asked that either Chinese be allowed to enter while resident growers visited China or that temporary resident permits be issued so that labour could enter New Zealand on a temporary basis (NZCGMJ, 1 September 1949). The Minister of Customs met the delegation from the growers' Association, including the chairman, secretary and an executive member. They got a sympathetic hearing, and the Minister promised to pursue the matter, although he suggested as an aside that it was sad Chinese from Fiji had overstayed their temporary permits, a situation that had apparently halted the policy of issuing such permits (NZCGMJ, 1 October 1949). At a meeting the following June,

the Department of Labour informed the growers' Association that they had completed their own survey on the needs of Chinese growers and in fact could find no labour shortage other than in Dunedin (NZCGMJ, 1 July 1950). However, the Department was willing to reconsider the situation if the Association could provide proof of need and a guarantee that they would take responsibility for the immigrants.

The essence of this proposal was that the government was willing to grant a temporary concession if the Chinese growers' Association acted as guarantor for the temporary workers, monitoring their residence in New Zealand and their departure (NZCGMJ, 1 July 1950). The Association was unwilling to accept this arrangement and appealed to the Minister of Agriculture to approach Cabinet with the problem and ask that temporary permits be issued just as a 'relief' measure (*ibid.*). Nothing eventuated from this for several years, for the Korean War was to undo alliances in the community and the relationship between China and New Zealand.²⁵

The New Zealand Chinese had become increasingly caught in a bind between support for nationalism and the political machinations of post-war developments. During the war, the issue had been clear, as support for the war against the Japanese was initially unquestioned. However, towards the end of the war and certainly by 1949, their allegiance was waning, and it split between those who supported China in the name of nationalism and Sun Yat Sen and those whose allegiance went to the exiled KMT government under Chiang Kai-shek. This situation was further complicated by the PRC involvement in the Korean war in October 1950 and their signing of the Pact of Friendship and Alliance with Russia, which reinforced anti-communist fear in the Western world. The blatant anti-American stance of the PRC also did not help, as overseas Chinese in most Western countries found themselves

again under scrutiny. The politics of the KMT versus the CCP, therefore, intruded into former loyalties, and communities in New Zealand reflected these factions.

The Auckland branch of the New Zealand Chinese Association, for instance, maintained its allegiance to the KMT and Chiang Kai-shek despite accusations of mismanagement and exile of the government. When the Wellington headquarters of the Association, in order to increase their capital available for the purchase or construction of a headquarters building, decided in 1949 to appropriate remaining war collection funds, Auckland objected.²⁶ In the first instance, it maintained that the money belonged to the Auckland Chinese community, and secondly it was not clear that they condoned the support of an Association centre in Wellington. The Wellington executive relented and, according to informants, returned the money to Auckland. The amount, however, that was returned varies depending on whom one talks to, but it has been variously estimated at between £6000 and £22,000. While the Auckland association branch objected to Wellington's initial proposal, a considerable number in the Auckland community were to object to Auckland branch's decision to return a portion of this money to the KMT and Taiwan. The money, the objectors maintained, belonged to all the Chinese in the Auckland area, and the association had no right to appropriate it without consent, especially when it could have been used to provide local facilities for Chinese youth. The amount returned to Taiwan is unknown, but estimates place it around £12,000, for which the Association branch received the "Formosa Cup" to be awarded at the annual sports tournament. Many informants have alluded to the fact that it was a very expensive cup.

The alternative interpretation of the Auckland situation was that the factions which appeared over this issue represented a political left and right within the community as younger members felt more allegiance to China, but it is arguable that this allegiance represented a continuation of nationalism, rather than having direct relation to the activity of the CCP.

In Wellington factions emerged, but they were largely concerned with the purchase of a site or building for the Association headquarters. Eventually arguments led to the appointment of a five-person committee after the Fourteenth Annual Conference of the Association. The committee, with three members from the Wellington executive and one each from Auckland and Otago, decided on the purchase of a private hotel for £46,000 which was renovated and opened in 1951. At the opening of the building, described as a 'hostel' to serve Chinese students and visitors, the Consul General spoke of the fact that Europeans and Chinese shared the same ideas: 'Both people loved freedom and peace, and desired good will towards all men' (EP, 21 August 1951). The meeting was attended by over 100 people including several members of the Wellington City Council. Like the money that was returned to Taiwan, the expense of the newly acquired headquarters was also criticised, since, according to opinions of many informants, it was not entirely clear what the building was to be used for.

The loss of status of the national Association allowed, if not forced, the emergence of some solidarity, and it appeared within the Dominion Federation of Chinese Commercial Growers Association which, like the New Zealand Chinese Association, had representatives in each growing area, which covered all of New Zealand (see Appendix XXXIV). They held annual conferences and in August 1949, put out the

first issue of the New Zealand Chinese Growers Monthly Journal, to 'strengthen the unity of the Chinese growers, to give information on growing techniques and market gardening knowledge, to improve grower's living standards and to spread Chinese culture' (NZCGMJ, 1 August 1949). In its first year of operation the Journal obtained the services of a former school teacher from Kwong Chew Club of Auckland who had also written for the New Zealand Chinese Association.

At the Eighth General Meeting of the Chinese growers it was clear that the Association had attained considerable status, perhaps more than originally anticipated, and that its activity was diverse, representing most segments of the community.²⁷ The director of the executive committee on the above occasion said of the organisation:

Both the New Zealand Government and the Chinese people here look upon us with great expectations as we are the only organization in the Chinese community which is granted a regular allowance from the New Zealand Government.

and of the Journal:

You will agree with me that the monthly is an important tool for communication. It is indispensable not only to our members but to all the New Zealand Chinese. We must realize that this is the only Chinese magazine in New Zealand. We should do our utmost to keep it going.

(NZCGMJ, 1 July 1950)

In the time between August 1949 and the June 1950 meeting, the executive of the Association with the Deputy Consul General had visited three growing areas in the North Island and four in the South Island;²⁸ met with the agricultural worker's union over wages and union fees;²⁹ consulted with the Department of Labour over the possibility of bringing Chinese agricultural workers to New Zealand; and with the Department of

Agriculture over the supply of blood and bone;³⁰ re-negotiated the annual government allowance to the Association;³¹ and opposed the imposition by the Wellington vegetable auctions of a charge on vegetable containers (ibid.).³²

In addition, the Association had aided in the purchase of appropriate machinery and helped those who wanted to travel to China³³ as well as keeping growers aware of changing requirements in the industry.³⁴ While many of the issues seemed to have concerned all growers in New Zealand (not only the Chinese) and while there was continued cooperation over such issues, the Chinese growers appeared to have guarded their autonomy jealously. In June 1949 the first suggestion of a merger was put forward at the annual New Zealand Growers Association meeting, but the attending president of the Chinese growers rejected the proposal (NZCGMJ, 1 August 1949).

The Journal also carried a considerable amount of overseas news and did not hesitate to record the entire speech of Mrs Gioh-fang D. Ma, professor of social work at the National Normal University in Peking and Nanking University. Professor Ma had accompanied her husband to New Zealand, as he was lecturing in microchemistry at the University of Otago, and in October 1950 she was invited to attend the Double Tenth sports tournament in Dunedin, where she participated in the opening ceremony. It is clear from the text that she supported the changes in China, and she expressed, in the conclusion of her speech, the hope that she would meet the New Zealand Chinese in China on a similar occasion in the future (NZCGMJ, 1 November 1950). Of more immediate importance to the New Zealand Chinese in the 1950s, however, were four observations she made about the local community:

In the first place, I come to see how pleasant it is for my countrymen to settle in New Zealand. There is very little discrimination against the Chinese as a race. From my personal experience I can see that the New Zealanders want to know about China and wish to

understand us. They have only good remarks to make whenever I mention the Chinese groups in this country. But, wherever our overseas Chinese come to settle, they have the tendency to be too self-sufficient and to pay too little attention to the community at large. Whereas we should remember our origin, I hope that you will also feel you are a part of the community in your adopted country. Often there is misunderstanding between the Europeans and the Chinese simply because the Europeans are not given the chance to have daily continued contacts with the Chinese. Almost as soon as they become well acquainted with a few Chinese, such misunderstanding disappears. Therefore, I suggest that every one of us, especially the young generation who has no language difficulty, should take it as his responsibility to participate in community activities as much as possible. Such participation will surely reduce the racial barrier.

Secondly, I am very happy to see the organization of Chinese youth clubs in many cities, the general interest in sports, and the delightful dancing party Sunday night. It shows that you have already absorbed part of European civilization, which is a good thing. At the same time, though, I wish to remind you that while we adopt Western customs, we should also adopt the ideas and principles behind them. For instance, when we have organization we must also have the spirit of cooperation; when we have sports, we must not lose sight of the ideal of team-work and sportsmanship; and when we hold dances, we should also learn their social etiquette and moral standards. In this transitional period in China, we have been criticised for having learned only the superficial things from the West so that we cannot have fundamental reforms. Now that you are living here, you have plenty of time to study the essentials of Western civilization. I hope that you will not overlook this point.

Thirdly, while we try to acquire the European civilization, we cannot neglect the Chinese culture either. Especially the young people, you have your clubs and sports, it may be a good opportunity to study China when you meet. As I try to look for reference material for my many speaking engagements, I discover that there are a great many books on China in the libraries. So I hope that my young friends may start some study groups. If each takes it in turn to read one book and report to the others, it should not be too difficult. China, with its long history covering several thousand years and an area spreading over several million square miles, is really a very interesting subject for study.

Fourthly, I went to Christchurch to attend the Jubilee Conference of the National Council of Women of New Zealand last week. I saw how those ladies discussed various health and social problems. While my speech on the status of Women in China was well received, I was deeply impressed by the Conference. Among many other thoughts that are stimulated by that experience, it seems to me that whether

it is in China or New Zealand, the position of women will become more and more important as time goes on. Therefore, speaking as a woman, I hope that my countrymen will give proper attention to the education of the young generation, including both boys and girls. I also hope that the girls will not think that your future is limited to housework. Girls, as well as boys, have to represent China wherever you are; you must shoulder your own responsibilities.

(NZCGMJ, 1 November 1950).

By the 1950s even from Professor Ma's ahistorical viewpoint, New Zealand appeared free from discrimination, but the Chinese community, described as self-sufficient and to some degree isolated from their environment, did not reflect this situation. It was not apparent to her that the legacy of prior restrictions could well have resulted in the kind of community she experienced. Furthermore, it is interesting that she saw the removal of the 'racial barrier' as the responsibility of the Chinese community.

In one sense, the community according to Professor Ma, was to become part of their adopted country, absorbing its 'spirit of cooperation', 'ideal of teamwork', 'social etiquette and moral standards', but at the same time Chinese culture should not be neglected. The crucial point of the seeming contradiction apparent in her remarks, however, was the fact that the situation confronted the very young people she would watch at the sports tournament. It would be these young people who would have to negotiate a path between Western customs and Chinese culture under the surveillance of elders, a particularly complex task for the Chinese women, who were urged by Professor Ma to 'shoulder your own social responsibilities'. As for 'representing China', again, it would be the elders affiliation and also New Zealand's foreign policy that would determine which China one would represent. While Professor Ma's

intentions were obviously positive, her statement was classic in the sense that it represented what ought to be but took no cognisance of what had been and what issues now affected the internal and external relations of the Chinese community.

The kind of compromised situation in which the New Zealand Chinese found themselves was exemplified in two decisions, one in late 1950 and the other in early 1951, the first concerning Chinese cultural training for young Chinese born in New Zealand and the other, the politics of the local community as regards the PRC.

In October 1950, the growers' Journal reported that there had been a noticeable increase in the New Zealand-born young Chinese population of the South Island and expressed concern because there were only two Chinese schools operating at the time, one in Christchurch and the other in Dunedin (NZCGMJ, 1 October 1950). This meant that Chinese culture, especially language, would lapse, in the opinion of older Chinese, since trips back to China for education were unlikely. The Journal organised a correspondence course through its pages which would be supplied with necessary material by the Chinese consulate (NZCGMJ, 1 August 1950).

The concern for young Chinese children in rural areas without Chinese schools - for instance, Waimate and Ashburton that together had thirty-two children - was curious, for many years later it would be argued that into these same areas had come mothers with no English, essentially confined to the home because of this, and that the children, at least up until school age, had been totally immersed in Chinese language and culture. In 1968, an article on a market-gardening area in the South Island noted that many of the women could still not speak English and that the children spoke only Chinese till they went to school, which, according to the local headmaster, put them at a disadvantage (New Zealand Woman's Weekly, 7 October 1968:8).

While the language problem may have hindered the children, the lack of English also meant that the wife could have little contact with European society, and the father was invariably responsible for all communication outside the family.

However, the Chinese school situation was viewed differently from the point of view of the New Zealand government. During the war there were eight Chinese schools located in Christchurch, Dunedin, Wellington, Levin, Otaki, Palmerston North, Gisborne and Auckland.³⁵ Some were run by private tutors, while others were run by the Association. In 1951 the Minister of Immigration requested information from the Chinese Consul on the schools that were currently operating.

In 1949 the Minister of Customs had been advised to discontinue issuing temporary permits to teachers,³⁶ and by 1951 the community felt the provision should be available to them to bring teachers to New Zealand. The Consul stated in his report that there had been four schools in operation, one each in Auckland (est. 1948), Gisborne (est. 1943), Christchurch (est. 1950), and Dunedin (est. 1947). Only the Gisborne and Dunedin schools were operated by the New Zealand Chinese Association, while the one in Auckland was run by the Kwong Chew Club and the Christchurch school by 'leading members of the Chinese residents' (L22/1/115, 1 February 1951). The Dunedin school had fifty pupils in 1950, employed one teacher and ran its classes on week nights.³⁷ Gisborne had twenty-one pupils, was open four nights a week plus all day Saturday and Sunday morning, when physical culture classes were held. Christchurch had only a small number of students and was in the process of closing, with the teacher arranging to depart for China. The Auckland school had thirty pupils, but the teacher had been ill for a year and the school had closed (*ibid.*). This situation reflected the differential solidarity of the war years, with Dunedin and

Gisborne better organised than other centres. The Consul, in his concluding remarks, made an appeal for more teachers on the grounds that a school could prove it had need (at least thirty pupils) and resources (funds and materials) (ibid.). The Consul also maintained that any teachers brought in would have proper and verifiable qualifications. He justified the request by the following argument:

Chinese residents in various cities born of parentage of the Chinese race should be given some knowledge of the language and culture of their race. Knowledge of Chinese culture in addition to their English school education is all the more desirable in good character building. Quite apart from the idea of bringing up Chinese children into a separate foreign group in New Zealand, the chief purpose of opening these Chinese schools is to guide the children into the ways of good citizenship in this country.

(L22/1/115, 1 February 1952)

The fear of the government was, precisely as the Consul had acknowledged, the possibility that such schools would reinforce Chinese insularity and hinder assimilation. It had not, nor would it, occur to those concerned that a grounding in their own language was perhaps a necessity before biculturalism and bilingualism could be readily encountered or even accepted.

The situation did not apparently move the government to action, and the Chinese communities therefore assumed individual responsibility for the provision of such schools despite the concern of the Chinese growers' Journal.

The second issue which affected the politics of the Chinese both internally and externally was the Korean War, more specifically, the split it caused in the community, which had come to the attention of the public. The Auckland branch of the growers' Association took steps quickly to stop the issue developing by proposing that all Chinese growers adopt a

resolution 'to support the United Nations action for safeguarding world peace' (NZCGMJ, 1 March 1951). The Association branches supported the move, but of the twelve branches, three abstained and one voted against (ibid.). The resolution was justified in the following:

It is absolutely important for us Chinese immigrants to adopt such a method to protect ourselves when the current political situation is tense and delicate. We left China and travelled thousands of miles to New Zealand in the hope of starting a new and prosperous life in a foreign country. We have neither the desire nor political power nor the interest in party factions. Our only wish is to settle down to a happy life and have a harmonious relation with the local people. We are fully aware of our status and take care that we do not contradict the national policy of the New Zealand government, and under no circumstances do we wish to have any conflict with the local people. Now we are watching closely the difficult situation in which the American Chinese have landed themselves at the moment. We are concerned about the New Zealand government's attitude towards a certain Auckland Chinese organisation. It has been reported that in the South Island disturbances occurred between some Chinese and local people. The incidents were caused by one or two Chinese shop-keepers who had made some unthoughtful remarks about current international events. We call on all New Zealand Chinese to be cautious. Imprudent words and action precipitated by emotion are dangerous.

(NZCGMJ, 1 March 1951)

Clearly, there was some concern as to how authorities in New Zealand would treat the Chinese as China's politics and her relationship to Russia influenced former friendly ties. The events in Christchurch did not appear in the local press, however, and there is no mention of an Auckland Chinese organisation in government correspondence. The only organisation that did appear was a Chinese Cultural Society made up of young Chinese who had recently come from China and were keen to keep up with developments. Their activity was largely concerned with the distribution of news to those who were interested and the showing of film's on China's development. While their attitude was open, and obviously there were others who were at least interested, news that came via the Chinese Consul at the end of 1951 tarnished the interest.

The Consul General in November, had received news from Australia that certain Chinese there were sending information back to China about the wealth of local Chinese so that pressure could be placed on their relatives in China to ask for more remittance money (Press, 25 November 1951). Two days later the Consul General received evidence from local Chinese that relatives of at least one family were being held for a ransom of £1500 (Press, 28 November 1951).³⁸ The relatives in New Zealand had refused, and the family members had been tortured and beaten publicly, according to the informants in Hong Kong who passed the news on to New Zealand (ibid.). In response to this 'a Chinese leader in New Zealand' had written to Mao Tse-tung protesting against 'blackmail letters sent to overseas Chinese families in China by party officials' (NZCGMJ, 1 May 1952). Radio Peking reported the communication and replied that the 'Council of the Overseas Chinese Affairs in Communist China had said that these letters were sent out by the KMT and its U.S. imperialist masters' (ibid.). The Consul General in Wellington refused to accept this explanation and described the response as an 'insult to common sense', but he had seen a number of these letters personally and they had been identified by their relatives in New Zealand (ibid.; see also Press, 24 April 1952).

In the following year a special envoy, General Lowe Li-shang, arrived to mobilise overseas Chinese to form Anti-Communist Leagues for Saving China (NZCGMJ, 1 May 1952). According to the report of his visit, Taiwan had dispatched a number of such envoys to countries where overseas Chinese lived, and General Lowe, from Jung Sing county and a previous resident in New Zealand, was given the mission. The stimulus for this action in Taiwan, he maintained, came from the considerable worry that was developing in overseas communities about relatives in China (ibid.).⁴⁰ The Taiwan government was endeavouring to convey

support to these people as well as inspecting the affairs of the overseas Chinese (ibid.). General Lowe met with the Consul General on arrival and scheduled visits to local Chinese communities.

The result of the visits was the founding of the Anti-Communist League in Wellington and Auckland. In Wellington the New Zealand Chinese Association convened a meeting and passed a resolution forming the League, sent a message of greeting to Chiang-Kai-shek and gathered £200 from its 100 members (NZCGMJ, 1 June 1952). A week after the League's formation a nineteen-member executive was convened in Wellington with the Consul General's wife as deputy president, and in Auckland a similar executive of fifteen members was organised (ibid.). In the following years the organisation maintained its profile and consistently appeared publicly alongside members for the Wellington and Auckland New Zealand Chinese Association, the KMT branches still extant and the Consul General.

However, two of its strongest benefactors in 1952, the current Consul General and his wife, were withdrawn from New Zealand the following year, which caused some consternation in the Chinese community and to the New Zealand government.⁴¹ The Chinese community reacted to the knowledge with a fear that their increasing ties with Taiwan would be severed, but with the arrival of the new Consul General in October 1953, their fears were allayed. The new incumbent, Tien Eng-sheng,⁴² was strongly anti-PRC and maintained the image of Taiwan as the fatherland, encouraging New Zealand Chinese to take the opportunity to go there and study, since, according to him, places were not available in New Zealand universities (NZCGMJ, 1 November 1953).⁴³ As regards the Chinese in New Zealand, he was willing to give them all the assistance they needed.

The New Zealand government, on the other hand was less confident about the new appointment and had requested a curriculum vitae from the previous Consul General. External Affairs sought advice from the New Zealand High Commission in England, who in turn visited the Foreign Office (NA, PM, 61/1/1, 18 August 1953). The specific questions had to do with Britain's withdrawal of recognition from the Republic of China while at the same time maintaining a Consulate in Formosa. External Affairs was advised that the office in Tamsui, Taiwan, was for de-facto relations and to protect Britain's interests rather than a diplomatic post (NA, PM, 61/6/1, 18 August 1953). New Zealand was concerned about the fact that it might move to recognise the PRC (NA, PM, 61/6/1, 10 August 1953) and stated in a letter to the Consul General in New Zealand that:

...in view of the uncertainty of the present international situation in the Far East, the New Zealand Government would like to take time for consideration before coming to a decision on the question of the admission of a successor to the post of Consul General of the Republic of China.

(NA, PM, 61/6/1, 21 August 1953)

The New Zealand High Commission in London, however, informed Internal Affairs that acceptance of the new representative would in no way interfere with a withdrawal of recognition, so visas were issued in Taiwan. The Consulate of the Republic of China in New Zealand now had a Consul General, a Deputy Consul and Secretary, the latter two being Cantonese while the Consul General was from northern China.

The Consul General's arrival was relatively uneventful, but within the year of his appointment he was to inherit a situation which his predecessor had initiated. The previous Consul General had sent out a circular in 1953 which contained the following information:

- 1) A Chinese who had acquired domicile in New Zealand and was married before 13/3/51 may still send in his application to the Director of Employment for a permit to bring his wife and minor children to New Zealand, but he must give full explanation to the Director as to why such application had not been submitted before 13/12/1952. Should the Director be satisfied with the explanation he would then give consideration to the application.
- 2) Any Chinese who has acquired domicile in New Zealand and whose marriage took place after the 13/3/51 will come under the following three categories:

One who has been married by proxy, but whose marriage is not recognized as legal. Should he first legalize his marriage in conformity with the law he may then apply to the Director of Employment for a permit to bring his wife to New Zealand.

One whose wife has died and who has remarried in China may apply to the Director to bring his wife to New Zealand.

One who has a fiancée in China and who wishes to complete the marriage procedure in conformity with the law and then bring his wife to New Zealand may now send his application to the Director of Employment.

(L22/1/115, 31 July 1953).⁴⁴

While section (1) complies with the provisions made in 1951, section (2) appears to have been a fabrication, or the Consul General had received notification of a memorandum provided for the Minister of Immigration by the Department of Labour and Employment in May 1953. That document was sent in response to a request by the Minister who wished to know how many applications the Department had received for people married after 13 March 1951 (L22/1/115, 7 May 1953).

The contents spelled out the situation that had developed since the Cabinet decision in 1951 and concluded that, although the sex ratio had improved from approximately five males to one female in 1936, to a situation in 1945 of two males for one female, marriage partners would still be in short supply for Chinese men. Although there were young New Zealand Chinese women who could get married, it appeared that

their parents wanted sons-in-law with adequate wealth, making marriage very hard for poorer young men. It was in fact only the rich who could marry the rich, which would not help young Chinese trying to establish themselves. The recommendation was to recognise marriages after 13 March 1951 and allow permanent residents to apply to bring these wives to New Zealand. This policy would have to include, the report continued, marriages contracted in Fiji or Hong Kong as well as those from mainland China. It seemed clear by the contents of this memorandum that some latitude was being offered.

The following year, however, another memorandum was sent from the same office to the Minister of Immigration, this time initiated by a request from the new Consul General, which indicated that as far as the Department of Labour and Employment was concerned no policy change had been accepted. It stated that there was no reason to accept application from New Zealand-born Chinese women who wanted to bring their fiancées in, nor was there any reason to accept applications from Chinese women who were permanent residents. The major problem, according to this document, was the fact that young Chinese males in New Zealand who had been brought up in China, or at least had some of their education there, wanted women who would 'accept the status afforded to Chinese wives in China', which was not the case for women born and educated in New Zealand (L22/1/115, 21 June 1954). The corollary to this was that Chinese males educated in New Zealand had no problem finding wives regardless of the sex ratio. The solution, according to the memorandum was for Chinese males who wanted wives 'to adopt the New Zealand way of life' and that young Chinese girls who had fiancées overseas or whose parents wanted them to marry a husband from China so that they had an 'immigrant worker prepared to work in New Zealand under Chinese conditions' would have to realise that this contravened accepted policy that the 'woman is expected to join the man

in his country (L22/1/115, 21 June 1954).⁴⁵ The report concluded that the Chinese had reached a 'relatively high figure' in New Zealand, 5,723 in April 1951 'compared to the total in Australia which is under 10,000', and that calculations from the following:

	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>
Full blood under 16	804	639
Full blood and under 45	1029	699
	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	1833	1338
	<hr/>	<hr/>

showed that there was a deficiency of only 495 females (ibid.).

The Minister of Immigration refused to change policy, which prompted the Consul General to follow a suggestion from the Minister of Immigration to collect a list of the Chinese who could marry in Hong Kong and who wished to bring their wives to New Zealand. The Consul General sent out a circular requesting the information, and by June received eighty-four replies from twenty-four towns throughout New Zealand with the larger numbers from Wellington (14), Christchurch (9), Otaki (8), Oamaru (7), Gisborne (7), Ashburton (5), and Dunedin (5) (L33/1/115, 8 July 1954). The predominant age range was from fifteen to thirty three with two men fifty five years old and one boy only five (ibid.). The occupations and incomes were also included in the list sent to the Minister of Immigration, which are summarised in Table 17.

TABLE 17: Applicants by Occupation and Income Range in 1954
(in Pounds Sterling)

Number	Occupation	Yearly Income Range
27	Market Gardeners	£516 to £524 (a)
27	Fruiterers	364 to 624 (b)
8	Shop Assistants	208 to 520 (c)
2	Fish and Chip Shop	416 to 546
2	Laundry	364
1	Merchant	780
5	Factory Workers	468 to 598
3	Mechanics	520 to 598
1	Assist. Chemist	520
1	Wireless Service	624
1	Civil Service	494

(L22/1/115, 8 July 1954)

- (a) There are two exceptions for market-gardening incomes, both from Pukekohe, where incomes ranged from £1508 to £1560 per year due to mechanisation and increased acreage.
- (b) There was one exception for fruiterers, a case where a fruit shop and garden were owned by the same person, which gave a yearly income of £1404. The lowest incomes in this occupation came from Gisborne.
- (c) The lowest end of this range represented minors.

The Consul General concluded his request for reconsideration of the policy with the following:

You would not, I know, like to see them dissatisfied and in bad health, which would surely be the result from their remaining unmarried when they wish to have a wife. Besides I feel it is most important and only fair that New Zealand born Chinese and domiciled Chinese should be given equal chances in this matter.

(ibid.)

While the above statement would hardly seem to allay the fears expressed by the Department of Labour officials concerning the probable status of wives brought to New Zealand, the Minister of Immigration modified the policy in accordance with the Consul General's wishes so that

privileges extended to Chinese born in New Zealand would now be extended to all domiciled Chinese, as soon as the latter attained citizenship. While the change was appreciated, the requirement of naturalisation meant that applications could be held up for as long as sixteen months till the papers were granted (L22/1/115, 13 September 1954), and Internal Affairs would not grant naturalisation to aliens whose wives or minor children were resident overseas at the time of application. Unfortunately, in the midst of negotiation over this, an election took place and, although National stayed in power, the Minister of Immigration changed, G.R. Hanan taking the portfolio. His initial response to the negotiations was rather less lenient than his predecessor, and he maintained that the concessions won were adequate regardless of the delay (L22/1/115, no date). In fact, it seems as though this stop-gap provided by the delay in naturalisation formalities and the expense of travel and arrangements to Hong Kong for such a marriage were, in the eyes of the Department of Labour, necessary to uphold 1951 Cabinet policy. In a document prepared in 1955 by the Department of Labour, the policy is reiterated and supported by calculations on the cost of the Hong Kong marriages. It was estimated that it would cost a Chinese bridegroom £600 to have the marriage in Hong Kong and then return to New Zealand with his bride (L22/1/115, 14 April 1955). It was maintained that:

The present 'high price' keeps the number down which is precisely what it is intended to do, the cardinal aim of the policy approved by Cabinet being to end immigration altogether.

(L22/1/115, 14 April 1955)

and further that:

As long as we allow the Chinese to bring in 'China trained' girls who will be completely subservient to their husbands and who will either work like coolies in market gardens or else live in fruit shops, so long will we continue to have an alien Chinese 'cell' in New Zealand.

(ibid.)

The report suggested that, since there were not enough Chinese females 'to go round...some Chinese males must either remain bachelors or else marry Maori or other Polynesians' a situation that it went on to describe as a 'good cross' (ibid.)⁴⁷ In summation, it recommended that it was '...most desirable that all possible pressure should be exerted towards assimilating the Chinese' and maintained that 'it can definitely be done, but not if it is made easy for Chinese to bring in wives from China' (L22/1/115, 14 April 1955).

The situation was paradoxical: historically the Chinese were criticised for their totally male overseas population with its attendant habits, and now that they had settled permanently with their wives, roles within the family were the offending characteristic. It was claimed that they did not assimilate in the past due to the absence of families, and now they would not assimilate due to presence of families, yet the government wanted them to assimilate and even inter-marry, something which was totally unacceptable at the time of the market-garden investigations of 1929.

It was not only in this area that the Chinese received pressure to assimilate. In 1953 the Chinese Growers Association issued a press statement complaining about the problems some of their members experienced in trying to understand developments in the industry that were communicated in English. This was particularly the case for those developing and expanding their enterprises. Internal Affairs picked up

the statement and suggested to the Chinese Growers Association that it was in the interest of Chinese growers to learn English and that they should make use of the adult English classes provided by the Department of Education in many centres (NA, IA 116/7, 17 July 1953).⁴⁸ Internal Affairs also communicated their feelings to the Department of Agriculture, linking the language problem to naturalisation. The Department maintained that since naturalisation was available to 'suitable Chinese in certain strictly defined categories' which included those with an 'adequate knowledge of English' the Chinese should not be offered material in their own language. Both the Department of Agriculture and the Dominion Federation of New Zealand Chinese Commercial Growers Association responded to the suggestions. The national secretary of the growers' Association pointed out that the president of the Association, a Justice of the Peace in New Zealand, was totally in favour of Chinese learning English and being loyal to New Zealand. However, he added, the market gardeners referred to in the article were largely middle-aged Chinese who had been in New Zealand for over twenty years, were hard-working and law-abiding, but now needed help to increase their productivity. The secretary maintained that it was because of the government and the country's needs during a time of war that the Federation was started in the first place, and now they should be assisted. In conclusion he stated that:

We have no desire to foster an exclusive community, but we must be realistic and deal with the situation as it is, namely that the majority of Chinese growers, as already stated, cannot be educated in the manner suggested. It is linguistically impossible for Chinese in later years to grapple with English, which is so fundamentally different from their native language, both in pronunciation and grammar.

They are engaged in a most hazardous industry and would be physically incapable of the strain entailed in attending night classes. It is not that they do not wish to know English, on the contrary they, for the sake of their own convenience, are all keen to learn but unequal to the effort entailed.

(NA, IA 116/7, 27 July 1953).⁴⁹

The Director General of the Department of Agriculture responded also, explaining to Internal Affairs the nature of the Chinese growers' organisation. He confirmed the points made by the secretary of the growers' Association regarding the existence of their organisation and affirmed that the Chinese justified its continued existence and autonomy from its European counterpart on the basis of special needs of the Chinese. He added, however, that the organisation was affiliated to the Dominion Council of Growers by virtue of an annual grant made to the Chinese on the basis of the number of Chinese growers in proportion to the total. This grant had been £350 in 1944 and £475 in 1950, but in 1952 and 1953, the amount had been reduced by the Dominion Council to £100 per year, and the Chinese resented this action.⁵⁰ The Dominion Council had justified their decrease of the grant on the grounds that there was no need to support a parallel organisation, but the Chinese were still bound to pay their registration fee by the Commercial Gardens Registration Regulation of 1943 (NA, IA 116/7, 27 August 1953). The Director General correctly saw the whole language issue tied to the future existence of the Chinese organisation which, the Chinese growers could argue, had a right to autonomous existence, for they had no guarantee that they would receive anything for their registration fee should they agree to disband.

While the Department of Agriculture made no attempt to provide material in Chinese for the growers, its horticultural field officers in various districts were instructed to encourage Chinese to learn English because it was 'Government policy' and also it would enable information to be exchanged (NA, IA 116/7, 27 August 1953).

As regards the immigration situation, the issue of Chinese wives was to linger on, but gradually policy changed. In 1956 it was announced that both naturalised permanent residents and New Zealand-born Chinese could apply to bring their wives to New Zealand in order to get married, which the Secretary of Labour noted would provide considerable savings to the Chinese concerned.⁵¹ In 1956 Internal Affairs recommended that the right to naturalisation be extended to older Chinese, since the applicants prior to 1956 had been from a younger group but now older people were applying (NA, IA 116/7, 20 November 1956), and in 1958 it was recommended that Chinese naturalisation be covered under 'normal statutory conditions' of the British Nationality and New Zealand Citizenship Act 1948 (NA, IA 116/7, 18 February 1958). Although it has not been ascertained that these recommendations were actually put into practice, naturalisation was becoming less of an issue for the Chinese in New Zealand as time went on, despite events in 1957, an election year which brought Labour back to power. This was the year in which illegal immigration activity was uncovered. The news broke in April 1957, and the Press picked up the story (see Press, 18 and 20 April 1957). The accusation was that Chinese were getting into the country illegally with false entry permits, but the Secretary of Labour denied rumours that government officials were involved (ibid.: 18 April 1957). Immediately all permanent entry permits were changed to temporary permits, and the investigations went on with the police involved. The Chinese leaders were divided in their allegiance, with an Auckland leader refusing to 'betray' another Chinese to the police, even if he was dishonest and the secretary of the Wellington branch of the Chinese Association stating it was the responsibility of the Chinese as citizens to cooperate with any investigations into illegal practices (ibid.).

The activity was also reported in the Chinese growers' Journal in which it was maintained that two Chinese, one from Wellington and one from Auckland, and a government official were involved in providing the permits for a fee of £1200 each (NZCGMJ, 30 April 1957). The situation was discovered by a lawyer who was applying on behalf of a Chinese client and whose application was turned down, and consequently he asked the Department of Labour to investigate. Once the situation was discovered, the police were called in, but according to the growers' Journal, the Chinese were saddened to think people had to resort to this extortion which would cost two years' income (ibid.). The article further maintained that most Chinese would not condone such activity, but those who had paid could not of course go to the police and reveal what had happened for fear of being deported (ibid.). Further, it noted the concerns of the New Zealand government about the political background of immigrants. Already in 1953 and 1956 there had been some indications that contact with the PRC was being maintained in New Zealand. In 1953 films from the PRC were shown in Wellington at the time of Double Tenth, and a number of local Chinese went to see them. In 1956 the President of the Chinese Building Workers Union visited New Zealand, and the Anti-Communist League sent out a circular warning local Chinese not to assist the visiting delegate, who was at the time in Auckland, if they were loyal to the Nationalist government (EP, 9 June 1956). It also maintained that:

It is heartbreaking indeed to watch these Chinese aiding and abetting the Communists in total disregard to the dictates of their conscience.

In the interests of the future of our country and that of the Chinese community here in New Zealand we therefore warn our compatriots not to be caught unawares and fooled by these people.

(ibid.)

In Wellington the New Zealand Chinese Association refused to allow their premises to be used for the reception of the visitor. Despite these events, however, the growers' Journal maintained that the government had not found any Chinese who were 'actively broadcasting communism' (NZCGMJ, 30 April 1957). By June the Press divulged that Chinese had been 'allegedly' visiting the PRC even though passports would not be issued for this purpose (NZCGMJ, 31 January 1956 and 31 May 1957). The article in the Press said that Chinese were obtaining visas to go to Hong Kong and then contacting the PRC Travel Agency in Hong Kong to arrange visits to the mainland (Press, 10 June 1957). They apparently could enter China via the New Territories and leave via Macao so their passports would not be stamped, and at least four young Chinese had been in China attending school in Peking and Canton for two years (ibid.). Despite this, it appears that the Consul General was more concerned about these visits than was the New Zealand government, for there was little the latter could do to stop visits to the mainland. Australian authorities however, did stop Chinese getting visas to go via Australia, which meant a number of people were stuck in Hong Kong (Press, 31 May 1957).

Further repercussions were minimal, for the exposing of the illegal procedures led to the voluntary resignation of a senior official in the Immigration Division of the Department of Labour. As for the Chinese involved, it was claimed that at least one became a persona non grata in his own community, which led to an ostracised existence until he died.

If the growers' Journal provided a medium of national communication which kept people informed, especially those who read Chinese, it was the Double Tenth celebration which was expected to typify the unity of all segments of the community. It was clear that

Double Tenth had increased in popularity both as a local activity and as a national sports day as more Chinese were able and willing to participate. In a real sense, one can see a dual process of collective and factional activity coinciding. Double Tenth sports tournaments, for instance, became increasingly important, uniting large groups of Chinese at least once every year. As more communities could send participants and competitions involved more events, the gatherings required more organisation. Businesses had to be closed and arrangements made for large gatherings. In 1952, Wellington, Auckland, Dunedin, Hamilton, and Gisborne all closed their businesses to celebrate the Double Tenth. The gatherings were large: 500 people in Wellington, more than 50% of the local population, and 200 in Dunedin, nearly 75% of the population, gathered together in the respective centres. The sports tournament held in Hamilton that year, a centre some distance from South Island participants, brought 200 players together from all over New Zealand (NZCGMJ, 1 November 1952). In the following year, ten centres sent participants, and the event was sufficiently well organised to collect £532.11.0 for the New Zealand Chinese Association, which made an annual £200 grant to the centre hosting the event. The other activities at the gatherings sometimes included films and cultural performances, especially by such groups as the Auckland Tai Tung (musical association), and often these would draw more of the community together.⁵² While the theme of unity was always the ideal, the reality of the occasion was far more complex, as it was expected not only to pull the young and old of the community together, celebrate an historic political event and support Taiwan, but also to develop the moral and physical strength of the local Chinese and present an acceptable image to European New Zealand.

To this end, the New Zealand Chinese Association and the Consul General yearly exhorted the community to remember all these aspects in their celebration. For instance, in 1950 the Chinese Association sent the following message to the Dunedin gathering:

Competition in sports will stimulate greater interest and fellowship within the Chinese community and win commendation from the New Zealand people.

Sports are not limited to the bounds of physical fitness, but they are also conducive to mental development and to cultivation of patriotism. We must do all within our power to safeguard the security of our motherland and our compatriots. We must carry forth the glory of the Republic of China.

(Third N.Z. Chinese Annual Sports
Tournament, Dunedin, 1950:3).⁵³

and the Consul General sent this statement:

The Double Tenth sports tournament not only plays an important role in developing athletic talents of the young Chinese; it exerts even greater significance in their moral construction. Many of the young Chinese left China in their childhood. It is important to cultivate their patriotic feelings. A gathering on National Day is an occasion to promote such a cause. Sports also play a part in bringing the Chinese youth who are scattered all over NZ closer together and strengthens their mutual understanding. We well appreciate the fact that unity is the cornerstone of the great cause for the whole Chinese community and for a strong and prosperous motherland.

The sports meeting plays an important part in strengthening the unity of the Chinese youth all over NZ and also enhances the understanding of the NZ people about the Chinese. For instance, the NZ people were so deeply impressed by a visiting Chinese soccer team some twenty years ago with its outstanding skill and good sportsmanship that even today the memory of this Chinese team is still alive in many for their performance. Through it they can see the excellent character of the Chinese youth. It is not a sheer exaggeration to say that this very soccer team has enhanced the friendly relations between the Chinese and the NZ people. We can appreciate ever more the great impetus in sports.

I sincerely hope that all the athletes taking part in this tournament will maintain the high levels of sportsmanship previously shown in the tournaments. Prizes and placings are not the ultimate goal in competition. Our vision should be brought to focus on more important and rewarding factors - the strengthening of unity and friendship among the Chinese youth and the promotion of the understanding between the Chinese and the NZ people.

(Third N.Z. Chinese Annual Sports
Tournament, Dunedin, 1950:3)

In 1954 the message from the Auckland branch of the Chinese Association was similar; amongst other things it said:

In his Double Tenth message President Chiang-Kai-shek instructed us last year that we celebrate the Double Tenth National day in that the Double Tenth brought us the glory of opening a new era - the founding of the Republic of China. Now history challenges us with the solemn responsibility of saving and restoring our country.

(Seventh Annual N.Z. Sports
Tournament, Auckland, 1954:2-5)

By 1960 the message from the new Consul was even more blatantly political, exhorting the local Chinese to moral re-armament:

We celebrate the "Double Tenth" Anniversary today. The 10th of October was the date on which the Republic of China was founded, 49 years ago by the youth of China, led by Dr Sun Yat-sen. This Republic is now facing the gravest test in its history. With its back against the wall, this Republic must be reborn and give the superior answer to the people on the mainland, or all of us - free China and the free world - will either perish or lose our freedom. Once again the youth of China can lead, this time to national rebirth through personal revolution. This revolution calls for personal change and commitment to the absolute moral standards of honesty, purity, unselfishness and love...

The Moral Re-Armament of youth everywhere - China, New Zealand and other nations - will win the world and usher in a new era under God.

(Thirteenth Annual Chinese Sports
Tournament, October 1960:5)

The chairman of the organising committee, while happy to welcome all the participants, also offered a more subdued note on the reality of Double Tenth and the internal relations of the Chinese community in the following:

In 1957, Jack Chan, our Chairman during that year, made the following comments about the Double Tenth Tournaments:

"Just what is so memorable about it? And from it, what have we actually achieved?"

Without doubt these Tournaments serve ideally in bringing together the youth of New Zealand and the friendships made and pleasures experienced during these Tournaments are long-lasting. Naturally, too, it is pleasing even to be able to represent one's province and to match skills against other teams from other parts of New Zealand.

Although these Tournaments serve many purposes, it is not possible to have more functions such as a Youth Conference or some such function, to discuss problems relating to the Chinese Community in New Zealand. Admittedly problems are few, but one that is of concern, we believe, is the general lack of unity in the Chinese Community in various centres. By this we mean that when a Tournament such as this is being staged, instead of the Chinese in that centre forgetting their differences and endeavouring to give all their efforts towards the running of the Tournament, organization is left to certain factions of the Chinese Community. We feel that the Chinese should forget their differences in dialect and customs and should pull together for the good of the Chinese as a whole. Perhaps it may be hard for people to do this - but why should it?

(ibid.:6)

In Wellington the organising committee, according to the chairman, had a dispute with the Chinese Association over rules which they had formulated for the future organising of the tournament. The Association refused to accept them. Part of the problem came from the large number of teams that were attached to particular organisations. Coordinating and representing their interests while at the same time maintaining diplomacy became an onerous task. To look in more detail at the situation that had developed, one has only to look at the numerous groups which had emerged within the Wellington community

In 1951 under the influence of the Chinese Progressive Club, the Eastern Club was started, but according to informants, the key members of the Progressive Club, dominated by one family, lost interest, and it was the Eastern Club that persevered with another group, the Northern Soccer Club. These two clubs represented two of the most popular sports, basketball for the former and soccer for the latter, which were to dominate local activity and the Double Tenth. The interpretation of this situation is based on a growing polemic in the community between those who saw sports as the most important group activity which would provide community, cohesion and reduce the chances of inter-marriage and on the other hand those who tended to see an emphasis on culture as a more appropriate activity to achieve the same results. In the early years culture and sports co-existed easily as club members readily participated in organising social activities and the relative expense of either was kept to a minimum. However, the time came when the cost of the sports represented only 20% of the total cost, and arrangements of social function became not only a burden for the organisers but also excessively expensive. The other significant point about the two sports clubs was the fact that they purposefully remained aloof from affiliation with other groups.

In addition to these two organisations involved in sport, there was also the Seyip Youth group, which had started in 1950 after the Seyip association had re-organised in 1947, and the Delta Club (Wellington Chinese Youth Club) started in 1957 and combining sports and social events (see NZCGMJ, 30 September 1958).

On the side of culture and social activity, the most significant groups were the Anglican and Baptist Chinese Churches. As already noted, the Anglican Mission had the benefit of an active pastor who in 1949 had already set about raising money for a new Chinese mission (see EP, 15 October 1949). Reverend Cheung was able to enlist considerable public

support and raise a large amount of money from bazaars which sold, at least in 1949, 'a precious cargo of exquisite handkerchiefs, table linen, bedspreads' which had 'arrived for the Chinese Missioner' (EP, 13 September 1949). The newspaper noted that this type of material had not been seen in New Zealand since before the war. The minister also displayed his own private collection of 'precious pieces dating back to Yuan and Ming dynasties' (*ibid.*). Aside from raising money, however, the missioner was also instrumental in starting a language school for teaching Chinese, a task for which he was eminently suited as the previous translator for the 'Wah Kiu Yut Po' (Overseas Chinese Daily Newspaper) in Hong Kong.⁵⁴ In 1950 he had twenty-five students, twelve who had no primary education in China, eight in an advanced class who were recent arrivals and five advanced university students (EP, 13 July 1950).⁵⁵ The aim of the school was to teach Chinese how to read and write their own language, which would help them correspond with home - a point, the article noted, which had received some criticism as yet another example of separatism and the 'fostering of unhealthy nationalism' (EP, 13 July 1950). Reverend Cheung argued to the contrary, that such knowledge would facilitate the transmission of Chinese culture for the benefit of all New Zealanders and introduce the notion of Oriental studies to the country, still lacking in the universities in the 1950s. By the time Cheung left in 1951 he had raised £4,500 for the new hall, of which £1,500 had come from local Chinese and a pledge of £3,000 to come from the Williams Trust in 1954 (EP, 13 July 1951).⁵⁶

In the same year, the Chinese Baptist Church was formed in Wellington after its split from the combined Anglican/Baptist mission (1932 to 1949). The membership of twenty-six Chinese Baptists,

including the son of its earliest leader, now had Reverend Peter Fung, who had arrived from Hong Kong in 1950. The occasion of its formation was attended by the new Anglican missionary, Reverend T. Mak, and the Consul General (EP, 15 October 1951).

From this time on, the two churches engaged in intense fund-raising and cultural activity in the Wellington community. In 1953, the Anglican Mission received permission to proceed with its building plans, and the missionary and his assistant continued the fund-raising started by their predecessor. The Anglicans showed films, made available by the Chinese Film Corporation, and the Baptist Church Youth Drama Group presented concerts and plays to the public (see EP, 3 September, and 23 December 1953).⁵⁷ The Anglican Youth Club collected £180 for an Old Persons' Home in Wellington and by 1954 the Chinese Anglican Church had accumulated £8000 towards the cost of their new hall, while the Baptists had collected £5000 towards theirs.⁵⁸

In May 1955, the Chinese Anglicans commemorated the laying of the cornerstone of their new hall and the middle of July 1956 celebrated its opening (EP, 9 May 1955 and 19 July 1956).⁵⁹ The building was unique, being both a hall and a church, the latter being achieved by having the altar behind doors on a stage. Otherwise the facility was described as a 'community hall' complete with all amenities including a kitchen (EP, 19 July 1956).

In August 1957, the Wellington Chinese Baptist Church was opened and the growers' Journal printed the following information, indicating the network used to draw donations from other centres:

Money Raised for the Wellington Chinese Baptist
Church

	£
Wellington	5,332
South Island	546
Otaki, Ohau, Levin	162
Foxton, Fielding, Palmerston North	211
Woodville, Dannevirke, Hastings, Napier, Gisborne	250
Auckland, Hamilton	133
European Friends	546
NZ Baptist Mission	3,000
	<u>£10,180</u>

(NZCGMJ, 30 June 1957)

The building was a church which could seat 300 people, although the permanent membership of the church was only thirty-seven in 1955, with eighty-eight enrolled for Bible Class or Sunday School (EP, 30 July 1955).

Besides the Anglican Chinese School, there was also in 1957 a Wellington Chinese School, which was using the Tung Jung Association facilities as a classroom. The affiliation of this school is unknown, although it had very obvious ties with the Consulate, as it was registered in Taiwan and received textbooks (1,600 especially for overseas Chinese) from the Taiwan government (NZCGMJ, 31 May 1957). This school had seventy-five attending students and ninety registered (*ibid.*).

While the development of groups seems particularly noticeable in Wellington, it was also happening elsewhere.

In Auckland the KMT was still active and in 1953 had sent £400 to help the Taiwan army (NZCGMJ, 1 December 1953), and the Kwong Chew Club collected substantial amounts and built a new building which opened on 2 December 1954.⁶⁰ There was also the Auckland Opera Club, which earned a considerable reputation and toured the country (see NZCGMJ, 29 February 1957 and Chapter 10),⁶¹ and the Auckland Chinese Sports Club which had started again in 1947.

The Gisborne community's branch of the Chinese association continued its work, offering classes and encouraging Chinese culture in the community for which it was awarded a merit certificate by the Taiwan government (NZCGMJ, 1 December 1954). In June 1954 a Canterbury Chinese Cultural Society was started in Christchurch with over 100 members and an executive of six intent upon starting a Chinese school and encouraging Chinese music, films, drama and art as well as providing a milieu in which young Chinese could meet New Zealanders (NZCGMJ, 1 June 1954). In the same year Dunedin had its own sports club and a Chinese school which taught both English and Chinese on Saturday and Sunday (NZCGMJ, 1 July 1954). Four years later the Hutt Valley branch of the Chinese association opened their own school. In attendance were the Consulate staff, representatives from the head office of the Chinese association and the Chinese Baptist Minister (NZCGMJ, 30 June 1958). The school had sixty-two children and also ran classes on Saturday and Sunday afternoon at times when young and old alike could get away from other obligations, particularly work and school, to attend.

The early fifties were busy and active times in nearly all Chinese communities as families established themselves, their children attended school and the adult community tried to contain its youngsters as demands from European society increased. The community also had a public profile, since the Anglican and Baptist community projects and various items about Chinese growers became newspaper copy, and some journalists attempted to predict the future course of the Chinese community.

In 1952 an article written by Paul Hegal appeared in The New Zealand Observer, entitled 'How Little is Known of Them, New Zealand's Chinese Do Not Lurk in Dark Alleys with Knives, They have Much to Impart to Those Who Would be Friends' (NZO, 12 November 1952).⁶²

The gist of the article is spelled out in the title, and it was essentially an introduction to Chinese customs and norms which were to make the European feel at ease. It explained the Chinese propensity for hard work as a result of a feeling of obligation; large dinettes in new Chinese houses as a product of hospitality and contemporary Chinese relationships as always governed by what has gone on in the past (a point highly pertinent to the history of associational activity in New Zealand but not the intended object of the article). The article maintained that gambling in Auckland was restricted to a small group and that there were only seventeen opium smokers (ibid.). Chinese children, it asserted, did not learn a word of English till they were five, fathers and grandfathers were the unquestioned heads of households, men shared in household tasks, firecrackers were equivalent to flowers in European society, and the colour red was good.

While these represented the more static aspects of the local Chinese community, there were three points made which were relevant to the transformation that was actually taking place in this conservative milieu. The first point related to children, who, according to the informant the journalist used, '...are becoming Westernized so fast it is difficult to keep up with them' (ibid.). Second, although a large number of the Auckland population was in fruit and vegetable shops or on the land, there was also a growing number in the professions and in many other trades. Third, the educational experience and diversity of occupation represented amongst the young people was breaking down the rigid hierarchical system of authority and the younger people, now experienced in the European world were being asked for advice by their elders. All three points represented the second innovation in the family structure of the Chinese community in twenty years, the first being the presence of increasing numbers of women and therefore complete or nearly

complete families. Now children were reaching maturity who, in the absence of early education in China, had the equivalent experience in New Zealand.

In 1958, another article, 'Growing Prestige of New Zealand Chinese' (EP, 26 May 1958), made similar observations about the role of young Chinese.⁶³ Specifically it drew attention to the ten Chinese who were in medical school in Dunedin and the others who had entered professions or who were currently in educational institutions. It stated 'Scholastically, the young Chinese have been a credit to their country of adoption' and:

Traditionally, young Chinese are noted for their eagerness to learn. This stems from the very real desire of the parents to give their children the best education possible to assist them to earn a livelihood and at the same time bring honour to their parents. The scholar has always been respected in China.

(ibid.)

Regardless of the status of a scholar, which to some extent was replicated in the New Zealand context, wealth and self-employment were more important. The article obviously portrayed and perceived young Chinese as becoming part of New Zealand and interpreted the role of the New Zealand Chinese Association not only as the 'chief' association and creator of the Chinese market gardening industry but also as one organisation which developed 'better relations between the Chinese people and New Zealanders' (ibid.). The other associations mentioned, including those based on locality, sports and the churches, were variously described as 'social centres' and 'outlets for youthful activity', but there was no mention of the KMT or the Anti-Communist League and only passing reference to immigration restrictions which, according to the article, began in 1905. The Chinese in New Zealand, according to the author, 'have long appreciated the fairness with which they have been treated in New Zealand'

and had shown it in their generous support for appeals and donations given on such occasions as the Queen's visit in 1954, when the Wellington Chinese collected £1000 for a fireworks display. Understandably, the author had not heard of the fact that the issue of the Queen's visit had caused a minor argument in the community, since some felt that the collection and the display were in fact a political statement and wanted to know who had decided this on behalf of the whole community (see NZCGMJ, 1 September and October 1953). In fact, the Consul had been approached by the Mayor of Wellington, and it had been on his initiative that the community had been organised into the collection.

The point here is that both articles in their own way were glossing the history of a Chinese community, both in its relations with New Zealand and as it was developing at the time. The Chinese community was being presented as a community without problems, without internal or external constraints, which would merely continue to exist and adapt.

In 1960 yet another article written by Walter Brookes appeared in the New Zealand Listener, 'The Changing New Zealand Chinese' this time passing as a review of Ng Bickleen Fong's book The Chinese in New Zealand, written by a New Zealand Chinese and published the previous year. While the author refused to deal with the sociological side of Ng's interpretation, he did provide a general coverage of the history, but the focus of the article again was on an adapting community. The author of the article maintained that

...we have in the last few years seen a reasonably adapted community with New Zealand ways and Oriental faces...

who are 'in fact turning into New Zealanders' since the 'prosperity and easy going ways of New Zealand are proving very seductive' but 'the young are perhaps adopting them too wholeheartedly for the approval of their elders' (NZL, 22 July 1960:4).

While there is some selection in the generalisations the author elaborates, the message is generally consistent with that of Ng's book. She argues that integration and assimilation are not only possible for the Chinese in New Zealand but desirable. As noted in Chapter 1 (see page 19), there is a sense of inferiority appended to the Chinese community in New Zealand for its paucity of Chinese culture, explained by the peasant background of the early migrants. While this might have been true for the very early years, in the fifties it is an acknowledged deficiency, as evidenced by the cultural groups that appeared to remedy the situation. There is also a sense in which both the article and Ng's book exclude the community organisations as part of Chinese 'culture' although uniquely modified to fit the overseas situation.

On the one hand, European New Zealanders had always wanted a Westernised (assimilated) Chinese minority. On the other hand, some individuals in the Chinese community itself had, in fact, started to rationalise their own ethnicity and gloss their own history in New Zealand. It was as if they had been given a new identity, as exemplified by the stereotypes presented in the articles, and that identity became their new reality. This was particularly the case with the younger Chinese socialised to a greater extent within European institutions during their formative years, who would have to confront their ethnicity only at marriage, when family could again exert its influence.

Although one can argue that there was some accuracy in this description of the Chinese, it was by no means totally true either as an explanation - that is, they were becoming Westernised - or as a fact, for as long as the structure of the Chinese community was excluded from the discussion, alternative explanations or evidence of changing social structure was not apparent.

The evidence previously noted, of continued segmentation within the community after the war, goes some way to dispel the notion that extant or emergent organisations were no more than archaic remnants of the past or innovations in a European idiom. Furthermore, the stereotypes ignored the reconstitution of Chinese family life and the effect this would gradually have on the profile of the community. It would be some years before families could actually settle down into some kind of routinised life following the periods of separation, final re-union and then the task of having to face the maintenance of economic stability in addition to the increased demands on their income for housing, education and the general cost of living.

The problems for the community, while to some extent now free from continual changes in immigration restrictions and economic insecurity, were still apparent. A diversity of groups existed, both the heritage of past factions and also the result of more recent innovations, but it was unclear how these would be able to articulate the changing needs of the community. The New Zealand Chinese Association and the Consulate had assumed the headship of the community in its various relationships with both China and New Zealand, but both these contexts had changed, giving rise to considerable uncertainty over the ability of the Association and the longevity of the current diplomatic representation. The national Association, the KMT, the Anti-Communist Union in addition to persistent locality associations represented an older cohort in the community, many of whose members had been part of the collection campaign during the war years. Their lives, if they had shared in the overseas experience for any length of time would have exposed them to the depression, the war, the cost of visits home and the possible repatriation with their families in New

Zealand plus a considerable effort in the maintenance of their overseas economic position. There were also however a growing number of younger people in the community, many of whom had come before the war under temporary permits as students or during the war years as refugees. These people were now part of a driving force in the numerous sports groups that flourished during and after the war. While some of these groups were attached to locality associations their orientation was clearly addressed to the immediate context in which the community existed rather than to the overseas relations of the community.

At least part of the organisational structure therefore seemed to represent a number of distinct interest groups that had appeared in the community. It was clear that old and young were divided with different orientations but in addition there were also divisions between those who supported sport as opposed to Chinese culture as an acceptable idiom through which to provide for community cohesion and those who felt affinity for the more traditional associations as opposed to others orientated towards the contemporary needs of the community. The latter including young people and their sports activity were often interpreted as part of a pattern of assimilation and this, to older people, meant a loss of their own community.

While this basis for divisions provided two groups of associations there was also a third alternative of organisations that seemed to bridge the above divisions as well as that between the Chinese and dominant host community. The Chinese Anglican and Baptist churches and Chinese Cultural Society and, to some extent the Chinese growers' Association, fulfilled this role. These organisations by virtue of their marginality to main associational activity and the political aspects of their own community were able to represent a segment of the community that cut across age and existing allegiances or divisions. While their marginality

made them the basis of criticism on the part of some the fact that they existed and persisted offered an example of innovation that would legitimate associational activity which would emerge later. However, in addition to the complex organisational situation there was also another trend in the community which can be summarised best as a move towards decentralisation of power and authority. The experience of the war years, the presence of increased numbers of families and the growth of smaller communities with a resident and stable population led to community-based local organisations. These catered for local needs and represented a statement of autonomy.

However, there were also other problems, particularly the concern with the results of the wave of apparent assimilation that was sweeping the community. Assimilation was a perceived prerequisite for existence in New Zealand, an opinion supported by government and its public advocates. It was this aspect alone that interested the European community, and this became, as already noted, part of the expectations of young Chinese. Educated in New Zealand, freed to some extent from the demands of their family life and keen to experience Western life, they moved further away from the commitment to the life of the community that their parents of necessity had to have. The cultural intensity, formerly present in the community due to frequent visits home, associational activity and collective action, were gone. The obligations of children to obey and parents to control and support their community were now relaxed. The parents felt less desire to control and in turn had less impetus to be attached to community activity and little opportunity to reinforce Chinese culture in their children. The result was a group of young people alien to their own community but at the age when they were old enough to take responsibility in it, and a group of elders unprepared for the future with no younger Chinese trained to

take over their position and no thought of how they could hold their community together and stem the tide of what they saw as assimilation. The position of the young people as seen from their perspective, is made clear in the conclusions written to a 1982 local community history (included below).⁶⁴ The history was put together by five young Chinese New Zealanders from the Christchurch Chinese community and while chronologically out of order indicates a clear link with the concerns of the 1950s.

Cultural Conflicts

In society today, the Chinese invariably experience some cultural conflict of one form or another as a consequence of living in a country other than their true homeland. In this chapter we would like to discuss some of these cultural conflicts which the Chinese youth of today may experience. The conflicts felt today do not necessarily apply to future generations and in all probability will not do so, but they too will need to deal with different conflicts that arise. In this discussion of the cultural attitudes and conflicts experienced by the Chinese youth, it must be appreciated that no definite conclusions can be drawn, as with all sociological studies of this kind.

One of the most visible cultural conflicts of today's society is evidenced by the difficulty the younger generation have in speaking both English as well as fluent Chinese. The majority of those born or raised in New Zealand have adopted English as their first language, which is not unnatural considering they live in a European society and undoubtedly want to do well within it. It is therefore only to be expected that one language (just as in other cultural matters) will emerge as the dominant one.

However, the youth do realise that it is advantageous to maintain as much of the Chinese language as possible. It is beneficial to them, especially in situations when talking with the elders of the Chinese community, as it can be embarrassing to be laughed at when struggling through a simple conversation.

It is obvious that if parents speak Chinese then it is fitting that their children speak Chinese, but in the majority of cases found, this does not occur. Often, the children reply, in part if not solely, in English. The reason for this may be attributed to the fact that children who have attended English speaking schools invariably tend to continue speaking the language at home. Parents have generally accepted the gradual introduction of English as the main conversational language of the younger generation, mainly because it would be unreasonable to demand otherwise.

It is difficult for the elders of the Chinese community to maintain many of their traditions and customs, and relay the importance of them to the younger members of this small Chinese community of Christchurch. What is needed to realise this is to have a large concentration of Chinese in one localised area, as in the Chinatowns of Sydney or San Francisco where such a congregation has been more successful in retaining Chinese language and culture.

The loss of many traditions can be attributed to a lack of interest and knowledge of the reasoning behind them. The children of today often practice these traditions for their parents' sakes, while themselves having scant knowledge of the causes for or aims of these acts. This will inevitably lead to a total disappearance of the customs which are currently being practiced after such parental insistence ends.

The traditions among the Chinese are basically alike, although there are differences between dialectic groups in the ways they are carried out. In the keeping of these traditions it is evident that there are distinctive roles for the males and females to fulfil. For example, the females are expected to be naturally domesticated, traditionally a much-respected trait, whereas parents place a greater importance on their sons obtaining a good education and achieving goals set by them, whether personal, business or academic goals.

In the course of fulfilling these expectations, children are expected to live at home, especially females. This is usually because the parents wish to have their offspring with them for as long as possible, generally until they get married. These strong family ties make mixed marriages unacceptable, and if this was to occur, it would result in a partial or total alienation of the children from their families and the Chinese community. Where children do finally go against their parents' wishes, their actions are generally condemned by the community, which usually results in gossip concerning the child and his/her family. The majority of the younger generation, however, realise that this more often than not affects the parents more than the children which is an undesirable outcome.

For these reasons then, parents are very much against their children mixing with the Europeans socially, and on the whole do not hesitate to emphasize this.

In conclusion, we can say that the members of the younger generation are faced with many conflicts, only some of which we have mentioned above, such as language, maintaining Chinese traditions, socialising with Europeans, mixed marriages, living at home as opposed to flatting, and the choice between entering a professional career or carrying on a private business. The conflicts mentioned so far are only some of the many, although these would be prominent conflicts which are felt. The younger generation are torn

between two varying cultures and where it is difficult to reach a compromise, they may be forced to make a choice which may lead to an estrangement with their parents and the community. In the generations to come, the conflicts they may face will not be the same as our own generation and it is hoped that the community will be able to change with the times...

(Sue et al., 1982:57-59)

The legacy of the past and continuing changes within the Chinese community led in the 1960s and 1970s to a number of developments, which reflect Chinese urban communities organising for the problems that confronted them. Basically the changes that were to occur were a compromise which retained the integrity of the associational structure but at the same time provided for the needs of growing communities. The former however, involved the sorting out of legitimate representation in the community as regards both local and national needs as well as the political overtones that were to come with changes in diplomatic representation. The changes that best exemplify the above occur in the two major Chinese urban centres and one smaller urban community. The former includes the complex developments that occurred in Auckland and Wellington which together held 64% of the total Chinese population in 1960 and 55% in 1976, and the latter example is from Christchurch where the Chinese community had increased from 516 in 1961 to 1,760 in 1976.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 9

- 1 The KMT celebrated with a separate evening meal attended by 100 people. According to reports, it commemorated the birthday of Sun Yat-sen and his role as a great leader (see EP, 13 November 1945).

- 2 The Evening Post reported in early 1946 that, since shipping had become progressively easier, many of the refugee women and children were speculating on the possibility of having to return to China. While older members of the community might want to return, the article continued, younger re-united families were happy in New Zealand, and it was thought that many of the wives would not want to leave (EP, 22 March 1946). At the time, the government was content to renew permits as it had done during the war.

- 3 A detailed description of the Wellington Anglican Mission is contained in a pamphlet written by Reverend F.C. Long, which traces events and appointments from 1900 to 1950 (see Long, circa 1950).

- 4 The Canton Missions were not under the control of the Church of Christ in China, but the Presbyterians were able to stay and work in the church until 1950, when they officially withdrew, realising they were an embarrassment to the Chinese church (see Murray, 1969:65-67).

- 5 The matter of naturalisation for Chinese had been before Cabinet six times (1912, 1921, 1923, 1935, 1937 and 1939) since the decision to decline naturalisation on 4 February 1908. In 1946, the issue was raised again when ten applications were received by Internal Affairs, and the Minister decided that policy should again be reviewed since the reasons for the ban had been partially eradicated by the Finance Act 1944 (NA, IA 116/7 24 June 1946). The significance of the poll tax provision eradicated by the 1944 Finance Act was that it legitimised unequal treatment for the Chinese.

- 6 NA, IA, 116/7, October 1946. The communities referred to in the letter were Dunedin and Christchurch, and in the latter centre the conflict was such that a court case was pending, according to the letter, but this has never been substantiated; an appeal to European authorities or to the courts to resolve internal conflicts within the Chinese community is unusual.

- 7 Matthews' quota system would select those who had some capability in English, were young, healthy and had a fair education (Matthews, 1946:6).

- 8 Matthews also recommended that New Zealand have a Minister in China, Chinese information bureaux in each of the main centres, Departments of Oriental Studies in each of the University Colleges as well as the availability of Chinese language (Matthews, 1946:7).
- 9 It has been impossible to ascertain whether or not any Chinese representatives from the community attended this meeting, although judging from informants and the lack of any meeting of the Chinese Association Executive prior to the deputation, it seems unlikely. From all accounts the Chinese were happy to allow the Presbyterian Church to speak on their behalf.
- 10 NA, L22/1/81:4. This event while it seemed 'drastic' in 1950, was in 1947 consistent with New Zealand's new status. In November 1947, New Zealand adopted the Statute of Westminster, giving New Zealand for the first time complete control over internal affairs and external policies. New Zealand was the last dominion to accept this status, and according to Fraser, Prime Minister at the time, it would end the subordination of the New Zealand parliament to that of Britain (see NZPD, 1947, 279:531-64).
- 11 There are a number of peripheral points that might be made about these provisions. First, the use of the year 1928 as a cut-off date for arrival in New Zealand seems largely to have been an attempt to ensure that the women involved were older and beyond child-bearing age, as the following illustrates:
- It will be seen that most of the wives admitted are past child bearing age and their admission should not result in an increase in Chinese births on as large a scale as that which followed 1939 concessions.

(NA, L22/1/81:5)

Second, it is curious that naturalisation should be part of the provisions, since naturalisation would not be granted to the Chinese again till 1952. Third, to a large degree the eligibility of each applicant was apparently based on a police report which was required of each applicant. The report would contain information on the 'conduct and character of each applicant, and his ability to support his family and to provide them with suitable accommodation' (NA, L22/1/81:4). A brief discussion of their procedure in the 1950 report on Chinese immigration (see reference) maintained that the police evaluated the applicant as part of a Chinese community and not on the basis of being New Zealanders, which meant that the police reports were in almost all cases favourable or, as the report adds, the applicants were all from a 'better class of Chinese' (*ibid.*).

Fourth, the stipulations concerning naturalisation were to cause major problems in the Chinese community. They were advised that they could not apply to bring their wives and children to New Zealand till such an application was made. Misunderstanding the meaning of naturalisation and making the application had led, according to the Chinese minister, to some 'unscrupulous' dealings (NA, IA 116/7, 27 September 1948:9), and inquiries

- and submissions to the Chinese Consul General. This structured a situation where Chinese were accused of doing the right thing but for the wrong reasons and forced the Consul into making a statement. The government, for its part, used the report filed by the police concerning this requirement as a means of sorting the cases where applications had been made to bring wives and children to New Zealand.
- 12 The Labour Department's response to this in 1950 was to suggest that it was a 'problem for which the Chinese themselves are greatly responsible' (NA, L22/1/81:5).
 - 13 Reverend Cheung reported that the Consul General's office had informed him that 508 Chinese had applied for passports to return to China up to 1946 (NA, IA 116/7, 27 September 1948).
 - 14 This comment on the characteristics of the male Chinese population is remarkably consistent with that expressed by Alexander Don when visiting the Chinese in the Otago gold fields in the late 1800s.
 - 15 Under these provisions the administrative responsibility fell entirely on the Minister of Internal Affairs, who alone granted or refused applications. Naturalisation was granted at the discretion of the Minister, and there was no right of appeal or review in any court, nor was any reason necessary for granting or refusing an application. (See NA, IA 116/7, 3 January 1952, enclosure 'Naturalisation Procedure').
 - 16 The exception of Wellington already having women's teams is attributable to the organisation of the Chinese Progress Club established in 1947 by three prominent Wellington families who had a large number of daughters. The Club was initially almost entirely for social gatherings to ensure that appropriate marriages were arranged for eligible daughters. Later the Club's activities turned to sport and contributed teams for the Double Tenth tournaments.
 - 17 Ibid. While not wanting to seem uncharitable towards Matthews' sentiments, I think he wrote this article in 1948 with some relief after he had taken a public and supportive stance on Chinese immigration the previous year.
 - 18 Most of these men were from Jung Sing and graduated in accountancy, mathematics or agricultural science from Auckland, Massey or Victoria. One graduate achieved distinction, getting a Ph.D. from Cambridge, and another was an agriculture graduate, chosen by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to take a shipment of sheep to China in 1946.
 - 19 The original plan was documented previously (see Chapter 8, pp. 411-412).
 - 20 The Yu Kiew shareholders from mainland China remain unknown, since it has been assumed that the list from which this information comes covers only the overseas Chinese.

- 21 In 1951 there were 58 Chinese females to every 100 males (Census, Vol. 7, 1966:4).
- 22 Remittances had almost doubled in amount since the early 1900s, when it had averaged £20 to £40 a year per person.
- 23 There was a provision already available whereby Chinese men born in New Zealand with wives overseas could bring them to New Zealand at any time provided the application fell within the annual quota of ten. This provision was introduced in 1935, but according to the 1950 Department of Labour report on Chinese immigration, it had never been fully utilised (NA, L22/1/81:13).
- 24 The rationale for the Department of Immigration using the journal to disseminate this information had, as already noted, to do with the status and distribution of the journal, but also with the notion that 'clan' and 'reputable Chinese agents' would not handle cases where illegitimate claims were being made. It is significant that the Department concerned now accepted the legitimacy of the Chinese community's knowledge and authority over that of, at least in some cases, European solicitors (L22/1/115, Memorandum, 1 February 1954).
- 25 The one exception to this came in 1951, when the then Minister of Agriculture, K.J. Holyoake, was quoted at length in the growers' Journal. The text was actually a message to the Chinese growers in which he praised them for their increased production (in 1951 one third of the area under production was worked by Chinese) in the face of labour shortages and increasing costs. He suggested that both problems might be met efficiently with increased mechanisation and that the Chinese should also make considerable use of scientific advice provided by the Department of Agriculture. The issue that emerged from this later (1953) was the fact that the scientific information was all provided in English.
- 26 In 1945 the national Association was dissolved as an incorporated society, much to the annoyance of people from other centres who requested immediate access to a balance sheet. One such request received a balance sheet from 1938 - the last entered into the file as an Incorporated Society (Records of Incorporated Societies, Justice Department, N.Z. Chinese Association file). The dissolution of the Association was declared invalid, however, two years later. The collection officially began in 1936 with the contribution of £100 each from seven members of the executive from Wellington and Dunedin.
- 27 In 1950 delegates came from nineteen areas including Auckland and Pukekohe (6), Hamilton (2), Gisborne (2), Ohakune (2), Hawkes Bay (2), Manawatu (2), New Plymouth-Hawera (1), Wanganui (1), Foxton (1), Levin (1), Otaki (2), Wairarapa (2), Oamaru (2), Otago (2), Lower Hutt (1), Nelson (1), Christchurch (2), Timaru (1) and Ashburton (1). By the Ninth Annual meeting, however, the number of areas had been reduced to the first fourteen districts (see above and also Appendix XXXIV for the major areas with district of origin and nearest auctions for respective areas).

- 28 On visits to growing areas, they not only discussed growers' problems but also anything that was of concern to the local community. The presence of a consular official was important in this regard.
- 29 Negotiations over wages reached a decision that wages should be increased from 2/6 to 3/6 per hour and that cauliflower cutting on Sunday would be paid at ordinary rates. The agricultural-worker problem has already been discussed (see pp.455-56).
- 30 The shortage of blood and bone was resolved by rationing the 8,000 tons to be imported in 1950-51 to each growing area.
- 31 The annual government allowance to the Chinese grower's Association amounted to 20% of the total registration fee collected from all growers. In 1950 the Chinese growers assessed their share at £472.12.7, but were willing to accept £350.
- 32 The commission charged by the Wellington Auctions on vegetable containers had been removed in 1945 as a gesture of good will, but had been re-instituted after the war. The Price Control Commission ruled that, contrary to the Chinese and European grower's view, the auctions had a perfect right to do this (NZCGMJ, 1 November 1949).
- 33 The Journal notified local Chinese that Chinese leaving for overseas destinations could obtain passports at the Chinese mission in Macau (NZCGMJ, 1 March 1950) and that visas for Hong Kong were available from the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Wellington rather than the Department of Internal Affairs (ibid., 1 July 1950).
- 34 For instance, growers were informed that all produce in a container should be of the same size and quality throughout and that all gardens except those growing onions, sweet potato, potato and taro must register with the Ministry of Agriculture every October and those with onions every February (NZCGMJ, 1 February 1950). Also, growers were notified that the Minister of Trade and Industry announced that potatoes would no longer be subjected to price control (ibid., 1 March 1950), and furthermore, that the government would no longer buy the main crop each year (ibid., 1 May 1950).
- 35 Informants have stated that schools began in these particular areas because diversity of county of origin was minimal, providing no problems in communication or collective support for the enterprise.
- 36 The reference to this was contained in the 1950 report on Chinese immigration, but the report itself does not say whether it was implemented. The rationale was to stop any means of regenerating Chinese culture in the overseas context among younger Chinese (NA, L22/1/81:7). Informants maintained that the provision was withdrawn at least temporarily but was later re-instituted.

- 37 An article in the Evening Star in 1949 publicised the existence of the Dunedin School, complete with a picture. The article stated that most of the children were from primary school and attended Chinese classes each day after school until they entered high school, when they found the work load too much (Evening Star, 8 October 1949).
- 38 According to the Press article, the £1,500 was equivalent to 25,000 catties of rice or HK\$22,500 (see Press, 28 November 1951).
- 39 While the growers' Journal contains information on events in Kwangtung, there was no news of persecution, although it did report anti-communist feeling in Canton as increased taxes were levied on commercial circles and the fact that people in Toy San (Seyip) were instructed to hand in lists of relatives living in Hong Kong (NZCGMJ, 1 May 1952).
- 40 Another concern which might have stimulated such a movement, although unsubstantiated, could have been the establishment of the New Zealand China Friendship Society in Auckland in 1952. Although the national organisation was not formerly organised until 1958, when Auckland, Napier, Christchurch and Wellington branches united, it was nevertheless in operation. In 1956 it sent a delegation to visit China and in 1956 organised a tour for a Chinese Opera group in New Zealand. A Christchurch society was started in March 1956, but it did not become a branch until 1958, when the NZCS was established (personal communication from W.E. Willmott).
- 41 Wang Feng, the Consul General, took a position in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Taiwan (NA, PM 61/6/1, 18 June 1953).
- 42 Tien was forty-eight years old, from Hubei Province, a graduate of Peking Economics and Commerce Institute who had also studied in London (NZCGMJ, 1 November 1953). In London he had become first secretary to the Consul, later to be appointed to the Department of External Affairs in Taiwan (1941) and first secretary to the Consul in Portugal in 1947. He had four children, all studying in America, and came to New Zealand with his wife (ibid.).
- 43 Tien was welcomed on his arrival by the two ministers from the Chinese Anglican Mission, the chairman of the Chinese Association and the departing Consul General. Later he was welcomed at the Seyip Association hall and following this gave his own reception, which included the Minister of External Affairs, other Members of Parliament, and representatives of the New Zealand Chinese Growers Association, Poon Fa Association, KMT, Jung Sing Association, and both churches (NZCGMJ, 1 November 1953). In regard to education in Taiwan, the community was later informed that a test would be required and also evidence of residence overseas for seven years or more (NZCGMJ, 30 June 1957); this latter requirement presumably excluded those who had contact with the PRC after 1950.

- 44 The Department of Labour and Employment obtained a copy of the circular in Chinese and had it translated before sending it on to the Consul General for verification. He rejected the translation and submitted this text.
- 45 The concern for the situation of Chinese women in New Zealand had also arisen because a number of Chinese girls who signed themselves as 'Chinese New Zealanders' had written to the Customs Department complaining that young Chinese 'boys' were going to China to marry and then were allowed to bring their wives to New Zealand, although they were not, the letter claimed, born in New Zealand (L22/1/115, 21 August 1953). The letter was duly passed to the Department of Labour and Employment.
- 46 The ten missing cases have no income data and include six students and four market gardeners.
- 47 The New Zealand Chinese Grower's Monthly Journal carried a slightly different report of the results. It stated that domiciled Chinese were now entitled to bring their wives to New Zealand but added that Internal Affairs was willing to grant naturalisation papers at the same time as the application was approved. It also added that Chinese growers had approached the government through the Consul General to be allowed to bring their future wives to New Zealand with the payment of a bond of £200 which would be deposited with the government and refunded after the marriage, but the government refused to accept this (NZCGMJ, 1 October 1954). In December 1955 the Department of Labour required a deposit of £150 before Chinese males departed overseas to go through the marriage ceremony (L22/1/115, 2 December 1955).
- 48 Classes were organised in some cases by the Principals of Technical Colleges or, where there were none, by the headmasters of district high schools or local primary schools. Both the Te Aro school and the Technical College in Wellington were offering such classes in 1953, using the rooms of the Chinese sports club (NA, IA 116/7, 17 July 1953).
- 49 Shum's survey in 1956 confirms that market gardening is indeed more hazardous than one would expect. Although Chinese market gardeners are usually fit, he described them as often weary, sunburned people who suffer from severe colds and influenza, chronic bronchitis amongst older gardeners and who are constantly faced with knife wounds, scalds, accidental falls, muscular strains and foreign bodies in eyes and hands. The cuts, falls, strains and foreign-body injuries invariably result from poor lighting and cold hands due to the hours of work (Shum, 1956: 18). In the period of a year Shum recorded the fact that thirty workers suffered 114 physical injuries which resulted in 145 days off work (*ibid.*:20). Shum also maintains that part of the problem has to do with their neglectful attitude towards treatment and prevention. There is a feeling Shum maintains, that entry into hospital is an indication of the extreme gravity of an illness, so when one does go it is bad and things will probably get worse (*ibid.*:110). This has been confirmed by informants, who also maintain one goes to hospital only to die.

- 50 The money came originally from a levy of £3 per market garden that the Dominion Council was authorised to collect in order to cover expenses of the organisation. According to the Journal of the Chinese growers the Dominion Council reduced the amount to £200 in 1953 and then to £100 in 1954. The Chinese organisation then approached the Minister of Agriculture to ask for an increase to £350 to which the Dominion Council acceded in 1954 (NZCGMJ, 1 November 1953 and 1 February 1954).
- 51 In 1955 the Presbyterian Committee on International Relations considered the situation of Chinese immigration, particularly the case of wives and families, having temporary residence converted to permanent residence (especially Chinese pastors), and the speeding up of the naturalisation process. The submission noted that only twenty-three applications for naturalisation had been approved since the right was re-introduced in 1951, which made the 1954 provisions seem empty. The response from the Minister of Immigration merely reiterated policy but did add the point that children over sixteen of permanent residents would be admitted to New Zealand for two years on a temporary permit, which could be converted to a permanent status subject to their 'good behaviour and satisfactory reports' (L22/1/115, no date, 1955). The issue of naturalisation was a matter for the Minister of Internal Affairs, according to the Minister of Immigration.
- 52 In 1954 the Auckland sports tournament hosted 700 participants, but the film evening drew a crowd of 1,500 people together (NZCGMJ, 1 November 1954).
- 53 All passages from Sports Tournament booklets are translated from the Chinese.
- 54 Reverend Cheung's job was to translate American and British news for the paper.
- 55 This school continued even after Reverend Cheung departed, and in 1955 it had expanded its curriculum to include reading, writing, speaking of Chinese and Chinese history. It was organised into three terms per year at £5.0.0 per person per term (NZCGMJ, 1 March 1955).
- 56 The Williams Trust was established by Archbishop Samuel Williams, founder of Te Atutu College, to commemorate his father and uncle, who were both pioneer missionaries (see EP, 19 July 1956).
- 57 One novel form of collecting money was suggested by the Anglican Chinese Missioner, who had requested members of the church that in the case of a death the money intended for flowers should be donated to the church instead, resulting in donations of £116 on one occasion and £300 on another (see EP, 15 July 1955).

58 Both halls were estimated to cost about £12,000 before completion. In 1954, the Baptists had bought a section for £2,600 and the Anglicans already had land provided by a loan from the Anglican Synod for the missionary's house. The Baptist Church had received £1,000 from the Baptist Church in New Zealand and £3,000 in donations, £1,000 of which came from one person (see EP, 26 October 1954 and NZCGMJ, 1 July 1954).

59 In 1955 Yue Jackson (Yue En Ho), who had retired from his post as Consul General in 1948, died. The Consul General at the time, Tien Fang Cheng, stated:

I speak for the Chinese of this country when I say that he will be sadly missed as a good and faithful friend, a wise counsellor, and a generous benefactor of good causes.

(EP, 18 November 1955)

60 There had been a decline in the activities of the club for some years prior to this event, explained by 'disunity and contradiction that divided our members' and the added fact that the Health Department had condemned the club room (Report on Kwong Chew Club 1967:2). Unfortunately, although considerable effort was coordinated to build a new building, the report maintains that the:

club leadership did not seize the opportunity to rally all the people around it for the well-being of the New Zealand Chinese. Before long disappointment bred negative attitudes among the members. The development of the Club was once again bogged down.

(ibid.)

61 This was originally the Tai Tung (Universal Brotherhood) music group that had started before the war as a small social group and then expanded during the war to become a substantial company of 30 people which performed to raise money for charity in New Zealand as well as for the war effort in China. After the war members dispersed, and it was not until 1954 that some of the original members got together again to perform Cantonese opera. They were involved later in fund-raising for the Auckland Chinese Hall.

62 Curiously, the article also had a picture which showed a South Korean family watching the U.S. Air Force doing practice paratroop drops in South Korea.

63 This article was translated and reprinted in its entirety in the New Zealand Chinese Grower's Monthly Journal, 30 June 1958, without comment.

64 The following paragraphs formed the conclusion of their study of the local community through documentary research and interviews in the summer of 1982 under the Department of Labour's then available Student Community Service Programme Scheme.

CHAPTER 10

HISTORIC CONFLICTS AND CONTEMPORARYORGANISATIONS: 1960-1976

The last period in this study covers the years from 1960 to 1976 when the Chinese population in New Zealand increased from 6,731 in 1956 to 14,860 in 1976. As noted in the conclusions to the last chapter the population, due to a changing occupational structure, had become increasingly urban. The immigration provisions which had reunited families, in addition to a generally improving socio-economic context in post-war New Zealand, led to a stable, developing and at least administratively acceptable Chinese minority.

By the 1960s naturalisation as well as welfare provisions were available to the Chinese and the presence of families with a substantial population under twenty-one years of age (see Appendix XXXV) meant that residence pattern became sedentary. For all the stability and acceptance that were apparent however, unresolved and newly emerging issues created the necessity and context for change in the community. The impetus for some of these changes have already been alluded to in the last chapter including the dilemmas presented by the threat of assimilation submerging the identity of the community and its youth as well as unresolved arguments that had their origin during the war-time collection. Essentially these issues had led to an increasing tendency towards a proliferation of organisations which intended to provide for the specific needs of the community and a desire on the part of local Chinese communities to seek autonomy from any national control.

The proliferation of organisations was not a unique response for it had occurred previously whenever unresolved conflict and unmet needs coincided but after the war the associational response included not only the original organisations in the community but additional ones which stood in a unique relationship to their own community. The Chinese growers' organisation, the Chinese churches and to an extent the Chinese Cultural Society were all marginal to the Chinese community yet providing for specific needs within this community. The period after 1960 therefore saw a complex organisational structure including the above organisations, the ubiquitous sports groups, the locality associations, the national organisation as well as the KMT and the Anti-Communist League all in a position to organise segments of the community, but none capable of wielding sufficient influence to produce national unity.

Issues resulting from the activities of the war-time collection, its leadership and the national organisation were sufficient to give prominence to local over national issues, a desire for a new leadership instead of the old and a concern to avoid becoming susceptible to political labels; while at the same time encouraging the cultural integrity of future generations. The successful resolution of these issues and conflicts, while preserving the integrity of the organisational structures within the community at national and local levels is the subject of this chapter.

The situation in Auckland had developed over a long period of time and, as already suggested, had given rise to factions and to uncertainty as to how the future would be handled (see Chapter 9, page 457). In 1948 an Auckland Sports Club had been started, co-existing, as far as has been ascertained, with the Kwong Chew Club and the KMT-dominated branch of the Chinese Association. There had been suggestions

to buy or build a community hall, but arguments over funding led to postponement until it was clear that some of the money collected and returned to Auckland had in fact been sent to Taiwan. There was certain indignation about this but also concern for changes that were taking place in the community which apparently were not being confronted. Specifically, the concern focused on the absence of cultural activities, loss of contact with China, and the lack of Chinese education for the young.¹

Two groups existed in the Auckland community already in 1950 who were going some way to remedying the cultural deficiencies. Prior to the war the Tai Tung (Chinese Music Club) as noted in the previous chapter, had been started and was important in helping with the national endeavour to support China and while it had dispersed after the war, it had started again in 1954.

The second group was a Film Club set up in 1954 which was established because:

...the overseas Chinese in New Zealand are very scattered and thus very difficult to unite. Some far-sighted Chinese had the idea of setting up an Association which would not only provide a place for recreation, unity and welfare of our friends but also for spreading Chinese culture.

(Auckland Chinese Hall, 1961:52-53)²

and

...we felt that overseas Chinese had little opportunity to be exposed to their motherland's culture except through the sermons of some churches given in Chinese and the Chinese growers' Journal which reported agricultural news.

(ibid.)

It was decided that film was the best medium to fulfil their aims, since education would be contained within entertainment. In brief:

The Film Club has a double meaning: 1) to help the establishment of an Association and subsidize the expenses that will be incurred from such an Association, 2) to provide good entertainment for our friends and also guide the children familiarizing them with their own motherland's culture.

(ibid.)

The Film Club organised itself formally with a constitution and newsletter and set about showing films to the community every week. Eventually the Club issued shares and had share capital of £4,075, with 89% of the local Chinese community investing in the Club (ACH, 1961:52-53).

In 1950 a further development took place when it was decided to start the Auckland Chinese Hall (hui sor).³ The report quoted above, written in 1961, described the events in the following way:

The increasing number of Chinese in New Zealand has thus stimulated the idea of setting up an association. Though there is a Branch of the New Zealand Chinese Association here to co-ordinate local Chinese, there has been no permanent place for meetings or large gatherings. This is due to the lack of an Association. The branch committee members and some people who are concerned with Chinese welfare here have for a long time been contemplating the setting up of such an association, but the idea was hampered by objective circumstances.

In the winter of 1959, the State Theatre that had been used by the Film Club for showing films was put up for sale, for £30,000. It was estimated that the re-building expenses would cost another £7,00-£8,000. The State Theatre, it was thought, would be an ideal facility, since it was close to transportation and could accommodate a large audience.

The Committee members thus immediately discussed the issue and initiated the campaign for buying the theatre. The first meeting of all local Chinese was held at the Chee Kung T'ang, which was at the time used by the New Zealand Chinese Association Branch as a temporary office. There were many Chinese in attendance. A chairman was elected, and several members of the committee explained the idea for the purchase of the theatre. The idea was unanimously supported, and the name Auckland Chinese Hui Sor was adopted.⁴ The name is suitable because it acknowledges the priorities of welfare and unity for the local Chinese and frees it from manipulation by any other association's politics. Every person of Chinese origin has the right to join.

(ACH, 1961:52-53)

The reception to the announcement of the plan was encouraging, a committee of thirty-one members was set up, and the purchasing committee started raising money. Initially substantial amounts came in from individual donations, which received specific acknowledgement for the husband's and wife's contribution. They also had £8,000 on hand from previous fund-raising affairs and the Film Club, but this was still short of the £30,000 needed for purchase and the £10,000 needed for renovation.⁵ The shortfall was met with three schemes which firmly tied the Hui Sor to the Chinese community. The first scheme was to act as an investment organisation whereby Chinese individuals would loan so much to the organisation and receive interest at bank rates. The second was an appeal to the Branch of the New Zealand Chinese Association for a loan of £5,000, which was seen as equivalent to the amount originally belonging to the community from the war collection. The third was to organise a "Debt Maintenance Committee" which would collect £2 a week from fifty members over a period of three years which would be considered as a loan until such time as the debt could be paid back out of revenue (see ACH, 1961:24-25).

The hall was purchased but not without all three schemes being put into operation and particularly the last, which meant that a small number in the community actually contributed a considerable amount to the maintenance.⁶ After it was purchased it was renovated, complete with kitchen and dining facilities and a stage, but no sports facilities. In the first year of its operation, the Hall was able, through generous donations, rent from three shops on the premises, the hiring of the hall to a 'Western' dance company and the Film Club, membership fees and borrowed money, to pay off over £36,000 of the debt, leaving just under £4,000 to be paid.

The community had a hall, which served as a social gathering place for the next nine years, but it was not able to provide for a school until 1968, for only then did the financial situation allow for this development. Furthermore, it had not provided any facilities for its young people, a point that was to have repercussions in 1969.

The Chinese growers' organisation meanwhile faced considerable pressure, not only for amalgamation with the Federation of Growers dominated by Europeans, but also later from declining cooperation within its own ranks.

In 1954 the Federation tried to withdraw the subsidy from the Chinese growers, which amounted to £350 a year. This money was collected annually as a registration fee from all commercial growers in New Zealand by the Department of Agriculture and redistributed to the two organisations. While the Federation relented in 1954 and paid the money to the Chinese, by 1957 this practice had been officially discontinued, although the registration fee was still paid out, by this time directly to the Federation rather than the Department of Agriculture. Growers were informed that in 1956 they would be levied £3.0.0 per market garden, which provided £8,400 from a total of 2,800 growers of which the 523 Chinese growers had contributed £1,569 while receiving little tangible benefit (see NZCGMJ, 1 January and 1 June 1955). The Chinese growers sent their objections to the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Holyoake, who told them that as far as the government was concerned there was only one growers' organisation and if there was any dispute it had to be settled by negotiation between Chinese and European growers' organisations (see NZCGMJ, 31 May and 30 June 1957).

The loss of government recognition and the withdrawal of the subsidy left the Chinese commercial growers no other choice but to take the offer of sending two representatives⁷ to the Federation's annual

meeting (non-voting positions) and increasing their levy to cope with the financial deficit.⁸ The consequence of the former was an increasing impatience with the constrained position they found themselves in, attached to the Federation, and of the latter, an increasingly difficult financial situation as regards the funding of their own annual meetings and the maintenance of the Journal which had since 1952 converted to a type-set copy after type had been purchased in 1952 by donations from each area (NZCGMJ, 1 October 1952). Aside from these problems, there were other issues⁹ which complicated the situation, summarised in an article by a Palmerston North grower in 1958.

In the article the writer maintained that the Chinese growers neither knew much nor cared much about their own organisation because they felt it had failed in negotiations to get their share of the levy and failed to protect the interests of the Chinese growers, both of which had led, with the presence of Federation branches in different areas, to Chinese supporting this organisation instead of their own. He argued that it was not the fault of the Chinese growers' organisation that they had lost the levy, because they were given only twenty-four hours notice before appearing before the government sub-committee which acted on the question; since the President of the Chinese organisation and their own sub-committee were in Auckland at the time, they could not make it (NZCGMJ, 31 December 1958). Besides, according to the writer 'the government was adamant that there be only one Commercial Growers' Association' (ibid.). As for the work done for Chinese growers by the New Zealand Vegetable and Produce Growers Federation, the author argued that 'any changes brought about in the past to benefit the Chinese or all growers were the product of a combined effort, and therefore the English growers were not right in their boasting' (ibid.). If Chinese growers thought they could rely on this organisation to represent them

in future, then they should go to the annual meeting, where they would realise that the issues of the Chinese growers were never discussed (NZCGMJ, 31 January 1959).

The Chinese commercial growers acknowledged that they now had little bargaining power, although an argument emerged from some information given by the auctioneering firms to the Chinese that they supplied 75% of the fresh vegetables to the auction system (NZCGMJ, 31 January 1959). This percentage was to be used for many years, but it was never proved or researched either by the Chinese, the Federation or the Department of Agriculture, so it could never be used as a strong argument for re-instituting the subsidy system for Chinese growers.

In 1960 the Federation attempted to raise the levy, and again the Chinese objected but received little support. Instead there was an attack on their Journal by the Minister of Agriculture, who said it contained too much political news and that if it was not deleted in future the publication would be stopped (NZCGMJ, 30 June 1960).¹⁰ Although the newly arrived Consul General¹¹ went to the 1960 annual general meeting of the Chinese growers, never, either in 1960 or before, did the organisation receive help from the Consulate, although, as noted before, the Journal was used to distribute information that emanated from that office.

At the same time that political news in the Journal became an issue, there was rumour of New Zealand recognising the PRC, which caused an immediate division amongst Chinese. The growers' Journal maintained that it would destroy the favourable relations New Zealand had with the Taiwan government and force an end to the fight against communism (NZCGMJ, 29 February 1960). Taiwan at the time portrayed itself as a bastion of opposition that would one day take over the

mainland again, a point constantly made by each successive Consul General from Taiwan. Responses to the initial article in the Evening Post that started the debate were divided, even from the Chinese, some of whom argued that the conditions in China and the evidence of refugees in Hong Kong would surely stop recognition, while others maintained that recognition of a government was not necessarily recognition of a system (see EP, 10, 12, 13 and 20 February 1960). One letter from a Chinese suggested that people should read Rewi Alley's article on China, since he had been there for thirty years (EP, 20 February 1960). Rewi Alley was in Wellington at the time and had given a talk on China indicating the positive developments during the time he had lived there, but more importantly, he gave a talk to the Chinese Cultural Society. This organisation had been started in 1951 by a group of young Chinese in Auckland, and by 1960 it had members in all the major centres.¹² They brought in films from China, the first being 'The White Haired Girl', and they sold Chinese literature including the Peking Review. Eventually in 1953-54 they held a 1st October celebration.¹³ In 1960, Rewi Alley's address was summarised in the growers' Journal, which noted that he had started to speak in Mandarin but none of the local Chinese understood, so he had to speak in English (NZCGMJ, 31 March 1960). The Consul General, soon to be promoted to an Ambassador and his office to an Embassy a month later, wrote a letter published in the growers' Journal maintaining that Alley was spreading propaganda for the PRC. He argued that in the past foreigners in China who served the people had been missionaries who 'dared' to teach Christianity, but Alley was there 'to teach Karl Marx and Lenin whose philosophy was to destroy freedom' (NZCGMJ, 30 April 1960). Alley's motives, in the opinion of the Consul General, were the opposite of the missionaries, and although China was not a Christian country, their values of respect for virtue and

tradition were similar (NZCGMJ, 30 April 1960). The Consul General also attended the 1960 annual general meeting of the New Zealand Chinese Association and spoke strongly against the recognition of the PRC (NZCGMJ, 30 August 1960). The following month he held an evening gathering for 200 Chinese youth in Wellington at the Chinese Anglican church, and in October he gave a special Double Tenth reception attended by government officials and the Prime Minister (NZCGMJ, 30 October 1960). The Double Tenth celebrations in 1960 seemed unusually large, with 500 people attending in Christchurch, 300 people in Wellington, 1,300 in Auckland. Picnics were also held in Dunedin, Oamaru, Hawkes Bay and Hamilton. Although not a contention which is unanimously supported amongst informants, it appeared that Taiwan was increasing its attention to the overseas Chinese. In 1959 there had been a visit from the Economic Council of the Taiwan government, and in 1960 the Consul General had encouraged New Zealand Chinese to invest in Taiwan with no tax on their investment for the first five years and only 18% on the return after that (NZCGMJ, 31 December 1960).

As for the new editorial policy of the growers' Journal, now devoid of political news, it became more directed towards the local community, taking a much more apolitical stance while attempting to emphasise cultural aspects and examine the organisational behaviour of local Chinese with balanced scepticism.

The comments on local Chinese were largely directed towards the status system as it operated through the associations. The editor noted with considerable circumlocution that some local Chinese talked when they knew little, and became leaders of associations with little ability. He maintained that the old seemed to have little to do other than read comics, work and go to the T.A.B.¹⁴ and that, surely, there was more to life than this (NZCGMJ, 1 May 1962). The young had become

Westernised and others continually saw private needs as more important than the public good, using associations for personal motives and monetary gain (NZCGMJ, 1 March 1963). He argued moreover, that members of the Chinese community had no loyalty: they only did what suited themselves (see NZCGMJ, 1 April 1963 and 1 July 1965).¹⁵ Organisations, he suggested, should have a common purpose with operations known to all, and those involved should be able to separate personal ambitions from things that are done for the community (NZCGMJ, 1 June 1963). Taken in isolation, this comment seems unnecessarily harsh, but in the context of the post-war community, there was an inflexibility about the community and competitiveness between individuals and associations.

From the perspective of an historic view, the community appeared to be gradually succumbing to the pressures that confronted it. On the one hand, the concern for the young had led to attempts to rebuild Chinese culture and social groups in the New Zealand idiom as well as allowing the young people to organise their own activities. The organisations which promoted cultural and educational activity, however, remained firmly in the hands of a group that had been in control ever since the war years and seemed reluctant to step aside. On another front, the desires of European New Zealanders regarding the ethnicity of its minorities was ever present. Furthermore, the probability that the Chinese would have to adapt yet again if New Zealand changed its diplomatic stance in regard to the China it wanted to recognise not only divided the community but also provided an uneasy situation for diplomatic staff and the allegiance of the Chinese community.¹⁶

The period since the war had developed as one full of anti-PRC speeches that punctuated every public or private occasion, and the continued pressure for allegiance to Taiwan kept the KMT alive, other

associations contributing whenever they were requested. For instance, the Tung Jung Association and the New Zealand Chinese Association both collected money to send to Taiwan for flood relief in late 1959 (see NZCGMJ, 30 November and 31 March 1960). However, the unanimous support became more guarded by 1962, and even the Ambassador's consistently vehement opposition to the PRC was deleted from his New Year's article for the growers' Journal (NZCGMJ, 1 December 1962).

The editor's concerns were also supplemented with a reiteration of the history of the Growers' Association and its achievements, which was intended not only to maintain interest in its existence but also to avoid interpersonal disagreements that might cause neglect of the more important issues for which the Association and Journal were responsible.¹⁷

In September 1965 a set of events unfolded which epitomised the concerns and fears of the Growers' Journal editor. At a special meeting of the New Zealand Chinese Association, a disagreement developed over the number of representatives to be appointed to the executive. Each year the Association met prior to the AGM to select delegates for the national meeting, but invariably Wellington and Auckland disagreed. In this particular case, the numbers for and against in the argument meant that no decision was made. One of the leaders of the national Association was not re-elected, and he maintained that the whole procedure was invalid (see NZCGMJ, 1 September 1965). Finally, there was an agreement that there be seventeen representatives, many of whom would be in Wellington to represent the Chinese Association, and the formerly excluded leader scraped in as a representative. It was also, decided, however, to investigate the properties of the Association,

since there had been allegations that some were using the deed of the Association headquarters as security for personal financial transactions. In the following issue, the editor of the growers' Journal reiterated some of his previous points, especially emphasising the inappropriate use of public property (the Association which belonged to the whole community) for private purposes (NZCGMJ, 1 October 1965).¹⁸

By October a meeting had been held by the committees of the Association, and two men tendered their resignations. The accounts of the Association were handed over to an accountant to be done every month in the future, but the previous accounts were held by one of the resigning men, whose wife had previously done the accounts (NZCGMJ, 1 October 1965). In November the Association asked the growers' Journal to publish the minutes of their meeting, which included a decision to hand over the investigation of the title deed to a solicitor (ibid., 1 November 1965). By December there was still no sign of the deed, and the Association put a notice in the press stating that the Association was not responsible for any debts owed or money raised through the use of the deed as security (NZCGMJ, 1 January 1966).

In January the Journal contained an article which gave an outline of associational history. It was an interesting exercise that had never appeared anywhere before, but its main purpose seems to have been to alert people to the conflict that periodically emerged in the community due to the activity of associations and their conflict with each other. Firstly, it noted the demise of the first Chung Wah Wui Koon, of which the article said the following:

On the surface they thought they were doing good things, but they were actually destroying the unity of the community.

(NZCGMJ, 1 December 1965)

It then went on to talk of the New Zealand Chinese Association during the war, which, according to the article, had charged a fee for the handling of remittances, a task which it had been assigned by the New Zealand government. Some did not like having to join the Association so they could remit money, but the only alternative was to go to a solicitor and pay £5, but he in turn would have to go through the Association.

The next installment of the history went back to the founding of the KMT and the 'political fight' that eventually developed between the Chee Kung Tang and KMT, culminating in a dispute over the flag to be flown at the Double Tenth celebrations. This again, according to the author, brought about the downfall of the Chung Wah Wui Koon and led to the organising of the locality associations including the Tung Jung, Poon Fa and finally the Seyip Associations. The history ended at that point without explanation, but it had already clearly pointed out the vulnerability of associations when any problems arose.

At the 1966 annual meeting of the New Zealand Chinese Association, unity prevailed, and it was decided to offer a £25 scholarship to the Chinese student who got the highest marks in School Certificate examinations for each year; students who had taken them in 1965 were asked to forward their marks for comparison (NZCGMJ, 1 June 1966).¹⁹ The Association also wanted to increase the size of the hall, carry out a census on the New Zealand Chinese, re-structure its branches and write a history of the New Zealand Chinese (ibid., 1 June 1966). The new deed was now lodged with a solicitor, and in future the signatures of half the executive committee plus the seal of the Association would be required before one could get the deed. It was also decided that the Association should go to the government to ask for an increase in the allowance for food imported from mainland China (ibid.). In the

following months the growers' Journal carried news of the New Zealand Chinese Association, the Tung Jung Association, the Poon Fa Association, and their own association, which by May was thinking about investing in their own piece of property, but there was no capital available (ibid., May 1966).

By 1965 the Poon Fa Association had moved from the business premises of one of its members to an hotel owned by Poon Yu people as a joint investment. The Seyip Association had a hall, as did the Tung Jung Association, which made the unprecedented move of allowing women to join and participate in the affairs of the association (see NZCGMJ, 1 October 1966).

In 1966 the Chinese Anglican Church embarked on a further fund-raising campaign to extend the facilities already available and provide a chapel, missionary's house and more area for church and youth activities (see EP, 12 August 1961).²⁰ Although the plans had been drawn up in 1961, and an elaborate two-day bazaar held in Wellington, opened by the leader of the Labour Party then in opposition, had proved successful (see EP, 2, 5, 11 September 1961),²¹ they were still £2,700 short of their required amount (EP, 10 August 1963). In 1967 shortages were still apparent, but the extent of the scheme had by then expanded into a five-storey complex of 36,000 square feet to be built adjacent to the existing humble hall (see EP, 12 July 1967). This was primarily described as a youth hostel for Chinese students who had come to Wellington to study, but it was also to have a film room and library plus full facilities for weddings and social functions. According to the minister, the emphasis on the youth hostel stemmed from the problems Chinese youth were experiencing in finding accommodation in Wellington (EP, 12 July 1967). While the plans received considerable support, with

£3,000²² from the September bazaar (EP, 4 October 1967) there were some who felt that the youth activities of the church were merely providing a marriage-introduction service. It was estimated at the twentieth anniversary of the Youth Club in 1967 that over 20% of its former members had found their future spouses at the meetings of the Club. While the criticism was debatable, the social fact that this otherwise occurred was very apparent, but it was not only the Chinese Anglican Church who could be accused of providing a place to meet future spouses. In fact, the Double Tenth Sports Tournament and the social activities of other associations also provided a socially acceptable context for meetings and the exchange of information about available and eligible marriage partners, as did the elaborate weddings that became a feature of the Chinese community in this period. The weddings were particularly important, for they often included anywhere from 200 to 700 guests from all parts of the country, becoming mini-conferences for social and economic planning in the community.²³

While the Chinese Anglican Church was planning its future, other groups in the community also began to suggest similar programmes. As it turned out, the Seyip Association wanted to build a hall, as did the Eastern Sports Club, who had already approached the Wellington City Council for land. The situation inadvertently now gave rise to competition for the legitimate right to provide a facility. The question remained as to where people's loyalties would lie and what kind of hall should be provided.

Before any of this was determined, however, the rural segment of the Chinese community, specifically the market gardeners, found themselves under attack. This story is part of the folklore of the community, and although verified by many informants, the details remain blurred. In 1966-67 a market gardener from one of the North Island growing districts went to the bank with a considerable sum of cash to

take it out of the country. The bank, somewhat astounded over the amount (£2,000 is the figure most of the informants quoted) coming from a mere market gardener questioned the source and inquired about the particular person from the Internal Revenue Department, whereupon it was discovered that the amount he had did not coincide with the declared income of his tax return. Receipts were apparently checked at the auction where he had taken his vegetables, and these confirmed a more substantial income than that declared. The outcome was a full-scale investigation into the tax returns of growers, and the subsequent publication of the name of all offenders and their fines. The fines were considerable, ranging in the Wellington area from £200 to £2,500 and the list even from this area was extensive (see EP, 23 June 1967). The extent of the deviance was such that little was made of the event either in the Chinese community, or for that matter, outside, where the press for once seemed to have remained neutral.

As for the Chinese community, it was a question of paying up without complaint, for it had always been known that it could happen at any time. Even the children of parents who were fined found some consolation in comparing notes rather than feeling total shame, but there was some speculation that it did not help the relationship between urban and rural Chinese. Rural students who were attending university at the time, have commented on the attitude of urban Chinese to their presence and the fact that they were often shunned.²⁴ The government took no action other than to subject the Chinese to fines. In fact, negotiations over the rice shortage in 1967 between the government and the Chinese Ambassador, the Growers' Association, and the New Zealand Chinese Association succeeded in extending the import quota to avoid serious shortages in the future (see NZCGMJ, January, February 1968).²⁵

While the income tax situation punctuated the events already set in motion over the provision of community facilities, it did not stop them. In 1967 the Christchurch branch of the New Zealand Chinese Association, reformed in 1961, attempted to start a collection for a Cultural Centre, but it received little support, and disagreements brought it to a stop.

In 1968, the still operating Auckland Chinese Hall started a school to teach Chinese,²⁶ and later in the same year the market gardening area of Pukekohe set up its own school. The Auckland initiative had been forced on the Hall organisation by the presence of an alternative group, also formed in 1968, called the Chinese Club (Auckland). This group was formed very quickly to remedy what was perceived as a stagnant stage in the Hall association's activity. The latter organisation was, according to informants, happy to sit on a large bank balance rather than move to introduce its programme for Chinese youth. Even the Sports Club of the Auckland Chinese Hall had not provided a basis or an impetus for change because, as some argued, the older people were still in control and opposed to change. The Club organised in response to provide an immediate solution to the shortcomings of the existing situation, but the absence of clear-cut aims, the emphasis on sports rather than a diversity of activity including things that were both cultural and educational, and the initial high membership fee of \$20 limited support, and even the wealthy were reluctant to give their full support. While the intended consequences were never met, the Club existed and more importantly produced immediate action on the part of the Auckland Hall group as part of the unintended consequences. The starting of the free school drew the youth as well as parents towards the Hall group and also moved the latter to start providing facilities for the young people.

In Wellington the newly arrived Ambassador²⁷ stated that he was keen to give the New Zealand Chinese cultural and diplomatic assistance in starting schools and trade with Taiwan (NZCGMJ, January/February 1969).²⁸ In May the Ambassador arranged for a teacher of Chinese to be brought to Wellington to start a school there, and the growers' Journal had an editorial on the importance of such schools. It praised the efforts of the Auckland Chinese school and went on to say:

Other places have not yet followed suit. What is more, it is disappointing to hear some people say that there is no real need to have Chinese schools in New Zealand and that it is not very practical. If people think like that, then what will their children be like?

Over the years there has been a number of Chinese schools set up in various places including Wellington and Dunedin over ten years ago, and also one in Gisborne. Due to a variety of reasons these schools have closed down after only a few years in existence. This indicates that starting a school is easy, but to carry on is difficult.

The recent publication about the schools in Auckland and Pukekohe seems to have created some concern in other centres and could possibly change the view of some people about Chinese schools and the need to teach Chinese children culture and education.

(NZCGMJ, May, June 1969)

By 1969 the Auckland Chinese Hall started its own journal,²⁹ and the issues of education and culture formed the major concerns in the first edition. Basically there were two concerns; the first was the perpetuation of leadership in the community in a situation where the next generation was not equipped with the cultural background needed. The concern is expressed in the following:

The new generation in this town is mostly brought up in New Zealand rather than China. Some can speak Chinese, but their Chinese is horrible and not fluent enough. To expect them to take up the responsibility of the association and to look after the welfare of the overseas Chinese here is not very easy. This is because they are not used to this kind of work and also they lack any nostalgia for China. Does this mean the association has to rely purely on our generation? The answer is negative.

The reason is that the young generation will live longer than us, and sooner or later they will have to bear the responsibility. They are no doubt alien to the association at the moment. This is because the association does not provide suitable interests for them. Every young person likes activities, every sort of sport and other social gatherings. So we should make use of this opportunity to assemble them together and to enlighten them as to the relationship between overseas Chinese and encourage the spirit of unity.

(Auckland Chinese Journal,
No. 1, November 1969).³⁰

The second concern was over cultural values. The article quoted above maintained that the New Zealand Chinese did have a feeling of being Chinese: they practiced Chinese culture at home, eating Chinese food, refusing to let children inter-marry, spending a lot of money on weddings and feeling a genuine loss when a Chinese person was killed on the roads even though one did not know the person (*ibid.*). However, this was all in the context of the past, and as the writer noted, it was a much more complex situation for young Chinese in contemporary New Zealand. The elders had taken Chinese culture for granted as being a part of the community without realising that it would have to be taught seriously, since all the things the young would experience would be quite contrary to Chinese culture. The author summarised the kind of attention he thought the new generation should be given in the following:

1. Do I always use Chinese to converse with my children?
Do I teach them Chinese at home?
2. When my children use English to ask me questions or to convey some information, do I stop them immediately and also explain to them why I am not willing to use English to converse with them even if it is more convenient for them or myself?
3. Our history has a lot of stories about historical figures, about the rise and fall of dynasties. They are all very impressive and they can be used to stimulate national culture. Do I often tell them?

4. Unfortunately, I am not at home in Chinese history, and it is quite impossible to follow, but my childhood and the customs of my village are also quite interesting. Do I often tell them?
5. Do I like to send my children to the Chinese schools established by the Association or the church which has organised a Chinese class for learning Chinese?
6. Although I find that my own business is above all the most important thing and that money is also of great importance do I think that Chinese culture for my children is equally important?
7. I am not particular about money. I have a firm economic base and a stable life. I should sacrifice some of my time to help make my children really Chinese.
8. I must remember the struggles and suffering of my ancestors. I have to spare no effort to preserve the next generation and therefore not disappoint our ancestors.

(ACJ, No. 1, November 1969)

If this was advice to each individual family, and particularly to the men of these families, the association also had advice for the community. The article admitted that the Auckland Hall, which had operated for eight years, had neglected the interests of a growing number of young Chinese in the community who had a 'lot of Western ideas in their brains' (*ibid.*). The solution was to be found firstly in the Chinese school started in 1968 and secondly in a proposal for another hall to be specifically for young people to use for sports and social gatherings. The association felt they must adapt to their environment by providing a venue for Chinese youth where, by virtue of its existence, they would tend to do things with each other rather than with Westerners:

Whenever the young people have a specific gathering place, they will naturally unite and make friends with each other and become Chinese forever.

(*ibid.*)

The place was to be a community centre, described as follows:

1. The Community Centre is a branch of the Association. Its objective is similar to the Branch, that is, the welfare of the overseas Chinese.
2. The Community Centre will become a centre for moral wisdom and physical health as well as cultural activities. This will allow the objective of Chinese making friends with Chinese and help preserve our nation once and for all.
3. The Community Centre will be reserved purely for our own use. The original hall will not be rented out except for several times a year when we shall use it. This will allow us to cover the expenses of the Association and increase our income.
4. The Community Centre is about two acres, and there are about 10,000 square feet of building for a basketball court, lecture rooms, and kitchen. The basket ball court can also be used as a ballroom and for other sports such as table tennis, and other areas will become a car park and tennis courts.
5. The Community Centre will most probably be in Mangere, since that place will in future be on the motorway and be no problem for transportation.
6. The Association has a detailed and complete building project, a sub-committee will be organized if necessary, and we will seek the help of Chinese youth here to help build the building so we can decrease our building expenses.
7. The building expenses are estimated at \$60,000. This amount apparently seems very large, but considering inflation now and also the strong economic position of the Chinese here, this \$60,000 is equivalent to 50% of its value ten years ago.

The Association is going to start a \$200 weekly salary campaign whereby a family contributes one week's wages to the project. The Association is confident that the overseas Chinese will support this campaign. After all, this community centre is for our children. They are the benefactors. This help for the Association amounts to helping themselves. In future the names of the donors and amounts of donation will be displayed on the wall.

(ACJ, No. 1, November 1969)

There were a number of paradoxes that immediately became apparent in discussion of the above project. In the first place, the initial articles, and in fact their English equivalents, spoke in benevolent terms of the youth in the Chinese community, what had not been done for them in the past and what should be done now. However, the actual structure of the organisation was very much one that had to be directed

and constructed by the elders. In one instance, it had been suggested that the young people start their own committee, and the task was assigned to older Chinese school students, but they were described 'as not very capable of organising', so the association set up a Youth Club (ACJ, No. 1, November 1969). The Club had a committee of six and was organised to provide various sporting and cultural activities on Sunday afternoons, including drama for the end-of-school celebrations. Primarily however, it was to provide leadership for the future, now guided by older members of the community (ibid.).

It seemed clear that some in the Chinese community perceived their youth as a problem, the cause of which was Western influence, which came particularly from those with whom their children associated. The solution here was to provide a hall, a place where they would be in the company of other Chinese youth. In a sense, the situation required coercion to control the use of leisure time in the absence of obligations present in former years which would have made it mandatory that children contribute their labour to whatever economic activities were being undertaken. As the English section in the Journal confirmed:

During the last several decades, we have become wealthy and successful businessmen in managing our own thriving businesses. We are enjoying a degree of prosperity that the first generation of Chinese that came to New Zealand never experienced.

(ACJ, No. 1, November 1969)

Things were relatively affluent in the Chinese community to the degree that benevolence towards their youth could prevail, but they were also expected to help. As noted in the brief outline of the project, young people were expected to contribute their labour, a point curiously not made in the English article describing the project. Furthermore, if a free school was provided, students were expected to attend and be on time.

This was an issue that merited a full article in the Journal chastising young Chinese for capitalising on the idea of 'Chinese time' which, according to the article, Westerners found laughable (ACJ, No. 1, November 1969).

In brief, the paradox was between an intent on the one hand to be concerned and benevolent while on the other hand to do it in such a way that it implied mandatory action.

The other paradox related to the attempt by the Hall, as opposed to the Auckland branch of the New Zealand Chinese Association, to start a collective project which was to involve the whole community and be explained in the Journal. The format fulfilled stipulations concerning proper activity in the Chinese community as laid out previously by the editor of the growers Journal; that is, they should be open and explained. However, by the second issue the legacy of former splits between associations became apparent, and the Journal had no choice but to argue its own case.

In the second issue of the Journal, some correspondents were already inquiring as to why the organisation was separate from the local branch of the Chinese Association, and in a lengthy article, Journal staff argued that it did not matter, since it was started to involve and represent all Chinese, just like the New Zealand Chinese Association (ACJ, No. 2, February 1970), but it also noted that the branch constitution and organisation was far less representative. It was argued that, although the organisers of the Hall were perhaps 'stupid' for assuming all this responsibility 'without much education', nevertheless they had 'determination', 'conviction' and:

we as a group work for the public, we work together and cooperate with each other. We don't consider our interest and our prestige. We will not in any sense make use of others.

(ACJ, No. 2, February 1970)

By innuendo at least, the reason for a separate organisation was made abundantly clear. The other point, although by no means made clearly, was that there were certain benefits to be had from financial independence, although the article maintained that construction and maintenance were going to be very expensive. The Hall was not worried about raising the money, since 'the Chinese economic base is stronger' and the property already owned by the association provided an economic foundation for the envisioned project. If anything, the article concluded, the branch of the New Zealand Chinese Association should be happy, since they will not have to provide for maintenance every year (ACJ, No. 2, February 1970).

If this issue was not enough, according to the Journal, there was a

...small minority group in our community who deliberately tried to hamper or not cooperate with our plans because of their self-conscious 'village mentality' or because of the interest of their private group or association. Because of this they have set up a separate faction. We will not be blinded by this kind of plot. We work for our next generation.

(ACJ, No. 2, February 1970)

While such a group did exist, it was not at all clear that they threatened the envisioned project, although they did persist in the establishment of their own club facilities. It was evident by 1970 that the free school, the minimal membership fee, the diversity of activities planned and the re-organising of the Youth Club had gone a long way to legitimising the right of the Hall group to undertake the community centre project. It was also apparent by 1969 that the leadership of the Hall group had changed its ideas and was more concerned with the future and less conservative about extending its aims.

Three months after the statement about minority opposition, the Auckland Chinese Club invited representatives from the Auckland Chinese Sports Association, the Auckland Chinese Hall Youth Club and the Auckland Chinese Hall Association to a meeting, which was attended by fifty people and set about resolving the differences that were evident between various groups. The explanations about the Community Centre project were evidently successful and the general feeling of the meeting friendly and cooperative (ACJ, No. 3, May 1970). In the following months, the Auckland Chinese Sports Association dissolved their organisation and joined the Hall group, bringing with them \$2,000 of their own accumulated funds (ACJ, No. 4, August 1970). The Tai Tung³¹ also joined the Hall group, donating their remaining funds of \$200 (ACJ, No. 4, August 1970) and in November a more intensive collection campaign was started with each of the twenty-five committee members contributing an average \$280 for a total of \$7,000, which was considered outstanding, since many of the contributors were 'representative of the older or near-retirement working-class group' (ACJ, No. 5, November 1970).³² Those who contributed had their names printed in the Journal, and those that did not became the subject of subtle but pointed comment in the same pages.

An example, directed particularly at the sectional interests of the locality associations, came in the February issue and is included below:

To Appeal for Great Unity of All New Zealand Overseas Chinese

There are small and big associations, and there are differences of interests in every association. This is the reason for this article. For instance, an overseas Chinese who went to a concert and very much appreciated the performance might think of joining that musical association. However, he might not be able to get in because the association was a small group and this group had the last say on membership.

Another case is that of a patriot who hopes to sacrifice himself so that he may serve the people; he might be prevented from doing this simply because he offends the old patriots who are the leaders.

The above two cases are only imaginary stories. Let me talk of some real stories. I have once had the opportunity to talk with Mr. Wong and Mr. Lee. Both of them are committee members of the Kwong Chew Association. I asked them, if there were two old overseas Chinese, one a Kwong Chew person and the other a Jung Sing person, both of whom sought help from the association, then what would the association do? Mr. Wong and Mr. Lee answered, 'We will help both of them if we have enough relief funds available. However, the member of our Association (Kwong Chew) has the first priority if we don't have enough funds'. Certainly, the Kwong Chew association is a charity organization, but because of the shortage of funds they have to set up certain priorities. Mr. Wong and Mr. Lee are very enthusiastic about overseas Chinese affairs. They deserve credit for serving the village association and its sectional interests. From there they move to serve all overseas Chinese.

(ACJ, No. 6, February 1971)

The article went on to describe a similar situation in Wellington, where the New Zealand Chinese Association had their annual general meeting. They were to discuss the problems of all overseas Chinese in New Zealand, but the only people there were from the Wellington branch, the National executive and the Embassy (ibid.). One of the executive members stated sadly:

Our association (referring to his locality association) managed to get about one hundred participants at every meeting. However, overseas Chinese are not interested in the New Zealand Chinese Association representing all Chinese. What are we going to do about the welfare of all overseas Chinese?

(ibid.)

The aim was to acknowledge diversity but to encourage it. not to stand in the way of new ideas or the unity of the community. One article even noted that associations had changed through time, particularly from 'tongs' to 'gwan', indicating a shift from the specific membership requirements of surname or dialect to more universalistic criteria.

These indicated to the writer of the article that the Chinese in New Zealand had patriotic ideals and that their cultural background was deeply rooted in the overseas Chinese mind (see ACJ, No. 6, February 1971). The latter was particularly exemplified by the collection during the war, it noted, when local Chinese gave considerable amounts (between £40,000 and £50,000 from Auckland alone) which could have built many community centres (ibid.). Now the community asked for only one centre, and yet, even in a situation of relative wealth, some were reluctant, a situation the author found shameful (ibid.). The criticism, while harsh, was well founded, especially considering local Chinese expenditure on horse-racing. An article the following August extended 'sympathy' for the Chinese who had lost on their bets and 'congratulations' for those who had won, expressing surprise at the fortune of wealthy overseas Chinese and 'their generosity in the habit of spending money recklessly' (ACJ, No. 8, August 1971).

Despite the above however, the project continued to accumulate money, and by November 1971, had \$50,000 (ACJ, 9 November 1971). As a result of elections for new committee members in 1971, at least half of the thirty-two positions were to be occupied by young members. The Journal emphasised that they should not be under-emphasised, but the young members themselves should at the same time not over-emphasise their own experience (ACJ, No. 8, August 1971). The Journal, as the growers' Journal had done before, continually published articles that chastised those who confused private and public roles, but also asked the public not to condemn a committee member for working hard or suspect his intentions, since one was hardly likely to criticise a shop-owner who worked hard (ACJ, No. 3, May 1970). The obvious point made here was that private hard work for personal gain was considered

meritorious for both individual and family, but hard work in a public organisation was suspect, which often resulted in reluctance to become involved.

At the same time as the Auckland Chinese organised their community project, the new minister of the Anglican Chinese Mission in Wellington decided, and finally convinced his vestry and a large number of the community, that a Chinese centre was needed.³³ Furthermore, he suggested that the APMC³⁴ would take responsibility as the co-ordinating organisation. In November 1969 the APMC vestry passed a resolution approving the building of a 'parish hall', and in January of the following year a public meeting was organised by the APMC to put the suggestion to the rest of the community. Most organisations and a number of individuals were represented at the meeting, and there seems to have been both enthusiasm for and opposition to the project even at this early stage. The opposition came mainly from the Eastern Sports Club, who could not accept that such a complex and its functions would be ultimately under the control of a church despite attempts by the church to dissuade them from this opinion. As far as Eastern was concerned, events and organisation would be interspersed with church work, and other groups would always have to rely on the grace of the church to get access to the hall. Eastern feared that at a time when their own membership was declining it would only be further eroded, since people would be more attracted to the APMC centre with its 'Dragon' sports club. Then, as far as they were concerned, it would be this group who received all the credit for organisation. The unintended consequence of the APMC's activity, however, now stimulated the Seyip and Eastern groups to think seriously about building their own halls despite the fact that the latter group had applied for land previously from the Wellington City Council but had failed to receive any help.

In early 1971 the APMC, 'with help of and for the benefit of the whole Wellington Chinese community', put on an 'Orient Evening' at the Wellington Town Hall for 700 paying guests (see EP, 5 May 1971). The event included a Chinese meal and concert and then a 'Western-style' ball, all of which was specifically to raise money for the APMC centre. It was stated clearly at the time, however, that while the project included a church and vicarage, the money (\$5 per person) collected from the evening would be used only for recreational, cultural and social amenities (ibid.).

Encouraged by the support from this evening, the APMC tried to purchase the land needed for their centre adjacent to their existing hall but found zoning regulations made such a plan unfeasible. Instead, they bought land elsewhere in the city, but this also proved unsuitable and was again sold.

While the church set about organising itself for the project, another group appeared which was made up of the Eastern Sports Club, now more enthusiastic about a venue for sports, and the Ambassador from Taiwan.³⁵ The Ambassador had arrived in 1968, and by 1970 he had already established, with help from Taiwan (see page 527), a Chinese school in Wellington complete with a teacher, which was arranged through the Embassy, according to informants. In 1971 this school had over sixty students and had opened a branch school in Otaki, a market-gardening area north of Wellington. In the same year, Eastern had meetings over a proposal for a hall which the Ambassador seemed to have been involved or at least known about. It was eventually planned that the Ambassador would call a meeting of all interested groups for September which was to include all organisations within the Chinese community. Before this took place, however, news filtered back from

Taiwan that an article had appeared in the Central Daily News (Chung Tang Ji Pao) describing the 'Orient Evening' as the ACMC's response to a call for support of the 'Sports and Cultural Centre'. The ACMC responded angrily to news of this, stating that such an arrangement was impossible since the Sports and Cultural Centre organisation did not as yet exist.³⁶ In effect, this created a situation of antagonism between the Ambassador and the future Anglican Chinese Centre organisation which was never fully resolved.

The September meeting was held by the Ambassador, and the ACMC were invited but declined. While unfortunate, this nevertheless seemed a clear situation; but it was anything but clear. The Sports and Cultural Centre had published a newsletter in August, before the meeting, stating that the ACMC had declined an invitation from the Ambassador to attend the September meeting, but the ACMC maintained they had received no such invitation. In the October newsletter from the Sports and Cultural Centre group, they maintained that the ACMC was invited but was unable to attend. By this time, the issue was complex and almost totally antagonistic.

The meeting that the Ambassador had called went ahead with some success, but it was clear that it was much more than a preliminary meeting of interested groups. The Ambassador announced that he had already consulted with the Mayor of Wellington using the name of Eastern, and had an undertaking that land would be made available for the Centre. However, he was quick to state that the use of Eastern's name by no means gave them ownership or management rights over the project. He suggested instead that the Wellington and Hutt branches of the New Zealand Chinese Association should be brought in as the founding organisation for the project. This move, according to informants, allowed the Sports and Cultural Centre to be seen, at least officially,

as representing the interests of all local Chinese, since the New Zealand Chinese Association was defined as fulfilling just such a role. This would also, it was hoped, defuse factional dissension, but the two branches, while willing to support the building of the centre, never took on the role suggested and, along with the Eastern Sports Club, the Chinese Baptist Church,³⁷ the Chinese Language School, the KMT and the Mui Shuit Society, only affiliated with the project. According to the booklet put out by the Centre outlining their proposed building project, the Tung Jung and Seyip Associations were also affiliated, but this, according to informants from both groups, was a debatable statement.

In October the Sports and Cultural Centre was formally constituted as the Wellington Chinese Sports and Cultural Centre [WCS & CC] and in November an executive committee was elected with a president who happened to be closely associated with the ACMC. In early 1972 the Ambassador moved the project along by promising a donation of \$5,000 and later imported a substantial number of Chinese paintings to be auctioned, from which 40% of the proceeds would go to the project. Apparently the Ambassador had his own trade licence which allowed the import of goods from Taiwan, excluding the paintings, out of which he also promised a certain percentage of the profits. In 1971 the Trade Span Company was started in Wellington, and some have argued that this, too, was under the initiative of the Ambassador, who designated that part of its activity would be directed towards funding a trust to operate on a percentage of the profits³⁸ from the company and 1% of the profits from the Eddie Shipping Company owned by the Ambassador.

By 1972 the Chinese community in Wellington had two groups, both purporting to provide community facilities for the whole Chinese

community which would encompass recreation, education, social gatherings and cultural functions and would be under control of the local Chinese.

The following two quotations give their stated aims in 1973 when, first the WCS & CC and then the ACC, published their plans to begin the fund-raising in earnest.³⁹

Background and Aims of the Centre (WCS & CC)

For several years, members of the Chinese Community in Wellington have been striving for the erection of a building complex with adequate facilities to completely cater for the recreational and cultural needs of the local Chinese community. However, in the wider sense, the Centre will also be a valuable asset for the whole of the community, as it has been designed to allow for a wide variety of uses ranging from exhibitions, conferences, receptions, concerts and dances to general recreational uses...

The Centre will not belong to any particular splinter group but will be in the property of the whole Chinese community. Any person or group may use the Centre by applying to the management committee and all may participate in its administration by becoming members and obtaining the full voting rights stipulated in the Constitution.

(Wellington Chinese Sports and Cultural Centre (Inc.) Proposed Building Project, 1973:4)

The plans in 1973 included a large multi-purpose recreational sports area, kitchen, changing rooms, cultural, educational and club rooms, squash courts and car park.

What are the Main Purposes and Aims of the Chinese Centre (ACC)

- A. To promote Chinese ethics, morals and culture in the wider New Zealand Society.
- B. To serve the Chinese community. We do not distinguish between district of origin, beliefs or even age groups - there are no barriers of any kind. The work is not confined geographically, nor is it confined to Chinese Christians, in fact non-christians receive the most benefit.

The range of our activities is comprehensive and extends from the present day living to Eternal life, body and mind, childhood to old age, from small to big affairs. In short, all good things and needs in the Chinese community are readily catered for in the CHINESE CENTRE.

(Anglican Chinese Centre Souvenir
Brochure for Raising Building
Funds, 1973:12)

The quotation continues with a detailed description of what the Centre will provide for the elderly, middle aged, youth, juniors, visitors and overseas visitors. In 1973 the plan therefore included a large hall, an old people's home, a guest house, student hostel, Chinese garden, outdoor recreational areas, church and vicarage.

While the ACC scheme appears far more grandiose than the other, the initial funding was to go specifically for the hall and vicarage. Excluding the vicarage however, the hall was to be used for essentially the same functions as the WCS & CC proposed building. Neither document, however, contained much financial information except the need for \$300,000 on the part of the WCS & CC and an initial \$150,000 on the part of the ACC. Both groups claimed to be supported by, and representative of, the whole community, but the WCS & CC did have group membership, which allowed several existing groups to affiliate, whereas the ACC recognised the groups but encouraged individual affiliation, which did not depend on a previous commitment to Christianity. The complicating factors were obvious. First, the representativeness was questionable and problematic from the beginning, and more obviously, there was a sense in which both groups wanted for the sake of status to be the one that completed the task. It was also the case that no matter how representative each group claimed to be neither of the finished results would be owned entirely by the Chinese community. The ACC project was still attached to the church, and the WCS & CC project was still attached to the local city council by virtue of the land

agreement. The question that formerly emerged in the Chinese community as regards the purchase of the New Zealand Chinese Association building in Wellington again emerged as people wondered about the use of their donations for projects that might not even fully belong to them in the end.⁴⁰ They also wondered why and how two projects could be justified with a local population of about 3,500 people, a large percentage of whom were under twenty-five and most likely to make use of the facilities, but as yet unable to support it financially.

The questions of course led to speculation and a variety of interpretations that have endured through time. Some argued that the intensity of the whole movement on the part of the WCS & CC and the ACC was the result of two strong and determined men. This is a view particularly followed by Wong (1973) in his thesis on the Wellington Chinese community. However, he makes no attempt to explain why their energies were so determined in this direction. Other informants have suggested that the Ambassador was keenly aware at the time that the PRC would be recognised shortly and that the Republic's embassies would be withdrawn wherever they were. It was necessary to establish ties before this occurred, and to this end, it was explained, the Ambassador set about leaving his mark on the community in regard to both the WCS & CC and the companies and trust which were directly involved with funding. He found the Eastern Club who were supporters of the Republic in need of facilities at the time and he used their organisation as a lever with which to move the community.

Like the Ambassador, the leader of the APMC and the ACC was noted for his strong personality and uncompromising position on some issues, but aside from his own role the efficacy of the Church's role must also be acknowledged. As noted previously, the APMC had a notable history of providing community facilities, and a number of its dynamic

leaders had envisioned similar centres and set about organising people and funds to recognise their aims. However, their visas always expired before their expectations were fulfilled, which in the current situation did not occur. Other than this, one would have to suggest that the marginal position of a church amongst Chinese organisations might be enough to produce this kind of determination, especially when confronted by these organisations. In a segmentary system, allegiance always tends towards the smallest unit when conflict arises, making it increasingly hard for a community-wide organisation to maintain its following, even more so when connected to a European organisation. The connection to European society, however, was more freely acknowledged by the WCS & CC than by the ACC. The former group's document contained a foreword from the Mayor of Wellington (a member of the Free China Society)⁴¹ and the information that land had been obtained at reasonable rent from the Council. Even so, there seems to have been less argument attached to this aspect of the WCS & CC than to the fact that they claimed they represented all Chinese in the Wellington area.

The actions of the ACC and the WCS & CC were not the only events which affected the community in 1972. The year also began with the continuation of an immigration matter from 1971. In early 1971 the representative of the Chinese growers to the Federation had joined a Labour Party national executive delegation to South East Asia (NZCGMJ, March/April 1971). In the course of this trip, during a visit to Queensland, Australia, he was given only a seventy-two hour visa even though he carried a New Zealand passport, while others were automatically granted a three-month visitor's permit (Sunday Times, 3 October, 1971).⁴² The argument that ensued between the Chinese New Zealanders and Australian immigration officials received considerable

press coverage and finally exposed a situation where Chinese had been singled out, for their New Zealand nationality was not recognised. In December 1971 the New Zealand Chinese Association sent a delegation of five men to the Australian High Commission in Wellington, where they received some indication that action would be taken - which satisfied the delegation sufficiently to call off its proposed demonstration. In 1972 the New Zealand Chinese were granted equal rights of entry with other New Zealanders.

While the above issue was being resolved, New Zealand was preparing for a national election, and the Ambassador went on a tour of various towns, speaking particularly to Rotary Clubs, where he explained the current situation in Taiwan and how it had been deserted as other countries began to recognise the PRC. He was also quick to point to Taiwan's growth and then to condemn the political activities of the CCP (see EP., 23 May and 13 April 1972). Two months later the first television documentary of the Chinese community was aired four days before the arrival in Wellington of table tennis players from the People's Republic of China. The programme gave a brief history of the Chinese community and some indication of the various activities that were going on in 1972 and then interviewed two local Chinese, both of whom were involved in the New Zealand-China Society. The immediate response was two articles in the Otago Daily Times. One was a review of the programme which accused the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation of presenting a very biased, pro-Peking view of the New Zealand Chinese community, maintaining that 'the other side which carried at least academic authority was ignored' (ODT, 16 July 1972). The 'authority' was S.W. Greif, who had just completed a survey of the New Zealand Chinese which showed conclusively, according to the ODT correspondent, that the 'overwhelming majority of Chinese New Zealanders did not want

Peking to be represented in New Zealand' (ibid.).⁴³ According to Greif, this did not mean they were necessarily pro-Taiwan but rather that they were definitely anti-communist (ibid.). The second article was an interview with Greif in which he confirmed the statements in the review. The debate over the programme did not end here,⁴⁴ however, for in the intervening period two advertisements appeared in the Wellington press on the day the Chinese players were to arrive. The first was signed by the secretary of the Free China Society and the KMT and the President of the New Zealand Chinese Anti-Communist Union and stated the following.

PING PONG DIPLOMACY

THE PUBLIC MAY BELIEVE AFTER SEEING THE GALLERY PROGRAMME
ON THE VISIT OF THE CHINESE TABLE TENNIS TEAM THAT THE
MAJORITY OF NEW ZEALAND CHINESE ARE IN FAVOUR OF THE VISIT.

Many of the New Zealand Chinese Community are opposed to
Mainland China and will not welcome the visiting team. They
believe that the visiting table tennis players are not
solely a sporting team but are also politically motivated
in visiting this country.

It should be realized that most of the Chinese who watch
the players in New Zealand will be attending the games
only because of their interest in table tennis and not
because they support Mainland China.⁴⁵

(Dominion, 17 July 1972).

The second was endorsed by the New Zealand China Society, New Zealand Chinese Cultural Society, the New Zealand University Student's Association and the Asian Studies Society and contained a welcome to the table tennis 'delegation' and wishes for friendship and unity between the people's of China and New Zealand (EP, 17 July 1972).

In the first case, the KMT had broken its long tradition of silence and spoken on behalf of the Chinese community, a mandate historically the prerogative of the New Zealand Chinese Association. It was also to maintain, through the announcement of its secretary the following day, a boycott of the games, but on the other hand it would help any member

who wanted to defect (see Dominion, 18 July 1972). With the Free China Society and the Anti-Communist Union also speaking out, it was clear that political sides had been taken. The unintended consequences of the television programme and the visit had been the unleashing of a political undercurrent. Despite this, however, it was not clear that any of the other groups who welcomed the team were adamantly pro-CCP but could be described more accurately as strongly committed to an interest in China at a variety of levels. While the Prime Minister⁴⁶ had made it clear that the players would be welcomed only as 'sportsmen irrespective of their country and of their political and ideological backgrounds...just as a Springbok team would be welcomed', others' perception of those who welcomed the players was entirely different (see Dominion, 17 July 1972): clearly to some, these people were politically aligned with the PRC.

While the matter of political factions in the Chinese community appears not to have surfaced again in 1972, it was clear changes were taking place. Double Tenth in 1972 was held in Christchurch, and the editor's foreword to the programme was perhaps indicative of this change:

Even though the origin of Double Tenth must not be forgotten the annual event has taken on much wider significance. There is no other single institution on such a scale to develop and strengthen bonds between our communities from different centres.

The Sports Tournament is largely a youthful affair. Less apparent but no less in enthusiasm are those of all ages who contributed in knowledge, money and spirit. This is a tradition we should cherish.

(New Zealand Chinese Double Tenth
Tournament, October 1972:1)

The Ambassador's foreword predictably emphasised the fact that the celebration commemorated the sixty-first National Day of the Republic of China and thanked the Wellington Chinese community for their efforts on behalf of the Cathay Life girl's basketball team who had also visited

New Zealand in 1972 (ibid.:3). In his last sentence he expressed the hope that all teams would have improved when they met again in October, 1973, but with the Labour victory at the polls in November and the recognition of the PRC by New Zealand on 22 December, there was no possibility of such a meeting. The Embassy of the Republic of China departed, leaving only an unofficial contact through particular trading companies in Wellington and Auckland. Before their departure, however, a curious document appeared in a paper called the Voice of China, which outlined the history of the WCS & CC project up until that time (see Appendix XXXVII). In this version, it was clearly 'Chinese community leaders' who initiated the school and the request for the school teacher (Voice of China, 1 December 1972:3). It was also under their initiative that the Embassy approached the Wellington City Council for land to enable the Eastern Chinese Sports Club and the Chinese Mui Shuit Society to have adequate facilities. Once this was organised it was the local leaders who organised a committee, called the meeting of 'nine and then ten small community organisations' and elected officers, a list which excluded the Ambassador (ibid.). The article talked of the collection of money, referring to the auction of Chinese paintings, the pledge from the Eddie Steamship Company and a donation from the Taiwan Fertilizer Company - all without mention of the Embassy or its involvement. Finally, it noted that the Centre will belong to 'no one, no particular splinter group' (ibid.:4), yet the Ambassador had stated in his Double Tenth message in 1971:

Upon completion this Centre will be the home of the Eastern Sports Club, the Chinese Mui Shuit Association the Chinese Language School and all other cultural and sports groups as well.

(Annual Chinese Sports Tournament Programme, October 1971:5)

Whatever effects the departure of the Embassy had, it did not stop the progress of both hall projects. In 1973 the WCS & CC changed its president again, electing a man previously connected with the ACCM. It held two major fund-raising events: a Chinese Ball and a Chinese market day (see EP, 21, 22 and 25 August 1973). The ACC Women's Guild held a banquet attended by 200 guests (EP, 24 November 1973) and the ACC received permission to build on their newly purchased hill site which was, it turned out, adjacent to the PRC Embassy building.

The previous Ambassador's departure was followed by a summary statement about the situation of the New Zealand Chinese made in an interview for a Dominion reported in Wellington. The article quoted one of the organisers of Eastern Club, who praised the work of the former Ambassador and regretted his expulsion but maintained that the new staff would receive a welcome since 'political considerations are secondary to the Chinese who are working to improve their lives here' (Dominion, 29 January 1973). He further stated that the former Ambassador did not have a political relationship with the community and that those who were coming would be met only with curiosity not hostility. The New Zealand Chinese are:

...servants of New Zealand now...so on the political side of things we will be extremely docile.

(Dominion, 29 January 1973).

This did not mean, however, that the new Embassy would not test the feelings of the New Zealand Chinese after they had arrived.

If there was animosity towards the PRC presence which arrived in 1973, there was no apparent manifestation either towards the new staff or between the so-called Nationalist and PRC supporters. In August it was made clear that the Chinese community was thinking of asking the new Embassy for help in getting relatives into New Zealand from mainland China (see Dominion, 7 August 1973). At the time there was

considerable concern over increased bureaucratic restrictions on the issue of visas for other Chinese to visit relatives in New Zealand. In 1972, one Chinese person, an important organiser of the ACC, took the problem to the press, and a lengthy article appeared in New Zealand Truth elaborating on the requirements then levied by the Immigration Department (NZ Truth, 30 October 1972). The actual case was a request for a visitor's permit for an uncle to come to New Zealand from Hong Kong for a visit, which in the end took a year to issue, and was given only after three declarations had been sent to the Department. These were made by the visitor's employer and two relatives in New Zealand, each specifying that no extension would be requested for the six-month permit even though the immigration Act permitted a visitor to request an extension to their permit (ibid.). The article in Truth issued a public challenge to the Minister of Immigration, who was accused of discrimination after a long exchange of correspondence. A month later the government changed, and Labour, perceived as the traditional allies of the Chinese community, took over. Consequently, the Chinese community wasted no time in using the opportunity to ask the party to comply with its manifesto declaration that:

New Zealand should make it clear by its method of deciding whom to admit that it is concerned that... it accepts close relatives of those already settled here.

(quoted in Dominion, 7 August 1973)

The issue of immigration now extended beyond the issue of visitors and including bringing relatives to New Zealand as permanent residents. From the outset, however, it was unclear who would represent the interests of the Chinese community now that the former Ambassador had gone. As it turned out, appeals came from four sources. Initially there was an attempt on the part of a Wellington group to

form The United New Zealand Chinese Action and Advisory Council. It was organised to protect the rights of New Zealand naturalised and resident Chinese over specifically immigration and naturalisation matters as well as any other issues that might have influenced their well-being. The organisation as proposed was to have representatives from Auckland (1) Wellington (1) Christchurch, Ashburton and Timaru (1) and one other for Oamaru and Dunedin. The organisation never got beyond a preliminary stage, however, since the New Zealand Chinese Association saw it as essentially duplicating their efforts and expressed the opinion that current immigration provisions were adequate (see Dominion, 7 August 1973).⁴⁷

Contemporaneously one individual and two other groups were involved in attempting to negotiate with the government on immigration issues. In Wellington a European man, Thomas Romain, had unofficially set himself up as a go-between for the Chinese community over immigration and naturalisation matters. In 1973 he said that he had been acting in this unofficial capacity for the Chinese for twenty-eight years and had seen 740 Chinese naturalised due to his efforts (Dominion, 7 August 1973). His specific interest in 1973 was the plight of the thirty-two Otaki market gardeners who cultivated 376 acres and were facing crucial labour shortages, especially since many of the children in these families were attending school and university and were no longer available to help. His submissions argued that the fresh-vegetable industry was crucial, that mechanisation was impossible, leaving the supply of additional labour as the only alternative to discontinuing gardening and selling the land for subdivisions.

While this submission went for the Otaki growers, the Chinese Growers' Association made their own submissions on behalf of all Chinese growers. The organisation represented 486 Chinese market

gardeners of whom, it argued at least 75% still had close relatives in China (Dominion, 30 August 1973). Between 1963 and 1973 it was estimated that 78 Chinese growers had left the industry (see McCallum, 1971:2). The exodus, according to the organisation, was due, as already noted, to the fact that labour was short and children were now unlikely to help, involved with education and other occupations. Many were getting old and, without children to inherit the garden, felt there was nothing to do but quit, unless of course they could get the help of newly arrived relatives, for whom they would guarantee a job and housing and who 'would immediately become useful and productive members of New Zealand society' (Dominion, 8 August 1973).

At the same time as the growers sent their request, submissions were also sent by Thomas Doo, a Chinese merchant in Auckland on behalf of the New Zealand Chinese Association. The major points included general opposition to the discretionary powers that were held by the Minister of Immigration in granting or refusing applications for immigration and a specific request for a quota system which would clearly lay out priorities and numbers. It was suggested that relatives be evaluated as prospective immigrants on the closeness of blood relationship. Suggested priorities were ranked in order of preference as follows:

- i) a) parents
- b) unmarried sons and daughters
- c) married children and families
- d) grandchildren
- e) brothers and sisters.
- ii) According to special skills and trade
- iii) Students for secondary schools upwards
- iv) On compassionate grounds.

(Submissions to the Honourable F.M.Coleman,
Minister of Immigration, on Behalf of the
New Zealand Chinese Association
Incorporated, 28 August 1973:5-6)

It was also made clear that, although there had been Chinese entering New Zealand continuously (see Appendix II), the numbers admitted were not proportionate to other groups, particularly Europeans, and further many who came were not relatives of New Zealand Chinese. The submission maintained that out of the 3,512 Chinese who had arrived between 1956 and 1970, only 250 were relatives of the New Zealand community, in most cases spouses or those engaged to be married (ibid.:4).

The concluding part of the submission noted that the current immigration situation had not been created by the Labour government but rather inherited and that it hoped something could be done about the situation.

The following year, despite confusion in the Chinese community as to who represented their interest, it was announced by the Minister of Immigration that fifty market-garden workers would be allowed to enter New Zealand. They would be selected on the basis of applications from their sponsors (relatives in New Zealand) which would be co-ordinated through the Federation of Chinese Commercial Growers and would be finally selected by the Immigration Department (Press, 23 July 1974). The Leader of the Opposition attacked the decision in Parliament and denied that there was any demand or need for such labour and that the plan was ill thought-out and could possibly lead to people 'being selected for political attitudes and the ability to introduce such attitudes into New Zealand' (ibid.). There was also an accusation of patronage, since the Secretary of the Chinese growers' organisation was also on the national executive of the Labour Party, but this was vehemently denied (Press, 25 July and 14 August 1974). The Leader of the Opposition also emphasised the last point and added that already the Chinese Embassy was pressuring local Chinese to leave the ACMC, which implied in his mind that some of the fifty immigrants would be sent to

New Zealand to subvert the local Chinese population (Sunday Times, 28 July 1974).

While the scheme went ahead, it was to take until September 1976 before the first immigrants arrived, a period sufficient for another change in government. When the National Party took office in 1975, there was obvious fear that the Labour Party agreement would be terminated but the new Minister of Immigration reluctantly agreed to honour the scheme while not allowing it to become a precedent (see Press, 17 March, 20 and 22 September 1976).

In the interim, the Hall projects continued to push ahead in Auckland and Wellington, but rising costs and inflation meant altered plans and more pressure on the respective communities to honour pledges and support the projects. The WCS & CC began construction of their project in April 1976 after two years' delay, but now heavily subsidised by the Ministry of Recreation and Sport, who had unexpectedly given them a grant of \$74,530.⁴⁸ The ACC, under pressure for funds and believing that their plan offered more than just a sports facility, were shocked by the event. When the announcement came, the president of the WCS & CC expressed complete surprise but emphasised in his appreciation for the grant the fact that his group 'represented the whole Chinese community' (Dominion, 9 January 1976). This blatant statement about the representativeness of the WCS & CC did not pass unnoticed, and at least some members of one of the affiliated organisations took umbrage at the declaration and sent a letter to their executive committee which included in its summary the major points of their argument:

We can summarize what we have said into the following points:

The Centre has no right to claim to be representative of the Chinese people in Wellington. The reasons are as follows:

1. The "Centre" has made no contribution to the Chinese people.
2. The "Centre" is completely devoid of Chinese culture.

3. The "Centre" shows no respect to other Chinese organizations nor to the Chinese community as a whole.
4. The "Centre" is not designed for the convenience of the Chinese people. Very often the facilities are rented out.
5. We declaim against the huge loans by the "Centre" under the name of "Chinese".
6. We recognize the Chinese Association as the only representative of the Chinese people in New Zealand. We declare that financial involvements of the "Centre" have nothing to do with the whole of the Chinese community nor with any other Chinese organization.

In the interest of our club (Tung Jung), we address this letter to the executive committee. We look forward to positive steps taken in the near future.

Yours faithfully

A group of Tung Jung members

(translated from the Chinese)⁴⁹

While some of the claims were obviously exaggerated, especially points 1, 2 and 3 in the summary, the crucial points were the right of representation and the Centre's relationship to other associations. It was, in fact, a return to the status quo, where the New Zealand Chinese Association was the recognised representative of all Chinese and each association had the right to its own autonomy. Despite the opposition and the escalating cost, which had risen from \$100,000 to over \$375,000 in 1977, the building was finished in March 1977 and opened in May (see EP, 28 January 1977). The following year the Auckland Chinese Community Centre was opened in Mangere near Auckland, again helped by a grant of \$30,000 from the Ministry of Recreation and Sport.⁵⁰ Two issues plagued the Auckland project however, one being the result of internal politics. This problem, according to informants, started because Chinese who were labelled as the 'left' had attempted to take over the executive of the organisation from the elders who had held the executive for a number of years. Faced with this prospect, a new executive was elected comprising mainly professionals and businessmen, but they have been unable to move the community any faster than their predecessors.

The same accusations about the influence of the left were to be found in other centres, especially in Wellington where the local branch of the New Zealand Chinese Association, the Tung Jung Association and the Seyip Association were deemed by some to have been taken over by the left, which was then proceeding to infiltrate the WCS & CC. Clearly from all reports, the New Zealand Chinese Association had come under new influence in Wellington, resulting in the Double Tenth celebrations, after a year of indecision (1973), being rescheduled as the Easter Sports Tournament, but it was hard to interpret this as anything more than the emergence of a new group of leaders who wanted to achieve credibility through their involvement with the associations. The criteria for identifying these people as part of the 'left' in the 1970s varied considerably from their counterparts in the 1950s, for it now seemed to be one of guilt-by-association rather than guilt by action. Many of those who are labelled as part of the 'left' have freely availed themselves of goods from China or actually sell them, while others have visited China and still others feel a much stronger attraction to their homeland. The range of feelings is extensive, as are the reasons of interest and in the end the fact becomes useful only as an aspect of gossip and accusation.

The Embassy of the PRC has, as is their policy, remained aloof from inter-associational arguments and from direct intervention in the community or its relationship with the New Zealand government. However, this has not stopped them from maintaining an interest and attending Chinese organisational meetings when invited. Friendship with local Chinese seems to have occurred on a personal basis and as such has led to certain people being identified as having ties with the Embassy or getting some benefits regarding trade licences, but little else has eventuated. In 1976 there were innuendos in a Listener article by

Vernon Wright that the WCS & CC had received \$40,000 from the Embassy, but this was vehemently denied both by the Secretary of the WCS & CC and by the Embassy, as was the suggestion that the project had received help from a Taiwan shipping company and the Taiwan government (see Listener, Vol. 84, No. 1929, 1976:14-15;⁵¹ and Listener, Vol. 85, No. 1937, 1977:12).

The unintended consequences of any so-called 'left' influence in particularly the Wellington community during the late 1970s, was felt most strongly by the ACMC and the members of the ACC organising committee, who felt slighted not only by the grant given to the WCS & CC but also sceptical about the detrimental influence the 'left' might have on their project (see page 553 and the Leader of the Opposition's statement on the ACC and the PRC Embassy).

This concern, plus the fact that the WCS & CC was already under construction, led to a massive effort in 1976 to raise more money for the ACC. The year began with the organisation of a 'China Night' by the ACMC to raise money for the new Wellington Town Hall, which was done to repay the city's 'hospitality and friendship' to the Chinese (EP, 1 March 1976). In September of the same year, two large bazaars were organised by the ACMC, which raised a total of \$44,000 (see EP, 6, 7, 10, 13 September 1976) and gave sufficient capital to allow the starting of construction in the same month (see EP, 2 September 1976). By the end of 1978, the first stage had been finished and the centre opened at a cost of \$500,000. The Department of Internal Affairs had contributed \$25,000 to the project by 1979, which removed the stigma of preferential treatment for the WCS & CC and the Auckland project.

During the time of their development, the Hall projects in Auckland and Wellington became a major topic of discussion in the Chinese communities all over New Zealand. They provided a delicate alliance between groups and a collective effort in the community at the time, but as much as it brought groups together it also provided the basis for disagreement. With the completion of the Halls, the sceptics were to some degree temporarily silenced, only to re-appear again when discussions of continuing maintenance of the facilities arose.

Regardless of the costs, however, they do provide facilities for the Chinese community, and they continue to function. The example they set in fact stimulated other centres to follow the pattern, and the Palmerston North, Dunedin and Christchurch Chinese communities all became involved in less grandiose but equally complex projects after a period when little, as far as community organisation, had been organised other than annual picnics. Each in turn, however, had difficulties relating in some cases to the re-emergence of subdued locality enmity, arguments over who had authority to organise such activities and fund-raising, a certain reluctance on the part of elders to let the younger people take over authority and a host of other problems that have to do with the mechanics of building or buying a facility for community-wide use.⁵²

In Christchurch, as noted before, there had been no branch of the New Zealand Chinese Association since the early 1940s, but in 1961 the central executive sent a representative to Christchurch to re-establish the organisation. Six years later the branch attempted to form a committee for fund-raising in order to build facilities for the local community, but it failed. At that time the local population was approximately only 500 people, and it was not until ten years later, with twice the population, that the local branch of the New Zealand

Chinese Association assigned to a sub-committee of four the task of investigating the possibility of getting a community centre. In 1977 the sub-committee set about its task in earnest and visited between 120 and 140 families, hoping to get pledges of \$1,000 from each family. They had been given the authority by the branch to ascertain the feasibility of the project and to arrange finance through the pledges.⁵³

The Annual Report of the New Zealand Chinese Association, Canterbury Branch, announced the "Community Project" in 1978, and the sub-committee justified the need for such a centre in the following:

Such a centre is a necessity for central communication; for our Chinese school; and for a permanent venue catering for general functions and youth recreation.

(Annual Report, 1978:37).

This was further supported in an article by a person who described himself as an 'oldie':

In my opinion, we Chinese here have got nothing to hide, nothing to be ashamed of, and perhaps a lot to be proud of. Most of us have managed to adapt ourselves into the European way of life quite well, and since the days of the gold rushes, a lot of environmental changes must have taken place within the Chinese community in New Zealand; but our attitudes and our traditions have dogmatically remained basically the same. Our Oriental culture is being perpetuated by the existence of an organisation called the New Zealand Chinese Association, an event called the Annual Chinese Sports Tournament, and, insignificant though it may be, a little food item called 'rice'. Even my little six-year-old girls seems to prefer her rice dish. In fact, to most of our Chinese people, a meal is not a meal without that bowl of rice. Then there is the magic of our Chinese cooking; and hence the thriving business of all Chinese restaurants everywhere. Those are the things which will help to constantly remind us of our Oriental heritage, which we must endeavour to preserve.

The Chinese community in Christchurch have already been hoping that one day we may be able to build a suitable permanent structure which we can identify ourselves with the benefits of our Chinese culture, and at the same time the general public at large from all over Christchurch (or from all over New Zealand for that matter) can share our facilities by taking part in cultural, recreational and sporting activities. Such a forlorn wish is now no longer just a pipe dream!

With collective enthusiasm, cooperation and determination, and for the sake of our future generation, we must try our utmost to succeed.

So when the time comes for fund-raising, in preparation for the building of our long awaited Chinese Cultural and Sporting Centre, I sincerely hope that the generosity of everyone concerned will match the spirit of our RICH CHINESE CULTURE.

(Annual Report, 1978:34 in English)

The sub-committee did their work thoroughly, drawing on the professional Chinese in the community for legal, accounting, engineering and architectural help and also enlisting the support of their local Member of Parliament for help in getting land.⁵⁴ The land was made available through an arrangement made between the M.P. and the Minister of Lands and Survey, and the building cost was estimated to be around \$100,000. In their enthusiasm, the sub-committee organised a large fund-raising banquet where local members of the Chinese community and local dignitaries were in attendance, but the total raised was only \$250. The committee realised that it was in financial trouble, unable to raise the money for the building. Lands and Survey, who had provided the land, became impatient and wanted to know whether it was going to be used, and the local residents in the area where the proposed building was to be erected threatened to barricade the street and stop the project. The sub-committee had planned to meet with the residents and explain the project as they had done to their own community members, but before it could be done they decided to drop the project. The local association branch was unperturbed: they had no financial or other commitment at the time.

In 1979 the same sub-committee with renewed vigour proposed an even larger scheme costing about \$400,000 with elaborate sports and meeting facilities. The Chinese community was to raise \$200,000 through pledges and a loan, and the government Labour Subsidy Scheme would match

it with an approximately equal amount through the provision of labour for the project. The community was even more enthusiastic, despite the size of the project, and the sub-committee had no trouble getting pledges for \$110,000 by September. When attempts were made to get finance, however, none was available, and without land they had no chance of raising further money. The plan therefore lapsed.

At the end of 1979 a disappointed sub-committee re-directed its sights to existing facilities and old halls that were for sale, thinking that this would be more realistic. In December they found a hall that was available and within their financial capability. The sub-committee contacted ninety-six families to come and look at it and twenty-six came, but the committee was sufficiently confident and went ahead with an offer of \$68,000 for the building. The offer was accepted, and the committee arranged for a special meeting of the local association to announce they were going ahead. At the meeting, however, some members of the local branch took exception to the way the sub-committee had gone ahead without consulting them. The opposition of older Chinese maintained they had been bulldozed into a decision made by the sub-committee even though that committee had been empowered by the local branch and its members were also members of the Association.

While considerable anger between the two sides persisted, it has faded with both groups now cooperating but the financial side of the community centre is handled entirely by the Canterbury Chinese Sports and Cultural Centre (Incorporated).

The Association branch supports the community centre on a purely voluntary basis. If money is needed for a particular purpose or if organisation is required, the Association may willingly come to its aid, but at another time when a decision has to be made relevant to the community centre, the Association will defer responsibility to the centre committee, refusing to become involved.

When one asks about the argument over the Hall, it is explained as a split between young and old, with the latter reluctant to let go of their authority and power.⁵⁵ The sub-committee, to them, was seen as a group of ambitious young people who wanted to have their own way and had organised their own centre under the wing of the Association, yet separate. The separation was similar to that which had occurred in Auckland in the early 1960s, and there, as in Christchurch, there was a sense in which local community groups wanted to be part of, but at the same time retain financial autonomy from, the New Zealand Chinese Association.

The committee that runs the Christchurch centre is now made up of members of the New Zealand Chinese Association, but they are young men and women, and it is the Association branch that provides the role of guardian. As it is, the young can serve their time as members of the Centre committee, where they can innovate and develop, but it will always be under the more or less watchful eye of the elders. Now that the hall exists, despite its shortcomings in terms of space and adequate provisions for Chinese language classes, both young and old in the community give it their support. The language classes, considered a vital part of the local community, are taught at more appropriate venues and now, after some years of experimenting with formal teachers, are run by roster system of parents who both write and teach the lessons, including songs and other activities to keep up interest in learning.

Both the centre and the local branch of the Association are, by virtue of membership, part of the national organisation, but the New Zealand Chinese Association exists as a body only during the Annual General Meeting to which, despite rumours of disinterest, all

twenty-six branches send delegates. Although the hegemony of Wellington and Auckland is still apparent, with their nine and seven delegates respectively compared to three from Christchurch, there has been no attempt by either centre to force decisions on local branches, although branches admit to being continuously wary of this happening. The national organisation has no membership levy and allows branches to collect their own membership fee, which is done with considerable seriousness in a few branches including Christchurch, where membership lists are published each year. Similarly, financial matters devolve to local branches, although the national body expects to be told of decisions if not consulted beforehand. The relationship of the branch to the national Association is much like the previously described relationship between the Centre and the local branch in Christchurch; the latter in both cases acts as a watch-dog over the former. In a sense, as the statement from 'Oldie' maintained, the New Zealand Chinese Association is still acknowledged as the parent body. It acts as benefactor of the annual sports tournament and annually acknowledges the academic scholarship of its younger generation by providing prizes for the highest School Certificate results on a national basis.⁵⁶

The Easter Sports Tournament is still the major event of the year for New Zealand Chinese, as it is the one occasion, other than large weddings, which brings a large portion of the young Chinese population together in a major centre for sports competitions. In most years the larger centres have dominated the competitions, but this does not deter the participation of other centres nor the enjoyment of the activity. As in the past, however, the concentration on sports competitions still provides a basis for disagreement. This emphasis, which has dominated the annual sports tournaments for over sixty years, aside from the speeches and annual ball, has led some to comment on the lack of cultural

activity. While the critics would never under-estimate the necessity for sports, they feel that there is also sufficient cultural interest and ability in the community to have other competitions, for example, in art or speech-making. However, these comments come from middle-aged Chinese, and it is not clear that the younger members would favour or attempt to organise alternative cultural competitions. While in the past such suggestions by elders would have been implemented regardless of others' opinions, now there appears to be much more discussion between age-groups and far less stern direction from the older generation. If there was bitterness in the 1950s and 1960s between the young and their parents, the 1970s have seen reconciliation (see Fraser and Ng, 1958).

In this last period discussed (Chapters 9 and 10) which covered just over thirty years, the Chinese community of New Zealand was able to resolve successfully a legacy of problems which derived both from internal and external relations of the community.

Finally in the post-war era, the Chinese were accepted as an ethnic minority in New Zealand which changed their status from that of being a problem group to that of permanent residents signalled especially with the removal of the poll tax provisions in 1944 and finally by the restoration of naturalisation rights in 1948. The community that received this acceptance was by the end of the war considerably changed, especially demographically. Increasing numbers of families had been reunited and growing numbers of children were present in the community. Significantly occupations were beginning to change as they tended to reflect the more normative pattern of New Zealand in contrast to the formerly stereotypic Chinese occupations. Both children and students of Chinese families resident in New Zealand had in this last period considerable experience within the New Zealand school system and this with occupational diversification meant increased

contact with and influence of the European dominant society. Coincident with this situation was the spreading acceptance of assimilation on the part of the dominant host society which was seen as the desired goal for all ethnic minorities. Unfortunately the concept was accepted and turned into policy without careful thought about the implications which presented a formidable threat to the Chinese who already witnessed the growing gap between generations in their own community. Increasingly both government and conventional wisdom hoped that the Chinese minority would be totally assimilated and New Zealand education, the severing of familial ties with China, permanent residence and the absence of visits to China would speed up the process.

Besides the above pressures the internal relationships of the Chinese community had also been left in a state of conflict.

A number of problems gradually emerged after the war which indicated that not only were there new groups with special needs in the community but also that the existing associations under an ageing leadership and in some cases diminishing status, manifested little flexibility in response to new problems. Differences in generations, economic position, political ideology, a growing distinction between rural and urban Chinese and differences of opinion over the direction the community should take, led to factions. Arguments emerged as to the viability of continued support for the Republic of China or the possibility of recognising the PRC. Similarly there were disagreements over who controlled the community and who had the right to exercise power or negotiate with the host society. The national Association and Chinese leaders came under criticism despite their long period of activity on behalf of the community during the war years. There was also uncertainty

about the role of sport versus culture as a means of both holding the young people together and maintaining the general integrity of the community. Language retention increasingly became a concern as younger Chinese involved in the European school system and drawn out of their own communities lost their language skills.

Given the mounting problems a number of changes appeared in the community which attempted to resolve some of the problems and disagreements. Sports clubs, active during the war in each centre put pressure on the national Association in 1948 to change Double Tenth from a cultural/political event to a national sports tournament. The move was supported by strong feelings that this would integrate a community spread all over New Zealand including most importantly a growing number of young people. The Chinese Anglican and Baptist Churches both, after 1945, developed active campaigns to rejuvenate their churches and provide facilities for their younger parishoners. The emphasis here, while acknowledging sport, was on Chinese culture albeit under the aegis of Christianity. The Consulate of the Republic of China, especially in the early 1950s began a conscious attempt to maintain support for the Republic, reinforced by the Anti-Communist League activity. This group however, was matched by the Chinese Cultural Society whose legitimacy in the community was questionable yet tacitly accepted by those who still maintained at least an interest in China.

In 1949 a Chinese growers' Journal was published which had a national circulation and produced news not only for growers but the whole Chinese community.

This situation where a number of groups represent various responses to the dilemmas confronting the community allowed the emergence of a new leadership in the community and another set of problems.

The issue of emphasis on either sport or culture as appropriate means to maintain a sense of community led to competing solutions in terms of the types of community halls that were to characterise the developing communities. The unresolved political situation led to accusation and counter accusation as ideology became a vehicle for criticism. Older leaders felt threatened as there were calls for communities to move faster in providing facilities and yet there was also scepticism of those who chose to be leaders, which became a topic of much discussion. Despite the situation, by the 1960s a number of events stimulated innovation in the community.

In 1965 the conflict that had plagued the role of leadership in the national Association emerged into the open through the growers' Journal and a major argument that had been brewing since the war was resolved leaving the Association intact. In the following years three major hall projects appeared in the largest urban Chinese communities. These emerged as community projects under community organisations but attempted to avoid the hegemony of any other associations, or implication in politics while attempting to resolve the dilemma of how best to articulate Chinese culture in New Zealand. All three projects also provided a medium whereby a young leadership now economically well off exerted its power over the community. While the projects did not resolve the former problems (excluding the external political one resolved by New Zealand recognition of the PRC), they did provide a means whereby the politics of the local community, that is the power and authority assumed by the new leaders, could have a clear focus which involved all members of the community, cutting across existing associations. Whatever the ideals that each project subscribed to and no matter how much these were violated all the projects were completed; furthermore they provided an example which was followed

by other small communities who, in turn sometimes with as many difficulties but without the extent of expense, provided their own facilities. The significance of the changes were that they produced a new set of structures with a new leadership but without the demise of the existing structures in the community. The new community associations paralleled existing locality associations and branches of the national association. The situation, while not solving the problems concerned with the maintenance of Chinese culture within the community, provided structures whereby power and authority in the community could and can be articulated through a number of structures each with a degree of financial and political autonomy. Regardless of age, economic position or profession the existing situation provided a medium for both conflict and cooperation within the community at large, while at the same time providing the means of a united front for external relations. Notably only a minimal number of organisations have discontinued, including the CKT, the Anti-Communist League, the Chinese Cultural Society and the smaller groups that have been amalgamated into the hall projects. The KMT has also totally declined as a viable organisation although individuals remain supporters of the Republic of China in the midst of those who would rather acknowledge their cultural links to their homeland.

The results therefore of nearly 118 years residence in New Zealand is more than survival. The Chinese community, through its ability to manipulate organisations has successfully provided the basis for the maintenance of ethnicity and the transmission of power and authority in the community in a context which at times presented formidable opposition to their presence.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 10

- 1 It is not clear what effects the loss of contact with China had, although older informants have talked about a CCP-influenced group within the community as early as the 1950s. This group is also described as 'left-leaning', but it is never clear what this meant, and in the late 1950s it might merely have meant a concern with continued interest in China or a return to the support of Sun Yat-sen as the founder of modern China, which would have conflicted with the then current KMT allegiance to Taiwan and Chiang Kai-shek.

- 2 The Auckland Chinese Hall was the first edition of what was to become the Auckland Chinese Journal, a monthly publication. The first issue commemorated the first anniversary of the founding and opening of the hui sor. The sources will be abbreviated to ACH and ACJ respectively hereafter. Both publications are written in Chinese so all quotations and references have been translated.

- 3 The "Auckland Chinese Hall" is translated into Chinese as hui sor, which makes its position in the community clear. It is, at least nominally, an organisation which stands between hui guan (community association) and gong sor (clan association or public hall). It is a community hall.

- 4 The organisation also had a badge or emblem which symbolised the structural position occupied by the group and was described by the designer as follows:

The badge is composed of two bunches of rice paddy. These two bunches of rice make a circle and are tied together with a red rope.

My purpose in using bunches of rice was to highlight the main theme of the organisation. Although we are far away from our motherland, we still take rice as our source of life. Thus, we should always remember this place which grows rice. What's more, we should have the strength to acknowledge that we are a nation and that rice is our staple food.

The two branches of rice go in different directions, though. This means that though we may have different directions in terms of ideas, beliefs, religion, occupation, we all stand together with overseas Chinese. We hope all of us could be tied together with 'sincere' hearts. That's why there is a red rope at the bottom of the two bunches of rice.

The emblem is not a closed circle but rather a half circle. This implies that our association is not closed but always open for any Chinese to participate. Every member has the right to express his viewpoint.

(ACH, 1961:7-8)

- 5 The initial estimates for renovation had by this time increased from the £7,000-£8,000 initially suggested.
- 6 The hall project was not without its opponents. The New Zealand Chinese Growers' Journal published a brief exchange in 1959 between two opponents then accused of being part of the 'left' and the Hall committee responded. The major part of the critique was levelled against the economic commitment made to the project and to the Chinese Association branch in Auckland. After two exchanges, the committee responded with the following:

The two gentlemen criticizing the financial set-up of the hall should make helpful suggestions for raising funds rather than saying how funds cannot be raised. The committee knows that you gentlemen have not contributed a cent, so presumably neither of you will be using the facilities.

(NZCGMJ, 31 September 1959)

- 7 Two men were assigned this responsibility, one from the Mosgiel-Outram growing area outside Dunedin and the other from Pukekohe. These two areas constituted the largest areas for Chinese growers in the South and North Island respectively. Both men were leaders in their local communities and the one from Pukekohe received the nomination as the Labour candidate for Franklin in 1963.
- 8 The levy had been 2/6 per acre per year to be collected in each growing area and sent to the head office, but there were provisions in the rules to raise it to 5/-. Because all areas contributed sporadically and the collection was not routinised in any way, however, there were always areas which elected to pay under the old rate. In February 1960, for instance, the rate was returned to the 2/6 per acre (NZCGMJ, 29 February 1960), but in June 1965 increased to 3/- per acre (NZCGMJ, 1 June 1965). There were other problems attached to the levy and its collection, and often differences in locality hindered collection. Seyip collectors had a hard time collecting from Jung Sing and vice versa, for instance, which led to a radical suggestion at one time that a Jung Sing person from one growing area should be sent to another to collect the levy and the same for other locality representatives (see NZCGMJ, 1 June 1964). Areas also varied in their degree of cooperativeness. Otaki and Levin with small farms and small crops were least helpful to the organisation, as was the case with Hawkes Bay. Gisborne was the best organised, and Otago, Manawatu, Pukekohe and Auckland were all good. Christchurch supported the organisation but never contributed, since there were only three growers in the district, while Oamaru organised themselves into a local group.

- 9 Two issues were at stake here, one concerning the supply of fertilizer after the war and the other concerning the price of sacks and cases prior to the war. In the first case, joint representation was made to government over the supply of fertilizer, but the Chinese contended that the European growers were in collusion with the fertilizer manufacturers and were restricting access to fertilizer by the Chinese. The latter situation involved a joint committee of both Chinese and European growers that got a ceiling put on the price of sacks and cases. One other issue that was still unresolved at the time was the charge levied by the Auction on new growers bringing their produce to the auction. This was also opposed, but the outcome is unknown.
- 10 The news he was referring to was usually included in the beginning of the Journal and covered events in Russia, China, Taiwan, and the United States which were of interest to the Chinese. Once the Minister had made this statement, all foreign news stopped, and the new editor who took over in April 1960, changed the editorial policy accordingly.
- 11 Tien Fang Chen departed in December 1958, stating in his farewell speech that, '...I can honestly say that New Zealand is one of the best places in terms of the treatment of the Chinese', and that he 'praised the behaviour and standards set by the New Zealand Chinese' and the 'way Chinese built up their community and their support for the Chinese government' (NZCGMJ, 31 December 1958). He was followed by Daniel Yu Tang Liu, described in the grower's Journal as a Cantonese Christian. At the meetings held to welcome him, particularly in Wellington and Auckland, the Chinese churches were in attendance as well as representatives of all the other associations including the Chinese Anti-Communist League (see NZCGMJ, 31 March 1959 and 30 May 1959).
- 12 Information from informants suggests that the Security Intelligence Service watched this group very carefully. Evidence for this was the fact that at least one member was refused naturalisation because of his affiliation with the group. He was, according to the same informants, told why his naturalisation was refused and was even asked for a membership list of the organisation.
- 13 In 1966, according to one informant, the Chinese Cultural Society and the New Zealand China Friendship Society celebrated October 1st together. At this time a considerable portion of the latter's membership was Chinese, estimated to be 400 or 500 in the early 1960s.
- 14 T.A.B. is the abbreviation for Totalisator Agency Board established by the Gaming Amendment Act 1949, which, by 1950 had devised a government approved Off Course Betting Scheme for horse racing and trotting (see Totalisator Agency Board, 1958).

- 15 In the Double Tenth Sports Tournament programme for 1963, the Dunedin editor also drew the attention of the readers to the problems he saw the community facing, which complemented those expressed in the grower's Journal. A part not translated into Chinese stated that:

The Chinese people in New Zealand must inevitably be undergoing some process of assimilation into the occidental way of life. In most instances assimilation is good. However, if assimilation means the complete obliteration of the remaining amount of Chinese philosophy that is in us then drastic action must be taken to safeguard the preservation of our philosophical ideals. Should the future generations of Chinese lose our valued philosophical identity it will be no fault of the younger Chinese, but the incompetence and the negligence of the past and present generations.

(Annual Chinese Sports Tournament
Programme, October 1963:7)

To facilitate a discussion of these problems, the organisers of the programme set aside time for a small conference (ibid.).

- 16 Two Chinese scientists invited by the New Zealand-China Society, whose aim was to 'encourage cultural and trade relations with China', were refused visas by the New Zealand government in 1964 (EP, 13 June 1964). Nearly three years later the same organisation called upon the New Zealand government to recognise and support the recognition by the United Nations (EP, 13 May 1967). In 1966 New Zealand had bought over £1,000,000 worth of goods from China, and China had bought £3,000,000 worth from New Zealand (ibid.).
- 17 Criticism had been levelled at both the Journal and the Association, the former for not including political news and for writing articles that were hard to understand, and the latter for doing so little. The editor's response was that a little difficult reading was a good thing and that if the Association went then who would oppose the European growers and the Federation.
- 18 The Journal also noted that the Tung Jung Association would be celebrating Ch'ing Ming by visiting the graves at the Karori Cemetery in Wellington. About thirty or forty visited the graves, and 160 attended a banquet at their hall in the evening. This was curious in that it had never published this information before, although it has been verified by informants that particularly this association had celebrated this occasion since its founding. One interpretation is that the locality associations were responding to the conflict evident in the community, offering traditional solidarity as they had done in the past.

- 19 The amount was initially set at £50 for the student getting the highest marks in four subjects. This represents the first occasion of an Association rewarding, particularly young people, for activity within European society. Formerly the only way of acknowledging their success was to send them to Taiwan for university education.
- 20 The concern for youth was not an exaggerated need. In 1966, 44% of Chinese males and 48% of Chinese females in New Zealand were under twenty years (see Appendix XXXV).
- 21 The initial estimate for the project required £7,500, and by 1961 £400 had already been raised through bazaars (usually made up of donated goods, food, and merchandise from Chinese shops and families), film shows and dispensing with wreaths at funerals (see EP, 12 August 1961). At the time it was estimated that there were about 300 Chinese Anglicans in New Zealand, of whom thirty-five families lived in Wellington-Hutt areas.
- 22 New Zealand changed its currency from Pounds to Dollars on 27 July 1967.
- 23 These weddings in a small country like New Zealand also serve as indicators of wealth by conspicuous consumption, and some younger informants have jokingly described them as very competitive affairs.
- 24 This was, however, not the only reason rural students were shunned. Some have maintained that it had more to do with the fact that rural Chinese were seen somehow as backward and lacking 'culture'. They were also not part of the fairly close social networks that had built up amongst young people in the urban centres who had the benefit of youth groups and sports in their leisure time, which were far less frequent opportunities for rural children, especially in market-garden families.
- 25 In June 1967 it was decided that the New Zealand Chinese Growers' Journal would change from a monthly to a bi-monthly journal due to the increasing costs faced by the publication (see NZCGMJ, August/July 1967).
- 26 The organisation had originally planned to open a school at the time of buying the hall, but it had been postponed due to financial problems. When it did open, it was a free school which cost \$2,000 to start with volunteer teachers. Its main objective was:

...to let every overseas Chinese child understand the importance of being a Chinese and also understand our national pride, our history and our deep culture.

(Auckland Chinese Journal, November, 1969).

In 1968 there were 180 students, which increased to 210 in 1969. They were divided into four groups equivalent to divisions within Chinese schools on the basis of their language capability.

- 27 This Ambassador, Konsin Shah, has been described by informants as a capable man who, unlike his predecessors, had only a high-school education. Before appointment to New Zealand, he had been an Attaché to Chiang Kai-shek, and his father-in-law was Minister of Foreign Affairs. His main contribution was to help New Zealand break into the Taiwan market, which from all accounts he accomplished with some success. His involvement in local community affairs, however, has been, since his departure in 1972, the cause of much debate.
- 28 Following these promises, which were partially honoured, there was a political revival in Wellington. In March 1969 the New Zealand Anti-Communist Union, the KMT and the two local branches of the New Zealand Chinese Association put on a special film show to celebrate the 29 March, 1910 Revolutionary Memorial and "The Youth Day" of the Republic of China. The following month the Republic of China sent a number of their naval ships to New Zealand to reciprocate a visit by a New Zealand frigate in 1968. The same groups as above organised a large reception for the visiting boats and called on all local Chinese to donate money to defray the costs.
- 29 The Auckland Chinese Journal was organised, according to its first issue, to help the Chinese school and to provide a medium for essays, reports and compositions (Auckland Chinese Journal, November 1969). The journal was to be free as an organ of the association, but was specifically not to publish politically factional articles or character assassinations (ibid.).
- 30 References to the Auckland Chinese Journal will be hereafter abbreviated to (ACJ). All passages quoted have been translated from the Chinese.
- 31 An article in the same issue relating the history of the Tai Tung group also mentioned a similar group that was attached to the Chinese Anglican Church in Wellington stimulated by the arrival of a new minister and his wife who came from Hong Kong in 1969. The article stated that, unlike the Tai Tung, most of the Wellington group had been born in New Zealand, and while some were from China they had come when very young (ACJ, No. 3, May 1970). This led to a differing quality of performance, but their aims could be seen to be essentially the same.
- 32 Using available Census statistics on income, this amount represents 9% of the average yearly Chinese male income and 14% of the average yearly Chinese female income (see Appendix XXXVI).
- 33 This is just one version of the sequence of events that surrounded the hall projects. Largely it is made up of explanations from a number of informants involved in both projects. However, it is not the only version, as Appendix XXXVII indicates. This will be discussed later (see page 548).
- 34 The ACMC is the abbreviated form of the Anglican Chinese Mission Church.

- 35 The Seyip Association was already making plans in 1970 for a gymnasium and clubrooms to be built on land they had already acquired. In the same year they also arranged for a cooking expert from Hong Kong to tour New Zealand giving seventy-five demonstrations aimed at encouraging people to use New Zealand foods for Chinese cooking when fresh Chinese ingredients were not available. The money received from this enterprise was to go towards the new facilities (see Eastern Suburbs Sentinel, 10 June 1970, and Dominion, 29 October 1970).
- 36 The Central Daily News corrected the statement in their December issue (Wong, 1973:146).
- 37 In October 1971, a month before the Baptist Church affiliated with the WCS & CC they had held a Chinese fair to raise money for the extension of their building to provide room for a Sunday School. They had collected over \$3,000 (EP, 18 October 1971).
- 38 According to the current owners of the company, which was started to develop trade with Taiwan, the company had two very bad years but in 1974 turned over \$4 million in trade. At that time it exported sheepmeat, live heifers and processed meat to Taiwan (see National Business Review, 18 June 1979). The Pacific Span Trust gave a grant of \$15,000 to the project (Wellington Chinese Sports and Cultural Centre, Progress Report, April 1976).
- 39 According to informants, a considerable amount of bad feeling was added to the already tense situation when the WCS & CC issued their proposal before the ACC. The ACC accused the WCS & CC of claiming to be a Chinese cultural centre but failing to print their brochure in Chinese. Although it was suggested that the bilingual ACC brochure tried to cover all the omissions of the WCS & CC brochure, it was denied.
- 40 This had also been the case, according to some informants, as regards the Northern Football Club in Wellington, which had been started by the Chinese Community with their own funds but by the 1970s was almost entirely European.
- 41 The Free China Society was an organisation operating in Wellington in 1970. It was essentially started to maintain ties between Taiwan and New Zealand, particularly in the area of trade. The Mayor of Wellington was a member and so was Sir Clifford Plimmer, who later became president of Trade Span; Sir Arnold Nordemeyer was a patron, and the president was E. Hill, a former mayor of New Plymouth (see NZL, Vol. 85, 27 November 1976:14).
- 42 The man who initiated the whole confrontation achieved a high public profile because of his action which, although supported by the New Zealand Chinese Association, was criticised in private as extroverted behaviour unacceptable to the Chinese community. It was agreed that he achieved a very notable change, but that the way he did it was improper.

- 43 Greif had done his study for a Ph.D. at the University of California, Berkeley, but the results of the survey had already been presented in Taiwan, Australia and at the University of Waikato in New Zealand. Greif had also, according to the Otago Daily Times, contacted the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation and offered to be interviewed after his return from Taiwan and later to present the results of his survey, but neither offer had been accepted, which led Greif to suggest that the Corporation had 'black-listed' him (see ODT, 15 July, 1972).
- 44 Several articles and letters appeared in the press after the table-tennis team departed. There were letters exchanged between Wellington and the Otago Daily Times over various aspects of their article and also a lengthy discussion in the New Zealand Tablet, which went over much the same material (see ODT, 20 July 1973 and the New Zealand Tablet, 26 July, 1972).
- 45 Informants have claimed that this statement was nonsense, since few local Chinese were interested in the game. Most Chinese who attended, both in Auckland and Wellington, were there out of curiosity.
- 46 The Prime Minister, however, did not welcome the players at the official reception and instead allowed the Minister of Internal Affairs to perform the duty (EP, 17 July 1972).
- 47 There was also an Auckland Chinese businessman, Ian Bing, who supported the contention of the New Zealand Chinese Association and stood in opposition to the submissions made by his fellow countrymen from Auckland (see pp.552 - 3). His particular reasons for opposition to any change included the following points:
- Without a doubt, we Chinese have developed a good reputation as law-abiding, conscientious, and industrious citizens in this country but this does not alter the underlying fact that, despite these qualities, we are not the ideal type of immigrants that this country needs.
- We are aware, very deeply, that in saying this we make an extremely unpopular observation, but nonetheless a very truthful one - and we feel you will not deny our honesty in upholding principle in this respect.
- They [the Chinese] do not condone the idea of integration and assimilation. Deep down in every Chinese heart, it is his or her desire that their children marry one of their own kind - that they retain certain basic features of our own culture and tradition.
- ...
- We uphold the principle that Chinese children should be permitted to join parents, wives their husbands, or husbands their wives; and that immediate relatives should join their folk subject to the usual procedures and approval - bearing in mind that such should not be a lever, the thin end of the wedge, for the mass movement of Chinese to this country.

The past immigration policy has been a satisfactory one and, due to the restriction of numbers [with respect to the Chinese], the same policy has been to the benefit of both Chinese and European communities. Indeed it has helped create and cement harmonious friendship between the two.

(Abridged version from New Zealand Truth, 2 October 1973)

- 48 In 1977 the WCS & CC, the ACC, the Chinese Baptist Church, and the three locality associations in Wellington received a portion of the \$81,000 remaining as assets of the defunct CKT. The formula for the division of the amount gave almost half of it to the two hall projects, dividing the rest between the other organisations excluding the New Zealand Chinese Association.
- 49 For the complete text of the letter see Appendix XXXVIII.
- 50 The Auckland Chinese Journal discontinued publication in 1973. At that time, the land for the new hall had already been purchased from a member who owned it as a market garden. This was in 1971.
- 51 This article acknowledged that there were groups in New Zealand that maintained allegiance or at least interest in both China and Taiwan and interpreted the two hall projects as a reflection of this division. Particularly, it traced the development of the WCS & CC, linking it to the former Ambassador from Taiwan and then seeing it change its allegiance with the arrival of the new Embassy. Unfortunately, there is a confusion in the article between the interests of individuals and the role of organisations as well as a paucity of information on the development of either the WCS & CC or the ACC project.
- 52 In Dunedin the issue of conflict had to do with the purchase of the facilities. At the time the project was started, the old but sound Chinese Presbyterian Church was offered to the Chinese Association branch for \$36,000, but the Association committee turned it down, resulting in the resignation of two members who thought the building, being centrally located and of historic interest to the Chinese, adequate. The committee instead bought a house outside Dunedin for \$25,000 and spent \$15,000 fixing it up. The building is adequate but small and of limited use.
- 53 Using available Census statistics on income, this amount would represent 13% of the average yearly income for a Chinese male and 24% of the average yearly income for a Chinese female in 1976 (see Appendix XXXVI).
- 54 The increased population and the presence of professionals in the community were important contributions to both the changing leadership and ideas in the community. This point can be generalised to other centres, where one also finds young professionals taking an active part in their community for the first time. In the period between 1971 and 1976, Chinese classified as Professional/Technical in the Census returns increased from 368 males and 138 females in 1971 to 868 males and 303 females in 1976 (see Appendix XXXIX).

- 55 Although it is seldom discussed or admitted openly, there is some feeling of locality enmity in Christchurch. The community in the 1970s and 1980s is predominantly Seyip, but formerly, according to some informants, it was divided equally between Seyip and Jung Sing, which was also used as an excuse for inactivity in the past.
- 56 First prize is \$100 with \$70 for second, \$60 for third and \$50 for fourth. There are also ten other prizes of \$10 each.

PART V

CHAPTER 11

CONCLUSIONS

In the previous chapters the Chinese community in New Zealand has been discussed not only in terms of an historical account but also as a developing community, or more accurately an ethnic group that has articulated its own needs in order to survive in a sometimes extremely antagonistic milieu. The term which best describes mechanisms used in this process of survival for the Chinese community is political ethnicity.

In this conclusion I want to draw attention to the two major points that this study commenced with. The first is the notion of context, or the actual history of events which circumscribe the history of the community itself and the three inter-related spheres of activity. These, as noted in the first chapter, have been traced out chronologically to provide a basis for the discussion of the analytical points. The second point relates specifically, therefore, to the analytical points which have to do with the cyclical developments in the segmentary system of the New Zealand Chinese community and the use of political ethnicity as a means of describing what occurs in this cyclical process.

The Making of a Chinese Community

Chinese migrants in New Zealand appeared at a crucial time in the development of the young colony as it experienced a gold rush and the change from provincial to central government which attempted to grapple with the problems of an ailing economy. The Chinese initially arrived in small numbers, invited by businessmen and protected by the law to be involved in the declining gold-mining enterprise, then in larger numbers uninvited, opposed and increasingly without protection to mine for gold and take up other occupations. While the opposition was vociferous and seemingly capable of eradicating a Chinese minority, it never was sufficiently organised or institutionalised to effect total exclusion.

The Chinese in the gold fields for their part quickly organised, not only to mine claims efficiently, but also to provide a network of communities complete with businesses to supply the needs of the miners, a move not anticipated by European businessmen, who saw their involvement in this role as justification for the invitation extended to the Chinese in the first place.

Within two years of their arrival, the Chinese had issued a petition to help expedite the apprehension of a European who had murdered a Chinese miner, and within five years Chinese merchants had opposed criticism of their role by drawing European attention to their contributions to customs duty and the general business of the community.

Simultaneously in the 1870-71 period, two opposing strains of thought appeared concerning the presence of Chinese in New Zealand. One was expressed in the guise of a government committee set up to satisfy the growing opposition to their presence and the other in negotiations by representatives of the same government to hire Chinese

labour for capital works, specifically railroad construction, despite opposition by a majority of provinces consulted. The government committee for its part recommended that there was no urgency for the exclusion of Chinese, but the railroad employment scheme became the source of a court case involving not only the European contractors but also the Chinese labour contractor and his disgruntled employees.

At the time, there was obviously sufficient support amongst some government members as representatives of the wealthy to tolerate a Chinese presence either for labour or as a small minority who would eventually return to China. However, neither the positive committee report nor the court case over the employment of Chinese labour helped the position of the Chinese. The report was only thinly sprinkled with facts about the New Zealand Chinese community, so decisions after 1871 were made on the basis of generalities, and the event of the court case deterred any further major attempts to employ Chinese labour. More importantly, both situations provided an occasion to gain an understanding of the Chinese community which could have been modified through time, but in fact no such task was seriously undertaken nor would be in the future, which meant that knowledge of the Chinese community, henceforth, was largely a product of hearsay and generalisations based on feelings and cursory observation. Ten years later the Chinese population in the gold fields of Otago had doubled, and it was clear that the positive comments in the 1871 report were less capable of being supported in the face of an economic depression, unemployment and the emergence of organised labour and trade unions opposed to any person perceived as competition. The increased Chinese population, however, while having the detrimental effect of alarming Europeans, had the positive effect of allowing a matrix of social relationships to be established in the gold fields between groups of Chinese miners and their local centres

attached to goldfield towns. It took only ten years after their arrival for the first locality association to organise (1869), and thirteen years later this association organised the Ch'eung Shin Tong to send the disinterred remains of deceased miners back to their villages in China. The Chinese were sufficiently organised in various areas to not only maintain their contact with home but also sustain some cultural and recreational activity that punctuated the monotony and hardship of mining. Such activities included the various celebrations of Chinese festival days, gambling and to some extent the smoking of opium, the last of which became the cause of a merchant association which aimed to rid the community of the habit by restricting importation.

While the majority of Chinese had organised themselves in the goldfields there had also been a gradual move by some into other areas of New Zealand, and although they faced little active opposition, a growing anti-Chinese argument developed in the European-dominant society. The argument essentially took all the previous positive characteristics listed in the 1871 report, including industriousness, frugality, morality, ability to adapt and their inevitable repatriation, and turned them on their head. The Chinese were undesirable because they were industrious, unfairly competitive because they were adaptable, of questionable morality with too much ability, and now apparently were not going back to China as formerly anticipated.

Since the validity of either set of arguments was never proved in any substantive sense, considerable power could be achieved by their use, as evidenced by the activity of government and segments of the dominant society in the pursuit of exclusion.

The Chinese, for their part, faced a growing hostility to their presence at a time when their socio-economic base in New Zealand was in transition after the gold-mining era, and in a context lacking diplomatic representation.

Simultaneously, the situation in China deteriorated with the Sino-Japanese war and later the Boxer Rebellion.

From the latter 1870s till 1908 the New Zealand government and the Chinese community engaged in an exchange of petitions and legislation. The endless stream of legislation restricting the numbers who arrived on each boat, imposed a poll tax, eventually withdrew the right to naturalisation, demanded fingerprinting as a means of identification and eventually under duress subjected the Chinese to a dictation test in English by 1907, is matched by attempts by the Chinese community, through its merchant leadership and by means of petition, to stop or at least modify these restrictions. Basically the New Zealand government justified and implemented an unequal status for the Chinese, and the Chinese for their part refused to accept this status.

The government's efforts drew on and stimulated support for their position from vehemently anti-Chinese organisations and the labour movement, both of which manifested their strongest opposition in periods preceding crucial legislation and/or economic crisis. The former was most evident in 1895 just prior to the poll tax being raised from £10 to £100 and in 1907 just prior to the imposition of the reading test in addition to the above, and the latter in 1926 just prior to the depression.

The Chinese community, with a centre in Wellington, drew on its leaders and others in the community and in some cases sympathetic Europeans to oppose the government's relentless efforts. Their petitions tried at least to modify and in some cases stop further

legislation. They also attempted to present a constructive profile of a responsible Chinese community that was concerned with their continued existence in New Zealand, and drew New Zealand's attention to its international responsibilities as a colony of Britain. Unfortunately, the constructive points which the Chinese community could use to justify consideration were exactly those points which by the late 1800s had been turned against the Chinese. They were accused of being a group who took everything out of the country, since they would eventually go home, but on the other hand, any desire shown by the Chinese to stay in New Zealand and settle was met with equal accusation and hostility. The government had ensured, therefore, that it was both hard and expensive to come and settle in New Zealand, which of course provided the impetus for the Chinese to ensure their socio-economic security even more. Restrictions slowed immigration, but neither the legislation or the restrictions stopped the process.

While the internal relations were played out in New Zealand, two spheres of external relations interceded to make the situation even more complex. New Zealand's dependent relationship with Britain was at best uneasy, with the lower House in Parliament adamant under Seddon that New Zealand must have autonomy to determine her destiny and the upper house more reticent and compliant to the requirements of New Zealand colonial status. In the first instance, New Zealand was seen to have every right to control its population and immigrants, while the latter maintained that any such policy should not endanger Imperial diplomatic relations. The Liberal Party in power overcame the veto exercised by both the upper House and the Governor as the representative of the Crown by replacing members in the first body (not without opposition, however), and in the second instance eventually devising legislation that was outside the Governor's jurisdiction and made any exemptions the responsibility of the Governor.

This uneasy relationship between Britain and her New Zealand colony was not unknown to the New Zealand Chinese and to Chinese government officials in both Peking and London. In 1887 and again in 1907 the Chinese government had dispatched Commissions of Inquiry to investigate the position of their overseas population, who, it was clear, faced increasing pressures from their dominant hosts which offended Peking. Local petitions from the Chinese community, aware of the fact that the external relations between New Zealand and Britain were the only vulnerable area which might cause modification of the restrictions, invoked on more than one occasion the existing diplomatic ties between Britain and China. Both the Chinese government and the local community pushed for diplomatic representation for the Chinese in New Zealand. One request was turned down in 1891 with little explanation other than the suggestion that New Zealand people had strong feelings against the Chinese, but by 1907 there was no opposition, and a Chinese Consul was appointed the following year. By 1907 Britain had already brought her colonies into line over the matter of immigration restrictions by forcefully suggesting they comply with the example of the Natal legislation which imposed a language test for admission. Britain had also, much to the annoyance of New Zealand, exerted her rights in allowing mining companies in the Transvaal to import Chinese labour without regard to the national interests of the country.

By 1907 the New Zealand government had imposed the reading test on the Chinese coming to New Zealand in addition to the poll tax, discontinued naturalisation, excluded Chinese from the old age pension provision, secured a right of entry to all Chinese homes and businesses on suspicion of opium use and achieved a modicum of autonomy with its new Dominion status.

The Chinese community received stronger restrictions, diminished rights as residents in New Zealand and diplomatic representation, while China had direct contact with approximately 2,600 more of its overseas population, and a diplomatic presence acknowledged by the New Zealand government.

Peking's influence was soon felt by New Zealand as they objected in 1909 to the 1907 Act, requiring five modifications. Two were acceded to by the New Zealand government in 1910 when special provisions for merchants, students and tourists, who both the Consul and Chinese government thought worthy of special attention, were made. The Consul arrived in 1909 and in the same year attempted to pull the factions of the community, created over political developments in China, together under one organisation. The first Chong Wah Wui Koon was intended to defuse the conflict growing between supporters of the Chee Kung Tong and the T'ung Meng Hui, but the task was interrupted by the 1911 Revolution in China and consistently by its inability to handle the opposition to the Chinese in New Zealand. This opposition surfaced again before and after the First World War, demanding the attention of the Consul, who did not hesitate to support his countrymen much to the surprise of some Europeans. The war had generated an anti-Chinese alliance between the Returned Servicemen's Association (RSA) and the Anti-Chinese League, which caused sufficient concern over Chinese immigration and economic activity to push the government to pass an Act in 1920 requiring all immigrants not of British parentage or birth to obtain a permit from the Minister of Customs before entering the country. The Act was formulated by a civil servant and complied with the provisions settled upon at the 1917 Imperial War Conference, which allowed all communities of the Commonwealth complete control of their own populations. The Act was administered by one person - the Minister

of Customs - and this effectively removed for all time the issue of immigration from parliamentary debate, since all future change could be accomplished by Cabinet decision. While the permit system was equally applicable to all intending immigrants, the Chinese still had the added burden of the poll tax, which by this time was sharply opposed by Peking and by the Consul, who had been denied access to the legislation before it entered the House as previously promised. The Chinese saw the arbitrary nature of the Act, and so did the Consul, who made moves to apply for a quota system for the Chinese, which was granted in 1921. The Governor and the Colonial Office disliked the Act, but upon advice from the Governor approved of it, since New Zealand had now the right to control its own immigration policy. The Colonial Office knew that the precedent had already been set in 1917, when the Attorney General had been given complete control over aliens in or entering New Zealand, and they further knew that New Zealand could legitimately make changes to this provision at will without informing them.

In the interim, the Revolution in China had already given rise to a third political faction in the Chinese community with the KMT, leaving the Chong Wah Wui Koon unable to perform its intended role. The uneasy relationship between factions in the Chinese community, the deteriorating situation in their home districts, the increased immigration restrictions and the continued pressure from anti-Chinese activity forced segments within the community to seek unity in locality associations. The first was the Poon Fa (1961) Association, historically part of the Chinese social structures in the goldfields but now moved to an urban setting with a large number of the former Chong Wah Wui Koon forming its membership. In 1920 the Kwong Chew Club (Sun Wui) started in Auckland, in 1924 the Tung Jung Association started in Wellington, and much later the Seyip Association (1936) in the same city.

Traditional solidarity allowed unity which represented the majority of districts(five)from which the New Zealand Chinese had come and cut across political factions to take care of more fundamental needs of individuals. The associations provided reading rooms, celebrated some Chinese festivals, arranged passages home and temporary residence for new arrivals, plus in some instances founding an import/hostel facility in Hong Kong. Despite the existence of locality associations, however, factions in the community persisted unresolved till 1928, when the Northern Expedition established Chiang in control, but even in 1927 the tension had led to open conflict in Wellington over the celebration of the Double Tenth in the absence of any community organisation or strong consular hand. The conflict was resolved, however, with the Chee Kung Tong's supporters admitting defeat and the KMT taking over leadership in the community.

The KMT's one public occasion was the Double Tenth celebration held each year by local Chinese communities, and although these were evident in 1912, it was not until the late 1920s that they were noticed by the dominant society in New Zealand. The Double Tenth gathering, steeped in nationalist fervour and organised to develop high morale and morality in the community through sport, was seen by the dominant host society as acceptable, and the fact that money collected on such occasions by the Chinese community was donated to local hospitals or other charities elevated the status of the Chinese community considerably.

Chinese living in small towns and urban areas weathered the depression within their own communities. Being wary of the bureaucracy's questions, they never tested its benevolence, but rural Chinese who had entered new market gardening areas suffered the brunt of another 'race purity' campaign. The real issue was blatant racism, but the excuse

for action was found in the supposed Chinese exploitation of an inter-marriage with female Maori labour on the market gardens. Such inter-marriage was seen as an insult to the Maoris, but equally there was alarm over the increased number of Chinese women in the community. The issue lasted from 1925 till 1929, creating an alliance between the Anti-Chinese League, the National Women's Council and four Maori organisations, resulting finally in a Commission of Inquiry and a later publicised argument between a doctor and the Chinese Consul. The Consul mounted a defence of the Chinese in general, but his arguments did little to ease the local tension from which Chinese associations noticeably stayed absent. The results of the inquiry were slightly more sophisticated than the 1871 report and gathered sufficient data, although in the wrong season, to point constructively to some improvements which could be made in the market garden but discovered nothing to confirm the contentions of the opposition.

The area from which the opposition had arisen was clearly dissatisfied with results but waited three years to launch another campaign. In the meantime, the Chinese had been alerted to their vulnerability, especially with increasing numbers of families and young students in the community and a depression depleting their resources at home and in New Zealand. Their response was a second Chong Wah Wui Koon, this time representing all existing factions, unlike its predecessor, which chose to organise by region. The organisation, with its headquarters in Wellington, was a clear reaction to the single government in China and the conditions in New Zealand. Simultaneously branches formed in communities where united action was possible, and the organisation proceeded to actively represent the community. Its efforts in re-activating the temporary permit system for Chinese immigrants, acting as the official welcoming committee for government

officials from China and the organisation through which money was collected to help build government buildings in Nanking indicate aspects of its role, but the united public opposition to the Franklin County petition for repatriation of all Chinese in New Zealand confirmed it as a representative body.

During the early thirties the association and its few branches stayed intact and became, with KMT leadership, an organising nexus of the various local Chinese communities, but with the Japanese invasion in 1937 the organisation on its own initiative became the foundation of the Go Koh Kong Yut. The organisation of this donation programme was a massive collective effort which demanded national coordination and considerable leadership. This activity was acceptable to the New Zealand government as a legitimate enterprise, since China was an ally at the time. This in turn facilitated the remittance of considerable funds to China and the initiation of a refugee programme to bring women and children to New Zealand, although this arrangement was discontinued after a year due to accusations about the supposed abuse of the provisions by the Chinese community.

The collective effort and the money sent to China attested to the concern of the New Zealand Chinese over the plight of their homeland, but the intensity of this concern waned, with individual communities feeling less inclined to continue sending money home when they were more concerned with getting their families to New Zealand. The united effort of the initial years therefore gave way to a divided community with some local communities withdrawing from the collection and the hegemony of the national association. There was also some scepticism over Chiang's future in China. Japan was defeated in 1945, China returned to a state of civil war as Chiang turned for the second time against his former allies and the CCP. The effect on the New

Zealand Chinese was uncertainty about their return home or the possible repatriation of their wives and children brought to New Zealand during the war on condition that they would return to China once it was over.

China's diplomatic front became increasingly vehement about maintaining the fire of nationalism amongst its overseas Chinese in New Zealand, but the New Zealand Chinese in turn had divided loyalties torn between support for their homeland and the more immediate needs of their family or local overseas community. New Zealand also had its problem, for it was forced to decide on whether it would accept a permanent Chinese minority complete with wives and families in the humanitarian tradition under which they had originally been permitted to come or repatriate them as the agreement specified, maintaining that it did not want a Chinese minority in New Zealand. The government, however, was not alone in making its decision. The Chinese Consul, the New Zealand Chinese Association and two Chinese churches together with the New Zealand Presbyterian Church joined as an effective lobby and prevailed on the government to decide in favour of continued residence for the refugee families. In 1947 the government approved their permanent residence, and in addition, under pressure from increasing applications by local Chinese, it also approved a quota system whereby residents could continue to bring in wives and children, but to a limit of fifty permits per year. The plan had to be reviewed each year, so that while one could argue that New Zealand had finally accepted its Chinese minority, it was only with considerable hesitation, and with a catch. The quota system was contingent upon the Chinese who applied for his family to come to New Zealand also applying for naturalisation, a right which was still prohibited to the Chinese until 1952. This problem was further compounded by the requirement of the Chinese government in 1948 that all Chinese desiring to change nationality

should get a release from their Chinese nationality first. This required the Chinese Consul to handle the application, but it was not clear that the Consul would approve such applications and send them on, since he had recommended to the New Zealand government that high standards be used by New Zealand in its naturalisation requirements should they be re-implemented. The government, realising the empty content of its quota system, dropped the naturalisation requirement and in 1948 began the process of re-instituting the right to naturalisation for the Chinese, which would take four more years before it came into effect.

By 1948 the Chinese minority in New Zealand was almost twice the number it had been in 1936, but more importantly it was now a settled community, not so much out of choice as out of necessity, since return to China became increasingly difficult with civil strife, inflation and later the constraints imposed by the ideological outcomes of the CCP victory in China and the Korean conflict, namely, the cold war. The absence of even the traditional trip home or the temporary repatriation of mothers and children while the latter were educated meant a substantial young population in the Chinese community who would of necessity have to be part of the local education system and perhaps lose what Chinese language skills they had. Attention to these youth led initially to the establishment of a number of Chinese schools, which ran during the war years. Due to the fact that teachers could come only on temporary permits and to the fluctuating interest of the local communities, they seldom became permanent fixtures. During the war, sports clubs were also started in various centres to give the young in the community a sense of identity and in 1947 these various groups managed to change the Double Tenth celebration from a

local community event into a national event which would be held at a different centre each year. While there was unity in this event, the war years had also left a legacy of division. The remaining funds from the war collection were the source of argument between Wellington and other centres. The decision by the national Association to buy a hall in 1951 led to feelings of distrust, and the presence of two Chinese governments led to even more complex divided loyalties in the community. The community had a national organisation, but its executive was neither capable of representing the whole community nor did they have the benefit of the Chinese newspapers used during the war years to reinforce their community role. Although the KMT and the locality associations persisted later joined by the Anti-Communist League, their action did little to ease tension within the community, as their attentions were directed largely towards developments in China and Taiwan.

Young and old were also divided. The old wanted to reinforce their Chinese heritage overseas now that it was under threat and also ensure that their young were properly socialised to enable participation in the community when they were older. On the other hand, the young, now free from the familial work obligations to which their predecessors had been subjected and living in the midst of a more affluent Chinese community, wanted their autonomy, or at least freedom to live in both the European and Chinese worlds.

New Zealand, and specifically the government, moved more and more in the post-war years to accept a policy of assimilation, which meant a disapproval of any Chinese moves to reinforce their culture through the provision of schools and the continued migration of Chinese women, especially those who would become the wives of local Chinese. There was even reluctance to continue the acknowledgement of the Chinese growers' organisation, started on the initiative of the New Zealand

government during the war but seen as an anachronism in the post-war era. The role of this organisation was crucial, however, for it had a national journal (in Chinese), and despite its focus on rural Chinese, it also became the medium for communication with all Chinese, presenting statements from the Consul and overseas news. While the government reluctantly acknowledged its role, it also gradually withdrew support, allowing the dominant European growers' organisation and the minority of Chinese growers to work out their own relationship, stopping the publication of overseas news and refusing to allow agricultural information to be provided in Chinese for the benefit of middle-aged and older growers. These moves, especially those directly affecting the financial viability of the Journal, eventually brought about its demise but not before it had served the community during the 1950s and 1960s, which would best be described as a transitional period and at worst a period thwarted by division and an uneasy relationship with the New Zealand government.

In the 1950s and '60s the Chinese communities, especially those in larger urban centres, began a search for a new way to articulate their specific needs. Unwilling to accept control by any central organisation and guarded about their public profile, individual communities sought to remedy their own problems. This gave rise to a number of activities by cross-cutting groups brought together to provide facilities for the growing communities. They drew on existing organisations for support but attempted to avoid political or locality divisions and the various conflicts inherited from previous years. In 1959 Auckland Chinese had started a Hui Sor largely aimed at maintaining the cultural integrity of the older members of the Chinese community. In 1965 the New Zealand Chinese Association resolved its internal disputes and emerged ready to acknowledge the need for community facilities, a history of the New Zealand Chinese and a monetary

recognition for its young who succeeded in the European education system. At the same time, however, the locality associations in Wellington and Auckland were stirred into action, and their activity predictably drew support away from the national organisation.

By the mid-1960s three organisations in Wellington stated their intention to build or provide facilities for community use, and the Auckland Hui Sor gave notice of its intent to provide a community centre which would cater for both young and old.

Three projects emerged in the late 1960s, two in Wellington and one in Auckland, each depending on the benevolence of the community for collective support and arguing vehemently that they intended to represent the interests of all Chinese, to be non-political and non-factional. While the intent was clear, this ideal could not eventuate without the historical reality of divisions re-appearing in the communities. In the midst of intense collective activity aimed at providing a base for future cohesion in the community the projects also highlighted differences, some unresolved from former times and others created by the contemporary relationships in the community. Accusations and counter-accusations filtered through the collection activity, and the involvement of the Chinese Embassy, local bodies and the national government also created their own consequences. Again, questions about the respective roles of cultural activities and sport as idioms through which to articulate the unity and needs of the community were discussed but unresolved. All projects tried to cover both areas, but their success could be evaluated only in future activities rather than the expressed aims.

The fund-raising that occurred was as intense as that during the war, but the projects were appealing to a more affluent community and the expectations were higher. Between 1977 and 1979 all three projects

completed their facilities, proving that co-operation was still possible, but it left a wake of division in the community, except for the New Zealand Chinese Association, which had remained aloof and unscathed.

While the projects were in progress, the political party in power had changed twice in the New Zealand government, and the Chinese made use of an interim period of a Labour government to push for increased immigration of their relations. The community was divided, however, as appeals came from two different groups, resulting eventually in the New Zealand Chinese Association exerting its presence as the legitimate representatives of all Chinese in New Zealand.

Labour's time in power also meant recognition of the People's Republic of China and the departure of the Republic of China's ambassador. Although this caused uneasy feelings both within the Chinese community and in New Zealand generally, curiosity was sufficient to equal opposition and dissent that might have emerged from the PRC's presence. There were only faint rumblings from the government that the 'left' might be part of the Chinese community after 1972, and while the community itself talked of a 'left' and 'right', its actual profile was remote from such party politics, although the labels were a viable tool in the politics of the Chinese community.

With the recognition of the People's Republic, the Double Tenth celebration became an anachronism, and after one year's postponement and intense deliberation, the annual event re-appeared as an Easter Tournament in 1974, equally as vigorous, but devoid of nationalist fervour. The KMT, although still active in some communities and still celebrating the Double Tenth, largely declined as Taiwan's future less and less concerned the imminent conquest of the mainland and as its members got older. The Anti-Communist League disbanded and the Eastern

Sports Club merged with the Wellington Sports and Cultural Centre. The locality associations remained intact, although their future membership was to be based on inherited (still ascribed) locality affiliation rather than on place of birth in China. While there are arguments about the dwindling influence of locality, it is persistently used as a means of identification.

The New Zealand Chinese Association as the national body also remains intact but largely by virtue of its Annual General Meeting, which still brings delegates from all over New Zealand. It has become, as one informant described it, 'the watchdog of the community', where maturing young leaders can watch the next generation as they fill the vacated positions in the community organisation.

The contemporary situation of the Association is best exemplified by the last community project discussed (see Chapter 10, pages 558-563). In a sense, the project began, persisted and was completed because of the Association, for without its presence it would not have been suggested in the first place, nor would the conflict have eventuated that spurred the centre committee on to be successful. The Association helped voluntarily; it expected to be consulted but not make commitments; it expected both to lead and to follow and decided to send a wreath to commemorate the death of Mao Tse Tung but wished to be consulted if a branch organised a trip to China or showed films from the People's Republic. In each instance, it might express its disapproval but it had and has no authority over the local branches, nor does it have any financial hegemony, for each branch guards its financial autonomy with caution.

Other local communities have also organised to provide facilities but with varying success, often plagued by old divisions in the community or the power of individual families or groups. They may even

disagree over the kind of facility needed. The debate about the appropriate idiom for the articulation of Chinese identity is ongoing, but as long as it is, the vitality of local communities is ensured.

As for relationships between the Chinese community and New Zealand society or the government, they remain for the most part mutually tolerant, with the latter still expecting eventual assimilation of its once undesirable minority and the former moving through cycles. As one informant described it, 'You lose a little then you gain a little, and maybe then you will lose some more'. Whatever the situation, social relations and social organisation persist.

If this overview can indicate anything it is the simple point, which cannot be over emphasised, that the history of the Chinese community is far more complex than the literature would portray or than one could imagine. The Chinese population in the goldfields cannot be dismissed as an occupational episode in the history of the local Chinese, for it was there that a whole set of relationships developed which can be traced through successive years.

Similarly, immigration restriction cannot be viewed totally as the product of personal or national racism, for this denies the utility of examining New Zealand's relationship with Britain and China's relationship with Britain, New Zealand and her overseas community.

More importantly, without this history in all its complexity, it is impossible to verify an active and organised community that often finds itself responding to pressures that are aspects of its own social relations as well as those resulting from other spheres of activity. These account for the survival of the community.

Chinese Social Organisations and Political Ethnicity

Several studies on overseas Chinese communities, including those mentioned in Chapter 1 have paid special attention to the associational framework which has developed in many overseas Chinese communities. This was important, for as Willmott noted in 1969, it was the beginning of attempts through sociological analysis to come up with some generalisations about overseas Chinese communities which could form the basis of comparative work (Willmott, 1969:282). This present study is, hopefully, a useful extension of that previous literature, since it attempts to put together, with modifications, the key ideas of Freedman (1967), Crissman (1967), Willmott (1969) and Wickberg (1979), in order to trace the changes and persistence in the associational structure of the New Zealand Chinese community. Essentially, through the provision of a social history of the Chinese community, which places it in a constantly changing historic context, it is possible to show how the organisational structure of the community is capable of variation through fragmentation, cohesion or the development of new organisations. This takes Crissman's model of the segmentary structure, the product of synchronic analysis, and applies it in a diachronic fashion. This assumes that, while the derivation of the segmentary system may be traced to urban adaptation in China, its development through time in the overseas community is a reflection of changing contexts. It is argued here, not only that interaction within and external to the Chinese community create the necessity for persistence and change in the segmentary system, but that the segmentary system itself provides an efficacious means through which the entire Chinese community or segments within it can articulate their needs. Consequently, as part of the culture of an overseas Chinese community, segmentation constitutes what Cohen (1974) refers to as a universe of '...formally non-political formations and activities that

are politicised in the course of social action' (Cohen, 1974:xvi), in brief, political ethnicity.

The brief historic overview of the Chinese community (pages 580-599) indicated that a viable Chinese community has survived within a complex set of relationships. The relationships, although overlapping have been described as three spheres of activity, two of which link the Chinese community historically to the dominant society in New Zealand and to China. The third sphere is the complex set of social relations within the Chinese community. This study has focused on one aspect of these relationships, namely, the segmentary system. This system is made up of a number of organisations which utilise a recognised criterion as the basis for this formation. In the New Zealand context, it is primarily being Chinese that qualifies one for membership in any one of the organisations that make up the segmentary system. Within the general category, however, there are other characteristics including speech group, surname and locality, the latter of which is relevant to this study.

The importance of these organisations - collectively, a segmentary system - is that they represent a set of interests and concerns in the community through time and because, as these interests and concerns change, so does the configuration of the segmentary system. Various organisations may cooperate over some issues and divide over others, and still others may be introduced alongside existing ones to defuse a situation or provide for other specific needs. In a sense, they become a map to the community's history which can precisely reflect the kinds of tensions within the community and the nature of its external relations. However, it is not enough to suggest they only reflect these aspects of the community and take action specifically

orientated to one or other of the external relations mentioned previously. Individually or collectively, they provide for their membership a means of articulating needs, making decisions and taking action. As Crissman noted, they are the government and administration of the Chinese community. In this sense, the leaders of these organisations are using ethnicity - that is, being Chinese and other specified characteristics which are commonly shared - to seek power and authority in their own community.

The organisational structure of the New Zealand Chinese community can be described historically as having both locality and community organisations as part of the segmentary system. In the goldfields the earliest association was the Poon Fa association, representing two localities and organised by merchants from these localities. However, the association was restricted to specified localities in the goldfields where people from these areas were working, and it was not until the Ch'eung Shin Tong was organised by Poon Yu people that this association asserted its power over all Poon Yu people in New Zealand. This activity links the Poon Fa association to its appearance in 1917, when it was reconstituted in the absence of any community organisation that could resolve the internal conflict of the community and constitute a united front. Aside from this, however, the association provided a medium through which merchants could articulate their specific needs, that is, for power and status within their own community. According to some informants, even from this early date, merchants from Poon Yu essentially controlled the Chinese community with the cooperation of Fa Yuen and Jung Sing people, initially in the goldfields and in later years throughout New Zealand.

The power they had allowed them to incorporate sanctions into the provisions of, for instance, the Ch'eung Shin Tong, which in Clauses 1 and 8 specified a minimum donation and a fine should the donation not be made prior to departure for China (see Appendix V). Later, when a group of merchants formed the Cherishing Virtue Union (1888) to discourage the importation of opium, they prescribed fines for non-compliance.

Both of these organisations were active after the founding of the Poon Fa Association and responded to the needs of the community, in the first instance repatriation for the deceased and in the second the concerted effort to present a constructive profile to New Zealanders, who had and would continue to use the opium habit as part of the invective levelled against the Chinese.

However, while these organisations provided a means of articulating and providing for certain needs they also had the potential to generate dissent. The act of wielding power within the community, which necessitated the appropriation of money from other individuals legitimised by the authority that power brings, often caused distrust and then accusation. In both the Ch'eung Shin Tong and the Cherishing Virtue Union, merchant leaders had collected money which would be put to a specified use without remuneration to those acting in an organisational capacity. However, because both efforts met with difficulties - in the former the sinking of the Ventnor, and in the latter argument over cooperation - the full purpose of the respective organisations was never realised. In both cases, public money was at stake, and in both cases there were questions about remaining funds and later accusations about its use. Even when remaining funds were declared and then used for another purpose, the executive of these organisations always left themselves vulnerable to the accusations that they appropriated and used funds without authority.

Provided the accusations were strong enough, they could undermine the authority of those in power. It was a slow form of democracy within the Chinese community but nevertheless effective, and it usually preceded drastic reorganisation of associations.

These organisations for the most part, however, represented an internal aspect of the community which linked it directly with its homeland. If they contributed any response to the pressures faced by the Chinese in the New Zealand context, it was to provide a solidarity which circumvented factions in their own community and insulated the members from European hostility. While they may have formally specified in their constitution that they would support members in situations of conflict with European society, this appears to have been more of a gesture to their milieu than a task they could undertake, for they had little community-wide power as locality associations.

In the early years of Chinese settlement, therefore, it appears that there was a lacuna in the organisational hierarchy with the absence of a community or voluntary organisation which could represent all Chinese in New Zealand. Furthermore, the community was also devoid of formal representation by a Consulate which would be recognised by the New Zealand government, by the Chinese government and, with some reservation, by the overseas community. This gap, while apparent if one seeks an organisational response, is not so apparent if one accepts other idioms by which the Chinese have articulated their needs.

Contemporary with the locality association but almost entirely orientated towards the dominant European society, were a number of Chinese petitions.

In the early years these petitions were less formal and more localised, expressing concern in 1867, for instance, over the murder of a fellow countryman in the goldfields and in 1872 questioning the judicial impartiality of a judge deemed to be unnecessarily hard on Chinese offenders. In both cases, however, Chinese merchants and shopkeepers were the initiators, as they would be in the nineteen petitions sent to the government between 1883 and 1907. These later examples of the strategy became more sophisticated of necessity as the New Zealand social and political environment paid increasing attention to the restriction of Chinese immigration.

This use of the petition by Chinese leaders occurred at a time when their community was economically and residentially in transition, in the first instance from goldmining to other activities and in the second from the goldfields to more exposed positions in urban centres and small communities all over New Zealand. Social relations built up in the goldfields changed, and many Chinese traded their partial seclusion in mining groups for more conspicuous occupations dependent on European clientele. The petition, using the only power the Chinese had, that is, their ethnic unanimity, attempted to ease the transition. Unfortunately, the characteristics which they perceived as peculiarly Chinese and at the same time argued were useful to European New Zealand were exactly those which the anti-Chinese Europeans found abhorrent. This would lead one, then, to suppose that the petition was an empty political strategy, since it did little to alter the impositions placed on the Chinese community, but in fact it was not. Like the locality association, it provided a means through which a new group of leaders could articulate the needs of their fellow countrymen and achieve power and status in their own community. While it may not have eased the position of the Chinese in New Zealand it did maintain an active profile for the community

and one which, operating within the norms of European politics, could not be used against them. It used ethnicity of the Chinese, since it allowed group participation, but in the end it was articulated in a European idiom.

The use of the petition ended abruptly in 1907 with the appointment of the Chinese Consul, in itself an indirect outcome of opposition to discrimination on the part of local Chinese. The Chinese government, increasingly concerned with its diaspora and particularly the cases where restrictions were limiting immigration and business developments, was alerted to the situation in New Zealand by the actions of local Chinese. It dispatched its own Commissions of Inquiry, whose findings and requests mirrored those expressed in the petitions, including a request for diplomatic representation. However, the Chinese government was not totally concerned with the restrictions faced by its overseas population, for it must also have been clear to them that political factions in China were now being duplicated overseas where, particularly, monetary support was readily available.

The arrival of the Consul in New Zealand coincided with the emergence of these factions represented through two associations, the T'ung Meng Hui started in 1905 and the Chee Kung Tong two years later. These were voluntary associations whose expressed purpose was to solicit support for political change in China, but while their aims were externally orientated, their effect was to split the local community. The Consul, as a representative of the Chinese government, naturally opposed the political activity overseas and used two strategies to thwart its development. The first was to discourage overseas residence by making continued reference to the discriminatory practices the Chinese faced. It was clear to him that opposition to the Chinese was based on groundless assertions that were demeaning and resulted in treating them like criminals by, for example, using

fingerprinting as a means of identification. Discrimination, according to the Consul, created an undesirable community, and if New Zealand was going to continue to do this, then the Chinese should return home. The Consul in fact had reversed the logic of anti-Chinese arguments which maintained that Chinese were undesirable and therefore should be discriminated against.

The second strategy, hardly consistent with repatriation but nevertheless a much more accurate reflection of the continued immigration statistics, was to strongly suggest the founding of a community organisation which would cross-cut the divided alliances manifest in existing factions.

Subsequently, the power and authority of local leaders and the Consul was sufficient in 1909 to start the Chong Wah Wui Koon. Its explicit aim was to bring together all Chinese in New Zealand and to avoid factionalism. In line with this, neither of the existing factions achieved formal representation, but instead the association was open to all Chinese regardless of political affiliation or locality. This aspect was formalised by having representatives from sixteen centres around New Zealand.

The interests of the Chinese community, therefore, by 1909 had been consolidated into one community organisation which could represent all Chinese in New Zealand. Fragmentation in the organisational structure resulting from external political influence had led directly to the creation of a Chong Wah Wui Koon and the setting in motion of an organisational cycle. The cycle itself is a process derived from the very nature of a segmentary system, which contains within it both the ability to consolidate or fragment depending on the influences which realign segments within it. In this period it would be hard to argue that population was sufficient

to have an influence on these developments, since the total Chinese population actually continued to decline until after 1916 (see Appendix I), so the segmentary system and the cycle must be variables which respond to spheres of social relations in which the Chinese community are enmeshed.

The further development of this cycle occurred seven years after the founding of the Chong Wah Wui Koon, at a time when New Zealand was involved in World War I and the legislative activity against Chinese immigration had abated temporarily. In China the 1911 Revolution had established the Republic and its political party the KMT. However, these changes had not resolved the factions in the overseas community. In the years after 1911 the Chong Wah Wui Koon in New Zealand faced dissent in the community and, as a result, its own demise. In its place emerged associations which chose to avoid influences of existing factions by building solidarity around locality. These traditional forms of solidarity emerged in response to continued hostility from the anti-Chinese League, later the RSA, and to the political factions in their own community - resulting from changes in China and their need to provide for more immediate concerns. The Poon Fa, Kwong Chew, and Tung Jung Associations represented the majority localities of the New Zealand Chinese. Their role was to represent the membership largely reinforcing the solidarity of the group. Like the Poon Fa Association in the goldfields, the later urban counterpart celebrated festivals, took care of funerals and arranged passage back and forth to China, a role previously performed by the Chong Wah Wui Koon. The other locality associations performed similar functions.

The segmentary system was now fragmented into political factions reflecting the homeland situation and locality associations providing for more localised needs. The Consul, as nominal head of the overseas community, remained uninvolved in associational activity until 1928.

This fragmented system characterised the community from 1916 until 1928, a period in which government moved even further to restrict Chinese immigration and local hostility to Chinese became critical on several occasions. The Consul, while silent about associational activity, was active in the sphere of Chinese/New Zealand relations. He monitored legislation, spoke on behalf of local Chinese who were unjustly treated and protected the interests of Chinese merchants. The latter group of Chinese had in fact always received preferential treatment, as evidenced by the special permits made available for them in the 1910 legislation and the support for their importing enterprise evidenced by later negotiations with the Customs Department. The Consulate was generally sympathetic to the merchants, who were considered a better class, a point various Consuls made clear to the New Zealand government on more than one occasion and which further legitimated the class to the New Zealand government. The Consul, unlike the Chinese community, had direct informal access to government by virtue of his diplomatic status, so negotiations were carried on directly with ministers and departments, which circumvented the bureaucratic process to which petitions had to be subjected. While the Consuls acted competently in these various capacities, they seldom spoke publicly in support of the New Zealand Chinese.

In 1927 the argument between opposing political factions in the fragmented community, despite the counter-influence of locality associations, came out in the open during the meetings held to organise the Double Tenth celebration. The CKT and the KMT argued over which

flag should be flown, and the feud became public knowledge. Although at the time it led to two celebrations, the victory of Chiang the following year left no uncertainty as to who controlled China. The CKT, with older members, gradually lost its institutional status as an active organisation, but members who were still alive kept it going for some years.

With the conflict resolved and the KMT firmly established in its political role amongst New Zealand Chinese, there was again a move to bring together the various associations under a community-wide organisation. Partially spurred on by unity in China and the fact that the KMT could play an important role in its development, it also coincided with anti-Chinese hostility, the depression and the virtual exclusion brought about by the 1920 Immigration Act in New Zealand. A meeting was held with representatives from each of the existing associations including the CKT, and another Chong Wah Wui Koon was formed with headquarters in Wellington. Branches also formed voluntarily in four other centres and the organisation became the active representative of all Chinese, both in the New Zealand context and in regard to China.

As noted in the previous section, the organisation persisted through the depression, when for the first time the Chinese community in New Zealand and China itself gained an acceptable status as far as New Zealand was concerned. The immigration system had been eased by a temporary permit system for a few wives and their children as well as students. If things had improved in New Zealand, however, they were steadily deteriorating in China. The civil war with the CCP, and the activities of Russia and Japan towards China alarmed the local Chinese and paralleled the fervent nationalism that had swept over the community after 1928. In 1935, under the influence of a newly arrived Consul, the Chong Wah Wui Koon was re-organised along lines similar

to its 1909 predecessor with regional representation consisting of twenty-six branches including those formed during the 1928 effort. The New Zealand Chinese Association, as it was known, recognised other associations but had no delegates from these associations, only representatives of communities. Even though the leadership came from other existing associations, they were expected to act on behalf of the whole community and not on behalf of their sectional interests.

While the ideal of representativeness was apparent, the actual organisation was dominated by the same locality groups which already existed. Furthermore, these new leaders had by now established themselves as wealthy members of the community. These people constituted a stable population, mostly with families and with interests both overseas and in China. The extent of their stability is apparent in the fact that they were able to maintain control of this community organisation until 1965.

Within a year of organising, the new community association had the chance it needed to weld the New Zealand Chinese together. With pressure from one of its branches, it organised a collection to support China in their war with Japan. The Wellington executive responded despite the Consul's reticence about forcing local Chinese to donate for such a collection, and by the end of 1937 the national executive had achieved the goal of organising a national collection which was to include all New Zealand Chinese. While there was no doubt about the sentiments of nationalism in the local Chinese community, there was no unanimity about organisational procedure and leadership, and the Consul's feeling about the kinds of impositions the community would tolerate for such a collection were accurate. The organisation of the collection,

including the fact that it had to be centralised and would in the end be controlled by a few, was sufficient to cause doubts about the reliability of those who so fervently encouraged it at every opportunity. The mandatory financial obligation week after week and the hegemony of the Association which appropriated the right to impose sanctions on defaulters also did little to help. In fact the only restraint that could be imposed on such an organisation was achieved by representatives from local areas absenting themselves from representative congresses, which were held whenever needed to coordinate further plans. However, there was no other body that could sanction inappropriate activity on the part of leaders, and the Consul was virtually powerless to intercede, as a person whose role was to encourage such efforts.

The dissent predictably was directed against both the national Association and individual leaders, and it came from Chinese centres in other areas of New Zealand who felt antagonistic to what they considered the arbitrary exercise of power by Wellington. The dissent was articulated through and focused on the issue of authority to appropriate the funds collected. The large amount of monies were centrally remitted to China, but as the realities of the KMT activity in China emerged and the war extended, enthusiasm had waned and autonomous community control of the collection or even termination had been seen as an alternative.

However, it was not entirely these concerns that caused the tension. The temporary immigration provisions both prior to and during the war which had allowed a number of families to be brought together in New Zealand had given rise to an increasingly large number of younger Chinese in the community. While the economic activity of these young people was determined by their kin, their education was under the

control of New Zealand society, a situation which had previously been mitigated by a mandatory educational sojourn in China for children who had been in New Zealand for some years. Now, with their home localities embroiled in war, repatriation for education was both risky and expensive.

The apparent need, therefore, to contain the youth within the community and develop a nationalist sentiment amongst them led to concerted efforts to organise them. Through the medium of Double Tenth, local schools and sports groups, each community was encouraged by the Consulate and the national Association to organise its young population. Language and sport became, during the war years, the two idioms through which Chinese ethnicity and nationalism could be articulated indirectly, providing the impetus for local communities to be concerned about their local needs. The tension resulting from the feelings of allegiance to China's needs while at the same time feeling concerned for their future in New Zealand, together with any misgivings people might have about the collection campaign, had the effect of providing a basis for fragmentation. However, the context in which it was occurring made the former bases for alternative solidarity inappropriate, for none was capable of providing for the needs of younger community members. The national Association, while concerned about youth to the extent that it encouraged the Double Tenth celebration, was too preoccupied with the post-war immigration situation to start any active programmes.

From 1945 till 1947 the issues of continued immigration of Chinese to New Zealand and the pending provisions for repatriation of war refugees and those in New Zealand on temporary permits were unresolved, but once New Zealand had decided to accept the possibility of a Chinese

minority, then the future activities of the Chinese in New Zealand became a topical issue. For the Chinese, it intensified the concerns of the war years as regards youth, but after 1947 and particularly 1949 the concerns had to do with their position in New Zealand. Two responses emerged initially. First, the Chinese Anglican Church in Wellington, run by Chinese but marginal to the segmentary system although supported by the Chinese community, proposed concrete plans to provide for youth in 1945. Secondly, three years later various Chinese sports organisations from local communities suggested to the national Association that an annual sports tournament be held involving representatives from all Chinese communities where Association branches were supposedly in existence. The first such meeting was a success but required considerable organisation, since leisure time was a relatively rare commodity before the 1960s, and days when businesses closed, while demanded by the national Association, met with opposition on more than one occasion.

In the annual sports tournament the New Zealand Chinese had at least one event which demonstrated their unity and preserved the integrity of their ethnicity amongst the younger community members, but other tensions had not been resolved. The remaining collection funds and their use after the war divided the two major urban Chinese communities, and the 1949 victory of the CCP and the Korean War in the 1950s placed additional pressure on the local community. The notions of 'left' and 'right' entered community politics, exacerbated by 'cold war' polemics but also by the conservative KMT, whose government affiliation had been moved to Taiwan. The KMT, where it was strong in New Zealand, claimed the right to remaining funds, but the national Association maintained its use was their prerogative, and local

communities asserted that it belonged to the individual Chinese communities. The solidarity and cohesion of the war years dissipated, and fragmentation of the Chinese community was inevitable. There were no publications which could reach local Chinese as there had been during the war, the Consulate was of an exiled government whose recognition by the rest of the world as the legitimate government of China was debatable and the PRC was considered part of the communist threat, making Chinese residents in New Zealand uneasy. In addition, New Zealand policy was keen to discourage any signs of manifest ethnicity in the Chinese community, either as a result of continued immigration or exclusive organisation, so active steps were taken to make such developments difficult if not impossible.

The complexity of the situation required careful articulation, and the organisations that eventuated in this period were understandably unique, straddling all three spheres of social relations, that is with the PRC and the Republic of China, with New Zealand and with their own community.

In the post-war years, a whole new segmentary structure appeared in the Chinese community parallel to that which already existed. A number of organisations emphasised sport as a focus and as the particular medium through which the young Chinese would express their ethnicity. The Progressive Club, the Eastern Club and the Northern Soccer Club, as well as numerous other sports clubs around the country, were organised by young people supported by elders who approved of their intra-ethnic activity and often met annually at the Double Tenth annual sports tournament. While the use of sports was hardly unique as a medium of association, this development was partially free from the hegemony of other associations and ostensibly provided for the young, which was a new development. Furthermore, it was seen to be preserving the

integrity of the Chinese community by bringing Chinese together in the absence of European influence, which otherwise was of considerably more significance in their lives than it had been in their parents' generation. Of importance, however, was the fact that sport was an acceptable idiom not only within the community but in Taiwan and later the PRC and in New Zealand.

Another counter-emphasis expressed in the post-war community was Chinese culture, which was acclaimed as having primary importance by the Chinese Anglican and Baptist Churches as well as the Auckland Hui Sor. These organisations and the New Zealand Chinese Association, aside from the traditional locality associations, were the only groups interested in providing something in the nature of community facilities. The churches, like the sports organisations, were not new, but now under almost complete Chinese control they saw Chinese culture - the maintenance of ethnicity - and Christianity as complementary. Both the churches provided community facilities very quickly after the war and accomplished it through community fund-raising in which at least a token exchange was seen to be transacted: the bazaar dinner or cultural performance gave the community something in return for its donation.

The Auckland Hui Sor similarly emphasised Chinese culture as a means to maintain Chinese ethnicity, and it brought together opera, Chinese films, and later Chinese school and sports under the roof of two community centres, initially a theatre and later a new hall for which money was raised in the community. The former building was refurnished elaborately but notably lacked facilities for a school and sports, which meant that culture for a period of years was the prerogative and foremost concern of older members in the community. It was not until a counter-organisation, a hybrid development partially related to a traditional

locality association and partially made up of concerned parents, brought pressure to bear on the Hui Sor, threatening to take its young population or potential members away, that the latter relented and quickly provided facilities for a school and later a new complex almost entirely for sports.

Two other types of organisation also became prominent along with the above; two reflected specific views of the external relations of the Chinese community and one other organisation came close to being a community association.

In the former category was the Anti-Communist League and the Chinese Cultural Society. The Anti-Communist League was the inspiration of the Republic of China and created in New Zealand as elsewhere to capitalise on the anti-PRC rumours moving amongst the overseas Chinese communities. These rumours were about the persecution of relatives in China who were being ransomed to draw overseas funds into the mainland instead of Taiwan. The organisation in New Zealand was closely aligned with the KMT, where it still existed, and the New Zealand Chinese Association and the Embassy until 1972. It was vocal about its anti-PRC feelings and created an image of a very pro-Republic of China Chinese community. It was later matched with a European version in the Free China Society. The external relations of the New Zealand Chinese in regards to politics and commerce were linked to Taiwan, and the Embassy's role reinforced this.

The counter to this organisation was the Chinese Cultural Society formed by younger members of the community who had experienced China after liberation and were keen to promote knowledge of developments. The organisation itself was small, but there was sufficient interest quietly expressed amongst local Chinese through willingness to receive

material and see films to make it viable. Although of concern to the New Zealand government and to some in their own community, they were allowed to persist but not without having the ideological label of 'left' attached to them. Like the Anti-Communist League, this organisation also had its European version, the New Zealand-China Friendship Society which was started at about the same time and was considered by many Chinese to be safer politically than being associated with their own organisation.

Both of these groups had a commitment to seeing China recognised by the New Zealand government, which finally occurred in 1972, but only the European version continued, with an extensive membership in some centres. External links to both Taiwan and China were maintained after 1972 by individuals making their own choice. Diplomatic representation, however, was from the PRC, and while there are still links with the Republic of China government, they are adjunct to trade relationships and not purely diplomatic nor acknowledged formally by the New Zealand government.

The organisation in this period that came closest to the role of the New Zealand Chinese Association as a community-wide group was the Chinese Growers' Association formally known as the Chinese Commercial Growers' Federation. This organisation, started during the war was, by 1949, publishing its own journal, which was distributed all over New Zealand. The significance of the organisation and the Journal was the fact that, aside from providing for the sectional interest of Chinese growers, it also became the voice of the Chinese community. It carried overseas news, published announcements by the Chinese Embassy, commented on Chinese associations and community affairs. Because market-gardening was both rural and urban and an occupation filled by young and old from all localities, it cut across locality, political and

community factions and remained purposefully apart from intra-community conflict. What was particularly unique about the organisation and its journal, however, was the fact that the growers' organisation had been initiated on the suggestion of the Prime Minister during the war and, together with the Journal, was subsidised by the European growers' organisation which by definition formally represented all growers no matter what ethnic group they belonged to. The subsidy, of course, was a proportion of the levy collected from all growers including the Chinese, but the fact that some was returned acknowledged the autonomy, if not the ethnicity of the Chinese growers. Increasingly this very fact became anathema to both the European growers and the New Zealand government. The former reacted by insisting on amalgamation. When that failed, they dropped their subsidy and gave the Chinese growers formal representation at annual meetings, with the government's approval. The government, aside from condoning the action of the European growers, also suggested forcefully that all foreign news be dropped from the Journal and that it print only material relevant to its membership.

Neither move destroyed the growers' organisation, but the removal of the subsidy meant the Journal could no longer be published after 1972, and at least three growing areas opted for joining the European organisation or organising their own cooperative. When foreign news was purged from the Journal, it was replaced by a poignant analysis of Chinese associations and the conflict between them and particularly how certain people used associations for private gain rather than public good. This was particularly germane at the time, for it was the conflict between associations and the suspicions held by some against former leaders in the community that gave rise to the newer segmentary structure outlined above. The realisation that the needs in the Chinese community had changed dramatically, that their relationship

with the New Zealand government and society was qualitatively different after the war than it had been before, and that their relationship with their homeland was again a ^{situation} of two governments, as it had been in 1927, demanded new ways of articulation. The articulation, however, was one that needed to bridge the gaps between factions, localities, young and old and, most importantly, to stem the dominant threat of assimilation and loss of ethnicity.

However, the parallel segmentary system seemed to be duplicating the conflict, since the mere fact of a new set of competing idioms and the political implications of any allegiance made new splits inevitable. By the end of the 1960s, therefore, two segmentary systems were operating in the Chinese community, one the legacy of the pre-war and war periods and the other resulting from post-war developments. The post-war developments therefore, left their own legacy of a fragmented community, not in a situation of conflict but neither with any indication of cohesion. There was also some uncertainty as to who had the authority to speak for the Chinese community, for although the New Zealand Chinese Association was still nominally in charge of Double Tenth and still had its branches throughout New Zealand, it had responded only minimally to its changing constituency.

After 1965, there were attempts to resolve some of the sources of past conflict, and this initiated a series of organisational changes which re-asserted the position of some traditional associations within the milieu of what had already transpired.

In 1965 the New Zealand Chinese Association had come under scrutiny by the Chinese community in Wellington, partly due to an argument over regional representation to the national body and partly over alleged misuse of the deed of the Association headquarters. Some maintained that an organisation which had been started to bring unity to the community had brought only disunity and given rise to

autocratic control by the central executive. The resolution of this situation was to provide mechanisms for preventing the misuse of both the Association's assets and the power that derived from its position in the community. In an attempt to change its image, the Association announced its recognition of young Chinese scholars in the community with awards for outstanding performance in examinations, talked about building or extending the hall for recreational purposes, and proposed to write a history of the New Zealand Chinese.

Only the first of these proposals was carried out, but the idea of providing facilities for the community had become the concern of a larger forum in the community. At the time the Seyip, Tung Jung and Poon Fa Associations had facilities, but they were limited in size and adequate only for banquets or for school classes. In 1966, however, the Seyip Association announced plans to build a hall, the Chinese Anglican Church started a collection for a new building programme and the Eastern Sports Club decided it was going to build a hall. All three were trying to cater for an increasing young population, but the emphasis was different. The church, as it had done in the past, wanted to provide the most comprehensive facilities including a youth hostel, chapel, missionary's house and additional activities, while both the Eastern Club and the Seyip Association appeared more concerned with a sports facility. The following year the Christchurch Chinese community also planned to provide a cultural centre for the community, and in 1968 the Auckland Chinese Hui Sor, as noted previously, expanded its functions to include a school. Both of these groups placed their emphasis on culture, as did the Chinese Anglican Church, although the Auckland Hui Sor, already established and having a larger population to draw on, was able to move considerably farther to consider a sports facility, and in 1969 they started their own journal to plot their progress. In 1970 the Auckland Hui Sor and the Chinese Anglican Church

both started to collect for their respective projects. The Auckland group set out purposefully to steer a course between existing groups in the community and found itself having to justify this position in the face of criticism from those who thought the project ought to come under the New Zealand Chinese Association branch and from others who thought that a locality association was sufficient. Both the Chinese Anglican Church and the Auckland Hui Sor organised public meetings to state their position, but the latter group met with more support from the community than did the Chinese Anglican Church.

The issues that were part of the argument in the two cases were essentially the same, having to do with distribution and use of power in the community. The Chinese community had a history, confirmed in both the Chinese Growers' Monthly Journal and the Auckland Chinese Hall Journal, of community leaders using the status of associations to place personal gain above community needs. The presence of this in the past had left doubt in the minds of many, especially when community projects were undertaken on behalf of all in the community. The doubt turned into distrust, antagonism or apathy and a refusal to cooperate.

In 1970, both the Chinese Anglican Church in Wellington and the Hui Sor in Auckland were established groups and were well aware of the kinds of factions that operated in the community, but whereas the Hui Sor group was able to pull the Auckland community behind them, the Chinese Anglican Church found themselves in a competitive situation. The other associations did not give them the mandate to act on behalf of the community, but nevertheless they persisted.

The outcome of the Wellington situation was two major Hall projects, the second generated by an alternative alliance between the Chinese Ambassador prior to recognition of the PRC in 1972, the

Eastern Sports Club and the Wellington City Council. The result was ideally to be a community Hall with all existing associations affiliated, but even in this case there was reticence, and any assumed affiliation on the part of what became the Wellington Chinese Sports and Cultural Centre was met with denial or criticism. The Chinese Anglican Church for their part had to rely on individual support, massive, well publicised fund-raising, and the argument that they included sports and culture as part of their plan, whereas the other project was equipped largely to be a sports centre.

It took nearly seven years for the projects to be completed, and the Chinese Anglican Church was able to complete only the first stage of their plan. Inflation over the fund-raising period increased the costs in all the projects, placing greater dependence on the local community's generosity. In Wellington the situation was worse, for in the end the Chinese community made the compromise of supporting both projects. The segmentary system in both Auckland and Wellington had survived, however, with individual units maintaining their autonomy yet supporting projects for community facilities. Curiously, the two projects in Wellington and the one in Auckland were all recipients of government money, and the Chinese Anglican Church is still nominally under the control of the New Zealand Anglican Church, so there is a sense in which they are a compromise in the area of ethnicity at the same time. In each centre there had also been a noticeable change in leadership in the early 1970s, which some argue accounts for the push to complete the projects, for these were young professionals who were at last taking their position as leaders in the community.

The situation outlined was not unique to the two major Chinese centres in New Zealand. Other small communities with increasing populations, young people and an energetic professional group, have attempted to pull local people together, often with the focus of a community project. In each case the problems have been similar, albeit on a smaller scale, forcing any new community effort to articulate its needs usually within a set of historic factions or divisions that already exist in the community. In most cases, they have chosen to try to avoid conflict.

The general means of doing this was similar to the Auckland Hui Sor, that is, to establish a community-wide organisation autonomous from but at the same time linked to, the existing institutional framework. In this way, power, status, authority and most importantly money could not be appropriated illegitimately by local members of the national organisation, the New Zealand Chinese Association. Nor was blame to be easily laid at the feet of those involved by others unwilling to accept the community organisation, for time commitment was voluntary and financial commitment was arranged in such a way that it could be seen as investment and not an outright expenditure.

The innovation derived from the experience of the post-war years had, therefore, not destroyed the segmentary system in the Chinese community but rather built on it appropriately to reflect the new context the community exists within and the kinds of needs this situation generates. However, there is a tension in the way this is articulated. The debate is still going on as to whether the Chinese community's needs are best articulated through sport or through culture, and whether the latter should be represented by language classes or some other means. There is also some tension over who actually represents the Chinese community, and despite the continual fluctuations that go on within the New Zealand Chinese

Association, it has maintained its integrity, still holding its annual meetings which are still sufficiently^{well} attended to decide on policy, albeit heavily dominated by representation from the two large urban communities. The right to actually implement policy, however, is the prerogative of local branches, who guard their autonomy, for the hegemony of the centre is no longer accepted. However, the national Association is still accepted both locally and nationally as the watch dog of the community, which demands to be consulted but may not have sufficient power to impose any sanctions on non-compliance with policy.

Other associations also persist as part of the segmentary system including both the Hall projects (and the Chinese Anglican Centre) the locality associations and the Chinese growers' association. The Chinese Anglican Church, while part of the European dominant society, is still largely operating within the Chinese milieu, so its inclusion as an essentially Chinese organisation is considered legitimate. The sports organisations for the most part have been re-incorporated into existing organisations, so whereas the autonomous unit may no longer persist its membership is still part of the organisational life in the community.

If one attempts to characterise the segmentary system now in terms of the cyclical process of cohesion and fragmentation, it would seem to fit the position of a compromise, for there are aspects of both cohesion and fragmentation evident. Christchurch epitomises this situation: a united community but with two legitimate groups having authority and wielding power within the community. The position of the New Zealand Chinese Association branches is also a case in point, affiliated to and part of a national organisation but autonomous within their local communities.

The dynamic process within the segmentary system is therefore still in existence, but rather than having to articulate interests in diverse spheres, it can restrict its activity to those which seem most important. The relative decline in the influence of events in China and New Zealand government policy on the Chinese community leaves them free to articulate interests and needs within their local populations.

Liberation from having to negotiate relationships in all three spheres of activity has allowed the Chinese to concentrate on the cultural ethnicity of their own community but even the articulation of this becomes a political act, concerning the use of power in the community to muster support for particular policies, a task often influenced by traditional allegiances.

As noted before, the segmentary structure in its contemporary state has two parallel forms of organisation which combine the function of being both traditionist and modernist at the same time. It is clear that in fact the modernist Hall projects, for instance, operating in a New Zealand Chinese milieu, are at heart traditionist in their sometime orientation to exclusiveness. Likewise the dichotomy between formal and informal has been bridged gradually as the cyclical process has unfolded. Aside from the formal requirement that all incorporated societies be registered, the major community associations have moved more and more towards operating at both an informal and formal level, articulating their interests both in the European and Chinese idiom. The formality necessary for accomplishing tasks within the context of the dominant society is undertaken by those who have the requisite skills, but the basis of any collective action must still rely on the informal relations that are an integral aspect of the Chinese community, very often only with the good will of elders. The

distinction between the contemporary situation and other periods as far as this is concerned has to do with the nature of the articulation. In the past, the English secretaries or other individuals who were bilingual not only wielded considerable power, as part of the executives of the associations but were seen to exist in a situation of confrontation. They confronted the hostile dominant society, its tax department or customs department, on behalf of the community and were trusted to do so. Now such skills are much more the norm within the Chinese community, and they attract less status and accordingly less power. Similarly those who achieved power and status by virtue of their positions within the Chinese community alone now face considerably more scrutiny than they did in the past. The likelihood of fragmentation occurring again like it did after 1909 and again after World War II seem less probable now, with the possibility of individuals using associations for their own personal political ambitions within the community diminished. In 1909, 1928 and 1937, not only the detrimental effect of internal community factions had brought about cohesion ^{also} but ~~also~~ predominantly external influences, largely to do with events in China. In each case, these external influences generated a means of achieving status and power in the community which was far less vulnerable than that achieved by action whose means and ends are immediate, circumscribed by the local situation. There has been a qualitative difference in the way various communities have become mobilised and politicised over the various hall projects from the situation of the collection during the 1937-1944 period, when the conflict was left to emerge after the event.

The type of political ethnicity which emerges and consequent changes in the articulation of the organisational structure are, therefore, variables influenced as much by the internal dynamics of

social relations within the Chinese community as by those external influences with which it must interact.

Like Cohen's example of the Hausa, the New Zealand Chinese as an ethnic group are the product of a set of relationships which have prompted the Chinese to use whatever cultural means they have available (the segmentary system) to articulate their ethnicity in a political way to ensure survival. Since the influences that affect the relationships are in themselves variable, the community follows no evolutionary pattern but has, on the basis of its segmentary system, alternative ways of articulating its interests depending on the pressures facing the community. Politically, ethnicity is, therefore, a product of interaction not of impositions.

This represents, as noted in Chapter 1, a departure from the work of Yancey et al., who tended to view emergent ethnicity as a result of structural constraint (see Chapter 1, page 25) and brings it closer to Barth's (1969) contention that social interaction may form the basis of ethnic distinctions (Barth, 1969:10). In the case of New Zealand the major constraint was the attempt to restrict the immigration of Chinese into New Zealand, which was largely achieved and justified by the erection of a boundary by the dominant host society protecting them from knowledge of and contact with the Chinese community. The failure to gather information about the community, to understand its organisational structure or anticipate its needs (with the exception of some situations after 1966), reinforced this boundary. In addition, the absence from New Zealand of any notion of a plural society, unlike the situation in Nigeria with the Hausa, further confirmed its existence. There was always a real concern to maintain separation between the Chinese and the dominant host society,

as evidenced by attempts, for instance, to prevent European women from trading with Chinese fruit and vegetable merchants or, particularly Maoris from inter-marrying with the Chinese. The only exception to this was in 1948, when the government (see Chapter 9, page 440) speculated that encouraging inter-marriage might represent a strategy for diminishing Chinese ethnicity. In other words, the dominant host society would modify its boundary but only with the intent of recruiting assimilated Chinese to European society. By 1954 this policy had been modified with the permission given to bring wives to New Zealand, but assimilation was still the desired outcome.

Given the lack of any desire on the part of the dominant host society either to interact with the Chinese or even to accept the idea of a plural society, it became incumbent upon the Chinese to articulate their needs by forcing interaction. The petitions and the request for diplomatic representation, the development of the Chong Wah Wui Koon (1927) and later the New Zealand Chinese Association were the results, in part, of attempts to mediate or negotiate the interaction with the dominant society. It was only in 1942 that the Chinese growers were acknowledged formally by the government and in 1947 that the Chinese minority was considered as a permanent part of New Zealand society. This contrasts markedly with, for instance, the situation Willmott drew attention to in his 1969 article, where he took issue with Freedman's generalisation that Chinese communities could be placed on a continuum from simple to complex in terms of organisational make-up. Willmott maintained that, while a synchronic view might confirm this contention, a diachronic view would not in some instances support the model. In Cambodia, Singapore, Java and Thailand, for instance, the presence of indirect rule had imposed a simple organisational structure on the respective Chinese communities,

which limited the extent of segmentation. This arrangement also specified the kind of interaction which could take place between the Chinese community and the government of the host society. Segmentation occurred in the above situations when the removal of indirect rule and the influence of events in China coincided. The consequence of this was the kind of community Freedman described in Singapore which he explained in terms of population size and heterogeneity.

In the New Zealand context, however, neither population size nor indirect rule can be used as explanations for the persistence and change within the organisational structure. The explanation which fits the New Zealand case is one that combines aspects from the analyses of Freedman, Willmott and Wickberg. This work therefore suggests that change in and survival of the Chinese community can be ascertained from an examination of the segmentary structure of the community through time. It suggests, furthermore, that this segmentary structure emerges and develops because of the influence of events in China and events in the dominant host society, which may include, in addition to those specifically directed at the community, others which are external to the community.

There is an additional variable which is equally important: the segmentary structure must also be seen as a response to the nature of the internal dynamics within the community. Since it provides a legitimate means to achieve power and authority in the community for both groups and individuals, it also produces the basis for conflicts of interest. The emergence of the locality associations after 1915, the 1927 Chong Wah Wui Koon, the various sports clubs after the war, the community projects and the movement for local community autonomy in the post-war years - all have aspects of their developments that relate to conflict internal to the community. From this perspective,

therefore, it is important to locate the associational and political development of the community within a context which encompasses relationships both external and internal to its existence.

Two points can be made from the preceeding. First, political ethnicity, while culturally derived from urbanisation in China, is nevertheless uniquely manifested in the overseas context through changes in the segmentary structure which ensure the survival and integrity of the Chinese community. Second, that the changes in the segmentary structure described variously by the term fragmentation or cooperation are as much the product of the external relations of the community as they are of the internal dynamics of the community. Internal conflict or dissension may affect the relationship and existence of associations and in turn the external relations of the community or vice-versa. As Crissman noted without elaboration:

Various segments, or sub-communities, combine and divide in different circumstances. In some contexts the whole Chinese community is united and acts together, while in different situations small segments act independently against each other.

(Crissman, 1967:193)

While Crissman does not intend his model to be anymore than synchronic and therefore omits discussion of the variables that might initiate change or reinforce persistence his suggestion of process coincides with the findings of this study. In addition, although beyond the scope of this work, there is an apparent but perhaps unintended affinity between Crissman's analysis and the extensive work done on segmentary lineage systems (see Smith, 1956). The very term segmentary or segmentation, other than having obvious links to biology, has had extensive coverage in the anthropological literature especially in regard to African kinship systems. Crissman, however, makes no connection even though he uses the terminology and refers to both explicit administrative and political roles of associations amongst

overseas Chinese in the absence of formal government (see Chapter 1, page 34). He also describes the possibility of what could be termed 'fission and fusion', both of which are used to describe change within segmentary lineage systems. A more substantial link however comes from the work of Smith who, in the course of a lengthy discussion of the problems posed by differing contexts and interpretation of the theoretical assumptions about segmentary systems states the following:

Since all political organisation involves segmentation, and since political organisation is only one aspect of the process of government a distinction cannot be drawn between societies which are organized on segmentary principles, that is, lineage societies, and those which are not. What is crucial in any particular case is the nature of the segments. In some societies these may be lineages, in others localities, in others age-sets or regiments, in others cult-groups or associations...

(Smith, 1956:35)

The linkage here between political organisation, segmentation and associations as legitimate segments is clearly consistent with the discussion of Cohen and Crissman as well as the direction taken in this study. However, the major problem that emerges relates to the notion of change within the system. In the other work quoted on overseas Chinese - especially Willmott and Wickberg - there is a clear emphasis on external influences but little on the internal dynamics of the community and their relationship to change. From Smith's discussion however, it is clear that the influences which initiate change are largely internal to the segmentary lineage systems. While there is considerable attention to the internal dynamics of the New Zealand Chinese community the shortcoming of this study is its inability to predict concisely the extent to which either internal or external variables bring about a change in the segmentary system. In other

words it is hard to say with any certainty that internal causes will produce one form of segmentary response and external will produce another. Hopefully with more research and a greater understanding of the impact of particular influences on the Chinese community this kind of result may be forthcoming.

In conclusion it would seem necessary now to bring together the two discussions that have ended this study. Aside from the analytical points which have been emphasised concerning the organisation of an overseas Chinese community I think there are some equally important observations one must make about the notions of ethnicity and multi-culturalism. New Zealand government policy as regards ethnic minorities has changed markedly from one that initially gave total support to assimilation, later integration and now multi-culturalism. The New Zealand Chinese have lived through all three and their community has persisted and changed. What is alarming about both the change in policy and the change in the Chinese community is that the former existed in a total vacuum from the latter. The development of the Chinese community has taken place, by and large, in a context which has desired to comprehend neither the process nor the necessity of its existence. This in itself has ensured the maintenance of inaccurate stereotypes and aided in persistent attempts to discuss and legislate against Chinese residence in the absence of meaningful communication with the community. It furthermore has perpetuated a level of ignorance within the larger community which if not entirely manifest in action against the Chinese has not helped their position, nor provided the basis for understanding that is necessitated by a multi-cultural nation. The Chinese community for its part has survived articulating its political ethnicity through a segmentary system which reflected the kinds of influence the community faced. The fundamental point here is that ethnicity or political

ethnicity in this context is a constructive and necessary aspect not only for the existence of the New Zealand Chinese but for any ethnic minority. The understanding of this phenomenon therefore is crucial for policy makers and for the public at large for without this understanding it is impossible to comprehend the kinds of constraints an ethnic minority faces and the kinds of responses they may make. The alternative to this view is to operate under the assumption that an ethnic minority's social life, in its entirety, can be explained by innate ethnic or racial propensities or as cultural traits brought from their homeland. These explanations, intentionally and unintentionally used can too easily lead to the failure on the part of a dominant society to either accept or understand the position of minorities. In the end this attitude may be used to absolve a potentially multi-cultural nation from taking any responsibility for those that do not fit its dominant cultural pattern and worse may completely eradicate the notion of ethnicity as a viable and constructive means of survival.

In the years that this study covers, New Zealand policy has changed and its effect on the Chinese community is noted, however, we have far to go before we can consider ourselves a genuine multi-cultural nation. It is hoped that policy decisions that are made in future concerning minorities and attitudes towards manifest ethnicity are informed by knowledge and not judgements and that the histories of ethnic groups in future will not be a matter of shame or indifference but produced with the dignity they deserve.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

THE CHINESE POPULATION IN NEW ZEALAND: 1867 TO 1976

Year	Male	Female	Total
1867	1213	6	1219
1871	2637	4	2641
1874	4814	2	4816
1878	4424	9	4433
1881	4995	9	5004
1886	4527	15	4542
1891	4426	18	4444
1896	3773	86	3859
1901	2885	78	2963
1906	2515	55	2570
1911	2542	88	2630
1916	2017	130	2147
1921	2993	273	3266
1926	2927	447	3374
1936	2432	511	2943
1945	3414	1526	4940
1951	3633	2090	5723
1956	4026	2705	6731
1961	4913	3611	8524
1966	5700	4583	10263
1971	7025	5793	12818
1976	8081	6779	14860

Source: New Zealand Census, 1871 to 1976.

APPENDIX II

ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES OF CHINESE IN NEW ZEALAND1871 TO 1941^a

Year	Arrivals	Departures	Gain	Loss	Deaths	Permanent Arrivals ^c
1871	1596					
1872	475	190	285			
1873	183	278		95		
1874	1123	355	768			
1875	776	384	392			
1876	112	453		341		
1877	162	443		281		
1878	1025	255	770			
1879	329	356		27		
1880	296	386		90		
1881	1029	371	658			
1882	23(15) ^b	168		145		
1883	44(37)	257		213		
1884	84(79)	306		222		
1885	94(71)	164		130		
1886	239(48)	181	58		31	
1887	354(100)	246	108		25	
1888	308(281)	211	97		33	
1889	16(13)	104		88	34	
1890	18(12)	169		151	27	
1891	5(6)	160		155	30	
1892	58(45)	197		139	43	
1893	116(107)	134		18	25	
1894	278(228)	143		135	3	
1895	214(158)	170	44			
1896	173(127)	122	51			
1897	13(6)	123		110		
1898	20(4)	93		73		
1899	26(3)	184		158		
1900	27(15)	181		154		
1901	75(29)	145		70		
1902	69(44)	87		18		
1903	132(90)	124	8			
1904	235(153)	128	107			
1905	239(145)	187	52			
1906	260(139)	133	127			
1907	255(148)	182	73			
1908	538(320)	248	290			
1909	171(3)	335		164		
1910	209(2)	298		89		
1911	546(1)	579		33		
1912	348(2)	412		64		
1913	325(1)	323	2			
1914	511(1)	537		26		

Appendix II (Continued)

Year	Arrivals	Departures	Gain	Loss	Deaths	Permanent arrivals
1915	265(2)	237	32			
1916	327(9)	216	111			
1917	272(12)	312		40		
1918	256(29)	214	42			
1919	418(289)	238	180			
1920	1477(1029)	380	1097			
1921	255[39] ^d	368		113		
1922	345[157]	362		17		
1923	365[99]	378		13		146
1924	548[88]	451	97			157
1925	531[53]	473	58			58
1926	600[40]	560	40			50
1927	527[8]	532	5			11
1928	545	656		111		6
1929	531	473	58			5
1930	458	521		63		7
1931	375	542		167		3
1932	327	461		134	(1932-1933)	0
1933	240	340		100	(1933-1934)	7
1934	222	349		127	(1934-1935)	10
1935	273	228	45		(1935-1936)	21
1936	309	218	91		(1936-1937)	73
1937	343	218	125		(1937-1938)	112
1938	473	265	208		(1938-1939)	130
1939	311	160	151		(1939-1940)	684
1940	780	127	653		(1940-1941)	197
1941	271	141	130			
1945-46 ^e	7	6				
1946-47	33	84				
1947-48	79	85				
1948-49	169	244				
1949-50	474	36				
1950-51	176	99				
1951-52	263	20				
1952-53	244	9				

^aThese statistics are compiled from the New Zealand Statistics, 1891:24, 1910:273, 1920:25 and the New Zealand Official Year Book for each year. Deaths were available only for the years listed in the AJHR, 1894, Vol. 3, H-21. Arrivals and departures ceased being listed in 1941.

^bThese statistics () are from (NA, L22/1/81). They represent new arrivals for the years who would have paid poll tax. This would have included the 10 poll tax from 1882 till 1896 and 100 poll tax from 1897 till 1944 when the tax was repealed. The Department however has only recorded those paid until 1920.

^cPermanent Arrivals were only listed in the New Zealand Official Year Book between 1923 and 1941, as a separate category.

^dThese statistics [] are from Appendix XI

^eStatistics for 1945 to 1953 (Census, 1951, Vol. 8:119).

APPENDIX III

STATISTICS COMPILED FOR THE INTERIM REPORT (NO. 1 AND NO. 2) OF THE CHINESE IMMIGRATION COMMITTEE, 1871

Return of the Estimated Number of Chinese in the Province of Otago on the 15th September, 1871

Districts Where Located	How Employed									Offences committed during the past Twelve Months										
	Carpenters	Miners	Storekeepers	Hotelkeepers	Gardeners	Agents	Cooks	Labourers	Hawkers	TOTAL	Manslaughter	Larceny	Assaults	Vagrancy	Disorderly Conduct	Attempting to Commit Suicide	Indecent Exposures	Furiour riding	Disobeying Summonses	Remarks
Dunedin	4		8		10	3		10	12	47						1				
Dunstan		1910	77		12		1			2,000	1	3		1			1			
Mount Ida		218	5		5					228		6		1						
Tuapeka		1083	6	1						1,000		3	6		1			1	4	
Southland		350								350										
TOTAL	4	3561	96	1	27	3	1	10	12	3,715	1	12	6	2	1	1	1	1	4	

Appendix III (Continued)

Return of the Estimated Number of Chinese in New Zealand, 19 October 1871

	How Employed											
	Carpenters	Miners	Storekeepers	Hotelkeepers	Gardeners	Agents	Cooks	Labourers	Hawkers	Cabinetmakers	No Return	TOTAL
Canterbury			2		2						5	9
Wellington	1		2		6		1	1		6		17
Hawkes Bay*												
Nelson			2					1				3
Marlborough			1									1
Auckland											2	2
Westland		9			14		1					24
Otago (15th Sept., see Return Interim Report, No. 1, Appendix III)	4	3561	96	1	27	3	1	10	12))
))
))
))
Since arrived by sea (less ten died in harbour)											444)
))
))
	5	3570	103	1	49	3	3	12	12	6	451	4215

*None in the Province

Source: AJHR, 1871 H-5:23 and H-5a:13

APPENDIX IV

REVENUE FROM THE DUTY ON THE IMPORTATION
OF OPIUM INTO NEW ZEALAND 1867 TO 1901

(in pounds sterling)

1867	£488
1868	691
1869	1348.10.0
1870	1570.5.0
1871	2028.0.7
1872	2217.5.0
1873	2414.1.10
1874	2369.7.4
1875	2697.17.6
1876	2809.1.6
1877	2688.18.9
1878	2578.0.0
1879	3289.10.0
1880	2544.9.2
1881	4102.4.5
1882	4019.4.5
1883	4183.7.6
1884	4340.10.6
1885	4603.7.0
1886	4367.16.6
1887	4424.10.0
1888	3790.5.0
1889	7576.15.9
1890	7553.18.3
1891	
1892	8159.5.0
1883	8045.16.6
1894	8041.19.6
1895	5968.18.6
1896	5408.15.0
1897	5625.7.6
1898	5501.9.0
1899	6139.4.4
1900	6425.12.6
1901	6617.10.8

Source: Statistics of New Zealand 1867-1901

APPENDIX V

RULES OF THE CH'EUNG SHIN TONGNew Zealand Gold Hill, Panyu District (1)Effulgent Goodness Board Rules

We hear that, generally speaking, through the great virtue of the Sages (2), beneficial influences extend to the shades; and through the deep benevolence of the Superior Men (3), favours flow to the most distant tombs; but the breast of the benevolent man is moved with compassion for fear that the wandering souls of the dead (4) should famish.

We, the publishers, village-gentry of the district of Panyu, pity those sojourning coffins not returned home, and regret the uneasiness of those scattered souls.

And there rests on us a duty imperative, on us fellow-villagers and fellow-sojourners; then how can we endure to sit on one side and look on?

But it is difficult for one man to bear such a heavy burden; the strength of many people is able to accomplish the good work.

Therefore together we have deliberated over the public-spirited proposal to transport these sojourning coffins back to Kwangtung; so let all open their purses of gold to aid the compassionate vessel to cross over (5).

It will perhaps be found that some graves are in the corners of the earth and in the remotest parts, so that "the lash though long will not reach;" but concerning the others, though rivers are vast and oceans broad, they can be crossed with one reed (6).

But having an initiator, it is desirable that we have responders; the skilful inventor still requires skilful successors.

Those who lay up virtue have a foundation, so let all proceed and bear the good fruits of the 1000 families (7); in doing good lies the greatest happiness, so let all bestow one drop from the willow branch (8).

Each man should regard virtue as devolving on himself, the performance of which he may not yield to another (9). Strive to be first with your subscriptions in aid; we are waiting for you to see what is right and do it; in paying taxes men fear to be last.

Those whom we look after, having relatives, will each on return to his native village (10) receive the sacrifice of posterity; those without such relatives, will be again buried in a public grave, there to enjoy the fragrant odours of the summer sacrifices.

Appendix V (Continued)

Alas! in past years their bodies fell in different places; we should deplore their separation from us by death, and rejoice that now their bones are to return to their native land; for what difference is there between the return of these dead and the return of the living?

For, see the moon in the heavens! is it always round? And on earth is there a flower that does not wither (11)?

The head of the corpse being adjusted in the grave (12) the souls of our former friends will be put at ease; and Hades will produce light gratefully favoured by your goodness.

All resting peacefully in the tombs, the deceased will surely bear grass (13) and bring golden rings (14) to requite your kindness. Moreover those who do good will have felicity descend upon them. The living may expect the advantages of a good name to follow.

1. It has been decided that each man shall contribute £1.10s. If some be rich, they must exceed this fixed sum; they may not contribute the mentioned minimum amount.

2. The committee of management are to receive no salary; but their expenses to and fro will be borne by the Board.

3. Those who subscribe shall receive a receipt setting forth the name, year, month, and day; distinguishing mark, number, and the name of the collector.

4. Each time a journey is made to the various gold-diggings to receive subscriptions, on return to Dunedin, the money shall be delivered to the manager at Sew Hoy's store when after deducting the collector's expenses, it shall be deposited in a bank to receive interest to make up any deficiency.

5. The money collected shall be used only for the "former friends;" it may not be applied to other purposes

6. Friends of the dead should, at an early date, write clearly about the deceased, giving village, surname and name, with the name of the burial place, sending the letter to the "Effulgent Goodness Board", that the name may be enrolled and the numbers ascertained.

7. Those who do business for the Board are reckoned as associates thereof; when they have set about their work, they shall not engage in any other business to the damage of their work.

8. Persons intending to return to China, must first go to the office of the Board, stating their intention, when they will get a receipt; if they already possess a receipt, they must so report when their numbers will be cancelled and they may proceed; those not possessing a receipt are absconders, whom it has been decided to fine in the sum of £5, no quarter to be given.

9. Those who arrange matters on the goldfields, shall send all moneys collected to the manager, who will issue receipts to the sender for delivery to the subscribers in proof of receipt.

10. It is required of the relatives, of fellow-villagers, who have died in hospitals, that they attend to the graves, to avoid there being in course of time levelled and lost; so that no mistake may be made by the openers. If any such mistake occur, no blame shall attach to the Board. Let this rule everywhere be observed.

Appendix V (Continued)

11. As the expense of transporting the "former friends" is immense, it has been decided that if any man return to China now, and afterwards come again to New Zealand, he must again subscribe in accordance with the above minimum amount - much talk not allowed.

12. Whatever the collectors collect must be forwarded every quarter, during the 3rd, 6th, 9th, and 12th months - these times must not be exceeded and people kept waiting.

13. The "former friends" having been raised and arranged shall be sent to Dunedin, where the directors shall, in the presence of the "former friends," reckon clearly all accounts, and burn a written oath to show plainly that all is fair without secrecy; they shall afterwards engage a vessel to convey the "former friends" back to Kwang Tung, so that in the end all shall be well. Any money remaining shall, as before, be lodged in the bank to receive interest for the purpose of carrying out any good work which hereafter may be determined.

Notes.

(1) P'anyu or P'oonyu - the district in Kwangtung province which shared in the exhumation.

(2) Literally, "Holy men," Yas, Shun, Show, King, Confucius, etc.

(3) Next in rank to the "Holy men".

(4) Those buried in far away lands.

(5) The original "compassionate vessel" is that in which the Buddhist goddess of mercy carries souls to heaven. The owners of the s.s. Hoihow (which carried the former men) will doubtless be overjoyed at the comparison.

(6) This sentence is obscure; it may be paraphrased, "It may be found impossible to reach some graves; but if rivers and oceans are the only obstacle, they will be easily crossed". *One reed* may mean a *bundle of reeds*, the expression comes from the classic Book of Poetry.

(7) The clan interested - the P'oonyuites.

(8) The goddess of mercy dipped a willow branch in a vessel of sweet dew and scattered it to cure disease.

(9) This sentence in the original consists of six words - "Each should regard virtue, not yield". It is from Confucius.

(10) Literally, "family garden".

(11) Implying that man also must change.

(12) The Chinese believe the fox to be capable of assuming at will the human form. It is said that when an old fox is about to die, the younger foxes are careful to arrange the body and head in a line pointing directly towards the opening of the den.

(13) Referring to a legend supplied by my Chinese tutor. The father of one Ngai-kit, a commander-in-chief, being about to die, charged his son to take care of an old friend while living and bury him when dead. Ngai-kit discharged his trust faithfully. Some time after the death of the old man, Ngai-kit met in battle with one To-Ui, a famous warrior who, all things being equal, would surely be victorious. They met near the grave of the old man with spears, face to face on horse. To-Ui had to pass the grave to meet Ngai-kit, but meanwhile the spirit of the old man

Appendix V (Continued)

was busy making a rope of long grass growing on the grave. As Toi-Ui passed rapidly on his horse to meet Nga-kit, the spirit pulled the rope tight, the horse and rider were overthrown., Ngai-kit was able to despatch his enemy and was thus requited for his kindness to his father's old friend.

(14) Referring to another legend. One Young Po seeing a bird in peril, rescued it and then set it at liberty. Some time afterwards the same bird returned with a golden ring in its mouth and said: "For three generations your posterity will attain to the title of duke or marquis." This proved true, and thus Yeung Po was rewarded.

Source: New Zealand Presbyterian, 1 December 1883:103-105

APPENDIX VI

CHINESE DWELLINGS IN NEW ZEALAND BY TYPE FOR 1878¹

	Houses	Huts	Tents	Sleeping Out
North Island	78	4	1	
Middle Island	1298	2100	888	13
TOTAL	1376	2104	889	13

¹The Middle Island is referred to as the South Island after 1891

Source: Census, 1878:9

APPENDIX VII

NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION PERTAINING
TO CHINESE IMMIGRATION, 1879-1944

1879	Chinese Immigrants Bill
1880	Chinese Immigrants Prohibition Bill
1881	Chinese Immigrants Act
1882	Chinese Mining Exclusion Act
1887	Chinese Influx Prevention Bill
1888	The Act to Amend the Chinese Immigrants Act of 1881
1889	Chinese Immigrants Act Continuance Bill
1893	Aliens Act Amendment
1894	The Undesirable Immigrants Exclusion Act
1895	Asiatic and Other Immigration Restriction Bill
	Chinese Immigrants Bill
1896	Asiatic Restriction Bill (1)
	Asiatic Restriction Bill (2)
1897	Aliens Immigration Restriction Bill
1898	Immigration Restriction Bill
1899	Immigration Restriction Bill
1901	Chinese Immigrants Amendment Act
1907	Chinese Immigrants Amendment Bill
1908	Immigration Restriction Act
1908	Immigration Restriction Amendment Bill
1911	Immigration Restriction Amendment Bill
1920	Immigration Restriction Amendment Bill
1944	Finance Act (No. 3)

Note: This list incorporates legislation both enacted and failed.

APPENDIX VIII

OCCUPATIONS OF THE CHINESE IN NEW ZEALAND 1871-1901

	1871	1874	1878	1881	1886	1891	1896	1901
1. Merchants		10	7	7	20	16	12	23
2. Storekeepers	103	87	105	116	140	137	217	209
3. Store Assistant		16	20	17	38	43	94	70
4. Servants		37	78	66	75	92	31	1
5. Hotel/Boarding House keeper	1	8	12	19	30	32	32	27
6. Restaurant		1	1	3	7	7	19	7
7. Service (General)	17	48	92	165	119	151	128	126
8. Laundry						4	31	86
9. Hawker	12	12	36	33	57	112	83	81
10. Market Gardener	49	102	255	393	631	566	530	591
11. Market Gardener Labourer/Assistant			24	7	16	43	127	94
12. Farm Labourer/Servant		47	129	132	80	61	45	68
13. General Labourer	12	337	199	133	91	79	59	50
14. Miner	3570	4022	3398	3860	3134	3025	2170	1313
15. Professional		8	13	6	16	13	13	11
16. Wives		2	6	4	4		11	15
17. Students			2	2	12	2	8	15
18. Children			8	9	6	14	17	16
19. Charitable Institutions		12	9	18	20	35	28	38
20. Prison		2	3	1	5	3	2	1
21. No Information	451	65	36	13	41	9	54	15
TOTAL	4215	4816	4433	5004	4542	4444	3711	2857

Appendix VIII (Continued)

- | | |
|--------------------------------|---|
| 1. Merchants | : opium, general, agent, money lender. |
| 2. Storekeeper | : grocer, fruit and vegetables, confections,
fancy goods, rag, bone, waste paper dealer. |
| 3. Store Assistant | : shopman, storeman, clerk, packer, traveller. |
| 4. Servants | : domestic, club, ship |
| 7. Service (General) | : baker, butcher, bootmaker, tailor, cabinet
maker, carpenter, cook, painter, wood carver,
brick maker. |
| 9. Hawker | : tea, vegetables, fish, fancy goods, drapery. |
| 14. Miner | : coal and gold |
| 15. Professional | : Herbalist, chemist, dentist, interpreter
law clerk, accountant, school teacher, music
teacher. |
| 17 & 18 | : includes both male and female. |
| 19. Charitable
Institutions | : hospital, benevolent asylum, lunatic asylum. |

Source: New Zealand Census 1874-1901 and AJHR, 1871, H-5a:13.

APPENDIX IX

POLL TAX, DEPOSITS AND BONDS PAID BY
CHINESE IMMIGRANTS 1882-1944

Year	Amount in	Year	Amount in
1882 ^a	150.0.0	1914	200.0.0
1883	270.0.0	1915	330.0.0
1884	770.0.0	1916	980.0.0
1885	510.0.0	1917	1,210.0.0
1886	530.0.0	1918	8,190.0.0
1887	990.0.0	1919	45,700.0.0
1888 ^b	2,780.0.0	1920	83,500.0.0
1889	70.0.0	1921	5,020.0.0
1890	90.0.0	1922	15,530.0.0
1891	50.0.0	1923	10,270.0.0
1892	440.0.0	1924	10,490.0.0
1893	1,050.0.0	1925	10,660.0.0
1894	2,200.0.0	1926	9,840.0.0
1895	1,460.0.0	1927	5,070.0.0
1896 ^c	1,100.0.0	1928	3,590.0.0
1897	430.0.0	1929	3,970.0.0
1898	100.0.0	1930	3,140.0.0
1899	1,200.0.0	1931	1,760.0.0
1900	800.0.0	1932	1,490.0.0
1901	2,300.0.0	1933	1,480.0.0
1902	4,400.0.0	1934	1,824.0.0
1903	10,030.0.0	1935	1,882.0.0
1904	14,800.0.0	1936	4,780.0.0
1905	15,500.0.0	1937	5,480.0.0
1906	13,000.0.0	1938	4,232.0.0
1907	21,800.0.0	1939	3,790.0.0
1908 ^d	23,600.0.0	1940	1,970.0.0
1909	300.0.0	1941	988.0.0
1910	100.0.0	1942	65,101.0.0
1911		1943	2,040.0.0
1912	300.0.0	1944	1,570.0.0
1913			

Source: Statistics of New Zealand: Finance Section 1882-1944.

APPENDIX X

MEMORANDUM FROM THE CHINESE MINISTER TO THE SECRETARY OF
STATE CONCERNING IMMIGRATION RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON THE
CHINESE, 1910

Chinese Legation, 14 August, 1909

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have received telegraphic instructions from the Wai-wu Pu in Peking, directing me to approach Your Excellency on the subject of the present position of Chinese subjects in the Dominion of New Zealand.

In the year 1908 the New Zealand Legislature passed an Act entitled the Immigration Restriction Act, with an addition in the same year called Immigration Restriction Amendment Act. On reading the provisions contained in the said Acts, I cannot refrain from remarking that the restrictions they impose upon Chinese subjects appear very oppressive and indiscriminating. With the exception of officers or crews of Chinese vessels of war, as provided for in clause 41 of Part III of the principal Act, all other classes of Chinese subjects are precluded from visiting that prosperous colony of the British Empire unless they are willing to submit themselves to certain proceedings derogatory to their dignity and self-respect.

As New Zealand is within easy distance of China, and has made great progress within the last generation in the development of various industries, and also in her economical conditions, it would be to the advantage of both countries if facilities were afforded to Chinese subjects to visit that Dominion not only for the purpose of encouraging trade, but also for intellectual studies.

With this object in view the Chinese Government have had this matter under consideration for some time, and have now arrived at the conclusion that the present might be considered an opportune time to approach the Government of New Zealand for the negotiation of some change in their laws regulating the immigration of Chinese subjects into their Dominion.

I am now instructed, therefore, by my Government to enclose herewith, for Your Excellency's information, a memorandum of the proposed modifications on the existing immigration rules of New Zealand, and my Government would feel deeply gratified if Your Excellency could see your way to exercise such a favourable influence in the matter as would contribute to the settlement of this important question in the sense desired.

I have, etc.

Sir Edward Grey, Bart., MP., etc.

Li Ching-Fong

Appendix X (Continued)

Memorandum of Proposed Modifications in the New Zealand Regulations for the Immigration of Chinese

1. Chinese officials, students, and merchants with capital shall be granted the same privileges and facilities in landing at any port of New Zealand as are granted to the subjects of other Powers who have treaty relations with England: Provided they can produce passports issued by competent Chinese authorities certifying as to his status and condition, such passports to be issued by English Consuls or otherwise duly authorised English officials.
2. Any Chinese subject who has been resident in New Zealand for over three years, and who is well known to have been engaged bona fide in any respectable business, can have his wife and family brought from China to New Zealand to reside with him, and his wife and family may be allowed to land without paying any tax or submitting themselves to the language test, if they can produce a passport or passports issued by a competent Chinese authority certifying that they are in fact the wife and family of the aforesaid Chinese subject.
3. No Chinese subject who has been resident in any part of New Zealand for a number of years and is well known to his neighbours shall, if he desires to leave New Zealand temporarily with the intention of returning within four years, be required to leave his thumb-impressions for identification.
4. Any Chinese subject who is able to pass the language test on entering New Zealand shall be allowed to land, like the subjects of other Powers, without paying any tax.
5. Any Chinese subject who is passing through New Zealand on his way to other countries shall be exempted from paying any tax if he can find sureties to guarantee that he is a bona fide through traveller. If such traveller is afterwards found to remain in any part of New Zealand he will be dealt with in accordance with clause 34 of the Immigration Restriction Act of 1908.

Source: AJHR, 1910, A-1:45

APPENDIX XI

ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES OF CHINESE (CHINESE NATIONALITY)
IN NEW ZEALAND (1921-1936)

Period	Arrivals			Departures		
	M	F	T	M	F	T
9 mos. 1921	32x	7x	39x	19 ϕ	- ϕ	19 ϕ
Year 1922	144x	13x	157x	12 ϕ	- ϕ	12 ϕ
1923	91x	8x	99x	15 ϕ	1 ϕ	16 ϕ
1924	81x	7x	88x	17 ϕ	- ϕ	17 ϕ
1925	51x	2x	53x	23 ϕ	- ϕ	23 ϕ
1926	34x	6x	40x	25 ϕ	1 ϕ	26 ϕ
1927	6x	2x	8x	35 ϕ	- ϕ	35 ϕ
1928	391	13	404	618	38	656
1929	453	25	478	492	36	528
1930	325	18	343	492	34	526
1931	331	14	345	406	32	438
1932	230	11	241	345	34	379
15 mos. 1933-34	227	21	248	335	15	350
Year 1934-35	246	12	258	207	14	221
" 1935-36	274	19	293	194	13	207

^xFor period 1921-1927, figures are for new immigrants intending permanent residence only; the remaining years cover all arrivals.

ϕ For period 1921-1927, figures are for New Zealand residents departing permanently only; the remaining years cover all departures.

Note: Table reproduced as in source

Source: NA, IA 1935, 155/39, a reply to an Internal Affairs Department request (NA, IA 1935/155/38) by the Census and Statistics Office, 8 April 1937.

APPENDIX XII

MIGRATION - PERSONS OF CHINESE RACE

Period	ARRIVALS						DEPARTURES					
	Full-Blood			Mixed Blood			Full-Blood			Mixed Blood		
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
9 mos. 1921	182x	24x	206x	x	x	x	253x	14x	267x	x	x	x
Year 1922	324x	21x	345x	x	x	x	345x	17x	362x	x	x	x
1923	348x	17x	365x	x	x	x	359x	19x	378x	x	x	x
1924	526x	22ø	548ø	.	.	5	430ø	21ø	451ø	.	.	3
1925	490ø	27ø	517ø	.	.	5	495ø	29ø	524ø	.	.	4
1926	590ø	23ø	613ø	.	.	6	517ø	24ø	541ø	.	.	2
1927	528ø	14ø	542ø	.	.	3	547ø	40ø	587ø	.	.	2
1928	397	17	414	4	1	5	634	45	679	-	1	1
1929	467	30	497	2	5	7	494	35	529	1	1	2
1930	331	20	351	-	2	2	503	43	546	4	2	6
1931	332	17	349	3	-	3	416	43	459	3	1	4
1932	231	12	243	2	-	2	352	41	393	2	2	4
15 mos. 1933-34	230	22	252	-	1	1	353	26	379	1	-	1
Year 1934-35	254	17	271	-	2	2	209	17	226	-	2	2
1935-36	279	27	306	1	2	3	202	15	217	-	1	1
11 mos. to 28/2/37	321	12	333	1	2	3	160	7	167	-	1	1

^xFor the period 1921-1923, the numbers of mixed-blood Chinese (if any) are included in the figures given for full-blood Chinese

^øFor the period 1924-1927, the figures given for full-blood Chinese include mixed-blood Chinese. Sexes of mixed-bloods not available for these years.

Note: Table reproduced as in source

Source: NA, IA 1935/155/38 - a reply to an Internal Affairs Department request by the Census and Statistics Office.

APPENDIX XIII

PERSONS BORN IN CHINA

(Figures not available prior to 1928)

Period		Arrivals (other than N.Z. residents re- turning)			Persons of Chinese race who were per- manent residents returning to N.Z. ^x			All Departures		
		M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
Year	1928	119	15	134	288	11	299	606	30	636
	1929	148	26	174	321	20	341	486	21	507
	1930	76	18	94	262	15	277	488	35	523
	1931	45	9	54	295	14	309	404	25	429
	1932	52	14	66	188	7	195	337	23	360
15 mos.	1933-34	44	15	59	193	15	208	355	34	389
Year	1934-35	40	17	57	226	13	239	216	23	239
	1935-36	104	19	123	188	16	204	198	20	218

^xIncluding mixed-blood. Birthplaces of N.Z. residents returning are not known, but the great majority of Chinese returning would probably be born in China.

Note: Table reproduced as in source.

Source: NA, IA, 1935/155/38 - a reply to an Internal Affairs Department request by the Census and Statistics Office, 8 April 1937.

APPENDIX XIV

PETITIONS SENT BY CHINESE IN NEW ZEALAND TO THE NEW ZEALAND
GOVERNMENT OR THE GOVERNOR OF NEW ZEALAND 1883-1912

- 1883, AJHR, Vol. 3, I-1, p.4
Petition of John Ah Tong and other Chinese:
"The petitioners pray that Chinese immigration may be freed from the poll tax until the number of Chinese in the Colony reaches seven thousand".
- 1888, AJHR, Vol. 3 I-1, p.3
Petition of Chinese residents (21) of Auckland:
"The petitioners protest against any legislation that imposes, or may hereafter impose restrictions on the immigration and residence of Chinese in this Colony, pleading that such legislation is not only unjust and impolitic in itself, but that it constitutes a violation of treaties now in force between the British and Chinese Empires".
- 1891, AJHR, Vol. 4, I-2, p.4
Petitions of Gee, Sew and Others, and Ah Kew and Others of Auckland: "Petitioners pray for an amendment of "The Chinese Immigration Act 1881".
- AJHR, Vol. 4 I-1, p.8
Petitions of Wong Choi Fong and Others (Fong Wong Choi):
"Petitioners pray for the Amendment of "The Chinese Immigration Act 1881".
- 1895, AJHR, Vol. 4, I-1, p.8
Petition of Sun Kwong Lee and Others of Wellington:
"Petitioners pray that the House will not pass any further laws of an oppressive nature against the Chinese".
- 1896, C.O. 209/256 Despatch 48.
Petition of Thot Chang Luke, Chow Fong, Sing Kee and Co., William Ah Tong - Interpreter.
"Your Petitioners humbly pray that your Excellency will take this petition into your favourable consideration and that your Excellency will be pleased to refuse your assent to the measure now before Parliament.
- C.O. 209/256 Despatch 48.
Petition of W. Hong Kew & Co., Wong Hong Cheok.
"Your petitioners respectfully ask that no further disabilities should be cast upon their countrymen...That all measures which place impediments in the way of your petitioners' countrymen bringing their wives and children to the Colony should be disallowed.

- 1897, AJHR, Vol. 3, I-1, p.4
Petition of Fook On, of Wellington: "Petitioner prays for relief from poll tax imposed upon his wife".

Reply: "I am directed to report that the Committee is of the opinion that, upon proof of the marriage ceremony in this Colony, the Governor be advised to remit the fine of 100, as provided by Section 10 of "The Chinese Immigration Act 1881".

Also see in connection with above: Letter in (NZPD, Vol. 100, 1897, pp. 873-875) from one Chin Tong, a merchant from Pahiatua, who makes reference to the situation of Hook On of Yee Chong Wing and Co. (Manners St., Wellington) who is believed to be the same person as the gentleman, Fook On.

- 1900, AJHR, Vol. 3, I-1, p.6
Petition of Ah Foot of Riverton: "Petitioner prays for a refund of expenses incurred by him in an action in the Magistrate's Court, Riverton".

AJHR, Vol. 3, I-1, p.8
Petition of Young Hee and 541 Others: "Petitioners pray that an act be passed prohibiting or limiting the importation of opium, and controlling the use and sale thereof".

Petition of 172 Chinese to Hon. J.G. Ward, Acting Premier.
"We...pray that for the reasons set forth, you will advise the Chinese Government to authorise the appointment in this city of a Chinese Consul or Protector.
Source: Turnbull Library MS Paper H-19.

- 1901, AJHR, Vol. 4, I-2, p.7
Daniel Wong and 100 Others; J.T. Pinfold and Another; Wee Wah and 32 Others, G.W. Moy and 34 Others; Rev. C.H. Garland and 4 Others; and Rev. H. Kelly and 3 Others: "Petitioners pray for the prohibition of limitation of the importation of opium into the Colony".

Reply: "I am directed to report that, as the subject matter of the petition has been dealt with by the passing of the Opium Prohibition Bill, the Committee has no recommendation to make".

- 1903, AJHR, Vol. 3, I-1, p.3
Petition of Louis Kitt and 322 Others of Wellington: "Petitioners pray that the Government will appoint some official representative of the Chinese in the Colony".

See also, NZPD, 1903, Vol. 125, p. 563.

- 1904, AJHR, Vol. 3, I-1, p.4
Petition of Louis Kitt, of Wellington, and 4 Others: "Petitioners pray that more drastic measures be taken for the suppression of opium smoking".

Reply: "I am directed to report that, in the opinion of the Committees, this petition, together with the evidence of Inspector Ellison, should be referred to the Government, and that the Government be recommended to give effect to the prayer of the petition".

- 1904, AJHR, Vol. 3, I-1, p.4
 Petition of Louis Kitt, of Wellington, and 4 Others: -
 "Petitioners pray that more drastic measures be taken for
 the suppression of gambling among Chinese".
- AJHR, Vol. 3, I-1, p.9
 Petition of Wah Lee of Wanganui, and Another:
 "Petitioners pray for the return of the fines inflicted
 on them (a portion of them)".
- 1907, AJHR, Vol. 5, I-1, p.4
 Petition of Kwok Wah Sui of Alexandra South:
 "Petitioner prays for a refund of the poll tax paid on account
 of his wife".
- AJHR, Vol. 5, I-1, p.7
 Petition of Ah Ming of Cambridge: "Petitioner prays for
 the return of poll tax paid for the second time".
- 1908, AJHR, Vol. I, A-1, p. 15 and pp. 19-22
 Petition of the Chinese residents () of the Dominion of
 New Zealand: "Petitioners...pray that Your Excellency may be
 pleased to place this their petition before His Most Gracious
 Majesty King Edward the Seventh. They pray that Your
 Excellency may be pleased to recommend His Majesty to withhold
 his assent from the Bill (The Chinese Immigrants Amendment
 Act, 1907) which Your Excellency has been pleased to reserve
 for the signification of His Majesty's, and that your
 petitioners may be granted such further or other relief as
 to His Majesty may seem meet.
- 1912, AJHR, Vol. 5 (Session 2), I-1, p.9
 Petition of William Pettie and 98 Others of Gisborne:
 "Praying for an Amendment to the Immigration Act 1908, in
 order that one Ching Foo be permitted to reside in New Zealand,
 the said Ching Foo having prior to visiting his native country
 in 1910 resided twenty years in this Dominion".

APPENDIX XV

CHINESE NATURALIZED IN NEW ZEALAND FROM 1852 TO 1907

BY OCCUPATION¹

Year	Barber	Boardinghouse Keeper	Butcher	Cabinet Maker	Carpenter	Carver-Gilder	Cattle Breeder	Commission Agent	Cook	Draper	Farmer	Fruiterer	Gardener	General Dealer	Hawker	Hotel Keeper	Interpreter	Labourer	Laundryman	Machine Driver	Manufacturer	Mariner	Merchant	Miner	Missionary	Restaurant Keeper	Shoemaker	Settler	Storekeeper	Storeman	Watchmaker	Woolscourer	No Data	Total	% of Total Chinese Population Naturalized		
1852							1																											1			
1856																																			1		
1866				1										1																					1		
1869																													2						2		
1870						1								1				1												1					4		
1872								1									1													1					3		
1873									1														3								1				4		
1874														1										1											2	.04	
1875								1					1															1	4						7		
1876											1		2					1							1					3					8		
1877									1														1												2		
1879													2										1							3					6		
1880													1																	1					2		
1881									1				2										1							3					7	.12	
1882			1						3	1			3	2	1			1		1	1		2			1	1		6	1				25			
1883	1		2						2	1	3		7	2				1						2				1		5	1				28		
1884									3			1	6		1								2	2						3					18		
1885		1			1							1	3											1						3					10		
1886													6										1	5						8					20	.44	
1887									1				9					2						1	2					3					18		
1888									6	2			3					2						1	18					7					39		
1889												1						1																	2		
1890											1		1						1											3					7		
1891									1				1											2						1		1			7		
1892													1											1						2					4		
1893									1			3	5	1					1							1				9					25		
1894									3		1	13	29										2	11						35	1				95		
1895									2		2		6											1						6					17		
1896									3				5					1					2	3						1				1	16	.42	
1898													2																	2						4	
1899									2				2																							4	
1900													2																							4	
1901																						1		1											4		
1902									1				3				1							1						1						6	
1903									1				1																	1						3	
1904									1			1	3										1		1	1				3						11	
1905									3				1	7					1	11										11					34		
1906												1	11					1	5						1					9					28	1.09	
1907									1			2							3										1	4						11	
TOTAL	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	2	37	4	10	21	128	5	2	1	1	13	20	1	1	1	18	56	3	3	2	4	140	3	1	1	1		488		

¹ In 1907 the "Chinese Immigrants Amendment Act" was passed, in order to restrict the immigration of Chinese into New Zealand. In view of this legislation (which was embodied in the Immigration Restriction Act, 1908), the Minister of Internal Affairs decided not to naturalize Chinese and placed the matter before Cabinet for a decision. Cabinet direction on the 4th February, 1908 was "decline naturalization."

(I.A. 116/7, 24 June 1946).

NOTE: From 1910 to 1947 the following exceptional cases were allowed to take out naturalization, 1 Commercial Traveller, 1 Domestic, 1 Clerk, 1 Child, 1 Merchant, 1 Housewife, 1 Medical Student, 1 Baker, 1 Medical Practitioner, 1 Radio Mechanic.

APPENDIX XVI

PETITION FROM WELLINGTON CHINESE CONCERNING POLL
TAX PROVISIONS AND THE TERMINATION OF NATURALISATION
RIGHTS 1897

To His Excellency the Governor of New Zealand

The Humble Petition of the Undersigned Chinese residents of Wellington, on behalf of themselves and their fellow countrymen in New Zealand.

Sheweth

1. That the Chinese residents in New Zealand are as a rule, peaceful, orderly, industrious, and law abiding Colonists, and compare favourably with the subjects of any other Nation who become residents of New Zealand.
2. That exceptional laws have already been passed in New Zealand in respect of the Chinese.
3. That for years past the number of Chinese residents in New Zealand is decreasing.
4. That in order to obtain Letters of Naturalization the Chinese have to pay a fee of £1.0.0, whereas Letters of Naturalization are granted to other aliens free.
5. That it is now proposed to make it unlawful in future to grant Letters of Naturalization to Chinese.
6. That your Petitioners respectfully submit that the proposed alteration in the law relating to the Chinese is exceptional, cruel, and unjust, and is such that one friendly Nation should not pass with respect to the subjects of another friendly nation.

Your Petitioners Humbly Pray that your Excellency will take this petition into your favourable consideration and that your Excellency will be pleased to refuse your assent to the measure now before Parliament. And your Petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray etc.

Thot Chang Luke
Chow Fong

Sing Kee & Co.
W. Heng Kew and Co.
Wong She
Yee Chong Wing
William Ah Tong, Interpreter

APPENDIX XVII

PETITION FROM NATURALISED CHINESE
DESIRING TO SETTLE PERMANENTLY,
1897

To His Excellency.

The Right Honourable David, Earl of Glasgow
Knights Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished
Order of Saint Michael and Saint George;
Governor and Commander-in-Chief in and over
Her Majesty's Colony of New Zealand and its
Dependencies.

The Humble Petition of the undersigned
British Subjects, natives of China but
duly naturalised by virtue of the
provisions of the laws from time to
time in force in the Colony of New
Zealand

Humbly and Respectfully Showeth

1. That your petitioners represent besides themselves a great number of their countrymen who have resided in Wellington and other places in New Zealand for various periods up to over twenty five years.
2. That the majority of the persons aforesaid including your petitioners have become naturalised subjects of Her Majesty the Queen
3. That your petitioners and those they represent have complied with the laws of the Colony during the time they have resided in the Colony and have, they believe, conducted themselves soberly, industriously, and with respect to the feelings of other law abiding residents of the Colony.
4. That some of your petitioners and their friends have relatives and some have wives and families resident in Asia.
5. That it has often been urged against Chinese residents in the Colony that they have neglected domestic relations by not bringing their wives to settle with them in the Colony.

6. That when your petitioners and their friends came to the Colony they did so with a view to a temporary residence only but almost the whole of them have become accustomed to the habits and rule of the Colony and so appreciate them that they have determined to make it their permanent home.
7. Some of them have in consequence of their premises brought their wives to the Colony and others desire to do so.
8. A strong prejudice on the part of some members of the community has caused legislation to be passed which presses heavily upon our petitioners and their fellow countrymen who are desirous of joining your petitioners in sharing the advantage of settling in this Colony.
9. Further legislation has been sought to be passed during the present Session of Parliament and the same has been passed by both Houses of Parliament.
10. Your petitioners humbly submit that this legislation now sought to be passed is unfair to your petitioners and their kinsmen who belong to the Nation at peace with Great Britain and bound by Treaty to permit intercourse between such nations.
11. If such legislation is passed your petitioners will be deprived except under heavy penalty of the right to bring to the Colony their wives and children at present resident in other parts of the world.
12. A slight is placed upon your petitioners by a public enactment which virtually declares that your petitioners and their countrymen are bad Colonists.
13. Your petitioners submit that they and their countrymen within the Colony have maintained as pure and unblemished a record as any similar number of Colonists of any other race.

Your Petitioners Therefore Humbly Pray

1. That Your Excellency will be pleased to transmit to Her Majesty the Queen whose subjects they pride themselves upon being, their assurances of respectful obedience and their above humble expression of their opinion.
2. Your petitioners respectfully ask that no further disabilities should be cast upon their countrymen but that if it is seriously alleged that they are guilty of any conduct not conducive to the well being of the State that due inquiry should be made before measures condemnatory of a large body of citizens are passed.
3. That all measures which place impediments in the way of your petitioner's countrymen bringing their wives and children to the Colony should be disallowed and your petitioners as in duty bound will ever pray etc.

W. Hong Kew & Co.
Wong Hong Cheok

APPENDIX XVIII

Age Distribution for the New Zealand Chinese Population, 1891-1921

	1891		1906		1916		1921	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
15 and under	11	8	25	10	39	33	160	80
15 and under 20	30	1	32	9	1	9	240	9
20 and under 25	161	3	125	13	32	8	428	23
25 and under 45	3000	6	939	22	672	22	1050	84
45 and under 65	1155	0	1146	1	850	1	753	9
65 and upwards	24	0	219	0	308	0	263	0
unknown	45	0	29		21		11	
TOTAL	4426	19	2515	55	1923	73	2905	205

Source: Census 1891:142, Census 1906:202-203, Census, Part X 1916:16, Census, Part VI 1921:30.

APPENDIX XIX

PETITION OF THE NEW ZEALAND CHINESE COMMUNITY
OPPOSING THE CHINESE IMMIGRANTS ACT AMENDMENT
ACT 1907

To His Excellency the Right Honourable William Lee,
Baron Plunket, K.C.M.G., Governor of the Dominion
of New Zealand.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,-

This humble petition of the undersigned Chinese residents of the Dominion of New Zealand sheweth:-

1. That your petitioners comprise the great majority of the Chinese residents of the Dominion aforesaid, and some of them are naturalised subjects of His Majesty and Christians.
2. That the Chinese residents of the Dominion are peaceful, hardworking, and law-abiding. The proportion of law-breakers among them is considerably smaller than among European residents, and practically all offences committed by them are of a minor character.
3. That before being admitted to the Dominion each of your petitioners paid the poll-tax, as required by law.
4. That your petitioners earn their living honestly as miners, market-gardeners, laundrymen, and shopkeepers, and more than two hundred have become naturalised.
5. That during the session of the General Assembly of New Zealand held in 1907, a Bill intituled "An Act to amend 'The Chinese Immigrants Act, 1881,' " was passed, but reserved by Your Excellency for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure thereon.
6. That your petitioners respectfully submit that the said Bill, having been introduced and passed at the close of an unusually long session of the General Assembly of New Zealand, was not fully and adequately considered and discussed; that your petitioners had no knowledge of the introduction of the said Bill until considerable progress had been made with it, and were afforded neither time nor opportunity for placing their protest fairly before Parliament.

7. That such Bill proposes to enact as follows:-

(a.) "It shall not be lawful for any Chinese to land in New Zealand until it has been proved to the satisfaction of the Collector or other principal officer of Customs at some port in New Zealand that such Chinese is able to read a printed passage of not less than one hundred words of the English language, selected at the discretion of such Collector or principal officer: Provided that any Chinese who is dissatisfied with the decision of the Collector or principal officer shall have the right to appeal to a Magistrate, who shall administer such further test in reading the English language as he thinks fit, and the decision of the Magistrate shall be final.

(b.) "Any master of a ship who lands or permits to land in New Zealand any Chinese who has not fulfilled the requirements of this Act shall be liable to the same penalties, and may be dealt with in the same manner as if he had landed or attempted to land without payment having been made as provided by section five of the principal Act."

8. That under "The Chinese Immigrants Act, 1881," every Chinese immigrant to New Zealand was subjected to a poll-tax of £10, in addition to which the proportion of Chinese immigrants travelling on any one ship was fixed at one for every 10 tons of registered tonnage.

9. That by an amending Act of 1888 the proportion of Chinese immigrants per ship was further limited to one for every 100 tons of registered tonnage. As if all this was not sufficiently severe, the General Assembly of New Zealand in 1896 passed a Bill intituled "The Asiatic Restriction Act," the chief objects of which were to raise the poll-tax to £100, to limit the proportion of immigrants to one for every 200 tons of registered tonnage, and to prohibit the naturalisation of Chinese. The measure was reserved, however, by His Excellency Lord Glasgow for the signification of Her late Majesty's pleasure thereon, and it never became law.

10. That when "The Asiatic Restriction Act, 1896," had been reserved as aforesaid, the General Assembly of New Zealand passed "The Chinese Immigrants Act, 1896," the object of which was to increase the poll-tax to £100 and to limit the number of Chinese passengers by any one ship to one for every 200 tons of registered tonnage. That Act was intended as a temporary measure pending the assent of Her late Majesty to the Bill which had been reserved, but, as Her late Majesty withheld her assent from the latter, the said Act of 1896 is still in force.

11. That when the Colonial Premiers met the Secretary of State for the Colonies in Conference on the occasion of Her late Majesty's Diamond Jubilee in 1897, the question of alien immigration into the British colonies was dealt with exhaustively. The Secretary of State for the Colonies submitted a draft measure to the Conference of Premiers for submission to their respective Parliaments, with a view, as far as possible, to the adoption of uniform legislation in this connection throughout the Empire. This measure, as adopted by the Premiers, omitted all reference to immigrants of any particular nationality; it contained no reference to the question of naturalisation, and it proposed a

uniform writing test for immigrants "in some language of Europe". The evident policy of the measure was to deal with a subject admittedly difficult in the least offensive manner possible in the circumstances, and to avoid undue harshness towards the people of any particular nation. "The Immigration Restriction Act, 1899," represents the measure submitted to the Premiers by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, as the same was adopted by the Parliament of New Zealand. Section 21 of the Act reads as follows: "Nothing in this Act contained shall apply to Chinese within the meaning of 'The Chinese Immigrants Act, 1891,' but all such Chinese shall continue to be subject to the Act as if this Act had not been passed". This clause was in the Bill as it was first submitted to the House of Representatives, and it clearly shows that the Conference of Premiers and the Parliament of New Zealand considered that, inasmuch as Chinese immigrants were already subject to a poll-tax of £100 and to drastic limitations on the number travelling by any one ship, it was neither desirable nor equitable that they should also be made amenable to a writing test.

12. That under the law as it exists at present alien immigrants other than Chinese are subject to the writing test aforesaid, which, generally speaking, is in their own language. Chinese immigrants are exempt from the writing test but are subject to the poll-tax and the limitation on travel already mentioned. If, however, the proposed legislation is approved by His Majesty, Chinese immigrants will be subjected to peculiar hardships, inasmuch as they will be amenable to the poll-tax, to the limitation of the number travelling by any one vessel, and to a reading test in a language foreign to them, and of which they cannot be expected to have any knowledge.

13. That the Bill recently reserved by Your Excellency is directed solely against persons of the Chinese race, and Your Excellency's Advisers expressly stated when the measure was before Parliament that its object was the complete exclusion of Chinese immigrants from New Zealand, and that its probable effect would be the prevention of any further accession to the Chinese population of this Dominion.

14. That your petitioners firmly believe that the effect of the Bill, if it passes into law, will be, as stated by Your Excellency's Advisers, to prevent all Chinese immigration into the Dominion, since practically all the Chinese likely to emigrate to this country must be manual labourers, and, as they have no facilities for acquiring a knowledge of the English language in China, they will necessarily be unable to pass the reading test for which the Bill provides.

15. That the said Bill makes no provision for the re-entry of Chinese residents who, though domiciled in New Zealand, are at present absent from the Dominion, and, though having their homes and property here, will be precluded by the rigorous reading test imposed by the Bill from returning. Moreover, your petitioners would respectfully point out that it is impossible to inform such persons of the provisions of the Bill in time to enable them to return before the same becomes law, if it should in due course receive the assent of His Majesty.

16. That the Bill provides for no exemption in favour of Chinese at present residing in New Zealand, but who may desire to visit China or any other part of the world.

17. That, if the said Bill passes into law, it will necessarily cause great hardship to those Chinese who are now visiting their native land, all of whom have made their homes in New Zealand.

18. That, if there were any influx of Chinese into this Dominion, your petitioners, though they would feel that they were being unjustly treated, nevertheless would not complain. The Chinese population of New Zealand, however, is steadily diminishing, and there is every reason to believe that it will continue to diminish, in proof of which your petitioners would quote the following figures from the official census returns:-

Census Year			Chinese in New Zealand
1881	5,004
1886	4,542
1891	4,444
1896	3,711
1901	2,857
1906	2,570

Your petitioners are thus able to show incontestably that for the past twenty-six years there has been a steady diminution of Chinese in this Dominion. Hence, even from the standpoint of those opposed to Chinese immigration, the said Bill is uncalled-for and unnecessary, more especially as the measure adopted by the Premiers' Conference on the suggestion of the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1897 was clearly intended both by the Conference and the Parliament of New Zealand to mark the point beyond which legislation should not advance unless special circumstances made such a course necessary. Your petitioners humbly submit to Your Excellency that, in fact of the official figures hereinbefore quoted, it cannot be seriously maintained that any such circumstances have arisen in this country.

19. That your petitioners submit further that the provisions of the Bill are opposed to the well-recognised principles of international comity, and that they amount to an unfriendly act towards the Empire of China, between the Government of which and His Majesty's Imperial Government happily the most cordial relations obtain. Your petitioners would respectfully point out that, if such legislation were attempted in China against the subjects of any foreign State, pressure would at once be brought to secure its withdrawal or modification, and your petitioners humbly submit that other Governments should hesitate to impose on subjects of the Chinese Empire disabilities to which they themselves would strongly object.

20. That your petitioners readily acknowledge and appreciate the many blessings afforded them by living under the British flag, and they particularly appreciate the even-handed justice invariably meted out to them in His Majesty's Courts of law. They are not unmindful either of the kindness and forbearance observed towards them by the great majority of His Majesty's subjects, from whom they are necessarily separated by difference of customs, language, institutions, and national feeling. Your petitioners feel strongly, since they find no difficulty in pursuing their respective avocations in this country, and that there is not the slightest objection to dealing with them in the ordinary course of business, that they are neither undesirable immigrants nor nearly such unwelcome residents as the provisions of the said Bill would indicate.

21. That, notwithstanding the far-reaching effects and the drastic provisions of "The Asiatic Restriction Act, 1896," there was not the slightest manifestation of popular dissatisfaction when Her Late Majesty withheld her assent therefrom, and your petitioners have no doubt whatever that the public opinion of New Zealand will dictate loyal acquiescence in His Majesty's will if His Majesty should see fit to save your petitioners and their countrymen from the hardships and indignities proposed by the said Bill.

Your petitioners, therefore, humbly pray that Your Excellency may be pleased to place this their petition before His Most Gracious Majesty King Edward the Seventh. Your petitioners realise that His Majesty has during his reign gained a proud pre-eminence for his noble efforts to promote peace and good will not only throughout his vast Empire, but among all nations.

They pray that Your Excellency may be pleased to recommend His Majesty to withhold his assent from the Bill which Your Excellency has been pleased to reserve for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure, and that your petitioners may be granted such further or other relief as to His Majesty may seem meet.

And your petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray.

APPENDIX XX

A MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND
TO THE GOVERNOR OF NEW ZEALAND REGARDING THE CHINESE
IMMIGRANTS ACT AMENDMENT AND A CHINESE PETITION

The Prime Minister presents his compliments to His Excellency, with the request that when forwarding to the Imperial authorities the petition of certain Chinese residents against "The Chinese Immigrants Act Amendment Act, 1907", he will also transmit the views of His Excellency's advisers on the subject matter of the petition.

(1) The Immigration Restriction Act, 1899, which imposed a writing test on all persons coming to New Zealand (with exceptions which do not affect the present matter) expressly exempted Chinese from its operation. The purpose of the present Bill is to remove this exemption. The only difference is that under the Act of 1899 the immigrant might select any European language he chose, whereas in the Bill the language is specified to be English. The difference is immaterial, and the Chinese immigrant cannot reasonably complain of legislation which merely brings him into line with all other persons who wish to land in New Zealand.

(2) This practically disposes of the petition, but it may not be out of place to offer a few observations on its various clauses.

(3) They cover a good deal of ground but may be resolved into two main points:- 1st that the Bill is directed solely against Chinese by name, and 2nd that it imposes hardships on Chinese residents by making no provision for re-entry to New Zealand, etc.

(4) As to the first point, it is sufficient to say that the objection comes too late. For very many years past both Australia and New Zealand have legislated against Chinese by name. The first New Zealand Act - The Chinese Immigrants Act, 1881 - which imposed a poll tax and fixed the proportion of Chinese immigrants on any ship to one for every 10 tons of registered tonnage - was reserved for the Royal assent, and duly received it. Since then various amending Acts have been passed, the purpose of each being to further restrict Chinese immigration, and none of them have been objected to by the Imperial authorities. In these circumstances the constitutional right of New Zealand to legislate on these lines must be deemed to be fully established.

Appendix XX (Continued)

(5) The long and consistent course of legislation on the subject shews conclusively the fixed conviction of the people of New Zealand that the presence of Chinese is undesirable. It is not necessary to offer reasons for this, though reasons in abundance could easily be given. It is sufficient to state the fact; and Your Excellency's advisers are profoundly convinced that any action by the Home authorities tending to fetter the policy of the New Zealand Parliament on this matter would be regarded by the people with feelings of the liveliest dissatisfaction.

(6) As regards the various hardships which the petitioners say the Bill will cause to Chinese residents, it is perhaps sufficient to observe that the Bill must be read with the existing Acts. It merely imposes one additional restriction. Hence whatever hardships can possibly arise in respect of this restriction under the Bill must also exist under the Acts in respect of their restrictions. Yet, so far as concerns the Acts, the Government is not aware of any case of hardship which has not been sufficiently met by the provision for remitting penalties.

(7) In conclusion it is submitted, that, the right to legislate on the subject being conceded, the details are matters entirely for the New Zealand Parliament in the exercise of the power conferred by the Constitution Act to make laws for the peace, order and good government of New Zealand.

(Sgd.) J.G. WARD

Source: C.O. 418/62, 21 April 1908.

APPENDIX XXI

THE RULES OF THE NEW ZEALAND CHINESE ASSOCIATION

History has borne out the fact that a wise emperor would always attach supreme importance to peace and the well-being of the nation, and to achieve this end, solidarity of the people and of different strata of the society must be realized. We have not seen a divided nation that survives.

His Excellency Consul Wong Wing-lian has instructed us over and over again that to forge closer ties amongst the Chinese in New Zealand is now our overriding task. To facilitate this goal we should work all out to establish an association of New Zealand Chinese.

The work of raising funds should be sped up. However the whole project has just taken shape. It has to be discussed by all concerned by convening meetings. It is hoped that all the Chinese in various places displaying their enthusiasm by giving generous financial support and publicizing the need for this body which is in the interest of all the Chinese in New Zealand. With this organisation behind us, no foreigners will dare to insult us.

The rules of the New Zealand Chinese Association

1. The name of the organization is the Chinese Association.
2. A. Aim: The Chinese Association is an organization formed to unite all the Chinese in New Zealand.
 - a) The Association will institute a consultant section to offer assistance to all overseas Chinese.
 - b) A reading room will be set up for the convenience of our compatriots.
- B. The Association endeavours to forge better friendly ties amongst our compatriots, fosters the spirit of mutual help, and plays an intermediate role in the case where divergent or conflicting opinions arise among our people.
- C. A night school will be arranged teaching Chinese and English.

Appendix XXI (Continued)

3. Nature of the Association: This organization promotes the progress of the society as a whole and is not involved in party politics nor religious affairs.
4. The premises: The Association is set up in Wellington. All Chinese are eligible members. The premises are rented. It is hoped that we can purchase a suitable site when our financial position improves.
5. The right of the executives and commentators:
 - A. Commentators have the right to take part in the discussion of the general affairs of the Association.
 - B. The Association undertakes to report in full details of its annual balance sheet and the good deeds performed by various individuals.
6. The duties of the executive and commentators:
 - A. The president manages the general business of the association.
 - B. Three vice-presidents assist the president. They shall be acting on his behalf in his absence.
 - C. The secretary will reside permanently in the living quarters of the Association building and temporarily take up the work of a caretaker.
 - D. The duties of the three treasurers are to record and manage the financial matters of the association.
 - E. The duties of the three inspectors are to see all the work of the Association are correctly performed.
 - F. The 15 commentators must be present whenever a meeting is convened.
7. Officers' designation: All officers are elected by all members of the Association annually by voting.
8. A. Every executive or commentator must be present at the semi-monthly meeting.
 - B. Only when more than half of the officers are present may the meeting be started.

Regulations to be Observed

1. Subscription and Donation: Each New Zealand Chinese must pay a basic subscription of 5/-, for which a receipt from the Association will be issued. Any donation to the Association will be commended by displaying the donor's name and the sum of money in the Association Hall.

Appendix XXI (Continued)

Any person returning to China will pay a levy of £1 and a commission of 10/- for purchasing his steamer's ticket. Those who are aged and sick are exempted from paying the levy. Those who try to evade paying the Association a levy will be dealt with severely.

2. The duties of the Executives: Six persons are elected to handle affairs of travelling to and from China. They act as guarantors for the travellers. They have the right to refuse guaranty should they think their honour is at risk. The secretary is invested with the power to handle correspondence in general. Any correspondence of important nature must be approved by executives or commentators before sending.

Commentators are requested not to interrupt one another when discussion is held.

The provisional chairman of each meeting announces the agenda and is made responsible for the proceeding of the meeting.

3. Emergency meeting: Any emergency meeting must be approved by the president of the Association and the secretary must be informed five days prior to the convention so that sufficient time is given for circulars to reach all the members.
4. Payments: All monetary matters are under the jurisdiction of the treasury. But all cheques must be signed by three persons.
5. Property and expenditure: All materials, furniture pieces are registered in detail. Incidental expenses are borne by the Association.

All executives and commentators are honorary members, the caretaker who resides permanently in the Association building is entitled to a salary. The amount of the salary is subject to the approval of executive committee. Teachers in Chinese and English are to be paid by the students taking the lessons. The tuition fee is £2 per year (one lesson weekly) or £4 per year (two lessons weekly).

6. Guest speakers: Guest speakers are to be invited each month. All members are welcome.
7. These regulations are subject to further revision in the future.

---The third month of the first year
of Emperor Xuan Tong (1909) by the
New Zealand Chinese Association---

Note: Document translated from the Chinese

Source: Turnbull Library MS 1923/264.

APPENDIX XXII

OCCUPATIONS OF THE CHINESE IN NEW ZEALAND1906-1916

	1906	1911	1916
1. Merchants	10	2	1
2. Storekeepers	275	368	407
3. Store Assistant	53	10	
4. Servants	11	14	290
5. Hotel/Boarding House keeper	19	21	90
6. Restaurant	4	3	
7. Service (General)	117	116	39
8. Laundry	243	287	
9. Hawker	97	83	
10. Market Gardeners	737	886	881
11. Market Gardener Labour/Assistant	57	62	
12. Farm Labourer/Assistant	45	63	
13. General Labourer	117	113	34
14. Miner	612	420	130
15. Professional	8	5	16
16. Wives	40	37	
17. Students	18	24	
18. Children	18	53	186
19. Charitable Institutions	47	14	38
20. Prison	5	1	8
21. No Information	13	27	
22. Rabbiter/Fisherman	26	15	14
23. Pensioner	3	2	
24. Independent Means	1	4	13
25. Clergyman/Missionary	3		
TOTAL	2570	2630	2147

Source: Census, 1906:457, 1911:507, 1961, Vol. 7:23.

Appendix XXII (Continued)

Notes on occupations included within each category:

1. Merchant : tea merchant, merchant, importer, agent.
2. Storekeeper : fancy goods dealer, fruiterer, greengrocer, grocer, storekeeper, dealer, tobacconist; (1916)-dealing in: art and mechanic productions, textile fabrics, dress and fibrous materials, food, drink, narcotics and stimulants, animals, animal and vegetable substances, fuel and light, metals and other minerals.
3. Store Assistant : assistant, clerk, storeman, shopman, salesman, expressman, carter, general carrier.
4. Servants : steward, housemaid, groom.
7. Service (General) : basketmaker, cabinetmaker, tailor, dressmaker, shirtmaker, carpenter, cooks, billiard-marker barber, butcher, fish dealer (1916)-engaged in: railway traffic, traffic on roads, on seas, and rivers, in forestry, water conservation and supply; working in: art and mechanic productions, textile fabrics, dress and fibrous materials, food, drinks, narcotics and stimulants, animal and vegetable substances, metals and other minerals, fuel, light and other forms of energy.
10. Market Gardeners : farmer, dairy-farmer, fruit grower; (1916) engaged in: agricultural pursuits, pastoral pursuits.
13. General Labourer : (1916)-engaged in: construction of roads, buildings and railroads, disposal of refuse or the dead, undefined industrial pursuits.
15. Professional : Chinese doctor, herbalist, chemist, interpreter, Consul and secretary, Secretary of Chinese Association; (1916)-engaged in: government, defence and law; ministering of religion, charity, health and education.

Appendix XXII (Continued)

Notes on Occupations, 1906-1916

1. In the 1911 and 1916 Census categories that were separate in 1906 have been collapsed. For instance, shopkeepers, merchants and fruiterers are separate categories to assistants for each in 1906 while they are collapsed and included under the former categories in 1911 and 1916.
2. In 1906 four new categories are added at the end to allow comparison with the previous Appendix on occupations. The new categories include Rabbiter/Fisherman, Pensioner, Independent Means and Clergyman/Missionary. The category 'Pensioner' is problematic since Chinese were excluded from the Old Age Pension Act in 1898.
3. In 1911 two new Professional categories are noted including the 'Consul and secretary' and the 'Secretary to the Chinese Association'. These do not appear again in the Census. The fact that they are listed however does reflect the appointment of a Consul for the first time to New Zealand for the Chinese in 1908 and the founding of the Chong Wah Wui Koon in the same year.
4. The merchant category is no longer clearly discernable in 1911 and appears to have been included under 'Storekeepers'.
5. In 1916 'Laundrymen' and 'Hawker' are excluded but it is entirely unlikely that they were non-existent. It can be assumed that they have been included in possibly 'Engaged in domestic service and attendance' and 'Engaged in undefined industrial pursuits' respectively, since the numbers in these categories match estimated numbers in these occupations based on previous years.
6. In general the use of 'Engaged in...', 'Working in...', 'Dealing in...' as general categories for 1916 makes clear analysis of occupation impossible.
7. In 1916 'Engaged in disposal of dead or of refuse' is included under 'General labourer' which is unsatisfactory.
8. Since there is no separate category of 'students', 'children' or 'wives' one can only assume that all three categories have been included under 'Dependent on natural guardians' since it is unlikely they disappeared after 1911. This category appears under (18) for 1916.

APPENDIX XXIII

SAMPLE OF POPULATION RECORDED BY ALEXANDER DON BY
TOWN, OCCUPATION AND COUNTY OF ORIGIN, 1909-1913

Town	Occupation	Name	Number of Partners	County of Origin
Nelson	Gardens: (1)		8 men	Poon Yu and Fa Yuen
	(2)		5 men	Poon Yu
	Fruit Shop		3 partners	Onwer Jung Sing Partners - Poon Yu
	Laundry	Wing Lee	1 man	Toy San
		Tin Lee	3 men	Toy San
Otaki	Gardens		7 men	Poon Yu
			1 man	Poon Yu
		Oh Loh's	1 man	Poon Yu
		Te Horo	2 men	Poon Yu
		Bridge	2 men	Poon Yu
		River Flat	4 men	Poon Yu
		On Tie		Jung Sing
	Fruit Shop			Poon Yu
	Fancy Goods Shop			Poon Yu
Fielding	Fruit shop	Hop Lee	family	Jung Sing
	Gardens: (1)	Wong You		Jung Sing
		Ah Chung		Jung Sing
				Jung Sing
				Jung Sing
	Laundry			Poon Yu

Wanganui	Gardens:	(1)	Long Acre	14 men	Poon Yu
		(2)		11 men	Poon Yu
		(3)		3 men	Poon Yu
		(4)		5 men	Poon Yu
	Fruit shops	(1)			Poon Yu
		(2)			Jung Sing
		(3)			Jung Sing
	Laundry	(1) (plus cookshop)		2 men	Poon Yu
		(2)		1 man	Poon Yu
		(3)		1 man	Poon Yu
		(4)		1 man	Sun Wui
	Hotel Cooks			2 men	Sun On
Palmerston North ^a	Gardens:	(1)		8 men	Poon Yu
		(2)		6 men	Poon Yu
		(3)		1 man	Poon Yu
	Fruit Shops	(1)	Wong Hop	2 men	Jung Sing
		(2)	Kew Kong	1 man	Jung Sing
		(3)		1 man	Jung Sing
		(4)		1 man	Jung Sing
	Laundry	(1)	Wing Lee	1 man	Toy San
		(2)	Sun Lee	2 men	
		(3)		2 men	Poon Yu
		(4)	Chung Lee	1 man	Poon Yu
		(5)	Wah Lee	1 man	Poon Yu
		(6)	Joe Lee	1 man	Poon Yu
Foxton	Gardens:	(1)		6 men	Jung Sing and Poon Yu
	Laundry			1 man	Poon Yu
	Fruit Shop			4 brothers	Jung Sing

Auckland	Gardens:	(1)	Poon Yu
		(2)	Poon Yu
		(3)	Jung Sing
		(4)	Toy San
		(5)	Jung Sing
	Fruit Shops	(1)	Jung Sing
		(2)	Poon Yu
		(3)	Jung Sing
		(4)	Toy San

a) Palmerston North was unusual in that a large proportion of the population were of a single surname 'Joe' and came from the same village in Poon Yu. In 1913 at least 23 of the 28 people recorded were in this category.

Note: Spaces indicate missing data.

Source: Alexander Don's Diary, 1909-1913:74-89.

APPENDIX XXIV

NOTICE AGAINST THE KO TONG HOSPITAL ISSUED AND CIRCULATED
BY THE PEOPLE OF PONG WU SHORTLY AFTER ITS OPENING IN 1909

It has been generally recognised for a long time that foreigners should learn the customs and taboos of a new place to which they go.

Recently, however, we discovered that a western doctor infringed local customs by establishing a special hospital in the public area of Ko Tong. The hospital caters only for women, excluding men, and young women rather than old. Moreover it employs young Chinese women who live at the hospital. The doctor seduced and incited women and such animal behaviour is not to be tolerated.

We have already set a trap to catch the pig. With pseudo charity this doctor has reduced our women to ignorance. Consequently this has destroyed our family relationships as well as our customs and Chinese heritage. Didn't you see what the Russians have done to the Jews, European Americans to Red Indians, British upon Indians, Japanese upon Taiwanese? Such behaviour destroys our customs our race and brings disaster upon our innocent women. So long as we are still human beings we cannot but help feel anger and hate especially taking into consideration the emphasis our dynasty has placed on the 'five human relationships'.

Now this doctor has broken the taboos. Moreover in the name of medicine he in fact preached religion clandestinely. By using honeyed words he induced young women to go astray and this has resulted in conflict and internal strife for the family concerned.

Ko Tong is a strategic place. If we do not design a method to prevent such happenings as soon as possible, we will be trapped. In view of this we cannot tolerate this development. Hence we unite our people here to start a public committee in the hope that there will be no more shameful incidents which might lead to the destruction of our customs and the extinction of our race.

After public discussion, all people in Ko Tong were informed that after the 15th day of August this year no people, young or old, men or women should enter the hospital for treatment or to buy medicine. No women will be allowed to go into the hospital, give the doctor money or work there.

Appendix XXIV (Continued)

This is a matter of public concern which was discussed publicly. A committee 'Pi Chien Yi Hui' will take charge of this matter. Anyone who breaks these rules will be fined \$150 regardless of whether they be men or women. The case will also be referred to the Court. The penalty however, will be the matter for the local area (Ko Tong). Regarding the fine, one hundred dollars will go to the Pi Chien Yi Hui for confiscation: the other fifty will go for those investigators who will distribute the money on an average basis.

The regulation will certainly be enforced and no excuse will be accepted. All our people should inform each other lest anyone should allege they have not been informed.

Source: McNeur Collection, Hocken Library (translated from Chinese)

APPENDIX XXV

OBJECTS OF THE SEYIP ASSOCIATION OF NEW ZEALAND
AS STATED IN THE 1947 CONSTITUTION

OBJECTS:

2. The objects of the Association are:-

- a) To foster, promote and encourage friendship, cooperation and understanding between the Chinese people and the people of New Zealand.
- b) To alleviate the necessity of aged, infirm and indigent members of the Chinese community.
- c) To contribute as opportunity affords to all deserving charities, which in any way minister to the needs of the community as a whole, both Chinese and New Zealand.

OBJECTS OF THE SEYIP ASSOCIATION OF NEW ZEALAND
AS STATED IN THE 1949 CONSTITUTION

2. OBJECTS:

The objects of the Association are as follows:

1. To provide for Chinese residents in New Zealand the means of mutual helpfulness, social intercourse, and rational recreation, and to promote the intellectual, moral and physical well-being of the Chinese in New Zealand and to unite and cooperate for patriotic cultural and educational progress and to deal with all matters concerning the welfare of Chinese.
2. To establish schools and classes and to make provision for public lectures, addresses and debates for the education and entertainment of Chinese.
3. To provide halls and meeting places, clubs, buildings and premises where members can meet for any of the purposes of the Association.

4. To purchase take on lease exchange or hold any real or personal property whatsoever or any easements therein or thereon requisite for any of the objects of the Association or which may in any way be used conveniently in connexion with any such objects and to sell lease exchange or otherwise dispose of any real or personal property and to grant any easements or rights therein or thereover.
5. To provide funds for objects of the Association or any of them and for that purpose to borrow or raise money and to give security in any manner over the whole or any part of the real or personal property of the Association.
6. To make application for leave to bring any Chinese student or other person into New Zealand and to go bond for any Chinese Student or person and to execute any bond or other deed or document required by His Majesty the King or the Government of New Zealand with respect to the entry of any Chinese Student or person into New Zealand and for such purpose to pledge the assets of the Association or any part or parts thereof unto His Majesty The King or the Government of the Dominion of New Zealand and to do all things which the Association may consider necessary or desirable in connexion therewith or in anywise relating thereto.
7. To accept from any person or persons any bond mortgage or other security with respect to any Chinese Student or person whether by way of security for any bond given to His Majesty the King or otherwise howsoever and to receive or recover from any person or persons any moneys owing or payable in respect of any bond mortgage or other security and to take such steps for the recovery of such moneys as the Association may in its discretion think fit.
8. To do all such other acts and things as are incidental or conducive to the above objects or any of them.
9. To form branches of the Association in such places in New Zealand as the Executive Committee shall from time to time determine.

Source: Informant.

APPENDIX XXVI

CONSTITUTION OF THE NEW ZEALAND TUNG
JUNG ASSOCIATION, 1926

PRINCIPLES

1. The principles of the association are cooperation, goodwill: to help one another, to help in any difficult matters where there is no harm for the good of the community.

AIMS

1. There is no annual subscription but members should pay £1 or more.
2.
 - a) Any member who leaves for China must pay a commission to the Association for the booking of the passage.
 - b) If the person fails to do this they will forfeit the privileges of the Association.
 - c) If the Tung Jung Association however, is not guarantor for the passage booking then the above clauses do not apply.
3. Any person going to China or returning can stay at the Association for up to two weeks. This may be extended on application to the committee. A committee member is exempt from the above clause.
4. Any member may be expelled.
5. Any elderly, disabled or crippled member who wishes to return to China, may ask the association to raise funds for the purpose.
 - a) Or, if any member dies and has no money for a funeral, the Association will raise funds.
6.
 - a) Monthly meetings of the committee may be called for any emergencies.
 - b) Any member who either leaves or returns may be officially welcomed or sent off.
7. Treasurers work: ordinary receipts and payments.
 - a) Any special items will have to be passed by Committee.
 - b) Accounts must be presented half-yearly.

Appendix XXVI (Continued)

8. a) Any member may be nominated for the committee.
 b) Annual elections will be held in May.
 c) Committee members will serve for one year.
 d) Every member must take an oath to be loyal to the Association.
 e) No committee member may resign.
 9. Committee should consist of: 1 president
 2 wardens
 1-4 secretaries
 1-2 treasurers
 Other members can be called to help the committee.
 10. Any member who returns to China and wishes to donate money to the Association will have his name entered in the Association.
 11. Any member of the committee serves on a voluntary basis.
 12. Any money remaining must be banked to receive interest for the benefit of the Association.
 13. The committee reserves the right to improve or change any of its aims.
- Note: Any one who wishes to return to China may inquire from any committee member or write direct to the Association.

APPENDIX XXVII

OCCUPATIONS OF ALL CHINESE IN NEW ZEALAND FOR
1921, 1926 and 1936

	Census* 1921	Census* 1926	Census 1936
Market gardening	1,252	1,144	914
Other agricultural, etc.	82	50	26
Gold mining	59	22	18
Sale of groceries	21	24	16
General storekeeping	57	26	8
Sale of vegetables and fruit	621	627	672
Sales, other goods	49	80	42
Private domestic service	35	26	14
Hotel and boardinghouse staff	101	56	15
Restaurants etc.	17	11	10
Laundries, dry cleaning	373	356	210
Others	183	669	203
Dependent on natural guardians	416	669	739
TOTAL	3,266	3,374	2,887

*Includes temporary residents

Source: Census, 1936, Vol. 9:p.v.

APPENDIX XXVIII

THE PETITION OF A CHINESE MERCHANT CONCERNING
A DISPUTE WITH THE CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT, 1932

TO THE HONOURABLE THE SPEAKER AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
 REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DOMINION OF NEW ZEALAND IN
 PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLED...

THE PETITION OF WAH LEE ...

Of the City of Auckland, Chinese Merchants...

Humbly sheweth:-

1. That your Petitioners are a firm of Chinese Merchants who have been established in Auckland for the past thirty years.
2. That your Petitioners import into New Zealand from China each year a considerable amount of merchandise and other articles mostly food stuffs.
3. That prior to July 1927 the Collector of Customs at Auckland before assessing the customs duty on your Petitioners' importations in every case demanded duty on double the cost of each article as disclosed in the invoices.
4. That the duty so assessed was paid by your Petitioners in ignorance of their legal rights.
5. That representations were made to the Customs Department in July 1927 pointing out that the system adopted was inequitable and wrong and that the practice was not adopted in the case of importations by other Chinese merchants in the City of Auckland, nor as your Petitioners believe in the case of any other Chinese merchant in New Zealand.
6. That immediately your Petitioners made representations to the Collector of Customs, Auckland, in 1927 for refund of duty for three years, the Customs Department instructed one of their Officers to compare your Petitioners' goods with like goods of their competitors, and it was found in most instances that your Petitioners' invoice values exceeded those of their competitors who were paying duty on invoice values only.

Appendix XXVIII (Continued)

7. That following on such representations to the Department instructions were immediately issued to discontinue the practice as the Department recognised the justification of your Petitioners' complaint.
8. That in consequence of the arbitrary assessments made by the Customs Officials your Petitioners have suffered very serious financial loss and have in fact paid double the correct amount of customs duty chargeable for the approximate period from 1912 to 1927.
9. That as a result of the arbitrary assessment of the Customs Department aforesaid your Petitioners have paid thousands of pounds in excess duty.
10. That the Comptroller of Customs recognised that your Petitioners have been overcharged and authorised a refund to your Petitioners of the duty overpaid for the period commencing on the 26th July 1926 and ending on the 26th July 1927.
11. That your Petitioners contend that they were entitled to a refund for duty overpaid for fifteen years but under the provisions of The Customs Act 1913 your Petitioners were debarred from making a claim for any period greater than three years.
12. That from July 1927 to October 1929 continuous representations were made and negotiations entered into with a view to the recovery by your Petitioners of all duty overpaid by them for the two years immediately prior to 26th July 1926.
13. That your Petitioners supplied to the Collector of Customs, Auckland, and the Comptroller of Customs, Wellington, all relative information in their possession relating to the duties paid by them prior to July 1927.
14. That the Honourable the Minister of Customs advised your Petitioners that in view of the limitations laid down by the Customs Act 1913, that he was not authorised to make to your Petitioners any refund for the period in question.
15. That your Petitioners are of the opinion that their claim for a refund is just and equitable and is one that would be considered by the Department but for the statutory restrictions imposed by The Customs Act 1913.
16. That your Petitioners presented a Petition to This Honourable House in November 1929 Praying for a refund of duty for the two years period mentioned herein.
17. That your Petitioners are advised that on the hearing of such Petition the Comptroller of Customs informed this Honourable House that his Department considered that they were entitled to double the invoice value of your Petitioners' imports and assess duty accordingly.

Appendix XVIII (Continued)

18. That since 1929 your Petitioners have refrained from presenting their claim for a refund in the hope that some steps would be taken by the Customs Department to remedy what your Petitioners consider an obvious injustice.

WHEREFORE your Petitioners humbly pray This Honourable House will recommend that the customs duty overpaid by them for the two years immediately prior to July 1926 be refunded to them.

AND your Petitioners will ever humbly pray

Dated this Fourth day of October 1932

SIGNED by WAH LEE ...

Per: Arthur Ming Watt

APPENDIX XXIX

CHINESE RESPONSE TO THE PETITION OF C.R. LLOYD AND 1456
OTHERS REQUIRING THE REPATRIATION OF ALL ASIATICS

The petition is calculated to inflame the minds of New Zealand nationals against the Chinese resident within its shores, and is calculated to insult not only the dignity of the Chinese nationals but the country from which they have sprung. It is a matter well recognised by the International Code that one nation bears an obligation to another to see that its nationals residing within its shores are not subjected to humiliation, and that indirectly the nation itself is not insulted. But it is in the opinion of the signatories to this memorandum that should any effect be given to the petition, which is not only based upon error but is couched in injudicious language, then both the Chinese residing in New Zealand and the great Republic of China itself will be insulted in contravention to the obligation that New Zealand owes toward China under the code subsisting between nations. Such violation of the common decencies which should subsist between nations will inevitably have a repercussion, and such repercussions will be visited necessarily upon British nationals residing within the shores of the Republic of China.

TRADE RELATIONS

It is axiomatic that trade relations should be cultivated between neighbouring nations, and it is to the advantage of New Zealand that trade relations with China should be cultivated and increased. Such a movement is recognised by the merchants and traders in New Zealand, and it ill becomes those thoughtless persons who have subscribed their names to the petition to so antagonise the Chinese nation as to compel it to shut its doors to New Zealand trade. But if these intolerable insults are continued, the dignity of the Chinese nation, and it is a dignity which that nation will insist upon cherishing, will compel it to take such steps as are available to it to ostracise New Zealand traders from commercial intercourse with itself.

It is not necessary here, but the slightest inquiry will reveal, to detail the enormous quantities of raw and made-up goods that China imports every year; indeed, so vast are the requirements that the whole of the meat and wool trade of New Zealand could be absorbed by China.

Appendix XXIX (Continued)

FRAMED IN ERROR

Dealing with some of the other matters mentioned in the petitions, we have said that they are framed in error, and in particular we desire to remark that there are not 6000 Chinese and Indians in New Zealand; indeed, there are not more, according to the records of the New Zealand Official Year Book, than 2854 Chinese and 1166 Indians. It is equally false, as the petitions aver, that the Chinese send an average of £100 out of this country to their relatives in China. The average is a great deal less than 50 per cent of this amount and the petitioners entirely ignore the fact that this is not necessarily a loss to New Zealand. It will be probably conceded, for it is the truth, that what money is sent to China is sent for the maintenance of the families and relations of those Chinese residing in New Zealand. If the New Zealand Government allowed the wives and families of these Chinese to come to New Zealand none of this money would leave these shores. It is as well to record the fact that a great many of the Chinese in New Zealand are unable to send any money out of New Zealand.

The petitioners also allege that the Chinese in New Zealand are from the lower classes in China. It is regrettable that such a false statement should have been so recklessly made. The Chinese in New Zealand are drawn from the professional, agricultural, industrial and the merchant classes, and to describe these people as anything but highly respectable is false and insulting, and this charge is most deeply resented by us all. To describe any of the New Zealand nationals who are drawn from these particular classes as from the lower classes would, we anticipate, be strongly resented by those persons.

To describe the living conditions of the Chinese in New Zealand as insanitary is mendacious. It is true that they do not live sumptuously and in large houses, but the Chinese culture has always regarded industry, thrift, and cleanliness as most important, and a comparison of the mode of living of the Chinese with New Zealand nationals carrying on similar work would, we are satisfied, reflect to the credit of the Chinese.

It is to be remembered that since 1896 the New Zealand government has compelled the payment of a poll tax of £100 by every Chinese national on his or her entry into New Zealand. This payment surely carried with it an assurance that the Government on its part would leave those Chinese in peace and to enjoy the full rights of citizenship so long as they respected the law of the land.

Appendix XXIX (Continued)

GROSSLY LIBELLOUS

An allegation is likewise made in the petition that the Chinese in New Zealand are immoral. This is grossly libellous. The immorality that is now and then referred to in the newspapers is almost invariably referable to the importunities of some immoral females who beset the Chinese in their shops and abodes, and we are satisfied a reference to the Commissioner of Police would nail this lie to the mast.

It is not necessary for us to review in greater detail the grounds on which we resent and oppose the petition. We desire, however, that publicity should be given to the other side of the case as was given to the petition when it was presented to Parliament. We trust that this will be the last time when the nationals of the country to which we are proud to belong will be insulted, and that for the future the happy relations which have hitherto subsisted between the nationals of both great countries who have taken the trouble to understand each other and the nations themselves will subsist for years to come. We believe that the great common-sense and kindliness of feeling which is characteristic of all units in a British Commonwealth of Nations will surmount any feelings of resentment which may have been stirred up by the unfortunate petition that has been presented to the House of Parliament in New Zealand.

Source: Evening Post, 7 November, 1932.

Branches of the New Zealand Association

Wellington	惠靈頓支會
Otago-Southland	區他特修特支會
Auckland	奧克蘭支會
Canterbury	堅都布厘支會
Manawatu	面那威吐分會
Wairapa	威靈頓分會
Gisborne	基士頓分會
Hawkes Bay	托士比分會
Hutt Valley	客威利分會
Hamilton	懷哈吐分會
Timaru	泰馬魯分會
Ohakune	區哥尼分會
Wanganui	汪架奴分會
New Plymouth	紐披林麻分會
Foxton	福士頓分會
Horowhenua-Otaki	區他忌分會
Ohau-Manukau	奧亞羅區他忌分會
Hawera	巧威那分會
Levin	李溫分會
Nelson	你路慎分會
Taihape	太希備分會
Rotorua	洛打勞分會
Blenheim	布蘭森分會
Dannevirke	登尼維分會
Wairoa	威靈頓分會
Greymouth	企利茂分會
Oamaru	奧馬魯分會

APPENDIX XXXI

A LETTER TO ALL NEW ZEALAND CHINESE FROM
OTAGO BRANCH OF THE NEW ZEALAND CHINESE ASSOCIATION

Dear Compatriots,

We all remember the day 7th July 1937, when the Japanese imperialists invaded China in an attempt to seize China's territory by wholesale annexation. We also remember the most glorious day in the history of the Otago area's NZ Chinese - 1st of August the same year, when a conference of the representatives of the Chinese was convened. At that conference the representatives filled with patriotism and determination initiated to donate all the possible money to safeguard our motherland, and formulated a long term policy of donations. On the same day about 90 Chinese in Otago area donated approximately 1,000 Pounds and on the next day, thanks to the relief organizers' hardwork, every Chinese in the area covering about 200 miles fulfilled his task of donating.

Three years have passed since the outbreak of the war. During these turbulent years the two hundred Chinese in Otago area have donated over 14,000 Pounds. The amount was not spectacular, yet our efforts have succeeded in mobilizing the whole Chinese community in New Zealand. According to the report of the 5th Congress of the General Association the NZ Chinese all have New Zealand have contributed £100,000 to the Chinese government during the past three years. We sincerely hope that all of us continue to raise high our patriotic and generous spirit to make more contributions in donation.

The following is a brief account of the financial situation.

According to Mr. T.S. Young, who has been elected one of the four finance executives, last year \$19,056.9.6 were sent to China by the General Association. \$2,580.18.7 are still in hand. The New Zealand government grants three thousand foreign exchange per month, namely \$36,000 a year.

On receiving the money the Bank of China issues a receipt and a duplicate draft. These together with the cheque stub from the General Association fully festifies to the fact that the money is sent to the Chinese government. Apart from that, every year representatives are elected to check the books. What is more, receipts are issued by

Appendix XXXI (Continued)

both the General Assembly and the Chinese government on receiving the donations. Under such stringent scrutiny no embezzling is possible. We hope that now some of our fellow countrymen gain a clearer understanding of the situation and adopt a better attitude towards the relief work. We hope that they not only hand in the money in arrears but also donate the money in advance. We hope all our compatriots will scrape every possible to help our motherland win the final victory.

Gisborne Branch was commended at the 5th Congress for its outstanding achievements in fulfilling the relief work. We should learn from them. We should carry on the enthusiasm and patriotic spirit displayed when we first initiated the donation in August 1937.

In order to do the relief work more efficiently 16 people divided into six groups will be responsible to collect the money to long term donation.

A resolution was passed at the 4th Congress on the decision of publishing a pamphlet listing the figures of the money each branch donated, either sent to the General Assembly or remitted directly to the Chinese Government. The work has been delayed because of the lack of cooperation from some branches. At the 5th Congress it was decided that every branch should hand in the data of its donation within eight weeks. It is hoped that the pamphlet will be available this year.

APPENDIX XXXII

NOTICE FROM THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN WELLINGTON WITH
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE 'STANDARD DONATION PAYMENT METHOD'

We received the letter from the Ministry of Finance that the National Government has stipulated a standard donation payment method on 12 July. The following is the detail of this method and it is hoped that all overseas Chinese would take note of this.

Standard Donation Payment Method National Government 12 July 1939

1. This regulation is applicable to donations from local and overseas Chinese for all items such as national salvation donations, monthly donations, charity donations cumulative donations, donations for pullovers and raincoats, donations for aircraft one dollar debt payment donations or other donations which could be converted immediately to cash for use such as jewellery, land titles or shares etc.
2. All donations from local and overseas Chinese should be sent to the Ministry of Finance which will keep the accounts according to different items of donation for appropriation.
3. The public or private organization in the local country (New Zealand) should send the Administrative Council details on their associations including the use of donations, and the way they are collected. They are not allowed to collect donations if they do otherwise.
4. The Ministry of Finance has delegated the responsibility of collecting all donations to the Four Central China Communication and Peasants Banks and these Banks in turn may delegate other banks to do the same. The payment procedure is as follows:
 - a) For the overseas donations, the overseas association or overseas Chinese must keep details on donor's name, address and donation amount. The money will be sent via the Bank of China, in Hong Kong to the Ministry of Finance which will keep an account in accordance with the different items of the donation. Also the Bank of China in Hong Kong will, according to the method of assignment, issue receipts for different items of donation to the donor or association. For certain other donations the Kueyang Int. Red Cross Association will issue special receipts.

Appendix XXXII (Continued)

- b) For the local donations, the donors of the association should write the donor's names, address and amount of donation clearly and send to any of the Central Communication and Peasants Banks with the donation. The banks will then transfer the money to Chungking (Ministry of Finance) where they will keep records in accordance with different items of donation from donors and associations.
 - c) The Bank of China in Hong Kong and Central Communication and Peasant's Banks in every place should draft reports in accordance with different categories of donation respectively.
 - d) The Administrative Council will order the Ministry of Finance, which received donations from overseas and local areas, to compile financial reports in accordance with different categories of donations.
 - e) This money which passed through the assigned banks should be approved by the Administrative Council.
5. If the donation was not stated for a special purpose or for a specific organisation by the donor, it will go the Ministry of Finance which keeps it as national finance.
 6. For those donations which were stated specifically for special purposes or assigned to an organization, the Ministry of Finance will collect the money. At the end of each month, the ministry will settle the account by transferring the total amount to each organization assigned. However, the recipient organization should forward another letter to the donor to confirm the payment and also to inform the donor in detail about the practical uses of the money.
 7. If the donor pays the donation directly to the organization (recipient) or public/private association, the the organization or association concerned should always keep the record on the donor's name, the donation item, amount of donation. The detailed record should be sent to the Ministry of Finance so that it can audit the account.
 8. This donation regulation is enforced when it is declared...

Source: Chinese Weekly News, 12 September 1939.

APPENDIX XXXIII

CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE NEW ZEALAND CHINESE TO SUPPORT THE WAR EFFORT IN CHINA: 1937-1944 (IN POUNDS STERLING)

	Charity Donations	National Salvation Donations	New Year Donations	Double Seventh Donations	Double Tenth Donations	Sept. 26 Donations	Marriage Donations	Kwangtung Aircraft Donations	Donations for Kwangtung Victims	Donations for Chung Wah First Aid Brigade	Donations for Cotton Clothes	National Salvation Bond	Donation for Relief of Victims	Donations for War Casualties	Donations for Victim Children	Donations for Relief Box	Donations for Relief Charity Donations	Red Cross Ass. Dons.	Donations for Selling Coupons	Donations for Cultural Entertainment for Army	Honan Province Disaster Donations	Kwangtung Province Foods Shortage Donations	Total	
WELLINGTON	2127	30316	320	2390	1662	152	60			234	381	414	21	651		560	81	3	18	119	112	275	39896	
AUCKLAND		19522								310		706				991			20		207	579	22335	
OTAGO-STHLAND	400	24899	375	854	531	216		563		53	231	420	41	13	209	231	67	30	20	146	168	174	29641	
CANTERBURY		10214	191	483	529	39				168	100	520			95	351			8	242	87	158	13185	
MANAWATU	255	8947	46	198	140					36	47	65	3	165		125	13		5	84	34	61	10224	
WAIKARAPAPA	349	6649		224	45						46	160							5			91	7569	
GISBORNE	203	5451	156	173	367						101			109		196	33		4	52	57	147	7049	
HAWKES BAY	100	5707		58	71					64	93					119					86	141	6439	
HUTT VALLEY		4200	73	275	183											72				40	37	37	4917	
HAMILTON	5	4062	132	229								30	2			116			2	36	17	77	4708	
TIMARU		2964	20	51	63	71				48	43					138			2			20	3420	
OHAKUNE		385	33	303	68						57								3				849	
WANGANUI	197	2672		146	35						1	75			2				1	15		32	3176	
GREYMOUTH	50	1924	88	20	32			1		4		648			1			2	4	3	20	37	2834	
WAIROA	48	1562	30	64	43						13	17				12			1	7	33	24	1854	
NEW PLYMOUTH	10	1576	11	103	43						12								1		30	34	1820	
FOXTON		1545		9	70														1			22	1647	
HORO-OTAKI	73	2835		61	42		10	2				54								46			3123	
OHAI-MANAKAU	76	1406	6									50											1538	
HAWERA	125	1189		47	15						16								8	14		38	1452	
LEVIN	105	1248		6	11						12	30										26	1438	
NELSON	24	1119		40	10	4						37	1	35			1		1			14	1286	
TAIHAPE	24	1003		81	5					12		6				69		1				8	1208	
ROTORUA		839		56	31					9		6			1				1		29	23	995	
BLENHEIM		782		11	5				5			50	36	29			2	35				23	978	
DANNEVIRKE	21	325																					346	
OTHERS		50	24	70	28												29			21			222	
TOTALS	4192	143391	1505	5952	4029	482	70	566	5	938	1153	3288	104	1002	308	2980	225	71	4	104	822	917	2041	174149

Source: NZ China Association Inc., Donations from Branches. 3 August 1937 - 30 July 1944.
Report 3 July 1944, Well.

APPENDIX XXXIV

DISTRICT OF ORIGIN AND NEAREST MARKETS FOR MAJOR
CHINESE MARKET GARDEN AREAS IN NEW ZEALAND

Market Garden Area	District of Origin	Predominant Auctions or Area
Auckland/Mangere	Jung Sing and Poon Yu (70%) ^a Toy San & Sun Wui (30%)	Auckland & Wellington
Pukekohe	As above	As above
Hamilton	Jung Sing (50%), Poon Yu (50%)	Auckland & Hamilton
Gisborne	Seyip (90%), Jung Sing (10%)	Gisborne & Wellington
Hawkes Bay/Napier	Seyip (30%), Poon Yu (50%), Jung Sing (20%)	Wellington
Ohakune	Tung Koon (10%), Jung Sing (30%), Poon Yu (40%), Seyip (20%)	Auckland & Wellington
Manawatu (Fielding and Palmerston North)	Poon Yu (90%), Jung Sing (10%)	Wellington, Palmerston North
Levin	Jung Sing (40%), Poon Yu (40%), Seyip (20%)	Wellington
Otaki	Seyip (40%), Poon Yu (20%), Jung Sing (30%)	Wellington
Wairarapa/Masterton	Seyip (60%), Jung Sing (40%)	Wellington
Oamaru	Seyip (80%), Poon Yu (20%)	Dunedin and Christchurch
Southland	Poon Yu (100%)	Dunedin

^aThe percentages indicate the estimated number from each district who are market gardeners in the area.

APPENDIX XXXV

DISTRIBUTION OF THE NEW ZEALAND CHINESE POPULATION BY SEX AND AGE 1945-1976

	1945(a)				1955(b)				1966(c)				1976(d)	
	Males		Females		Males*		Females**		Males		Females		Males	Females
	FB	MB	FB	MB	FB	MB	FB	MB	FB	MB	FB	MB		
15 and under	666	187	559	184	1055	155	897	131	1589	439	1483	373	2300	2188
16 and under 21	248	21	117	25	341	28	200	34	433	58	292	61	1075	747
21 and under 25	130	9	79	15	293	19	187	23	457	33	314	24	1079	660
25 and under 45	739	35	341	29	664	46	546	44	1435	74	1096	78	2355	1983
45 and under 65	1088	34	148	14	1029	39	543	19	598	30	625	24	847	774
65 upwards	248	9	10	5	330	14	58	12	529	25	204	9	452	457
TOTALS	3119	295	1254	272	3712	301	2431	263	5041	659	4041	569	7576	6809

(a) Census, 1945 Vol. 8:17-18

* 13 unspecified

(b) Census, 1956 Vol. 7:34

** 11 unspecified

(c) Census, 1966 Vol. 7:34

(d) Census, 1976 Vol. 7:10

APPENDIX XXXVI

INCOMES FOR ACTIVELY AND NOT ACTIVELY ENGAGED CHINESE
AGED 15 YEARS AND OVER IN NEW ZEALAND, 1971 AND 1976

1971

Income in \$	Actively Engaged		Not Actively Engaged		TOTAL	
	M	F	M	F	M	F
No Income	17	13	886	1489	903	1502
Under 999	168	279	633	426	801	705
1,000-2,999	1223	1094	207	124	1430	1218
3,000-3,999	569	115	6	2	575	117
4,000-5,999	496	68	6	4	502	72
6,000 and over	256	22	3	4	259	26
Not Specified	310	34	32	19	342	53
TOTAL	3039	1625	1773	2068	4812	3693

Source: Census, 1971, Vol. 7:84

1976

Income in \$	Actively Engaged		Not Actively Engaged		TOTAL	
	M	F	M	F	M	F
No Income	32	38	920	1506	952	1544
Under 1,499	260	243	736	623	996	866
1,500-2,999	254	455	238	150	492	605
3,000-4,999	849	872	51	68	900	940
5,000-6,999	1039	474	14	19	1053	493
7,000-9,999	686	130	2	10	688	144
10,000 and over	486	64	6	6	492	70
Not Specified	319	54	21	16	340	17
TOTAL	3925	2330	1988	2398	5913	4728

Source: Census, 1976, Vol. 7:70.

APPENDIX XXXVII

REPORT ON THE WELLINGTON CHINESE
SPORTS AND CULTURAL CENTRE

"THE COMMITTEE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE WELLINGTON CHINESE
SPORTS AND CULTURAL CENTRE"

Its origin, construction and fund-raising activities.

In 1969 several Chinese Community leaders appealed to the Embassy of the Republic of China to arrange the assignment of a Chinese language teacher in Wellington so as to keep up the cultural bridge between the community and the home country.

In April 1970 the Overseas Commission sent Miss Pearl Szetu to Wellington with her monthly allowance and travelling expenses fully paid asking the committee and school organisers to arrange for her accommodation. A Cultural Renaissance committee was formed and responsible officers were elected to organise a Wellington Chinese Language School. Directors were named and the purchase or constructions of school premises began.

Also in Wellington is the Eastern Chinese Sports Club organised many many years ago and supported by most of the younger member of the community. The club fields as many as fourteen men and women basketball teams at open tournaments and is also active in the field of football, rugby and other sports and athletic activities. However, the club has been using borrowed facilities since the limited size of the Chinese community in Wellington prevented it from building its own stadium.

Meanwhile the Chinese Mu Shut Society has also been operating on borrowed sites, with enthusiastic members from among both Chinese and European communities engaged in the practice of the Chinese Kungsu as well as Oriental Karate and Judo. Needless to say, the community often hires halls for largescale gatherings both public and private.

All in all, a centre for sports and cultural activities was urgently required.

However, in order to build the required facilities the cost of land would be between \$1-200,000 let alone the construction cost and the internal furnishing; Add to this the cost of ground preparation, roads and parking facilities, the size of the Wellington community could hardly raise the entire amount required.

The Embassy was advised that the Wellington City Council had hitherto offered the Eastern Chinese Sports Club a piece of land for the construction of its club facilities. The land had to be returned since Eastern at that time did not think they could raise the amount required. Now that the community sees the necessity of pooling their requirements and therefore combined efforts perhaps the Council could be approached again for the use of Council land.

His Worship the Mayor was approached at first. He immediately indicated a very favourable reaction, so a delegation of seven community members called on the Mayor, who indicated in principle:

1. The Council could provide public land for the construction of such facilities under a lease;
2. The Council will prepare the ground for such construction, and
3. The Council may guarantee half the payment of the loan up to half the total of the construction cost.

With this amount of encouraging support community leaders called a meeting in September and again in October 1971. Beginning with nine and then ten small community organisations supporting this centre a committee for the construction of the Wellington Chinese Sports and Cultural Centre was organised, byelaws were drafted and passed and officers nominated and elected. By this time, the chairman of this committee is Mr. Jimmy Louey, the Vice-Chairman Dr R.T.S. Law, secretary Mr. Victor Wu and Treasurer Mr Harvey Wu. C.J. Tse & Associates including Mr. B. Wong and Brian Young formed the construction sub-committee which launched into designing and drawing for the new centre.

When the Chinese Language School was being organised, community leaders began to pledge amounts of donations for the purchase and construction of school premises. Such pledge amounted to as much as \$1,000 and smaller ones \$200. The organisers deferred the collection of such fund pending the acquisition of a suitable site. In the meantime Chinese film shows, the auction of Chinese water colour paintings and other activities had taken place to raise funds for this purpose. Objects of Chinese art and handicraft have also been donated and brought in for a largescale bazaar scheduled for early 1973. The Taiwan Fertilizer Co. donated \$US5,000 towards community welfare and the Eddie Steamship Company has also pledged longterm support directly and indirectly for similar purposes. An appeal was made to the New Zealand Lottery Board - the former president of which pledged in principle a large grant close to one-quarter of the total construction cost. This appeal will be renewed now that a new government has been ushered in.

The Wellington City Council is expected to review and pass a request for the use of land at Mt. Albert Park for the construction of this centre in the first week of December 1972. Thereafter the construction sub-committee will launch into detailed drawings so that contractors may estimate in detail the total cost and work schedule.

The centre will belong to no one, no particular splinter group, and will be the property of the whole community. Everybody can use it and all who participate may take part in its administration.

We wish to express our admiration and respect to all those who initiated, organised, pledged or donated money and contributed with hard work and warm support to such a purposeful movement. Let us wish the centre speedy construction and completion and total success.

APPENDIX XXXVIII

A LETTER TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE
TUNG JUNG ASSOCIATION

The reputation of the whole Chinese community in Wellington and all the Chinese organizations in the capital are at stake. We feel that we can no longer remain silent.

1. The "Sports Centre" has no right whatsoever to claim to be the representative of the Wellington Chinese, because not all the Chinese in Wellington are members of the "Sports Centre". In fact, even if all Wellington Chinese were members, it would have no warrant of representation. The grounds are:
 - A. The "Sports Centre" is merely a sports body. How can we allow such an organization to be our representative?
 - B. Participation and representation are two separate issues, e.g. members of the United Nations are at the same time members of the Olympic Games, but neither may have the right to speak on behalf of any member country - the reason is very obvious.
 - C. Participants of the "Sports Centre" include Europeans; therefore it is not purely a Chinese organization. What is more, it receives a government subsidy at the expense of the organization's independence.
2. The "Sports Centre" has no right to represent all the Chinese organizations nor even those organizations which affiliated to "the Centre".
 - A. Some Chinese organizations take part in the activities conducted by "The Sports Centre", because they merely wanted to assist the construction of the "Centre". This in no way implies that they confer their willingness to be represented by the "Centre".
 - B. There are more than nine organizations in Wellington. Some of these nine organizations have already withdrawn from the "Centre". More will follow suit. The so-called representative for the whole Chinese community is nothing but a fanciful expression.

Appendix XXXVIII (Continued)

3. The "Centre" is only a newcomer to the Chinese Society. There is no fact nor any sign to substantiate its desire to serve the Chinese people in the capital. One very important point has drawn our attention - the "Centre" is completely void of Chinese culture. May we ask, on what merit is the "Centre" to claim the representation right of the Chinese? It is highly dangerous and foolish for the overseas Chinese in New Zealand to put blind faith in the "Centre".

The "Centre" has borrowed a large sum of money which is to be repaid in thirty years. If it claims to be the representative of the Chinese community, then has it obtained permission of the whole Chinese community to borrow the money? Does it mean that the debt be borne by the whole Chinese community?

We can summarize what we have said into the following points:
(The "Centre" has no right to claim to be representative of the Chinese people in Wellington.) The reasons are as follows:

1. The "Centre" has made no contribution to the Chinese people.
2. The "Centre" is completely devoid of Chinese culture.
3. The "Centre" shows no respect to other Chinese organizations nor to the Chinese community as a whole.
4. The "Centre" is not designed for the convenience of the Chinese people. Very often the facilities are rented out.
5. We declaim against the huge loans by the "Centre" under the name of "Chinese".
6. We recognize the Chinese Association as the only representative of the Chinese people in New Zealand. We declare that financial involvements of the "Centre" have nothing to do with the whole of the Chinese community nor with any other Chinese organization.

In the interest of our club (Tung Jung), we address this letter to the executive committee. We look forward to positive steps taken in the near future.

Yours faithfully,

A group of Tung Jung members

(translated from the Chinese)

APPENDIX XXXIX

EMPLOYMENT OF CHINESE IN NEW ZEALAND OVER THE AGE OF 15 BY INDUSTRY 1966 AND 1976.

Industry Division and Major Group	1966		1976	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, HUNTING and FISHING	630	224	461	285
Agriculture Services	-	-	2	2
Agriculture and livestock production	627	223	453	282
Forestry and logging	2	1	6	1
Hunting, trapping and game propagation	-	-	-	-
Fishing	1	-	-	-
MINING and QUARRYING	7	-	3	-
Coal mining	5	-	-	-
Stone quarrying, clay and sand pits	2	-	-	-
MANUFACTURING	423	195	625	382
Food manufacturing industries except beverage industries	81	21	99	44
Beverage industries	1	-	12	1
Tobacco manufactures	1	2	1	3
Manufacture of textiles	26	31	44	52
Manufacture of footwear, other wearing apparel and made-up textile goods	19	94	24	139
Manufacture of wood and cork, except manufacture of furniture	8	1	8	1
Manufacture of furniture and fixtures	13	1	16	4
Manufacture of paper and paper products	4	4	23	8
Printing, publishing and allied industries	36	3	45	22
Manufacture of leather and leather products except footwear	1	3	-	6
Manufacture of rubber products	6	1	7	2
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products	9	10	37	16
Manufacture of products of petroleum and coal	-	-	-	2
Manufacture of plastic products	-	-	14	10
Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products, except products of petroleum and coal	8	-	20	3
Basic metal industries	4	-	18	1
Manufacture of metal products (except machinery and transport equipment)	25	2	-	-
Manufacture of fabricated metal products	-	-	45	6
Manufacture of machinery (except electrical machinery)	31	4	84	15
Manufacture of electrical machinery, apparatus, appliances and supplies	35	4	58	26
Manufacture of transport equipment	100	7	58	11
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries	15	7	12	10
CONSTRUCTION	63	4	30	-
ELECTRICITY, GAS, WATER and SANITARY SERVICES	17	1	32	5
Electricity, gas and steam	15	-	32	5
Water and sanitary services	2	1	-	-
COMMERCE	969	524	1204	881
Wholesale and retail trade	958	499	733	509
Restaurants and hotels	-	-	377	276
Banks and other financial institutions	6	12	30	51
Insurance	2	12	49	37
Real estate	3	1	15	8
TRANSPORT, STORAGE and COMMUNICATION	255	34	666	204
Transport	236	9	437	54
Storage and warehousing	1	-	-	-
Communication	18	25	49	48
Business Services	-	-	178	100
Machinery and Equipment rental and leasing	-	-	2	2
SERVICES	375	283	603	447
Government Services	37	14	210	93
Community and business services	151	151	295	301
Recreation services	7	8	15	14
Personal services	180	110	59	33
International and other extra-traditional bodies	-	-	24	6
ACTIVITIES not ADEQUATELY DESCRIBED	9	9	78	45
Totals actively engaged	2,748	1,274	3,925	2,330
Not actively engaged	2,786	3,174	1,988	2,398
GRAND TOTALS	5,534	4,448	5,913	4,728

Source: Census, 1966, Vol. 7:40, and 1976, Vol. 7:63-66.

G L O S S A R YDistricts and Counties: and other Localities:

<u>Sam Yap</u>	三邑
Poon Yu	番禺
San Dak	順德
Nam Hoy	南海
<u>Sey Yip</u>	四邑
Toy San	台山
Yun Ping	恩平
Hoy Ping	開平
San Wui	新會
<u>Tshang Sheng</u> (Jung Sing)	增城
Fa Yuen	花縣
Tung Goon	東莞
Kwangtung	廣東省
Peking (Beijing)	北京
New Zealand	新西蘭 或 紐西蘭
Shansi	陝西

Associations

Tung Jung Association

東增會館

Poon Fa Association

番花會館

Ch'eung Shin Tong

昌善堂

Cherishing Virtue Union

同盟會

Koumintang (KMT)

國民黨

New Zealand Chinese Association

新西蘭華僑聯合總會

Auckland Chinese Hall Inc.

屋崙華僑會所

Chinese Progress Club

中國前進俱樂部

National Salvation Movement

救國公約

Chinese Club (Auckland)

屋崙(中國)華僑俱樂部

Kwong Chew Club

崗州會館

Seyip Association

四邑會館

Anti-Communist League

反共同盟

Eastern Sports Club

東方體育社

Anglican Chinese Centre

華人聖公會

Wellington Chinese Sports and Culture Centre

惠灵頓體育文化中心

Chinese Anglican Church

中華聖公會禮拜堂

Chinese Baptist Church

中華浸信會禮拜堂

Mui Shuit Club

武林社

Dominion Federation of New Zealand Chinese Commercial Growers (Inc.).

華人種植總會

Publications

Mung Sing Bow

Mung Kwok Bow

Chinese Weekly News

Q-Sing Times

Central Daily News (Taiwan)

New Zealand Chinese Growers'
Monthly Journal

Auckland Chinese Hall

民聲報

民國報

中國大事周刊

僑聲刊

中央日報

新西蘭華農月刊

屋崙華人會所(刊物)

Other Terms

Ching Ming

Chi'ing Yeung

Tung-chi

Fou-tei

All Souls Festival

Kite Flying Festival

Dragon Boat Festival

Double Seventh

Double Tenth

New Zealand Chinese Sports Tournament

清明

重陽

冬至

佛誕

清明節

飛鸞節

端午龍船節

七月七日

雙十節

新西蘭華人運動會

Overseas Chinese

華僑

Hakka

客家

Punti

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Kuan-ti

關帝

Hung Shing

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